EDITED BY THOMAS RITCHIE.

THOMAS RITCHIE & JOHN P. HEISS,

PROPRIETORS AND PUBLISHERS.

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VOLUME IV. "LIBERTY, THE UNION, AND THE CONSTITUTION." NUMBER 26.

CITY OF WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY MORNING, MAY 31, 1848.

TO OUR SUBSCRIBERS.

The name of no person will be entered upon our books unless the payment of the subscription be made in advance.

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THE CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER will be furnished them on the same terms.

THE pain of decayed teeth from cold or toothache, arising from exposure or tenderness of the nerve, is always cured in one minute by WHEELER'S TEABERRY TOOTHWASH, and still all decay of this and all the other teeth, if any there be decayed, is entirely arrested, and they remain protected by this tooth wash in perfect health. It also keeps pure, strengthens, and solidifies the gums, and preserves the purity of the mouth and breath. It effectually cures soreness of the gums, where it may have existed; entirely cures softness of the gums, and stops all bleeding of the gums at once. It corrects all the complaints of the teeth, gums, and mouth, and keeps the teeth, gums, and mouth so corrected—always pleasant, and in a perfect state of the best health.

The following copyright will show the time of the origin of *Wheeler's Teaberry Tooth-Wash* to be over five years since, while imitative articles are of recent origin:

Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to wit:

[SEAL.] Be it remembered, that on the second day of February, anno Domini one thousand eight hundred and forty-two, W. Wheeler, of the said district, hath deposited in this office the title of a book, which is in the words to wit:

TEABERRY TOOTH-WASH,

the right whereof he claims as proprietor, in conformity with an act of Congress, entitled An act to amend the several acts respecting copy-rights.

FRA'S HOPKINSON,
Clerk of the U. S. District Court.

1842, Feb. 2d, copy deposited—CHAS. F. HEAZLETT.
Re-entered in 1847, by W. W. HUBBELL, inventor.

Testimonials in its favor.

I have seen *Wheeler's Teaberry Tooth-Wash* used in very many cases of diseased teeth, with the best results.
J. L. ROSE, M. D.

I have occasionally used *Wheeler's Teaberry Tooth Wash*, and experienced beneficial results. I consider it a useful preparation, and unite with others in recommending it as a purifier of the teeth and gums.
JAMES PAGE.

Have the goodness to send me by the bearer one large bottle of your Tooth Wash. I have used it for the last two years, and find it the best article of the kind I have ever met with; in fact, it is the only wash, the use of which hardens my gums and preserves them from bleeding.
With respect, yours,
GEO. F. SITES, Cor. Front & Race sts.

On Saturday last, while suffering with an extremely painful toothache, I called in at No. 71 Chesnut street, to obtain a bottle of *Wheeler's Teaberry Tooth Wash*, applied a little of it to the tooth, and *instantly* it caused *all* toothache to *cease*, and I have not had any pain since; which I publicly state for the relief of those who suffer with toothache.
A. W. STRUTHERS.

Having used *Wheeler's Teaberry Tooth Wash* and Powder, I have found them to possess cleansing and purifying properties, and while they whiten and beautify the teeth, they have a beneficial effect upon the gums, by imparting to them free and healthy action.
F. A. RAYBOLD.

I have used *Wheeler's Teaberry Tooth Wash*, and its effects upon my teeth and gums have given me a high opinion of its merits. I cheerfully recommend it to the general use.
H. R. KNEASS.

Having been requested by two dentists, I have for a long time used *Wheeler's Teaberry Tooth Wash*; and deem it well worthy of patronage by the public generally for curing toothache, allaying irritation of the gums, and preserving the teeth and gums.
E. B. SCHNABEL.

This is to certify, That I have used *Wheeler's Teaberry Tooth Wash*; and can assure the public that it is really a meritorious article, and has proved beneficial to my teeth and gums on every application.
JACOB LEIDY.

Having used *Wheeler's Teaberry Tooth Wash* for diseased teeth and gums, and found that although before its use my gums were so much out of order that the lower teeth could be laid back—a few applications of this tooth wash effectually cured all disease. I recommend it to the public in general, as a very efficacious and the best article I have ever used.
BENJ. G. MITCHELL.

So very great has been the benefit derived from *Wheeler's Teaberry Tooth Wash* by my family, and every person to whom we have recommended its use, also by the workmen employed by me, by its immediately and effectually curing all toothache and preserving the teeth and gums from disease, that I, with this certificate, earnestly recommend its use to persons generally, as a certain remedy and pleasant article.
F. S. JOHNSON.

It gives me great pleasure to say, for the alleviation of the usual pain and difficulty of teething, that, in the case of my child, although other preparations, sometimes considered useful, were without much benefit used, that *Wheeler's Teaberry Toothwash* afterwards, for the first time, was used to remedy soreness and fever in the gums of my child while teething; and it did alleviate all pain and fever, is very beneficial, and manifestly is an excellent article to wash the gums of children while teething.
N. S. LAWRENCE, Minor st., Phila.

Having used *Wheeler's Teaberry Tooth Wash* for some time, I am of opinion that it is the best article known, and most sincerely agree with the many excellent certificates that I have seen, and hereby warmly recommend it to the public in general, as being pleasant, and the best preservative of the teeth and gums.
ROBERT E. JOHNSON.

My daughter has used *Wheeler's Teaberry Tooth Wash* and powder, and found its effects to be a cleansing and purifying of the gums, and a sweetening of the mouth. I have no hesitation in recommending it as the most beneficial preparation for the teeth I have ever used.
C. J. JACK.

I do certify, that for a number of years my teeth were so much out of order, as to prevent me from eating with any pleasure; always causing me much pain: and finally having heard of *Wheeler's Teaberry Tooth Wash*, I tried one bottle of it, which, in less than two weeks from the commencement of its use, made my teeth sound and good, so that now they can be freely and pleasantly used. I therefore, with the utmost confidence, recommend its use to those who may be in need of a remedy.
J. BRAZER.

Owing to having taken cold, but mostly in consequence of the acid of a paint used in coloring prints, my teeth became very much injured, giving excruciating pain at intervals, for between two and three years; *Wheeler's Teaberry Tooth Wash* was used, and has entirely cured them, which in certificate form I send, that those who wish a perfect remedy for painful teeth, and also desire a pleasant tooth wash, may with confidence try *Wheeler's Teaberry Tooth Wash*.
MARY A. TAYLOR.

Depot Nos. 1 and 2 Brown's Hotel.
M. H. STEVENS, Agent.

May 10

ASSESSORS' NOTICE.

AT a meeting of the board of assessors appointed under the act appointing assessors and providing for the return of all persons subject to the school tax, it was resolved that they should enter upon their duties of assessing this day, the 24th instant, and continue so to do each day till finished. Also, that the first and second days of June, between the hours of 2 and 7 o'clock, p. m., be appointed to enable those persons whose names may have been omitted, to call and have them entered on the lists, if by law subject to the school tax. The following are the places appointed to receive their names:

First ward, at the West market.
Second ward, at McClery and Clements's, corner of 14th street and Pennsylvania avenue.
Third ward, at Charles Wannell's grocery, corner of 9th street and New York avenue.
Fourth ward, at George Cochrane's tobacconist, 7th street, between D and E streets.
Fifth ward, at the Columbian engine-house.
Sixth ward, at R. M. Coombs's grocery, 8th street, between I and K streets.
Seventh ward, at Island Hall.

JAMES M. TOWERS, Secretary.

May 25—dtd

City Election—Personal and School Taxes.

COLLECTOR'S OFFICE, May 27, 1848.

NOTICE is hereby given, that, by authority of the law recently passed by Congress, amending the city charter, an annual school tax of one dollar has been levied by the corporation upon every white male resident of the city over twenty-one years of age, which is required by law to be paid in addition to all other personal taxes due previous to voting.

In order as far as practicable to avoid the inconvenience to voters attending the payment of taxes by so many persons at the polls, the collector gives notice that he will attend in his office every day during the ensuing week until six o'clock, for the purpose of receiving taxes.

All payments are required to be in specie, or bank notes of the District or Baltimore.

A. ROTHWELL, Collector.

May 28—d1w

To Contractors for Masonry.

ENGINEER'S OFFICE BALT. & OHIO RAILROAD,
Baltimore, May 15, 1848.

PROPOSALS, under seal, and suitably endorsed, will be received by the undersigned up to Saturday, the 10th June proximo, inclusive, for the construction of two large stone viaducts upon the Washington Branch of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, over the Little Patuxent river, near the Savage Factory and Northwest Branch at Bladensburg.

These viaducts will be heavy structures, well worthy the attention of contractors of the first capacity for this kind of work, who are therefore invited to examine them. The plan of the bridges may be seen at the Company's office No. 23 Hanover street, Baltimore, where full information will be given by C. P. Manning, master of road.

Unexceptionable recommendations must accompany the proposals.

By order of the President and Directors:
BENJ. H. LATROBE, Chief Engineer.

May 25—eo6t

$10,000 to $15,000 for Investment in Slaves.—Boys and girls would be preferred; but, to avoid separation, families will be taken.

Proposals are invited by letter, addressed to A. B., Washington city, postage paid, at any time between this and the 1st of July.

April 4—1e2wswtlt

CONGRESSIONAL.

SPEECH OF MR. CALHOUN,

OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

In the Senate of the United States, May 15, 1848—On the proposed occupation of Yucatan.

The Senate having under consideration the bill to enable the President of the United States to take temporary military occupation of Yucatan—

Mr. CALHOUN said: The President in his message recommends to Congress to adopt such measures as they may deem expedient to prevent, in the first place, Yucatan from becoming a colony of any European power; and, in the next place, to prevent the white inhabitants of that territory from being exterminated or expelled. In support of the latter, he informed the Senate that there is now raging a cruel and devastating war on the part of the Indians against the whites; and that, unless some foreign power should aid, they will be destroyed or driven from the country. In support of the other recommendation, he states that the government of Yucatan has offered to the governments of Great Britain, Spain, and the United States the dominion over the country in order to obtain aid. The President also informs the Senate that, unless we grant aid, some other power will; and that, ultimately, it may assert its dominion and sovereignty over the territory—a result which, he informs us, would be in contravention of the declaration of Mr. Monroe, and which must, on no account, be permitted. The Committee on Foreign Relations, in order to carry out these recommendations, have reported a bill which is now before us, the first section of which provides for taking military occupation of Yucatan, as recommended by the President.

Such are the recommendations of the President, and such the measure recommended by the committee. The subject is one of great magnitude. It is pregnant with consequences, both near and remote, which may deeply affect the peace and interests of this country. It demands the most serious deliberation. I have bestowed upon it full attention, and have arrived at a conclusion adverse to the recommendations of the President and the report of the committee. I propose to show, in the first place, that the case of Yucatan, even as stated by the President himself, does not come within the declarations of Mr. Monroe, and that they do not furnish the slightest support to the measure reported by the committee.

In the message referred to—that of 1823—Mr. Monroe makes three distinct declarations. The first, and by far the most important, announces that the United States would regard any attempt on the part of the Allied Powers to extend their system to this country as dangerous to our peace and safety. To show that the case of Yucatan does not come within this declaration, all that will be necessary is to explain who were the Allied Powers, the object of their alliance, and the circumstances in which the declaration itself was made. The Allied Powers were the four great continental monarchies—Russia, Prussia, Austria, and France. Shortly after the overthrow of Bonaparte, these powers entered into an alliance called the "Holy Alliance," the object of which was to sustain and extend the monarchical principles as far as possible, and to oppress and put down popular institutions. England, in the early stages of the alliance, favored it. The members of the alliance held several Congresses, attended either by themselves or their ambassadors, and undertook to regulate the affairs of all Europe, and actually interfered in the affairs of Spain, for the purpose of putting down popular doctrines. In its progress the alliance turned its eyes to this continent in order to aid Spain in regaining her sovereignty over her revolted provinces. At this stage England became alarmed. Mr. Canning was then Prime Minister. He informed Mr. Rush of the project, and gave to him at the same time the assurance that, if sustained by the United States, Great Britain would resist. Mr. Rush immediately communicated this to our government. It was received here with joy; for so great was the power of the alliance that even we did not feel ourselves safe from its interpositions. Indeed, it was anticipated, almost as a certain result, that, if the interference took place with the governments of South America, the alliance would ultimately extend its interference to ourselves. I remember the reception of the despatch from Mr. Rush as distinctly as if all the circumstances had occurred yesterday. I well recollect the great satisfaction with which it was received by the cabinet. It came late in the year, not long before the meeting of Congress. As was usual with Mr. Monroe upon great occasions, the papers were sent round to each member of the cabinet, so that each might be duly apprized of all the circumstances, and be prepared to give his opinion. The cabinet met. It deliberated. There was long and careful consultation; and the result was the declaration which I have just announced. All this has passed away. That very movement on the part of England, sustained by this declaration, gave a blow to the celebrated alliance from which it never recovered. From that time forward it gradually decayed, till it utterly perished. The late revolutions in Europe have put an end to all its work, and nothing remains of all that it ever did. Now, by what ingenuity of argument, by what force of sophistry can it be shown that this declaration comprehends the case of Yucatan, when the events which called it forth have passed away forever?

And yet, the President has quoted that very declaration in support of his recommendation; but in a manner changing entirely its meaning by separating it from the context as it stood in the message, and which referred it to the Allied Powers; and placing it in connexion with a portion of his message which made it refer to Great Britain, Spain, or other European powers. The change has made the declaration so inconsistent and absurd that had it been made by Mr. Monroe, as it stands in the President's message, it would have been the subject of the severest animadversion and ridicule, instead of receiving, as it did, the approbation and applause of the whole country. It would have placed England in the false position of acting against us and with the Holy Alliance in reference to the Spanish American republics; and it would also have placed us in the position of opposing Spain in her efforts to recover her dominion over those States; and, finally, it would have involved the absurdity of asserting that the attempt of any European State to extend its system of government to this continent, the smallest as well as the greatest, would endanger the peace and safety of our country.

The next declaration was, that we would regard the interposition of any European power to oppress the governments of this continent, which we had recently recognised as independent, or to control their destiny in any manner whatever, as manifesting an unfriendly disposition towards the United States. This declaration, also, belongs to the history of that day. It grew out of the same state of circumstances, and may be considered as an appendage to the declaration to which I have just alluded. By the governments on this continent, which we had recognised, were meant the republics which had grown up after having thrown off the yoke of Spain. They had just emerged from their protracted revolutionary struggles. They had hardly yet reached a point of solidity; and in that tender stage the administration of Mr. Monroe thought it proper, not only to make that general declaration in reference to the Holy Alliance, but to make a more specific one against the interference of any European power, in order to countenance and encourage these young republics as far as we could with propriety. This, like the other belonging to the events of the time, has passed away with them; but suppose that not to be the case, I ask, Does the case of Yucatan come within this declaration? Has there been any interposition in the affairs of Yucatan on the part of any European power, with the design of oppressing her, or changing her destiny? If not, how can the case of Yucatan be comprehended in this declaration?

But, it may be said, although the case of Yucatan is not expressly comprehended in the declaration, yet it is so by implication, as it is meditated by England; for, after all, that is the government which is meant in the message, under the general term "European powers." The message indicates that England meditates such interference, and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations distinctly avows that opinion. Has England, then, manifested any disposition to interfere in order to oppress the people of Yucatan, or to change the character of their government from a republic to a monarchy? We have no evidence whatever on that point. It is true that the commissioner from Yucatan, Mr. Sierra, would insinuate as much. He speaks of the Indians who are in hostility to the white people of Yucatan as having obtained arms from the British. He speaks with some degree of uncertainty, however, and is unable to say whether the arms were given or not, and cannot state how they were obtained by the Indians. He speaks also of the hostile temper of England, and gives several indications of that kind. But, in answer to all that, his own letter furnishes a conclusive reply. He tells us that the people of Yucatan could themselves have obtained an abundant and cheap supply of arms from the Belize, without stating why they were prevented, or why they did not obtain them. In my opinion the cause is different from that stated by the senator from Massachusetts. It was owing to the fact that Yucatan was not considered as a neutral power, but as a part of Mexico, as far as the introduction of arms was concerned, and arms were, in consequence, made contraband; and, therefore, they were prevented from being introduced by our act, and not by that of the British government or its agent or people at the Belize. One of the members of the committee goes a little further, and says that the settlement at Belize have sent arms and a military force along the coast of Yucatan, without stating any particulars. I do not find any evidence of that. I do not know whether it is a fact or not; but if it be a fact, it still remains to be shown whether that was intended to relieve the people of Yucatan, or for the purpose of seizing and occupying the territory. The chairman of that committee took higher ground, and, without assigning his proof, said boldly and distinctly that England meditated occupation of the country, and that we ought to pass this measure in order to prevent it. But the President himself does not put it upon this ground. He does not make this charge. He says, if we do not grant aid, England may; and that, after granting it, she *may*—there is no stronger expression used—*may* ultimately assert her dominion and sovereignty over Yucatan. This is the utmost charge made by the President. Now, the question arises, suppose this contingency should happen:—would it bring the case within the declaration just quoted? Not at all. England does not interpose as a hostile power. She does not come to oppress Yucatan. She comes at the request of Yucatan, and only to aid, to rescue the people of Yucatan from extermination and expulsion by the Indians, according to the statement of the President himself. Again, suppose England should assert her sovereignty, would that bring the case within the declaration? Not at all; for the declaration is directed against interpositions to change the government and oppress the country. But, in this case, the tender of sovereignty is voluntarily made on the part of Yucatan. The acceptance of it may be objected to, and it may be contended that we ought not to allow it. I waive that subject for the present. I assert, however, without possibility of contradiction, that the case even then does not come within the declaration. The President himself gives strong indications that in his opinion it does not; for, although he refers to this declaration in the body of the message, he does not say a word in regard to it when he comes to make his recommendation. In that he calls upon Congress to prevent Yucatan from becoming a colony to some foreign power. That shows on which of the three declarations he rests his recommendation. It is upon the third and last, which refers to an entirely different subject. That declaration is, that the continents of America, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are not henceforth to be considered as subjects of colonization by any European power. It is upon this the President bases his recommendation. Is the case of Yucatan, then, comprehended in this declaration? I expect to show that it is not, with just as much certainty as it has been established that it does not come within the two former.

The word "colonization" has a specific meaning. It means the establishment of a settlement by emigrants from the parent country in a territory either uninhabited or from which the inhabitants have been partially or wholly expelled. This is not a case of that character. But here it may be proper, in order to understand the force of my argument, to go into a history also of this declaration of Mr. Monroe. It grew out of circumstances altogether different from the other two. At that time there was a question between Great Britain and the United States on one side and Russia on the other. All three claimed settlements on the northwest portion of this continent. Great Britain and ourselves having common interest in keeping Russia as far north as possible, the former power applied to the United States for co-operation; and it was in reference to that matter that this additional declaration was made. It was said to be a proper opportunity to make it. It had reference specially to the subject of the northwestern settlement, and the other portions of the continent were thrown in, because all the rest of it, with the exception of some settlements in Surinam, Maracaibo, and thereabout, had passed into independent hands.

Now, having stated the history of these transactions, I contend that the word "colonization" does not apply to the case of Yucatan. That is the case of surrendered sovereignty over a people already there—a people who have tendered it, and, if accepted, freely accepted on the other side. Is that "colonization?" Can it be construed to be so by any forced interpretation? No; by accepting it Yucatan may become a province, or, to use the appropriate term that she employs, a "possession" of Great Britain, but not a colony.

When the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations addressed the Senate a few days since, he related a conversation which he had with Mr. Adams, in reference to this declaration, and, according to his statement, if I heard him aright, and he be correctly reported, Mr Adams, in applying his observations to the whole of these declarations, stated that they all originated with himself, and were unknown to the other members of the cabinet until they appeared in Mr. Monroe's message. There certainly must be a mistake either on the part of Mr. Adams, or that of the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, as to the two first of these declarations. The history of the transaction, the Senator will perceive, if he examines the documents, shows distinctly that they came through Mr. Rush, originating, not with Mr. Adams, but Mr. Canning, and were first presented in the form of a proposition from England. I recollect, as distinctly as I do any event of my life, that all the papers in connexion with this subject were submitted to the members before the cabinet met, and were duly considered. Mr. Adams, then, in speaking of the whole as one, must have reference to the declaration relative to colonization. As respects that, his memory does not differ much from mine. My impression is, that it never became a subject of deliberation in the cabinet. I so stated when the Oregon question was before the Senate. I stated it in order that Mr. Adams might have an opportunity of denying it, or asserting the real state of the fact. He remained silent, and I presume that my statement is correct; that this declaration was inserted after the cabinet deliberation. It originated entirely with Mr. Adams, without being submitted to the cabinet, and it is, in my opinion, owing to this fact that it is not made with the precision and clearness with which the two former are. It declares without qualification that these continents have asserted and maintained their freedom and independence, and are no longer subject to colonization by any European power. This is not strictly accurate. Taken as a whole, these continents had not asserted and maintained their freedom and independence. At that period Great Britain had a larger portion of the continent in her possession than the United States. Russia had a considerable portion of it, and other powers possessed some portions on the southern portion of this continent. The declaration was broader than the fact, and exhibits precipitancy and want of due reflection. Besides, there was an impropriety in it when viewed in conjunction with the foregoing declarations. I speak not in the language of censure. We were as to them acting in concert with England, on a proposition coming from herself—a proposition of the utmost magnitude, and which we felt at the time to be essentially connected with our peace and safety; and of course it was due to propriety as well as policy that this declaration should be strictly in accordance with British feeling. Our power then was not what it is now, and we had to rely upon her co-operation to sustain the ground we had taken. We had then only about six or seven millions of people, scattered, and without such means of communication as we now possess to bring us together in a short period of time. The declaration accordingly, with respect to colonization, striking at England as well as Russia, gave offence to her, and that to such an extent that she refused to co-operate with us in settling the Russian question. Now, I will venture to say that if that declaration had come before that cautious cabinet—for Mr. Monroe was among the wisest and most cautious men I have ever known—it would have been modified, and been expressed with a far greater degree of precision, and with much more delicacy in reference to the feelings of the British government.

In stating the precise character of these declarations, and the manner in which they originated, I have discharged a double duty; a duty to my country, to whom it is important that these declarations should be correctly understood, and a duty to the cabinet of which I was a member, and am now the only survivor. I remove a false interpretation, which makes safe and proper declarations improper and dangerous.

But it is not only in these respects that these famous declarations are misunderstood by the Chief Magistrate of the country, as well as by others. They were but declarations, nothing more; declarations, announcing in a friendly manner to the powers of the world, we should regard certain acts of interposition of the allied powers as dangerous to our peace and safety; interposition of European powers to oppress the republics which had just arisen upon this continent, as manifesting an unfriendly disposition, and that this continent having become free and independent, was no longer the subject of colonization by European powers. Not one word in any one of them in reference to resistance. There is nothing said of it; and with great propriety was it omitted. Resistance belonged to us—to Congress; it is for us to say whether we shall resist or not, and to what extent. But such is not the view taken by the present Chief Magistrate. He seems to hold these declarations as imposing a solemn duty on him as Chief Magistrate to resist on all occasions; and not only to resist, but to judge of the measure of that resistance. He tells us in this very message that it is not to be permitted in any event that any foreign power should occupy Yucatan. That is language for us to hold, not for the Chief Magistrate. And in conformity with that, he sends in a message without giving us one particle of evidence as to those great political considerations which influenced the cabinet decisions as stated on this floor, in declaring whether we shall occupy the country or not. I speak it not in the way of censure. I state it only as a matter of fact deducible from the message itself, and as evincing undoubtedly a great and dangerous misconception of these celebrated declarations. But that is not all. He tells you in the same message that these declarations have become the settled policy of this country. What, the declarations? Declarations are not policy, and cannot become settled policy. He must mean that it has become the settled policy of this country to resist what these declarations refer to; and to resist, if need be, by an appeal to arms. Is this the fact? Has there been one instance in which these declarations have been carried into effect by resistance? If there be, let it be pointed out. Have there not been innumerable instances in which they have not been applied? Certainly. Still stronger declarations, under this broad interpretation, were disavowed entirely three years afterwards by the vote of the republican party, when the administration of Mr. Adams endeavored to apply them by sending ministers to the Congress at Panama, as will be seen by reading the debates and the proceedings on the subject. And let me say—for it is proper that I should make the declaration on this occasion—that there has been an entire revolution between the two parties in this country in reference to our foreign relations. At the commencement of our government, and down to a late period—I will mark it—the commencement of Jackson's administration, the policy of the republican party was to avoid war as long as war could be avoided, and to resort to every means to avert its calamities. The opposite party, without being a war party, had not so decided an aversion to war. The thing is now reversed; and hence I, who endeavored to maintain the old ground of the party, have for years, on all questions connected with our foreign relations, been compelled to co-operate with gentlemen on the opposite side, and to resist those in the midst of whom I stand. No; it is not, and never has been, the established policy of the country. And if it should ever become so, to the wide extent to which these declarations have been interpreted to go, our peace would ever be disturbed; the gates of our Janus would ever stand open; wars would never cease.

What the President has asserted in this case is not a principle belonging to these declarations; it is a principle which, in his misconception, he attempts to engraft upon them, but which has an entirely different meaning and tendency. The principle which lies at the bottom of his recommendation is, that when any power on this continent becomes involved in internal warfare, and the weaker side chooses to make application to us for support, we are bound to give them support for fear the offer of the sovereignty of the country may be made to some other power and accepted. It goes infinitely and dangerously beyond Mr. Monroe's declaration. It puts it in the power of other countries on this continent to make us a party to all their wars; and hence I say, if this broad interpretation be given to these declarations, we shall forever be involved in wars.

But, in disavowing a principle which will compel us to resist every case of interposition of European powers on this continent, I would not wish to be understood as defending the opposite, that we should never resist their interposition. That is a position which would be nearly as dangerous and absurd as the other. But no general rule can be laid down to guide us on such a question. Every case must speak for itself—every case must be decided on its own merits. Whether you will resist or not, and the measure of your resistance—whether it shall be by negotiation, remonstrance, or some intermediate measure, or by a resort to arms; all this must be determined and decided on the merits of the question itself. That is the only wise course. We are not to have quoted on us on every occasion general declarations to which any and every meaning may be attached. There are cases of interposition where I would resort to the hazard of war with all its calamities. Am I asked for one? I will answer. I designate the case of Cuba. So long as Cuba remains in the hands of Spain—a friendly power, a power of which we have no dread—it should continue to be, as it has been the policy of all administrations ever since I have been connected with the government, to let Cuba remain there; but with the fixed determination, which I hope never will be relinquished, that, if Cuba pass from her, it shall not be into any other hands but ours: this, not from a feeling of ambition, not from a desire for the extension of dominion, but because that island is indispensable to the safety of the United States; or rather because it is indispensable to the safety of the United States that this island should not be in certain hands. If it were, our coasting trade between the Gulf and the Atlantic would, in case of war, be cut in twain, to be followed by convulsive effects. In the same category I will refer to a case in which we might most rightfully have resisted, had it become necessary, a foreign power; and that is the case of Texas. It has been greatly misunderstood. It sprung up in the midst of party excitement, when a large portion of both parties were opposed to annexation, and when it was difficult, if not impossible, to get a fair hearing. I never supposed, as has been stated on this floor, that Great Britain intended to subject Texas to her power. That was not my dread. What was dreaded was this: Texas being a small power, and Great Britain having a free and large commercial intercourse with her, and we almost none, although "bone of our bone, and flesh of our flesh," she would gradually have been weaned of her affection for us. Kindness for England and aversion for us would have been the result. That is the inevitable tendency between nations having coterminous limits. At that very time there were several questions between this country and Texas which, had it not been for the most amicable feelings which subsisted between us, would have ended in hostilities. A long line of more than a thousand miles illy defined the boundary between us and Texas, exposed us to the hazard of becoming involved constantly in war with her, supported by Great Britain and Mexico as her allies. I saw all this; I saw clearly that it was a case to resist interposition, and that there was no other mode by which resistance could be made except by annexation; and, therefore, I was in favor of annexation, even at the hazard of war.

But I was asked by one of the members of the Committee on Foreign Relations if I would be in favor of resisting Great Britain if she should assert sovereignty and dominion over Yucatan? I answer, I would not. And for irresistible reasons. I would not, because the country is, to a great extent, a most worthless one. Nearly one-half is destitute of a single stream—rocky and barren throughout the greater part; and it is only by means of the artificial reservoirs of water that they are enabled to live through the dry season. I would not, because the possession of Yucatan would contribute nothing to the defence of the passage between it and Cuba, which is represented to be so important to our commerce. It is not without its importance; it is important to the inward trade, but not at all to the outward trade of the Gulf. There is a constant current of wind and water setting in that direction, of which vessels going to New Orleans, or any other port on the Gulf, may avail themselves. But on coming from those ports, they almost invariably take their way between Florida and Cuba, and thus the passage between Yucatan and Cuba is the inlet to a limited extent into the Gulf, but not the outlet from it; while the passage between Cuba and Florida is almost the exclusive outlet and the principal inlet. I speak in reference to coasting vessels. In voyages from Europe, they pass south of Cuba into the Gulf.

But I take higher grounds. If it were ever so important not only as an inlet, but an outlet, the occupation of Yucatan by England would add nothing to her power in cutting off our trade. Yucatan is very destitute of ports—there is not a frigate-port laid down in the charts on the whole peninsula, unless that at the Belize be so. But, with or without Yucatan, Great Britain possesses an uncontrollable power over the passage whenever she chooses to exert it. If ever we should be engaged in a war with her, there is not a single vessel of ours, even if we were in possession of Yucatan, that could enter into the Gulf by that passage, or depart out of it. The passage from the Gulf between Yucatan and Cuba does not, as seems to be supposed, lead directly into the Atlantic, but into the Caribbean sea, which is that portion of the Atlantic ocean, having on its north and west side Yucatan and Cuba; on the east the Windward islands; and on the south all that portion of South America extending nearly from Oronoco to Yucatan. Great Britain has the complete command of that sea, the island of Jamaica being in the midst of it. Jamaica abounds with the finest ports, and the most commodious naval stations. In addition to that, she has the Belize, which is nearer the point of Yucatan than Laguna or Carmen, on the opposite side of the peninsula next the Gulf, and which is the only port on that side in which even a sloop-of-war can enter, and of course the Belize is better calculated to command the passage. In addition, she possesses many of the Windward islands to the east, and hence the complete command of the Caribbean sea, and she will continue to possess it so long as she retains her ascendency on the ocean. It would be thus locked up effectually against us in time of war. In time of peace we do not need it. But I would not take military possession of Yucatan, if I were certain Great Britain would, for another reason; because it would impose on us a very heavy cost of both men and money—first to take possession, and then to keep it. The extent to which our expenditures would go, no man can estimate. We have no data on which we can act. The population is between five and six hundred thousand, of which only fifty thousand are said to be whites and mixed blood. The Indians, originally a very peaceful and quiet people, unaccustomed to arms, from being frequently called into the contest between the factions and the war with Mexico, have become accustomed to them, and possessed of some military knowledge. They are represented as very active, capable of marching rapidly, and in the habit of flying to the mountains to escape from their pursuers. In that climate, among the most arid upon earth, if these people fly before us, how or when will this war come to an end? It may prove another Seminole affair. Who can answer what will be the sacrifice of men and money?

But an Indian war would not be the greatest danger to which we would be exposed. To attempt to take military possession with a view to prevent England from asserting sovereignty and dominion over the country—if that indeed be her intention—might bring us into conflict with her, and, it may be, with Spain, too. They, as well as we, are implored to accept the sovereignty, on condition of defending the existing government against the Indians. Suppose they, as well as we, should accept the offer, and that we should find them with an armed force prepared to take possession: must it not lead to a direct conflict of arms, unless one or the other give way? Would we be prepared, in such a case, to back out? And if not, what reason have we to suppose that others will not be as resolute to carry out their object as we are? Would not a conflict be inevitable? That such would be the result is anticipated by Mr. Sierra himself, who, speaking in reference to it, says that the condition of the country would be, in that case, "infinitely more unfortunate than it is now, because, in addition to all the evils of the present war, it would be exposed to become the theatre of another war." Are we prepared to occupy the country by military force, as recommended by the committee, at the risk of so great a hazard? I am not. I am in favor of peace, whenever it can be maintained consistently with the honor and the safety of the country. I can see no such necessity in this case, even on the supposition stated, as to induce me to incur such hazard, especially at a period like the present. Never was the future more uncertain. Events occur with electric rapidity. No man can tell what may come to-morrow; and never was there a time when caution was more necessary—when there was stronger inducement to husband our resources—to avoid quarrels and wars, or anything that can involve us in difficulty, in order to stand prepared to meet emergencies as they arise. He who looks abroad—he who looks at the eastern horizon, and does not see the necessity for caution, is blind to the future.

I would not take military possession, even under the contingency I have stated, for another reason. It would be a breach of good faith. Not long since, we agreed upon the terms of a treaty with Mexico. That treaty, before this time, has been acted on, or is about to be acted on, by the Mexican government; and until it is acted on, we are bound in good faith to observe it. If it is acted on favorably, it becomes a permanent obligation. We have considered Yucatan as part of Mexico—as one of the States of the Mexican republic. It is not comprehended within the line which is proposed to be drawn between us and her. We could not seize upon that State in conformity with good faith; nor could we in conformity with the armistice, for the same reason. The armistice makes some exceptions, but this is not one of them.

I have now stated my reasons against the measure reported by the committee to carry into effect the message of the President, recommending that we should adopt the measure to prevent Yucatan from becoming a colony of a foreign power. I now proceed to consider the next—to adopt measures to prevent the white population from being exterminated or expelled from Yucatan. And here let me express my regret that the President should, in the same message, unite two measures of such different characters—one an appeal to our humanity, which I would, as far as we could with propriety, act upon promptly, and at once. The other, involving the highest considerations of policy, and which requires much time and much deliberation. It is among the most complicated questions ever presented to this body, and by no means the least important. Why these different questions have been mingled I am not prepared to say. The emergency for the one seems to have existed long before the other. Danger to the white population has been known to exist since the middle of February, but the message has only been recently communicated to us. During this long interval, if the case appealing to our humanity had been brought forward, we might long ere this have rendered efficient aid. But, whatever may be the effects of the delay in reference to the Yucatanese, they are not chargeable to us. Higher considerations in reference to ourselves—considerations of policy—demand of us deliberation, and that deliberation, I trust, will be given, in despite of the charge of unnecessary delay. But I pass on to the question of humanity.

If this be a war of races in reality; if the white race be not responsible for this war; if they have used all manly exertions, and exhibited due courage in repelling the danger, strong indeed would be the appeal to my sympathies. I have no aversion to any race, red or black; but my sympathies are for the white race. I am not so much sophisticated by misguided philosophy, or false philanthropy, as to lose the natural feelings which belong to me. I go further. If this is a case of war between races; if the Indians have, without just cause, risen and threatened the massacre and extermination of the white race, who have acted so generously towards them as to raise them from the condition of slaves or serfs to that of citizens and freemen, this would present a strong case on the score of policy for interposition, connected with considerations belonging to progress, civilization, and liberty. It was the Spanish or white race; and in that we include the mixed races, who overthrew the Spanish power, and have throughout evinced the greatest attachment, under all circumstances, to republican government. They have all the wealth, and comprise nearly all the intelligence of the country; and on their ascendency, in my opinion, depends the future progress of civilization and liberty of Yucatan. It is true, they are not very elevated in their sentiments, nor very well informed on political subjects; but they are far better informed, and far more elevated in sentiment, than the Indian race can possibly be. If they can maintain themselves, there is some hope that Yucatan may go forward, that intelligence may increase, and that at some future day they may be prepared to take a higher position in civilization than at present. If the white race be overthrown, and Indian ascendency established, there will be a directly opposite tendency to end in a despotic government, like that of Hayti. Perhaps a capable man may at first be elevated to power, and may govern tolerably well; but it will undoubtedly follow the course of Hayti. The tendency of power will be downwards, until it come down to the very bottom, and end in a savage state.

But if there are powerful considerations why we should interfere as far as we could with propriety for these reasons, there are very powerful ones why we should act with great caution. The case of Yucatan does not stand alone. All the causes operating there to produce the present state of things are operating in all the portions of this continent south of us, including Mexico, down on the eastern side of the Andes to Buenos Ayres, and on the western to Chili. All, all are in great danger of falling into the condition in which Yucatan is now placed. The history of all has been the same. The white and mixed races led in casting off the yoke of Spain. They, every where, elevated the Indian race to an equality with themselves. It was done most imprudently, and inculcates a solemn lesson. They conferred upon the Indians full political rights, subjecting them at the same time to unequal civil burdens. While they gave them the power of voting—the highest political power—they imposed a tax upon them exclusively of a most onerous character, so as to throw almost the whole burden of supporting the government and the Church upon them. If the order had been reversed; if they had given them all civil rights, and dealt out to them more sparingly political rights, elevating the more intelligent and extending the basis of suffrage as the intelligence of the Indian population increased, a very different result might have taken place. All these South American States consist of the same population—whites, mixed, and Indians. The African population is small. All will, I fear, be revolutionized in turn, and the whole of them be subjected to one melancholy fate, in spite of all that we can do. The magnitude of this subject, however, should teach us caution. Whatever we do in this case, we set a precedent; we affirm a principle; and every one knows the force of precedents and asserted principles upon a population like that of our country. You will have to follow it in all other cases. Even now, Venezuela is involved in a war every way similar. How it may end we know not. Guatemala has gone through the process. She is already under Indian authority. A man of remarkable character, it is said, is at the head of the government. Things may go on very well in his time; but how they will be managed afterwards, who can tell? Such being the case, are we to declare now, by our acts, that in all those cases we are to interpose by force of arms, if need be, and thereby become involved in the fate of all these countries? Ought we set such a precedent? No. The first duty of every nation is to itself, and that is the case preeminently with the United States. They owe a high duty to themselves—to pursue a line of policy which will secure their liberty. The success of their great political system will be of infinitely more service to mankind than the securing of the ascendency of the white race in the southern portion of this continent, however important that may be. But if, instead of pursuing this wise policy, such a course be entered upon as that recommended in the message of the President, I fear that, sooner or later, the ruins of our government will be added to those which have fallen within the last few months. But, while I see the greatest reason for caution, I think that this government, upon all occasions, ought to give encouragement and countenance, as far as it can with safety, to the ascendency of the white race—that it ought to be the guardian of the civilization, progress, and liberty of this continent, in reference to those portions of it where they are exposed to this danger. I will not say that in no case should we ever give them military aid; but for a case to justify that, it must be an extraordinary one, and to be judged of by its intrinsic merits, and not governed by a general rule.

I have said that if this be a case of war between races, if the white race be not responsible for it, if they have been patriotic and courageous in their own defence, it would present a strong appeal to my sympathy. But is it a war of races? I have examined the case with all the lights before me; and I shall now state the conclusion to which I have arrived.

It is now, I believe, substantially a war of races, but was not so at the beginning. It seems that from the beginning of the government of Yucatan there have been violent factions, accompanied by a disposition on the part of the factions to call in the aid of the Indians; and in order to obtain their aid as voters, certain promises were made to them, which have not been well fulfilled. It would seem that in this case one of the factions, to secure the Indian vote, promised the reduction of the capitation tax—an enormous burden which presses them to the earth. The conflict originated, it is said, in this wise: In the contest for power between Mendez and Barbachino, the partisans of the former about Campeachy made proposals to the Indians to reduce the capitation tax. Mendez, in consequence of these overtures, obtained the aid of the Indians, and was elected governor. But when he got into power, he did not fulfil his promises. Instead of removing the taxes, he enforced their collection rigidly, which produced some disturbance. It seems, further—for this is an inference rather than a statement—that the question of the war between the United States and Mexico entered into the quarrel, and that Barbachino leaned to the side of Mexico, while Mendez took the side of neutrality, which preponderated. It would also seem, that the Indian resistance was at first feeble. In the midst of the conflicts of the contending factions it grew and became at length so important and threatening as to occasion alarm and consternation. There has been almost no display whatever of courage on the part of the white population, and very little evidence of patriotism throughout the whole affair. All this tends very much to weaken my sympathies. Were the case confined to the male population I should have little or none. But there are helpless women and children, whose wretched condition, on the score of humanity, demands interference. I may add, that there is some information inducing the belief that it is not altogether even now a war of races. Barbachino is now in power, and such has been the violence of faction that a large portion of the forces of Mendez has withdrawn from the army on the change in the government. I will state in this connexion what perhaps should have been said before, that the intelligence brought by a late arrival at New Orleans establishes beyond all controversy that England has not been implicated in the affair. It appears that even the British settlement at the Belize is threatened by Indians; that the city last captured is not more than one hundred miles distant from that settlement, and that a despatch had been sent for additional troops from Jamaica. This apprehension of an attack had resulted from the British settlement having sent down a few vessels on the coast of Yucatan to pick up the miserable fugitives. If there had been any suspicion as to the conduct of that settlement, or British subjects in that quarter, these facts ought to put an end to them forever.

How far ought we to go, then, on the score of humanity? I am of the opinion that all the naval force which we can spare should be sent to relieve these helpless people, and that we should supply food and raiment for their present necessities, and convey them wheresoever they desire—to Cuba or elsewhere. In a word, we should do all that humanity requires. But I cannot agree to carry out the provisions of a bill which authorizes the President to use the army and navy to take military occupation of the country. No considerations of humanity, or of the ascendency of the white race in Yucatan, justify, in my opinion, the adoption of such a course of policy. It is now clear that the white population, including the mixed race, is so prostrated and feeble, and the Indians so powerful, that not a hope remains of re-establishing the permanent ascendency of the former. We can, doubtless, by force, subject the Indians, and reinstate the whites in power; but the moment that we withdraw, the former state of things will recur. We will thus be perpetually engaged in this work. Now, I am not willing to incur the danger and the cost of maintaining the ascendency of the whites. I am not willing to have this task, which does not belong to us, assumed by our government.

I come now to the amendment of the senator from Mississippi, [Mr. DAVIS.] As between the bill and the amendment, I prefer the bill. They both propose the same thing. It is true, the amendment says only that the President shall have the power without prescribing what the President is to do with it. But the President has told us what he will do. He has told us as clearly as if it was put in the amendment. His object is to take military occupation of Yucatan—temporary, to be sure, but it must end in permanent occupation. Now, I would rather do that with our own sanction directly, which the President proposes to do, than under the cover of this amendment. Nor am I reconciled to the amendment by the preamble offered by the senator from Alabama. I think the senator had not seen all the documents when he offered that preamble. It does not reach the case. It presupposes an obligation on the part of the government of the United States to defend the white race there because we had so crippled Mexico that she could not afford them protection. I believe I state the substance of the preamble correctly.

Mr. LEWIS assented.

Mr. CALHOUN. The case is very different from what the preamble supposes. Yucatan does not look to Mexico for protection. On the contrary, they are more alarmed at the danger they have to fear from Mexico than from the Indians. Unfortunately for themselves, they assumed a position of neutrality, or, as they say, of independence. They thereby became traitors in the eyes of Mexico; and no doubt they will be held responsible as such. Hence we see Mr. Sierra makes a strong remonstrance against the treaty with Mexico. Nay, he goes so far as to say that, as a matter of good faith, the United States should not permit Yucatan to be sacrificed. There has been, in my opinion, a good deal of mismanagement in reference to this whole affair. The people of Yucatan were recognised as neutrals or not, just as suited the pleasure of the President. So far as the collection of revenue was concerned, they were not neutral; as far as the importation of arms into the country was concerned, they were treated as belligerents, and the arms were made contraband of war, lest they should be transferred to Mexico. The effect has been this, and they complain of it—that they have been kept destitute of arms and means whereby to defend themselves in this contest. On reviewing the whole case, however, I think that the white population of Yucatan have, in a great measure, themselves to blame. The factious conflicts—fierce and maniacal—in which they have been engaged, to the last, have involved them in these frightful calamities. But the administration are not wholly irresponsible. They knew that Mendez had declared neutrality, if not independence, and approved of it. They beheld the progress of those Indians. They witnessed their devastations, and instead of interfering to defend those who had declared themselves to be our friends, stood by with arms folded, and thereby have incurred a very heavy responsibility. They ought to have given no countenance to their claim of neutrality, and treated them as one of the Mexican States, or ought to have fully recognised their neutrality and independence. On the contrary, by regarding them as a Mexican State or as a neutral and independent power, as best suited their convenience, they have placed the people of Yucatan in an awful condition, by leaving them unprotected from the fury of the Indians, and exposing them to be treated as traitors by Mexico; and we are now appealed to, at this late period, to remedy the evils resulting from this fluctuating and uncertain policy when they are no longer curable, but by incurring hazards and sacrifices we cannot be justified in making.