



Charlotte M. Yonge

CHAPTER III.

Major Haye had nothing to say against the acquaintance formed with General Seymour's nephew.

"Therefore," Mrs. Haye eagerly interposed, "you are the Mr. Lawrence whom we have so often heard of."

A shade had come over Lawrence's brow. He looked vexed—disconcerted.

"I am sorry that I cannot lay claim to the good fortune of a cousin of mine, whom I think your friends must have met."

"Well, it was to Mr. Jack Lawrence that Miss Seymour was engaged," said Mrs. Haye in a tone of conviction.

"No," said Lawrence, rather grimly; "that marriage did not take place."

Lawrence hesitated a little. "Yes," he said, "ultimately, I suppose."

"You met Mrs. Burton in London, didn't you, Anne?" said Mrs. Haye, suddenly turning to her companion.

Lawrence bowed gravely, with some curiosity as to what Miss Carteret would do or say.

"Mr. Lawrence and I remember each other," she said. "He was the gentleman who kindly brought me a glass of water when I turned faint, yesterday."

"Then some of the other passengers joined the group, and presently Mrs. Haye was persuaded by one of them to take a walk up and down the deck."

"You will not take a little walk?" Lawrence said to her.

"No, thank you," said Miss Carteret, not strong enough to walk.

"You will not take a little walk?" Lawrence said to her.

"No, thank you," said Miss Carteret, not strong enough to walk.

"You will not take a little walk?" Lawrence said to her.

"No, thank you," said Miss Carteret, not strong enough to walk.

"You will not take a little walk?" Lawrence said to her.

"No, thank you," said Miss Carteret, not strong enough to walk.

"You will not take a little walk?" Lawrence said to her.

"No, thank you," said Miss Carteret, not strong enough to walk.

"You will not take a little walk?" Lawrence said to her.

"No, thank you," said Miss Carteret, not strong enough to walk.

"You will not take a little walk?" Lawrence said to her.

"No, thank you," said Miss Carteret, not strong enough to walk.

"You will not take a little walk?" Lawrence said to her.

"No, thank you," said Miss Carteret, not strong enough to walk.

"You will not take a little walk?" Lawrence said to her.

"No, thank you," said Miss Carteret, not strong enough to walk.

"You will not take a little walk?" Lawrence said to her.

"No, thank you," said Miss Carteret, not strong enough to walk.

"You will not take a little walk?" Lawrence said to her.

"No, thank you," said Miss Carteret, not strong enough to walk.

"You will not take a little walk?" Lawrence said to her.

"No, thank you," said Miss Carteret, not strong enough to walk.

"You will not take a little walk?" Lawrence said to her.

"No, thank you," said Miss Carteret, not strong enough to walk.

"You will not take a little walk?" Lawrence said to her.

"Will you think of me sometimes?" "I will remember you," she said.

"She turned from him without another word and went down into the cabin. He watched her out of sight, then returned to his former position, leaning his elbows on the railing, and placed his hands on either side of his head."

"In the morning Miss Carteret and Lawrence parted with laughing words upon their lips. Yet when Lawrence's back was turned a little weariness crept into her face."

"How miserable that young man looks!" she said. "And a man in such fortunate circumstances, too—rich, well-born, handsome, free! Some people are never contented in this world!"

"Mrs. Haye's trite moral reflections were always rather lost upon Anne, but the fact which had called them forth on this occasion was not so easily overlooked."

"She had little time for speculation concerning it, she had just distinguished in one of the boats approaching from the shore the figure of her uncle, Mr. Dumaresq, at whose house she was going to stay, and her attention had to be given to him."

"Mr. Dumaresq belonged to a large banking house, and had lived in Egypt for many years. His wife and children often went to England or Switzerland for a few months; but he himself was much absorbed in business affairs, and had now not quitted Egypt for some time."

"Mrs. Dumaresq was the sister of Mrs. Carteret, who had died several years before Anne ever thought of going out to Alexandria. Mr. Carteret also was dead; and since his death Anne had lived in the house of a distant relation, an old admiral, whom she had nursed and tended ever since she was eighteen. His recent death left Anne desolate; and the Dumaresqs wrote to her, inviting her to spend the winter with them."

"Mr. Dumaresq's class of the hand was a comfort to Anne, who had been feeling a little lonely. He thanked the Hayes for their escort, asked them to his house, gave orders about the luggage, and helped Miss Carteret and her friends into the boat."

"Your Aunt Charlotte would have come to meet you, but she was not well enough," he said to her. "She sent her love, and hopes you will accept of it."

"Yes, Anne knew his name. Two figures were pointed out to her on the quay; but they were too distant to be easily recognized. Her luggage had to be delivered to the custom house officers. An hour or more passed before she found herself seated in the carriage which had been provided for her, with Michelle Dumaresq at her side, and Mr. Dumaresq in front. Eastlake opposite. The Hayes were driving in another carriage to a hotel. Michelle was a slight, pretty girl with dark eyes, and Mr. Eastlake was a tall, good-looking, middle-aged man. Just as they passed the English church, at one side of the square, a gentleman in another carriage raised his hat. Anne returned the salutation, and offered a word of explanation to her friends as she did so."

"That is a Mr. Lawrence, who came from Malta with us in the Syria."

"H'm—a very good-looking man," said Mr. Dumaresq. "He knows people here, then. I see he is driving with Mr. Calcott."

"He said he had friends in Alexandria."

"Here the carriage stopped in order that Mr. Eastlake might get out of it. He entered a pile of buildings in a narrow street near the square. Anne understood them to say that he was going to his office. It was in a curiously bewildered state of mind that she presently found herself at an ordinary looking railway station, and seated in an ordinary first-class carriage. Here Mr. Dumaresq bade them good-by; he had no time to go out with them to the village of Ramleh, where his house was situated, three miles from Alexandria. The train steamed out of the station, and moved onward through a new world."

"There were five or six stations at Ramleh, about five minutes' walk from each other. Michelle and Anne got out at one of these stations. A tribe of donkey boys with their steeds rushed at the travelers, but, on Anne's refusal to mount a donkey, Michelle dispersed them with an energetic Arabic sentence or two. Then they walked on to Mr. Dumaresq's house, which was not very far distant, a large white mansion, in a garden, with a broad veranda running almost round it. The garden was gay with flowers; roses bloomed there all the year round; the poinsettia trees were gay with scarlet leaves; the golden green of the ragged banana leaves glittered in the sunshine. The babble of children's voices could be heard from an upper window, and Mrs. Dumaresq was ready at the door to take the newcomer into her welcoming arms."

"CHAPTER V. Anne's boxes had to be unpacked. Mrs. Dumaresq was astonished and rather vexed at the smallness and perhaps the shabbiness of Anne's wardrobe; and Anne had to own with a smile that when she left England she had been too ill and too worn out with fatigue to trouble herself about her dresses."

"Besides," she said, "I thought I was coming to the desert; not to a place where I should want dinner dresses. I can't go out much; I am in mourning."

"Mourning, nonsense!" said her aunt; "you have been in mourning—how long?"

"Four months."

"And old Admiral Fitzgerald was your relation by marriage?"

"He was like a father to me," said Anne, turning a little pale, and ceasing to smooth out the dresses upon which she had been engaged. "I had lived five years in his house."

"Now, Anne," said Mrs. Dumaresq, "I am going to speak plainly to you. James said I was to talk to you. We are the only people you have to look after your affairs and interests. You were eighteen when your uncle, as you call him, took you home with him after your mother's death, and said you were to be his daughter, and all that sort of thing. Now, weren't you?"

"I was."

"And you are twenty-three now. That is to say, you let him mow you up in a gloomy way in London, where you went out or saw anybody from one week's end to another; and when he became ill you nursed him and tended him like an angel—no, don't interrupt me; I shall say what I like—and were scolded and bullied and suspected all day long until he died last July; and then of course you fell ill from overwork and over-anxiety; and we all said, 'Thank goodness, that part of her life is over!'"

"Aunt Charlotte, I am sure you were not so unfeeling!" said Anne.

"And we also said," continued Aunt Charlotte, regardless of the interruption, "Now she will have her reward. The old Admiral ought to have made her independent for life. And at first we heard that he had left you his whole fortune; and then we were told he had left you nothing; and then you wrote and said you had two hundred a year. So now, your Uncle James and I would like to know what it all means, dear, if you don't mind telling us; because we are your nearest relations, and we do hope that you have got your rights."

"Yes, I got all my rights."

"Do, dear Anne, tell me what happened," said Mrs. Dumaresq, persuasively. "How did he leave his money? He had two thousand a year, I know."

"Anne hesitated for a moment, then looked her aunt steadily in the face said, 'He left his money to me.'"

"Well, what have you done with it?"

"I gave it away," Anne murmured, apologetically.

"Mrs. Dumaresq rose from her chair, and drew herself to her full height. 'Good heavens, Anne,' she said in her most emphatic tones, 'and you wrote and said that part of her life is over!'"

"Anne hesitated for a moment, then looked her aunt steadily in the face said, 'He left his money to me.'"

"Well, what have you done with it?"

"I gave it away," Anne murmured, apologetically.

"Mrs. Dumaresq rose from her chair, and drew herself to her full height. 'Good heavens, Anne,' she said in her most emphatic tones, 'and you wrote and said that part of her life is over!'"

"Anne hesitated for a moment, then looked her aunt steadily in the face said, 'He left his money to me.'"

"Well, what have you done with it?"

"I gave it away," Anne murmured, apologetically.

"Mrs. Dumaresq rose from her chair, and drew herself to her full height. 'Good heavens, Anne,' she said in her most emphatic tones, 'and you wrote and said that part of her life is over!'"

BANKS ARE SQUEEZED.

THEY SUFFER FROM THE LOWERING OF VALUES.

Banks Must Share the Losses Which the Currency Policy They Supported Has Brought to the Business of the Country—Only the Unlucky Profits.

Effect of the Gold Standard.

The recent sealing of the capital stock of the Preston National Bank of this city, says the Detroit Evening News, from \$1,000,000 down to \$700,000, furnishes a valuable object lesson in the effect of the gold standard upon property values. A few years ago, when the bank was organized and capitalized at \$1,000,000, that figure honestly represented its value. Its shares sold at par, or very nearly par, and that was the best evidence of its value. It did a large business and its affairs were managed with as much discretion and ability as other banks. Its losses were no greater than inevitably fall to the lot of ordinarily well-managed banks. There is a wide-spread impression among a certain class of people that banking is the one class of enterprise which enjoys immunity from the ordinary uncertainties of business, and that, given fair management and honesty on the part of the directors, there must be a continuous profit in its conduct, whether times are good or bad.

The truth, however, is that the banks are as sensitive, if not more so, to the depressing influences of hard times as any commercial or industrial enterprises whatsoever. They are the largest holders of property of all kinds in the country, although they are nominally not its owners. Their own capital is but a small percentage of the money which they loan. The great bulk of their loans is the money of their depositors. As security for this they receive bonds, stocks and mortgages, covering industrial plants and lands, and in this way more actual property lies in their hands than can be found at times unnumbered in the hands of its nominal owners.

When from any cause these properties depreciate in value, the banker's first duty to his depositors, which is his first duty in law and morals, is to see that the depreciation does not endanger the safety of the funds of which he is the trustee. But depreciation during the last few years, due to the rapid appreciation of the medium in which values are measured, was too enormous and too quick for the most prudent of bankers. It swept along the whole line, and securities that were supposed to cover twice and three times the money loaned upon them were found to be unsalable at the face of the money advanced. Few have any adequate conception of this enormous scaling down of the value of their securities has brought to the managers of the banks. In many cases the depreciation has been so great that securities for the legitimate purposes of banking have become actually worthless—that is to say, they were not salable at all.

The numerous bank failures which followed the election of Mr. McKinley throughout the West were merely symptoms of a general condition which may not yet have reached its worst stages.

We have not waited until this late day to warn the bankers of this country that they must ultimately share the losses which the currency policy they supported had brought to the industry and commerce of the country. Again and again throughout the late campaign the Evening News predicted that the gold standard would ultimately reach the banks in its ruinous influence. Their interests, properly understood, are precisely the same as those of the farmer, the mechanic, the manufacturer and the merchant. All have suffered alike, or will yet suffer, if they have been so fortunate as to escape thus far.

How different would it have been had the country never left the double standard, or, having left it, had returned to it years ago. The greatly increased production of the precious metals with which the world had been blessed would have kept the supply of basic money approximately up to the demands of the increasing necessities of mankind, and the prices of property and products thus sustained would have furnished a continuous incentive in profit to the exertion of human industry. Values would have been kept up, the debtor would have found a market for his holdings and have been able to pay his debts, and the banks to-day would have had a solid foundation in their securities for both their depositors and their capital.

It is true, the purchasing power of money would not have been so great as it is, and the absolutely secured creditor would not get so much property for his claim as he now can, but is not this just what all the banks as well as everybody else—namely, that the claim of the creditor eats up too much of the property of the debtor and while ruining the latter nets a loss also to the former? The private usurious lender of money, who actually contemplates at the time of making the loan the desirable possibility of seizing the collateral at a reduced price and makes all his arrangements to render the transaction profitable, may find interest in this process, but the average bank cannot do so. It is not organized to hold properties of all sorts or to manage them when seized.

Its highest interest, therefore, lies, as do the interests of its depositors and its debtors, in the integrity if not the enhancement of the properties it takes as collateral. In a word, the banker is a debtor even more than he is a creditor. If the bankers of this country were only intelligent and far-sighted enough to understand this simple fact they would not have been almost unan-

BANKS ARE SQUEEZED.

THEY SUFFER FROM THE LOWERING OF VALUES.

Banks Must Share the Losses Which the Currency Policy They Supported Has Brought to the Business of the Country—Only the Unlucky Profits.

Effect of the Gold Standard.

The recent sealing of the capital stock of the Preston National Bank of this city, says the Detroit Evening News, from \$1,000,000 down to \$700,000, furnishes a valuable object lesson in the effect of the gold standard upon property values. A few years ago, when the bank was organized and capitalized at \$1,000,000, that figure honestly represented its value. Its shares sold at par, or very nearly par, and that was the best evidence of its value. It did a large business and its affairs were managed with as much discretion and ability as other banks. Its losses were no greater than inevitably fall to the lot of ordinarily well-managed banks. There is a wide-spread impression among a certain class of people that banking is the one class of enterprise which enjoys immunity from the ordinary uncertainties of business, and that, given fair management and honesty on the part of the directors, there must be a continuous profit in its conduct, whether times are good or bad.

The truth, however, is that the banks are as sensitive, if not more so, to the depressing influences of hard times as any commercial or industrial enterprises whatsoever. They are the largest holders of property of all kinds in the country, although they are nominally not its owners. Their own capital is but a small percentage of the money which they loan. The great bulk of their loans is the money of their depositors. As security for this they receive bonds, stocks and mortgages, covering industrial plants and lands, and in this way more actual property lies in their hands than can be found at times unnumbered in the hands of its nominal owners.

When from any cause these properties depreciate in value, the banker's first duty to his depositors, which is his first duty in law and morals, is to see that the depreciation does not endanger the safety of the funds of which he is the trustee. But depreciation during the last few years, due to the rapid appreciation of the medium in which values are measured, was too enormous and too quick for the most prudent of bankers. It swept along the whole line, and securities that were supposed to cover twice and three times the money loaned upon them were found to be unsalable at the face of the money advanced. Few have any adequate conception of this enormous scaling down of the value of their securities has brought to the managers of the banks. In many cases the depreciation has been so great that securities for the legitimate purposes of banking have become actually worthless—that is to say, they were not salable at all.

The numerous bank failures which followed the election of Mr. McKinley throughout the West were merely symptoms of a general condition which may not yet have reached its worst stages.

We have not waited until this late day to warn the bankers of this country that they must ultimately share the losses which the currency policy they supported had brought to the industry and commerce of the country. Again and again throughout the late campaign the Evening News predicted that the gold standard would ultimately reach the banks in its ruinous influence. Their interests, properly understood, are precisely the same as those of the farmer, the mechanic, the manufacturer and the merchant. All have suffered alike, or will yet suffer, if they have been so fortunate as to escape thus far.

How different would it have been had the country never left the double standard, or, having left it, had returned to it years ago. The greatly increased production of the precious metals with which the world had been blessed would have kept the supply of basic money approximately up to the demands of the increasing necessities of mankind, and the prices of property and products thus sustained would have furnished a continuous incentive in profit to the exertion of human industry. Values would have been kept up, the debtor would have found a market for his holdings and have been able to pay his debts, and the banks to-day would have had a solid foundation in their securities for both their depositors and their capital.

It is true, the purchasing power of money would not have been so great as it is, and the absolutely secured creditor would not get so much property for his claim as he now can, but is not this just what all the banks as well as everybody else—namely, that the claim of the creditor eats up too much of the property of the debtor and while ruining the latter nets a loss also to the former? The private usurious lender of money, who actually contemplates at the time of making the loan the desirable possibility of seizing the collateral at a reduced price and makes all his arrangements to render the transaction profitable, may find interest in this process, but the average bank cannot do so. It is not organized to hold properties of all sorts or to manage them when seized.

Its highest interest, therefore, lies, as do the interests of its depositors and its debtors, in the integrity if not the enhancement of the properties it takes as collateral. In a word, the banker is a debtor even more than he is a creditor. If the bankers of this country were only intelligent and far-sighted enough to understand this simple fact they would not have been almost unan-

BANKS ARE SQUEEZED.

THEY SUFFER FROM THE LOWERING OF VALUES.

Banks Must Share the Losses Which the Currency Policy They Supported Has Brought to the Business of the Country—Only the Unlucky Profits.

Effect of the Gold Standard.

The recent sealing of the capital stock of the Preston National Bank of this city, says the Detroit Evening News, from \$1,000,000 down to \$700,000, furnishes a valuable object lesson in the effect of the gold standard upon property values. A few years ago, when the bank was organized and capitalized at \$1,000,000, that figure honestly represented its value. Its shares sold at par, or very nearly par, and that was the best evidence of its value. It did a large business and its affairs were managed with as much discretion and ability as other banks. Its losses were no greater than inevitably fall to the lot of ordinarily well-managed banks. There is a wide-spread impression among a certain class of people that banking is the one class of enterprise which enjoys immunity from the ordinary uncertainties of business, and that, given fair management and honesty on the part of the directors, there must be a continuous profit in its conduct, whether times are good or bad.

The truth, however, is that the banks are as sensitive, if not more so, to the depressing influences of hard times as any commercial or industrial enterprises whatsoever. They are the largest holders of property of all kinds in the country, although they are nominally not its owners. Their own capital is but a small percentage of the money which they loan. The great bulk of their loans is the money of their depositors. As security for this they receive bonds, stocks and mortgages, covering industrial plants and lands, and in this way more actual property lies in their hands than can be found at times unnumbered in the hands of its nominal owners.

When from any cause these properties depreciate in value, the banker's first duty to his depositors, which is his first duty in law and morals, is to see that the depreciation does not endanger the safety of the funds of which he is the trustee. But depreciation during the last few years, due to the rapid appreciation of the medium in which values are measured, was too enormous and too quick for the most prudent of bankers. It swept along the whole line, and securities that were supposed to cover twice and three times the money loaned upon them were found to be unsalable at the face of the money advanced. Few have any adequate conception of this enormous scaling down of the value of their securities has brought to the managers of the banks. In many cases the depreciation has been so great that securities for the legitimate purposes of banking have become actually worthless—that is to say, they were not salable at all.

The numerous bank failures which followed the election of Mr. McKinley throughout the West were merely symptoms of a general condition which may not yet have reached its worst stages.

We have not waited until this late day to warn the bankers of this country that they must ultimately share the losses which the currency policy they supported had brought to the industry and commerce of the country. Again and again throughout the late campaign the Evening News predicted that the gold standard would ultimately reach the banks in its ruinous influence. Their interests, properly understood, are precisely the same as those of the farmer, the mechanic, the manufacturer and the merchant. All have suffered alike, or will yet suffer, if they have been so fortunate as to escape thus far.

How different would it have been had the country never left the double standard, or, having left it, had returned to it years ago. The greatly increased production of the precious metals with which the world had been blessed would have kept the supply of basic money approximately up to the demands of the increasing necessities of mankind, and the prices of property and products thus sustained would have furnished a continuous incentive in profit to the exertion of human industry. Values would have been kept up, the debtor would have found a market for his holdings and have been able to pay his debts, and the banks to-day would have had a solid foundation in their securities for both their depositors and their capital.

It is true, the purchasing power of money would not have been so great as it is, and the absolutely secured creditor would not get so much property for his claim as he now can, but is not this just what all the banks as well as everybody else—namely, that the claim of the creditor eats up too much of the property of the debtor and while ruining the latter nets a loss also to the former? The private usurious lender of money, who actually contemplates at the time of making the loan the desirable possibility of seizing the collateral at a reduced price and makes all his arrangements to render the transaction profitable, may find interest in this process, but the average bank cannot do so. It is not organized to hold properties of all sorts or to manage them when seized.

Its highest interest, therefore, lies, as do the interests of its depositors and its debtors, in the integrity if not the enhancement of the properties it takes as collateral. In a word, the banker is a debtor even more than he is a creditor. If the bankers of this country were only intelligent and far-sighted enough to understand this simple fact they would not have been almost unan-

BANKS ARE SQUEEZED.

THEY SUFFER FROM THE LOWERING OF VALUES.

Banks Must Share the Losses Which the Currency Policy They Supported Has Brought to the Business of the Country—Only the Unlucky Profits.

Effect of the Gold Standard.

The recent sealing of the capital stock of the Preston National Bank of this city, says the Detroit Evening News, from \$1,000,000 down to \$700,000, furnishes a valuable object lesson in the effect of the gold standard upon property values. A few years ago, when the bank was organized and capitalized at \$1,000,000, that figure honestly represented its value. Its shares sold at par, or very nearly par, and that was the best evidence of its value. It did a large business and its affairs were managed with as much discretion and ability as other banks. Its losses were no greater than inevitably fall to the lot of ordinarily well-managed banks. There is a wide-spread impression among a certain class of people that banking is the one class of enterprise which enjoys immunity from the ordinary uncertainties of business, and that, given fair management and honesty on the part of the directors, there must be a continuous profit in its conduct, whether times are good or bad.

The truth, however, is that the banks are as sensitive, if not more so, to the depressing influences of hard times as any commercial or industrial enterprises whatsoever. They are the largest holders of property of all kinds in the country, although they are nominally not its owners. Their own capital is but a small percentage of the money which they loan. The great bulk of their loans is the money of their depositors. As security for this they receive bonds, stocks and mortgages, covering industrial plants and lands, and in this way more actual property lies in their hands than can be found at times unnumbered in the hands of its nominal owners.

When from any cause these properties depreciate in value, the banker's first duty to his depositors, which is his first duty in law and morals, is to see that the depreciation does not endanger the safety of the funds of which he is the trustee. But depreciation during the last few years, due to the rapid appreciation of the medium in which values are measured, was too enormous and too quick for the most prudent of bankers. It swept along the whole line, and securities that were supposed to cover twice and three times the money loaned upon them were found to be unsalable at the face of the money advanced. Few have any adequate conception of this enormous scaling down of the value of their securities has brought to the managers of the banks. In many cases the depreciation has been so great that securities for the legitimate purposes of banking have become actually worthless—that is to say, they were not salable at all.

The numerous bank failures which followed the election of Mr. McKinley throughout the West were merely symptoms of a general condition which may not yet have reached its worst stages.

We have not waited until this late day to warn the bankers of this country that they must ultimately share the losses which the currency policy they supported had brought to the industry and commerce of the country. Again and again throughout the late campaign the Evening News predicted that the gold standard would ultimately reach the banks in its ruinous influence. Their interests, properly understood, are precisely the same as those of the farmer, the mechanic, the manufacturer and the merchant. All have suffered alike, or will yet suffer, if they have been so fortunate as to escape thus far.

How different would it have been had the country never left the double standard, or, having left it, had returned to it years ago. The greatly increased production of the precious metals with which the world had been blessed would have kept the supply of basic money approximately up to the demands of the increasing necessities of mankind, and the prices of property and products thus sustained would have furnished a continuous incentive in profit to the exertion of human industry. Values would have been kept up, the debtor would have found a market for his holdings and have been able to pay his debts, and the banks to-day would have had a solid foundation in their securities for both their depositors and their capital.

It is true, the purchasing power of money would not have been so great as it is, and the absolutely secured creditor would not get so much property for his claim as he now can, but is not this just what all the banks as well as everybody else—namely, that the claim of the creditor eats up too much of the property of the debtor and while ruining the latter nets a loss also to the former? The private usurious lender of money, who actually contemplates at the time of making the loan the desirable possibility of seizing the collateral at a reduced price and makes all his arrangements to render the transaction profitable, may find interest in this process, but the average bank cannot do so. It is not organized to hold properties of all sorts or to manage them when seized.

Its highest interest, therefore, lies, as do the interests of its depositors and its debtors, in the integrity if not the enhancement of the properties it takes as collateral. In a word, the banker is a debtor even more than he is a creditor. If the bankers of this country were only intelligent and far-sighted enough to understand this simple fact they would not have been almost unan-

Situation Is Grave.

It is a singular fact that the election of Mr. McKinley has not even restored confidence among the multimillionaires and money owners of New York City. We say the fact is singular because this class placed all their influence at the disposal of the Republicans and did everything in their power to promote Mr. McKinley's election. They succeeded in their efforts. They have had the fulfillment of what seemed their heart's desire, and still they view the situation with the gravest doubt and suspicion.

Populist Pointers.

Every trust is a menace to good government. Public opinion is the greatest foe to progress. Paternalism is a thousand times better than favoritism. Government banks will regulate the volume and give us a stable currency.

It is not over-production, but a false system of distribution that causes poverty. Keep it before the people that the Republicans promised to deliver prosperity. The government part of our Government is socialism—when it is not favoritism.

The mission of the People's party is hardly begun. The work of education must go on. No amount of wealth can ever stand before a revolution. It is weakness instead of strength. Resolutions of sympathy for the poor is worse than soup, and soup is a mighty light diet.

The spirit of liberty and independence can be crushed and smothered, but it cannot be killed. If fusion ever had any respectability some of the place hunters have snatched it with disgrace. The real question is whether the Government or the banks shall issue the paper money of the country.

The "cross of gold" is yet standing, while the "crown of thorns" is being pressed down on labor's brow. The Republicans are kept busy explaining why prosperity doesn't come, and when it may be looked for. Changing men will do no good unless we also change the system. The Republican party will bring no better times.

The first half of the nineteenth century will mark the demonetization of all metallic currency except for subsidiary coins. When one trust begins to compete with another it gets out an injunction and puts a stop to it. Isn't this a dandy Government?

All the gold produced in the world in one year would not pay the interest on the world's debts three months. Then, how are we expected to pay the principal? We can't get fair railroad rates until the water is squeezed out of the stock. The best way to do this is for the Government to acquire ownership and operate them. The gold reserve seems to be reserving all right, but it doesn't bring prosperity, and now the question occurs, What connection has the gold reserve with prosperity?

If the Government can't keep gold to redeem its paper, how do the banks expect to do so? The Government's much stronger than the banks and its credit better than that of all the banks combined. After all, the problem in the last stages of its analysis is, whether manhood or money shall rule in this country. All other issues center around this one. It is the same old question of human rights.

His Grip Labels.

The coming man, of course, cuts no ice with the new woman; but then he is up to all sorts of devices to be strictly "in it." A ruddy complexioned, self-conscious young man lugged a leather bag into a down-town 6th avenue elevated train to-day, and, placing it in front of him, where it might be easily seen by other passengers in the car, he settled down behind his paper to await the effect. The bag was