A. O. P. NICHOLSON & J. W. FORNEY,
EDITORS AND PROPRIETORS.

TERMS:

DAILY, per year $10 00
SEMI-WEEKLY, (published tri-weekly during the session of Congress) 5 00
WEEKLY 1 00

Clubs will be furnished as follows:

Five copies of the DAILY, for 40 00
Five copies of the SEMI-WEEKLY 20 00
Ten copies of the " " 35 00
No deduction for clubs on WEEKLY.

The Daily Union.

VOLUME V. "LIBERTY, THE UNION, AND THE CONSTITUTION." NUMBER 289

CITY OF WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY MORNING, MARCH 26, 1856.

6th Auditor

TO OUR SUBSCRIBERS.

The name of no person will be entered upon our books, unless the payment of the subscription be made in advance.

Distant subscribers may forward us money by letter, the postage of which will be paid by us, and all risk assumed by ourselves in its safe transmission.

The COUNTRY PAPER is published tri-weekly during the sessions of Congress, and semi-weekly during the recess.

Subscriptions for a period less than a year will be received on terms proportioned to the above annual rates.

☞ POSTMASTERS are authorized to act as our agents; and by sending us FIVE DAILY subscribers, with $50 enclosed; or FIVE SEMI-WEEKLY subscribers, with $25 enclosed, will be entitled to a copy *gratis*.

For Sale Four Hundred Negroes and Ten Thousand Acres of Cane-Brake Land in Dallas and Perry Counties, Alabama.

ON the first Monday in April next (the 7th) I will sell, at Cahawba, Dallas county, Ala., to the highest bidder, for cash, or Mobile "acceptances," at sixty or ninety days, bearing interest, one hundred and fifty likely negroes; also, fifty others, on longer time. All acclimated, and experienced cotton-plantation hands.

I will also sell, at any time during this year, at private sale, for cash or on time, two hundred other valuable negroes, (in lots to suit purchasers,) and 10,000 acres of the very best and most advantageously situated "cane-brake" and "black land," including the nine plantations known as the "Trigg Plantation," "Mud Hall," "Sixteenth," "King Plantation," "Blevins Place," "Ludlow," "Lodebo," "Holmes Place," and the "Cross Roads," all of which, for cotton and corn, are inferior to no plantations in the world. Also, an elegantly improved and beautiful residence adjoining Summerfield, eight miles from the city of Selma, with about four hundred acres attached to it; the dwelling house, offices, out-houses, grounds, garden, &c., are all in first-rate condition. These plantations are 70 or 80 miles below the city of Montgomery, about 150 miles above Mobile, and west of, and near to, the Alabama river, which is at all seasons navigable for steamboats. Near seven thousand acres, including four of the plantations, are on the Selma and Woodville railroad; and on this body of land, about fourteen miles from Selma, is located the depot at the junction of the Marion railroad with the Selma road, to and from which depot the cars run regularly. Of the other plantations, one is on the Selma railroad two are two miles, and two six miles distant, one of which is within six miles of the city of Selma. These plantations are in the highest state of cultivation, with good gins, gin-houses, cotton-presses, mills, negro cabins, shops, stables, artesian wells, &c., &c., &c.

I will sell them in tracts to suit purchasers, of 500, 1,000, 1,500, 2,000, or 3,000 acres, and so laid off as to give as much opened and wood land to each tract as may be desired, and with or without the negroes, stock, plantation tools, corn, provender, &c.

Possession of the above plantations and negroes will be given to the purchasers at any time whilst the crop is growing, or in December or January next, as they may wish.

If not sold privately previous to the first Monday in December next, I will, on that day, at Selma, sell to the highest bidder such negroes as may then be unsold.

Such opportunities and advantages were never before presented for those wishing to continue or to engage in the cultivation of cotton. It has been difficult for years past to find a plantation in the "cane-brake" region for sale at any price, or even to purchase there a large unimproved tract.

These plantations are, in fertility, facilities for transportation, and in all other respects, fully equal, if not superior, to any in the cotton-growing States; and I know that personal investigation will prove to the satisfaction of every one that no portion of the Union is more healthy than the "cane-brake" region of Alabama.

I will also sell privately, for cash or on time, one of the most beautifully improved private residences in the city of Selma, and several valuable and elegantly-finished large blocks of brick buildings, including the largest and most desirably located store-rooms, offices, banking houses, &c., &c.

Also, several very desirable unimproved large lots, and small tracts of land in and contiguous to Selma.

Also, about 30 head of blooded horses; among which are the celebrated "Brown Dick," several superior brood mares, several young stallions, geldings, colts, and fillies—all of them from the very best racing stock.

Among the negroes are a first-rate trainer, several good race-riders, and many excellent mechanics, cooks, seamstresses, and house servants.

For further particulars address the undersigned, or W. M. Byrd, esq., at Selma; or W. M. Brooks, esq., at Marion, Perry county, Alabama. The overseers now on the plantations will give all desirable information to those who may wish to make a personal investigation of the premises. BEN. EDWARDS GREY.

SELMA, Alabama, Feb. 11, 1856.
Feb 19—d2mif

Land Warrants.

JOHN CLARK, (late register at Iowa city, Iowa,) agent for the location of military bounty-land warrants in the State of Iowa.—I have opened an office in Washington city, D. C., in connexion with local agents and surveyors at the several land offices in the State of Iowa, by which I am prepared to offer new facilities for the location of land warrants, the only mode by which warrantees and other holders can fully avail themselves of the bounty of the government.

TERMS.

The land will be selected, the location made, and certificate mailed to the address of parties, sending warrants by mail, for the following fees, which must accompany the warrants:

40 acres, fee for selection and location, $4; to which add land office fee, $1—$5.
80 acres, fee for selection and location, $6; to which add land office fee, $2—$8.
120 acres, fee for selection and location, $8; to which add land office fee, $3—$11.
160 acres, fee for selection and location, $10; to which add land office fee, $4—$14.

The above are the lowest prices charged by competent agents at the local office.

I guaranty that all selections will be made judiciously, upon actual inspection, and of as good land as remains vacant in the district at the time.

The selecting agents are the most competent and experienced in the State, and are fully advised of all the local advantages—such as railroads, county seats, timbers, water, and settlements, present and prospective.

Lands thus selected will be worth, I am confident, from $2 50 to $5 per acre as soon as selected. Warrantees, for whose benefit this agency is designed, and other holders, cannot fail to realize a large advance upon the face of their warrants.

DIRECTIONS.

Warrantees will execute to me a power of attorney to locate endorsed on the warrant. And others will please fill the blank assignments with the full name of the locator.

Address JOHN CLARK, No. 432 Pennsylvania avenue, with J. W. Webb & Co.

Refer to the Iowa delegation in Congress, and the Hon. Charles Mason, Commissioner of Patents.
Feb 12—dil 3m*

THIS is to give notice that the subscriber hath obtained from the orphans' court of Washington county, in the District of Columbia, letters of administration on the personal estate of Thomas Law, late of the State of Illinois, deceased. All persons having claims against the said deceased are hereby warned to exhibit the same, with the vouchers thereof, to the subscriber, on or before the nineteenth day of February next; they may otherwise by law be excluded from all benefit of the said estate.

Given under my hand this nineteenth day of February, 1856.
Feb 22—law3w HENRY MAY, Administrator.

Medical Card.

DOCTOR STANISLAS HERNISZ, regular practitioner of homœopathy. Office, 231 corner F and Fourteenth streets. Consultations from 10, a. m., to 3, p. m.

Doctor Stanislas Hernisz, having returned from Europe with improved health, will attend to the practice of his profession.

Le Docteur parle Français.
Der Doctor spricht Deutsch.
El Doctor habla Español,
Il Dottore parla Italiano.
Jan 19—d6m

Madame Devos,
From Paris and New York.

MADAME DEVOS'S millinery has arrived, and is now opened for inspection at The Lakes, 504 Pennsylvania avenue, to which the attention of the ladies of Washington, Georgetown, &c., is respectfully invited.
Jan 24—tf

For Sale—Twenty-three Thousand Acres of Land.

THE subscriber offers for sale, upon the most liberal terms, the following lands: situated in Jasper county, Indiana, 1,360 acres; in Stark county, 6,676 acres; in Iroquois county, Illinois, 240 acres; in Hamilton county, 340 acres. These lands are finely timbered, in an old settled district, within five miles of McClanesborough, the county seat, and on the line of the Chicago railroad. In Jefferson county, Illinois, 240 acres; in Franklin county, 640 acres; in Pope county, 160 acres; in Alexander county, 240 acres; and other lands in Wisconsin. For further information call on G. M. GORDON, No. 288 H street, agent for J. L. DE CAMP.

Washington city, D. C., Feb. 17, 1856.
Feb 19—dif tf

THE subscriber will remain in town a few days to dispose of the remaining States and Territories for the control of the sale of his Flour Restorative. He will treat with parties for the States of Louisiana, Arkansas, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, Oregon, Washington Territory, Nebraska and Kansas, Minnesota, Utah, Northwestern Territory, New Mexico, and the island of Cuba. During my absence at any time from the city, my agent, Mr. G. M. GORDON, No. 288 H street, will represent me. J. L. DE CAMP.
Feb 19—dif tf

Willards' Hotel.
J. C. & H. A. WILLARD,
Pennsylvania avenue and Fourteenth street,
Washington, D. C.
Jan 29—difif

F. L. MOORE is prepared to furnish the best white and red ash coal of all sizes and Cumberland coal of all kinds to his customers at the lowest market prices.

2,240 pounds guarantied to the ton.

Hickory, oak, and pine wood at very low prices.

A good article and full measure may be relied on in all cases.

Yard west side 9th street, between D and E, opposite "Old Stand."
Nov 30—FTuThif

A Card.
Miss Brooke's English and French Boarding and Day School, Seven Buildings, No. 138 Pennsylvania avenue.

THE second session of this institution will commence on Monday, February 4, 1856.

Daily instruction in the French language as given by a lady, recently from Paris, who resides in the family; the higher branches of English are under the especial charge of Miss Brooke, and every means is afforded for the acquisition of a thorough and elegant education. Jan 27—eod3w

GEORGE W. MORELL, Attorney and Counsellor-at-law, United States circuit court commissioner, commissioner for the Court of Claims, No. 44 Wall street, New York.

Refers to Hon. S. Nelson, Justice United States Supreme Court; Hon. H. Fish, United States senator; General J. G. Totten, Corps of Engineers, United States army; M. Blair, Solicitor to the Court of Claims; R. H. Gillet, esq., and Major Arnold Harris, Washington city. Oct 10—WF&Sun3m

NOTICE is hereby given that I will apply to the Commissioner of Pensions to grant me a duplicate of a 40-acre land bounty warrant, issued to me under the law of September, 1850, and numbered 54,683, for my services in the war of 1812–'15, which warrant has been lost, and which has never been assigned, pledged, or located by me, or by my authority.
Jan 18—lawliw JOHN ROSS.

SKETCH Book of Meister Karl; by C. G. Leland. $1 25.
The Way of Salvation; by Albert Barnes. $1.
The Ocean—illustrated; by P. H. Gosse. $1.
Tales from the German; by W. H. Turness. 75 cents.
Mar 4 FRANCK TAYLOR.

Splendid Schemes for March, 1856.

GREGORY & MAURY, MANAGERS, Wilmington, Delaware.

$36,000!
Lottery for the benefit of the
STATE OF DELAWARE.
Class 55, for 1856.
To be drawn at Wilmington, Del., on Saturday, March 15, 1856.
78 number lottery—13 drawn ballots.

RICH SCHEME.

1 prize of	$36,000	1 prize of	$1,100
2 prizes of	20,000	15 prizes of	1,000
2 do	10,000	15 do	500
2 do	7,500	15 do	400
4 do	5,000	25 do	250
4 do	2,500	200 do	200
&c.	&c.		&c.

Tickets $10—halves $5—quarters $2 50.
Certificates of packages of 26 whole tickets, $140
Do do 26 half do 70
Do do 26 quarter do 35

$65,000!
Lottery for the benefit of the
STATE OF DELAWARE.
Class L, for 1856.
To be drawn at Wilmington, Del., on Saturday, March 22, 1856.
78 number lottery—15 drawn ballots.

BRILLIANT SCHEME.

1 grand prize of	$65,000	1 splendid prize of	$6,795
1 splendid prize of	30,000	5 prizes of	5,000
1 do	20,000	50 do	1,000
1 do	15,000	394 do	300
1 do	10,000	&c. &c.	&c.

Tickets $20—halves $10—quarters $5—eighths $2 50.
Certificates of packages of 26 whole tickets, $240
Do do 26 half do 120
Do do 26 quarter do 60
Do do 26 eighth do 30

$40,000!
Lottery for the benefit of the
STATE OF DELAWARE.
CLASS 66, for 1856.
To be drawn at Wilmington, Del., March 29, 1856.
75 number lottery—12 drawn ballots.

MAGNIFICENT SCHEME.

1 grand prize of	$40,000	1 prize of	$3,500
1 splendid prize of	20,000	1 do	3,000
1 prize of	10,000	1 do	2,147
1 do	6,000	50 prizes of	1,000
1 do	5,000	50 do	500
1 do	4,000	111 do	250
&c.	&c.		&c.

Tickets $10—halves $5—quarters $2 50.
Certificates of packages of 25 whole tickets, $140
Do do 25 half do 70
Do do 25 quarter do 35

Orders for tickets and shares and certificates of packages in the above splendid lotteries will receive the most prompt attention, and an account of each drawing will be sent immediately after it is over to all who order from me.

Address P. J. BUCKEY, Agent,
Wilmington, Delaware.
Feb 16

Brilliant Schemes for April, 1856.

GREGORY & MAURY, Managers,
Wilmington, Delaware.
To be drawn under the superintendence of commissioners appointed by the governor.

$40,000!
Lottery for the benefit of the
STATE OF DELAWARE.
Class 72, for 1856.
To be drawn at Wilmington, Del., on Saturday, April 5, 1856.
75 number lottery—13 drawn ballots.

BRILLIANT SCHEME.

1 prize of	$40,000	1 prize of	$2,415
1 do	20,000	40 prizes of	1,000
1 do	10,000	40 do	300
1 do	6,000	200 do	200
1 do	3,500	&c.	&c.

Tickets $10—halves $5—quarters $2 50.
Certificates of packages of 25 wholes $120
Do do 25 halves 60
Do do 25 quarters 30

$51,000.
Lottery for the benefit of the
STATE OF DELAWARE.
Class No. 78, for 1856.
To be drawn at Wilmington, Del., on Saturday, April 12, 1856.
78 number lottery—14 drawn ballots.

SPLENDID SCHEME.

1 grand prize of	$51,000	1 prize of	$5,000
1 prize of	30,000	1 do	2,664
1 do	15,000	100 do	1,000
1 do	10,000	257 do	300
1 do	7,500	&c.	&c.

Tickets $15—halves $7 50—quarters $3 75—eighths $1 87½.
Certificates of packages of 26 whole tickets, $180 00
Do do 26 half do 90 00
Do do 26 quarter do 45 00
Do do 26 eighth do 22 50

$37,500!
Lottery for the benefit of the
STATE OF DELAWARE.
Class 84, for 1856.
To be drawn at Wilmington, Del., on Saturday, April 19, 1856.
78 number lottery—12 drawn ballots.

RICH SCHEME.

1 prize of	$37,500	1 prize of	$3,297
1 splendid prize of	20,000	1 do	2,000
1 prize of	15,000	100 prizes of	750
1 do	10,000	114 lowest 3 No. prizes	500
&c.		&c.	

Tickets $10—halves $5—quarters $2 50.
Certificates of packages of 26 whole tickets, $150 00
Do do 26 half do 75 00
Do do 26 quarter do 37 50

$67,500!
Lottery for the benefit of the
STATE OF DELAWARE.
Class M, for 1856.
To be drawn at Wilmington, Del., on Saturday, April 26, 1856.
75 numbers—12 drawn ballots.

BRILLIANT SCHEME.

1 grand prize of	$67,500	10 prizes of	$3,000
1 splendid do	35,000	40 do	1,500
1 do do	25,000	40 do	1,200
1 do do	12,500	125 lowest 3 No. prizes	1,000
1 do do	6,578	&c.	&c.

Tickets $20—halves $10—quarters $5—Eighths $2 50.
Certificates of package of 25 wholes $260 00
Do do 25 halves 130 00
Do do 25 quarters 65 00
Do do 25 eighths 32 50

Orders for tickets and shares and certificates of packages in the above splendid lotteries will receive the most prompt attention, and an account of each drawing will be sent immediately after it is over to all who order from me. Address,
P. J. BUCKEY, Agent,
Wilmington, Delaware.
Mar 14

United States Court of Claims.
CARD.

THE undersigned, John C. Devereux, of New York city, and M. Thompson, of Washington, D. C., attorneys and counsellors-at-law, are associated for the legal prosecution of claims, for creditors of government, in the Court of Claims.

They will co-operate in immediate and careful attention to business matters at Washington which may be intrusted to their care by gentlemen of the profession and claimants, in the city of New York, or elsewhere in any part of the Union.

They may be consulted at any time, personally or by letter, either at New York or Washington. Particular information as to claims which have been at any time before Congress or departments can be furnished at once upon application by the parties interested.

JOHN C. DEVEREUX,
No. 90 Broadway, corner Wall street, New York city.
M. THOMPSON,
Washington city.

N. B.—J. C. Devereux is a commissioner of the Court of Claims.
Jan 31—3tawif [Intel.]

Law Partnership.

R. J. WALKER. L. JANIN.

ROBERT J. WALKER & LOUIS JANIN have formed a partnership for the management and trial of cases in the Supreme Court of the United States and in the Court of Claims. Address Washington City, D. C.
Jan 2—eodif

United States Patent Office,
Washington, February 13, 1856.

ON the petition of Michael B. Dyott, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, praying for the extension of a patent granted to him for an improvement in lamps for essential oils, for seven years from the expiration of said patent, which takes place on the thirtieth day of May, 1856—

It is ordered that the said petition be heard at the Patent Office on Monday, the nineteenth May next, at 12 o'clock, m.; and all persons are notified to appear and show cause, if any they have, why said petition ought not to be granted.

Persons opposing the extension are required to file in the Patent Office their objections, specially set forth in writing, at least twenty days before the day of hearing. All testimony filed by either party to be used at the said hearing must be taken and transmitted in accordance with the rules of the office, which will be furnished on application.

The testimony in the case will be closed on the 5th of May; depositions, and other papers relied upon as testimony, must be filed in the office on or before the morning of that day; the arguments, if any, within ten days thereafter.

Ordered, also, that this notice be published in the Union, Intelligencer, and Evening Star, Washington, D. C.; Republican, Baltimore, Maryland; Pennsylvanian, Philadelphia, Pa.; and Journal of Commerce, New York, N. Y., once a week for three successive weeks previous to the nineteenth of May next, the day of hearing.

CHARLES MASON,
Commissioner of Patents.

P. S.—Editors of the above papers will please copy, and send their bills to the Patent Office, with a paper containing this notice.
Feb 15—law3w

GENTLEMEN'S HATS.—TODD & CO. will, to-day, introduce their spring style. March 1—d3t

United States Mail.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT,
March 3, 1856.

PROPOSALS for conveying the mails of the United States from the 1st day of July, 1856, to the 30th day of June, 1859, inclusive, in the State of North Carolina, and from the 1st day of July, 1856, to the 30th of June, 1858, inclusive, in the State of Tennessee, will be received at the Contract Office of the Post Office Department, in the city of Washington, until Wednesday, the 30th of April, 1856, at 5, p. m., (to be decided by the 7th May following.)

NORTH CAROLINA.

5808 From Asheville, by Sulphur Springs, Hommeny Creek, Pigeon River, Forks of Pigeon, Waynesville, Peru, Scotts Creek, Franklin, Skench, Tennessee River, Aquone, Head Tennessee, Valleytown, and Tomatla, to Murphy, 128½ miles and back, twice a week, in two horse coaches.
Leave Asheville Monday and Thursday at 4 a m;
Arrive at Murphy next days by 12 p m;
Leave Murphy Saturday and Tuesday at 4 a m;
Arrive at Asheville next days by 12 p m.

TENNESSEE.

8548 From Cleaveland, Tenn., by Chataly, Wansville, Benton, Pelton, Springtown, Towee Falls, Coker Creek, Turtle Town, N. C., Laurel Valley, Persimmon Creek, and Nottla, to Murphy, 77 miles and back, twice a week, in two-horse coaches.
Leave Cleaveland Thursday and Sunday at 1 p m;
Arrive at Murphy next days by 9 p m;
Leave Murphy Wednesday and Saturday at 4 a m;
Arrive at Cleaveland next days by 12 m.
Proposals to commence at Benton are invited.

NOTES.

No pay will be made for trips not performed, and for each of such omissions not satisfactorily explained three times the pay of the trip may be deducted. For arrivals far behind time as to break connexion with depending mails, and not sufficiently excused, one-fourth of the compensation for the trip is subject to forfeiture. Fines will be imposed, unless the delinquency be promptly and satisfactorily explained by certificates of postmasters or the affidavits of other creditable persons, for neglecting to take the mail from or into a post office; for suffering it to be injured, destroyed, robbed, or lost; and for refusing, after demand, to convey the mail as frequently as the contractor runs, or is concerned in running, vehicles on the route. The Postmaster General may annul the contract for repeated failures to run agreeably to contract, for disobeying the post office laws or instructions of the department, or for assigning the contract without the assent of the Postmaster General. The Postmaster General may alter the schedule. He may also order an increase of service on the route by allowing therefor a *pro rata* increase of the contract pay. He may also curtail or discontinue the service in whole or in part, at *pro rata* decrease of pay, if he allow one month's extra compensation on the amount of service dispensed with. The bids should be addressed to the Second Assistant Postmaster General, superscribed "*Mail Proposals for North Carolina or Tennessee.*" The contracts to be executed and returned to the department by or before the 7th of May, 1856. For further particulars as to conditions to be incorporated in the contracts bidders may see pamphlet advertisement for conveying mails in Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and Iowa, of 1854.

JAMES CAMPBELL,
Postmaster General.
Mar 4—law4w

United States Mail.

MISSISSIPPI.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT,
February 25, 1856.

PROPOSALS for conveying the mail of the United States from July 1, 1856, to June 30, 1858, on the following route, will be received at the Contract Office of this Department until 3, p. m., of April 30 next, to be decided by the 7th of May following:

7484 From Charleston, Miss., by Mouth of Cold Water, Mitchell's Cross Roads, Mound Place, Moor's Bayou, and Swan Lake, to Helena, Ark., 75 miles and back, once a week.
Leave Charleston Monday at 7, a. m.;
Arrive at Helena next day by 9, p. m.;
Leave Helena Wednesday at 7, a. m;
Arrive at Charleston next day by 9, p. m.

NOTE.

Proposals must be guarantied by two responsible persons, certified to as such by a postmaster or judge of a court of record; and contract must be entered into by the successful bidder, with surety, before the 1st of July next.

No pay will be made for trips not performed, and for each of such omissions not satisfactorily explained three times the pay of the trip may be deducted. For arrivals so far behind time as to break connexion with depending mails, and not sufficiently excused, one-fourth of the compensation for the trip is subject to forfeiture. Fines will be imposed, unless the delinquency be promptly and satisfactorily explained, for neglecting to take the mail from or into a post office; for suffering it to be injured, destroyed, robbed, or lost; and for refusing, after demand, to convey the mail as frequently as the contractor runs, or is concerned in running, vehicles on the route. The Postmaster General may annul the contract for repeated failures to run agreeably to contract, or for disobeying the post office laws or instructions of the department. The Postmaster General may alter the schedule. He may also order an increase of service by allowing therefor a *pro rata* increase on the contract pay. He may also curtail or discontinue the service in whole or in part, at *pro rata* decrease of pay, allowing one month's extra compensation on the amount of service dispensed with. Bids should be addressed to the "Second Assistant Postmaster General," superscribed "*Proposals for No 7484, Mississippi.*" For further particulars see pamphlet advertisement for conveying the mails in Alabama, Mississippi, &c., of 1854 and 1856.

JAMES CAMPBELL,
Postmaster General.
Feb 26—law4w

Novel Lottery.

THE SECOND EVER DRAWN IN THE UNITED STATES ON THE HAVANA PLAN.

In the first one drawn in January all the high prizes were sold. Our own impression is that low numbers will draw the prizes this time.

In this scheme all the prizes are placed in one wheel and all the numbers in another.

$136,000.

MARYLAND LOTTERY TO BE DRAWN ON THE HAVANA PLAN.

GRAND CONSOLIDATED LOTTERY OF MARYLAND,
CLASS TEN,
To be drawn in the city of Baltimore, Maryland, on Saturday, Mar 22, 1856.

Prizes amounting to 136,000 dollars will be distributed according to the following splendid scheme.
20,000 numbers—1,000 prizes.
Prizes payable in full without deduction. One prize to every twenty tickets.

SCHEME.

1	prize of	$35,280	is	$35,280
1	do	10,000	is	10,000
1	do	10,000	is	10,000
1	do	5,000	is	5,000
1	do	5,000	is	5,000
10	do	1,000	are	10,000
20	do	500	are	10,000
165	do	200	are	33,000

APPROXIMATION PRIZES.

4	do of $100	approx. to	$35,280	prizes	are	$400
8	do of 75	" "	10,000	do	are	600
8	do of 40	" "	5,000	do	are	320
40	do of 30	" "	1,000	do	are	1,200
80	do of 25	" "	500	do	are	2,000
660	do of 20	" "	200	do	are	13,200

1,000 prizes, amounting to $136,000
Whole tickets, $10; Halves, $5; Quarters, $2 50; Eighths, $1 25.

APPROXIMATION PRIZES.

The two preceding and the two succeeding numbers to those drawing the first 200 prizes, will be entitled to the 800 approximation prizes. For example: If ticket No. 11250 draws the $35,280 prize, those tickets numbered 11,248, 11,249, 11,251, and 11,252 will each be entitled to $100, and so on according to the above scheme.

PLAN OF THE LOTTERY.

In the above scheme there are 20,000 tickets, numbered from 1 to 20,000. There are 200 full prizes and 800 approximations—making, in all, 1,000 prizes.

The numbers from 1 to 20,000 corresponding with the numbers on the tickets, printed on separate slips of paper, are rolled up and encircled with small tin tubes and placed in a glass wheel.

The amounts of the different 200 full prizes, similarly printed and encircled, are placed in another wheel. After revolving the wheel, a number is drawn from the wheel of numbers, and at the same time a prize is drawn from the other wheel by boys who are blindfolded. The number and the prize drawn out are opened and exhibited to the audience and registered by the commissioner, the prize being placed against the number drawn. This operation is repeated until all the prizes are drawn out. The drawing is then printed, and, after comparison, the commissioner certifies to its correctness.

SPECIAL NOTICE.

We are so well satisfied that low numbers will draw the high prizes in this lottery that we have secured all the low numbers in the scheme under 1,000, for the especial benefit of our own customers. By an early application to our office only you can obtain any number you may desire in this truly extraordinary lottery.

If you want to secure one of them, address a line to
EGERTON & BROTHER,
Regular licensed agents, Box 102 Baltimore Post Office, or call at their Office, corner of Exchange Place and South street.
Mar 4—2aw3we&dif

United States Patent Office,
Washington, March 13, 1856.

ON the petition of George L. Wright, of West Springfield Massachusetts, praying for the extension of a patent granted to him on the 28th of May, 1842, for an improvement in "machines for ruling letter paper," for seven years from the expiration of said patent, which takes place on the 28th day of May, 1856—

It is ordered that the said petition be heard at the Patent Office on Monday, the 12th of May next, at 12 o'clock, m.; and all persons are notified to appear and show cause, if any they have, why said petition ought not to be granted.

Persons opposing the extension are required to file in the Patent Office their objections, specially set forth in writing, at least twenty days before the day of hearing; all testimony filed by either party to be used at the said hearing must be taken and transmitted in accordance with the rules of the office, which will be furnished on application.

The testimony in the case will be closed on the 2d of May; depositions, and other papers relied upon as testimony, must be filed in the office on or before the morning of that day; the arguments, if any, within ten days thereafter.

Ordered, also, that this notice be published in the Union, Intelligencer, and Evening Star, Washington, D. C.; Republican, Baltimore; Pennsylvanian, Philadelphia; Day Book, New York; and Post, Boston, once a week for three successive weeks previous to the 12th of May next, the day of hearing.

CHARLES MASON,
Commissioner of Patents.

P. S.—Editors of the above papers will please copy, and send their bills to the Patent Office, with a paper containing this notice.
Mar 14—law3w

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Mar 14—

CONGRESSIONAL.

SPEECH OF HON. A. H. STEPHENS,

OF GEORGIA;

Delivered in the House of Representatives, March 11, 1856.

The resolution from the Committee of Elections asking for power to send for persons and papers in the Kansas election case being before the House for consideration—

Mr. STEPHENS said:

Mr. SPEAKER: It is not my desire to prolong this debate, nor do I expect to present any new points on the merits of the question before the House. I wish, and intend only in what I have to say, to enlarge upon and enforce some of the points made in the minority report on your table. I wish, too, in what I have to say, to have the ear of the House rather than the ear of the country; not that I do not want the country to hear what I say, but my main object is to address myself this morning particularly, especially, and emphatically to the attention of the House, and upon the questions before us. These, sir, are grave questions. They are questions involving principles of the first magnitude; they are questions of a judicial as well as political character of the highest order, far above the small consideration of which of two men shall have a seat as a delegate here. In deciding them, we sit not as legislators, but as judges. Our decision upon this resolution, whatever it may be, will be an important precedent in the future history of this country. We should, therefore, not act without due deliberation, careful reflection, and a full understanding of the principles involved; and we should also be stripped, as far as possible, of all party bias and all political prejudice.

The proposition before us is one of an unusual character. It is for this House to exercise one of its extraordinary powers—that is, the power to send for persons and papers in a case before us, sitting as a court judging of the qualifications, election, and return of one who occupies a seat as a territorial delegate upon this floor. Now, sir, I do not question the power of the House to exercise the authority invoked. The gentleman on my right from Pennsylvania, [Mr. KUNKEL,] in his remarks yesterday, spoke as if he thought those of us who oppose the resolution now pending denied the power to send for persons and papers in cases of contested elections; and he cited cases in which it has been done. On this point I wish to be distinctly understood; I do not deny the power in a proper case; though no instance of its exercise has occurred since the act of Congress of 1851, regulating the mode of taking testimony in cases of contests for seats here; and no case need ever occur, as far as I can see, so long as that law remains on the statute-book. Its provisions are full and ample. But should the case occur where it may be necessary, in order to get proper and competent testimony to establish any fact that the House can legitimately and properly inquire into in such investigations, to send for persons and papers, I do not question their power to do it. What I maintain is, that the power can be rightfully exercised only when it is done to procure testimony which is in itself relevant, pertinent, competent, and admissible to prove such facts as the House can properly consider and look into. Nor do I wish to be understood as being inclined in the slightest degree to oppose investigation in this case to the fullest extent that can be properly gone into by us. Within these limits I am in favor of the House taking the widest range and greatest latitude of investigation. But is the question before us such a one as would allow a hearing of the testimony sought to be obtained even if it were at hand? I think it is not. It is to this point I now speak.

What, sir, is the character of the testimony which is asked to be sent for? And what is the object of it if obtained? Sift the whole matter—get rid of the rubbish—go through both reports; and does not the real gist of this application amount to this: The memorialist wishes witnesses sent for to prove the *invalidity* of the law of a Territory of the United States, under which a sitting delegate was elected, on the ground that the members of the legislative assembly of that Territory which passed it were not properly and legally elected. Is not this a fair statement of the proposition as it now stands before us? It was to get this clear view of its merits before the House that I moved, when it was here before, to refer the proposition back to the committee, to have their reasons and grounds for making it reported to the House. We now have their reasons; we now know what is their object; and have I not stated it fully and fairly? Then, sir, is the testimony competent if it were here? Mark you, we sit as a court. Would it be admissible in the trial of any cause in any court—in a criminal case, for instance—to permit a party to offer evidence to impeach the validity of the law under which the accused was arraigned by showing that the legislature that passed the law was not properly elected and legally constituted? The *validity* of a law may be inquired into and judged of by a court on some grounds which might be stated. The constitutionality of a law may be decided upon—that I do not question; but never upon this ground. The rules governing all courts in passing upon laws and construing statutes I need not here state. But no court, in judging of the *validity* of a statute on any of the grounds they take cognizance of, will ever allow an inquiry into the legality of the election of the members of the legislature that passed it. No case can be found of this character in the whole history of civil jurisprudence.

The reason courts of law will not allow such inquiries to be made before them is, that the decision of all such questions properly belongs to another tribunal—to the houses, respectively, of the law-making power itself; and their decision, when made, is considered as the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, which no other court will inquire into. And this House, sitting as a court as it now does, cannot inquire into any fact invalidating or impeaching the validity of any law, either of the United States, a State, or Territory, which any other court could not inquire into. I assert this as a principle that cannot be successfully assailed. I call upon gentlemen who occupy a contrary position to show a case, if they can, in this or any other country, where the validity of a law in any court of justice was ever allowed to be impeached by inquiring into the legality of the election of the members of the legislature that passed it. That is what we are now called upon to do; and that is what I assert we have no right to do. Why, sir, it is a fundamental maxim of the English law, laid down by Sir Edward Coke, illustrated by Sir William Blackstone, and enforced by every writer on the subject, both English and American, that it is an inherent right of the High Court of Parliament—from which, as a model, all our legislative, parliamentary bodies have sprung—to settle for itself all questions touching its own organization; and when such questions are thus settled, they cannot be inquired into elsewhere.

What is the question now before us? Under that clause of the constitution which secures to this House the right and power to judge of the qualifications, elections, and returns of those who may be entitled to hold seats on this floor, we have brought to our consideration the right of the sitting of the sitting delegate of the Territory of Kansas. Into his qualifications, election, and return we have full power to go, and to determine all questions pertaining either to his qualifications, his election, or return. But in doing this, we are asked to take a step further, and to judge not only of his election, return, and qualifications, but to go into an investigation and judge of the qualifications, elections, and returns of the members of the legislative assembly of Kansas which passed the law under which it is admitted he was elected. I say, sir, according to the principle which I have laid down, no case in the parliamentary history of England, from which all our institutions have sprung, or in this country, can be adduced to justify or warrant it. I beg leave to call attention to some authority on this point. I read from Sir Edward Coke, (4 Inst., p. 15.) In speaking of the High Court of Parliament, he says:

"And as every court of justice hath laws and customs for its direction, some by the common law, some by the civil and common law, some by peculiar laws and customs, &c., so *the High Court of Parliament, suis propriis legibus et consuetudinibus subsistit.* It is *lex et consuetudo parliamenti.*

"And this is the reason that the judges ought not to give any opinion of the matter of Parliament, because it is not to be decided by the common laws, but *secundum legem et consuetudinem parliamenti*; and so the judges in divers Parliaments have confessed."

On any matter relating to the constitution, organization, rights, or privileges of the members of the House of Lords the Commons cannot interfere. In like matters, relating to the organization of the House of Commons, the Lords cannot interfere. No other court in the kingdom can interfere. The highest court of the realm—the King with the prerogatives of the Crown—cannot interfere. On all these matters each house is a court with full, ample, absolute jurisdiction over the whole subject. And when they are determined by that court, with full and competent jurisdiction over the subject-matter, its judgment cannot be inquired into by any other tribunal. Sir Edward Coke says further, on page 50, same volume:

"Thus much have we thought good to set down concerning knights, citizens, and burgesses; because much time is spent in Parliament concerning the right of elections, &c., which might be more profitably employed *pro bono publico.*"

This latter remark is not very inapplicable to our condition. But the author goes on:

"Now, to treat more in particular (as it hath been desired) of the laws, customs, liberties, and privileges of this *court* of Parliament, which are the very heart-strings of the Commonwealth, * * * would take up a whole volume of itself. Certain it is, as hath been said, that *curia parliamenti suis propriis legibus subsistit.*"

And he goes on to say that it does not belong to the justices of England, or the barons of the exchequer, to judge of any of these matters coming within the jurisdiction of this court of Parliament. Now, sir, I invite attention to what Sir William Blackstone says on this subject in his Commentaries, with which all of us ought to be familiar. After referring to these remarks of Coke, and affirming them, he says, in vol. I, p. 163:

"It will be sufficient to observe that the whole of the law and custom of Parliament has its original from this one maxim, 'that whatever matter arises concerning either House of Parliament ought to be examined, discussed, and *adjudged* in that House to which it relates, and not *elsewhere.*' Hence, for instance, the Lords will not suffer the Commons to interfere in settling the election of a peer of Scotland; the Commons will not allow the Lords to judge of the election of a burgess; nor will either house permit the subordinate courts of law to examine the merits of either case."

All such matters are to be decided by the houses of Parliament, respectively, not arbitrarily, but according to the usages, customs, and precedents in like cases, which constitute the *lex parliamenti*, or law of Parliament; but when decided, whether right or wrong, there is no power to reverse the decision. Just so, sir, with us; when this House passes judgments upon the qualifications or election of a member here, it is final and conclusive. Here the matter is to be examined, discussed, and *adjudged*; and, when adjudged, it cannot be inquired into elsewhere. So with every legislative body. On this point I now call the attention of the House to what Mr. Justice Story says upon the same subject, in speaking of this clause, in his treatise upon the constitution of the United States. After quoting the clause of the constitution which provides that each house shall judge of the qualifications, elections, and returns of its own members, he says, in vol. II, p. 295:

"The only possible question on such a subject is as to *the body* in which such a power shall be lodged. If lodged in any other than the *legislative body itself*, its independence, its purity, and even its existence and action, may be destroyed or put into imminent danger. No other body but itself can have the same motives to perpetuate and preserve these attributes; no other body can be so perpetually watchful to guard its own rights and privileges from infringement, to purify and vindicate its own character, and to preserve the rights and sustain the free choice of its constituents. *Accordingly, the power has always been lodged in the legislative body by the uniform practice of England and America.*"

If more authority is desired on this point, I refer to Kent's Commentaries, Tucker's, and to all writers on the subject. It is the uniform practice of this country, adopted from England, to leave the adjudication of all questions touching the elections and returns of members of legislative bodies to those bodies themselves. The principle runs through all our State legislatures. It lies at the foundation of all our representative institutions. It is recognised even in all our voluntary associations and conventions, whether civil or ecclesiastical. There can be no efficient political legislative organization without it; and when the legislative body, to which the question belongs, has made its decision, there is no appeal to any other power. It is a final judgment rendered. It is so with the decision of this House on such questions—it is so with the decisions of the Senate on like questions. It is so with the State legislatures, and it should be so in Kansas. If the election of any members of the legislature there, either of the house or the council, was illegal, the proper place for an inquiry into it was there. And if any person wishing to contest those elections failed to present their case there before the proper tribunal, they cannot come here to do it. If we inquire now into the legality of those elections for the purpose of disregarding or invalidating the law passed by the legislature under which the sitting delegate was elected, why may we not inquire into the validity of the law of Congress organizing that territorial government, upon the grounds that some of the members of this House who voted for it in the last Congress were not properly elected? or on the ground that some of the senators who voted for it were chosen by members of State legislatures not properly elected? And this, too, on the still further ground that some of the sheriffs or returning officers in the State elections for members of the legislature perhaps were not legally elected or qualified? If you open the door to such an investigation as that now sought, where are we to stop? Who can see the end of this beginning? Whose vision can take in the wide extent of that vast region of uncertainty, insecurity, abounding in hidden, unseen dangers and perils, your course may lead to? I hold, sir, that if a law should be passed by the votes of members now upon this floor, who may hereafter be turned out because of the illegality of their election, the validity of such law so passed can never be inquired into either by any court of the land, or even by ourselves, on the ground of its having been so passed. And though a law may be passed in a State or territorial legislature by the votes of members who may afterwards be turned out, because of the illegality of their election, yet the validity of such a law can never be questioned in consequence of that fact. But if the principle, now advocated for the first time in our history, shall be established, and the precedent be followed up, you unhinge all legislation; you bring everything like law amongst us into uncertainty, doubt, and confusion; you cut the "heart-strings," as Coke says, of our whole system of government; you take the first step, and, if it be pursued, that which will prove to be a fatal step towards political and social anarchy. I enter my protest here this day against it.

I repeat, sir, these are grave questions. I give you, Mr. Speaker, and the members of the House, as my fellow-judges in this matter, my views of the rules which should govern us in the judgment we are to render in this case. Weigh them as they deserve, and give them such consideration as they merit.

But the gentleman at my right, [Mr. KUNKEL,] who addressed us yesterday, asked, if the allegations be true as here made, that a set of usurpers assumed to be the legislature of the Territory, are we to be bound by that assumption? I say to him, no. The countenance of any usurpation and the exercise of prerogatives not duly belonging to any body of men, even ourselves, is what I am against. There must be something more than a bare assumption of legislative authority to entitle the acts of any body of men to be recognised as emanating from a body clothed with power to make laws. The law-making power of this country must rest upon some better showing than bare assumption. It must come into being in the proper and legally-constituted way. This is well understood in America. We are not by any means legitimists, in the European sense of the word; but we recognise that government as legitimate which springs into existence by the will of the people, as expressed under the forms of law passed by the regularly-constituted authority of the land. A government so presenting itself we regard not only as the government of the people *de facto*, but *de jure*.

And now, sir, how is it with regard to this legislature of Kansas? We have a law of Congress authorizing it. It is familiar to all. That law organized the Territory of Kansas; that law permitted the people there, under the direction of the governor, to hold elections for members of the territorial legislature, with power to pass laws regulating the election of a delegate to Congress. This organic law of the Territory emanated from ourselves. This law we are bound to recognise. A governor was appointed in pursuance of it. The governor, the judiciary, the whole machinery of the government there, was legally constituted by ourselves—by Congress; and the forms prescribed, through which this territorial body exercising legislative functions came into existence, emanated from the highest authority known to us under the constitution. These facts are admitted. No person questions the public law creating the territorial legislature. Nobody questions the legal appointment of Governor Reeder. Nobody questions the proclamation he issued to hold an election on the 30th of March, 1855, for a territorial legislature, in pursuance of our law. These are all admitted facts. If anything irregular, then, attended the election of its members, it presented a question to be inquired into and adjudged by the proper authority, just as similar matters are inquired into and settled in other elections of legislative bodies—just as we inquire into such matters pertaining to our own organization. When, therefore, it is admitted that an election for members of the territorial legislature was held in Kansas on the 30th of March, as stated, in pursuance of law, under the direction of the legally-constituted authorities of the country, we are bound to recognise the body so coming into life as legitimate in its origin. It certainly did not spring from usurpation; nor does it rest its claims of legitimacy upon bare assumption. It had its birth in a legal way.

But here comes the argument from the other side that it was spurious, because the members who constituted it were not properly elected in conformity to the laws under which it was created. Well, sir, that was a judicial question to be settled and determined by the *lex parliamenti*, according to the authorities I have cited, and the universal practice of this country in like cases. It does not come within the purview of the powers of this House to settle that question. It was an inherent right in the houses of the Kansas legislature to judge and decide upon the qualifications, elections, and returns of their own members respectively. This power, says Story, by universal practice in England and in this country, is lodged in every legislative body to determine for itself. It is, indeed, one of the vital functions of the organism. The question was a judicial one, which some body was to determine; and what body was it? The courts of the country (say all the authorities) cannot take cognizance of it. Governor Reeder, as it appears from the papers before us, insisted that it was his right, under the law empowering him to prescribe the rules governing the election, to decide it; and the two houses of the legislature insisted that it was their parliamentary and legal right to decide it. My opinion is, that the houses were correct in their position. But, be that as it may, the merits of the question before us are not affected by it either way; for, if Reeder, as governor, had the right, it is an admitted fact that, out of twenty-six members composing the house of representatives of Kansas, he, as governor, claiming the right to judge of this matter, did *judicially*, and not *ministerially*, award certificates to seventeen of these members, as having been duly and properly elected on the 30th March, in pursuance of his proclamation duly and legally made. And like certificates he gave to ten out of the thirteen members composing the council. Thus a large majority of both branches of the legislature were *adjudged* by him to be duly chosen and returned members thereof—members whose election, he now says, was carried by an invasion, and that they held the places which he assigned them by nothing but usurpation! I am not now upon the question of his estoppel; I am considering the question of his right to judge, and, in that view, the effect of his judicial judgment rendered in the case. Keep in mind that, upon every question before any tribunal which has the sole and absolute right to judge in the matter, when the final judgment is rendered, it is forever conclusive upon the points embraced in it. Elections were held in May, by order of the governor, to fill the places of the nine members and six councilmen rejected by him at the March election. To those elected in May to fill those places he gave like certificates. Every man who took his seat in the legislature at its organization was adjudged and certified by the governor to be entitled to it. The legislature, therefore, if the governor had the right to judge, was legitimately and legally constituted; and their claims to be recognised as the proper law-making power of the Territory rest not upon bare assumption or usurpation. And, on the other hand, if the houses had the right to settle these questions touching their organization, the result is the same; for they, too, settled the question the same way as to the original seventeen members of the house and ten councilmen, and their judgment must be conclusive upon the fact that a majority of both houses were properly constituted. In either view, therefore, we may take as to the hands in which this power of judging was lodged, the question is a closed one; it is *res adjudicata*, and we have no right now to open it. I repeat, I am not now upon the point of Reeder's individual or personal estoppel in law. What I affirm is, that this question, from admitted facts, is closed; judgment has been rendered, and there is no appellate jurisdiction in this House, nor in any other tribunal. We can no more open this question than we can that of the proper organization of any State legislature.

The gentleman on my right, to whom I have alluded, [Mr. KUNKEL,] said, in the course of his remarks yesterday, that we, this House, have got a right to go, and have often gone, into an inquiry into the validity of the laws of the States in judging of elections to this House. Sir, I do not deny this. I admit that we may pass upon and judge of the validity of any law coming before us in such cases, just as any court may do, and upon just such grounds, and such grounds only, as courts may properly do. The grounds upon which this inquiry is sought courts will never inquire into, and we have no right to do it. There are some matters touching legislation and the rules governing the law-making power which must be considered as closed; and when judgment is rendered in them it must stand until the great day of judgment.

Mr. SIMMONS. Will the gentleman allow me to ask him a question?

Mr. STEPHENS. With pleasure.

Mr. SIMMONS. I ask whether a judgment is valid for any purpose whatever until it be shown that the party in whose name it is is the true party?

Mr. STEPHENS. To ascertain the true and proper party is part of the proceedings before judgment. That is one of the matters to be settled by the judgment, and when once settled by judgment finally rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction over the subject-matter, it is settled forever. Whether the party in whose favor it be rendered be the true party or not cannot be inquired into afterwards or elsewhere. And so in this instance persons presented themselves as the elected representatives of the people of Kansas in their legislature. They presented their credentials; the governor, claiming the right to pass judgment judicially in their favor, certified that they were the proper and true party. They then took up their own credentials in the usual way of legislatures, and came to a similar judgment as to a large majority in both houses. That judgment, viewed either way you please, is final on that question. That is my answer to the gentleman.

But the gentleman from Pennsylvania, in speaking of the inconsistency of Governor Reeder's course—for even he seemed ready to admit his great inconsistencies——

Mr. KUNKEL. No, sir; I said it was not necessary to my argument to prove that Governor Reeder was consistent.

Mr. STEPHENS. And the gentleman added that he could not speak for his consistency. Now, what I was about to submit to the House is, whether anybody can defend his course? I intend to speak of the facts as they are detailed before us in these reports, and as we know them to be. He was duly appointed governor of Kansas. He accepted the trust, and was in office when, according to his own showing, the election which took place in that Territory on the 30th of March was held in pursuance of his own proclamation. Twenty-six members of the house of representatives and thirteen members of the legislative council were elected. These were the numbers of which the houses were respectively composed. He assumed the right to judge of the election returns of these members. The rules governing the elections were prescribed by himself, and very rigid ones they were. The judges of elections were required not to allow any non-resident to vote, and to take an oath that they would not. These returns were submitted to him, and he examined them. He ratified the returns, and gave certificates to seventeen members of the house, and rejected but nine. He gave certificates to ten members of the council, and rejected three. He ordered a new election to be held to fill the places of those vacated by himself; but the two houses, as I have stated, assuming the right to judge of the qualifications of their own members after they met, decided in favor of those who had the highest number of votes on the first election.

But, sir, it was three months and upwards from the holding of this March election until the legislature met. He then said nothing of what we now hear of the manner of this election. But he, as governor, upon being notified that they were organized in obedience to his own call, addressed them as the legally-assembled and constituted legislature of the Territory. As late as the 21st of July, *after the houses had acted upon the subject of the contested seats in the cases of the nine members and three councilmen rejected by him*, he again addressed them in a message, and in it he says nothing of an invasion. He says nothing of subjugation—nothing of "martial music" and "artillery"—nothing of "border ruffianism"—*nothing of their action in the cases of contest referred to.* But he addressed them *then* as the legally-constituted legislature of the Territory. If, therefore, Governor Reeder had the right to judge of the election returns, as he claimed, was not his *acquiescence* in the decision of the houses on matters pertaining to their organization an *affirmance* on his part of their *judgment* in those cases? And at his instance shall we now go behind, not only the judgment of the houses of the legislature on these questions, but his affirmance of that judgment by an official act of Governor Reeder himself?

But, sir, I wish to notice some other matters that have dropped in this debate. Another gentleman from Pennsylvania, on my right, [Mr. CAMPBELL,] gave as a reason why this investigation should be gone into—why we should set aside Gov. Reeder's own judgment in this case—that he was a gentleman of high character—a man of worth, standing high in the estimation of the people of his State, and that this investigation was due him as such. Well, Mr. Speaker, I say to the gentleman that, if what Governor Reeder now says be really true, he certainly has forfeited and lost all just claims he may have had to the high and exalted opinions of his countrymen; he certainly shows himself guilty of the most flagrant and gross dereliction of duty that any public officer in the whole history of the country was ever guilty of. The gentleman from Pennsylvania must admit that if the Territory committed to his charge was invaded by an armed force, by which the legally-qualified voters of the Territory were driven from the polls in every district save one, and the polls seized by non-residents, who by violence carried the election—if that be true which Governor Reeder now affirms to be true—if that took place which he now says did take place, and he silently sat by and saw all, and afterwards recognised these invading hordes as the duly-elected legislature of the people, as he certainly did—then he was guilty of a base disregard of his official duty, without a parallel in our history, and one that no depth of infamy and degradation would be too low to assign him to for.

Mr. CAMPBELL, of Pennsylvania. If the gentleman from Georgia will allow me, I desire to ask him, if these thinks can be substantiated, why deny to Governor Reeder this investigation? Governor Reeder is ready to prove that his course was consistent, honorable, and proper. I ask that the gentleman will hear him, and then decide.

Mr. STEPHENS. Governor Reeder can never show that his course was proper and becoming an officer in his position, if what he states be true. I am not for this investigation, because I do not think it is right to make it. I do not regard it as a part of my duty to make improper investigation to sustain a man who, by his own statement, shows himself to have been guilty of a gross disregard of his official duty. So far as he is concerned, his showing