

Samuel M. Rutherford, of Arkansas, agent for the Seminole Indians.

We publish in another part of the paper this morning a communication from James Phelan, esq., in vindication of the consistency of the opinions of Mr. Calhoun upon the subject of the Missouri Compromise. This vindication is complete. Mr. Phelan has rendered a most acceptable service. He has exploded an erroneous imputation. He has brought together the evidence for this purpose, and made it accessible to the people of the country, most of whom might otherwise never have seen it. His valuable labor will be properly appreciated.

THE FEE SYSTEM OF COMPENSATION

Those who serve the public or others, are entitled to compensation, and the mode of ascertaining and making it is a matter of no little importance, and especially where it is not the subject of private agreement, but is regulated by law. Formerly attorneys were paid under fee bills, containing numerous items, and the drawing and copying papers were charged by the folio. This produced prolixity, and occasioned long and useless forms in legal proceedings. Where fee bills have been abolished, and attorneys paid a gross sum, or by agreement of their clients, legal business has been greatly simplified as well as expedited. But whenever forms and ceremonies can be increased, whenever they will be adhered to far enough to secure it. In public offices where the fee system is preserved, numerous useless ceremonies are performed merely to get the fees. We have heard of an English lawyer's taxed bill of costs that was over a hundred feet long, and we have read accounts of very long ones in this country. But as to the lawyers, fee bills are nearly all abolished, and we think, rightfully. Whenever it is practicable to do so, fee bills should give place to a better system of compensation, and especially with officers of the national government. This is particularly desirable where the service is for the government itself, both with reference to the public and the officer. It would be far better for both. With United States district attorneys and clerks special salaries would relieve from much embarrassment and needless expense. The records of the treasury will show what sums they have heretofore actually received. An average for the last three years' compensation would doubtless fairly compensate them for the future. It would relieve from the necessity of keeping penny accounts, and getting them certified by judges, and often coming to Washington to superintend their settlement, and prevent frequent disappointment in receiving their pay when earned and actually due. It would also relieve the accounting officers from some of their most embarrassing duties. We learn that many district attorneys and clerks say they would prefer to receive twenty-five per cent. less in a salary regularly paid to keep accounts and procure their settlement.

But probably the most onerous and inconvenient fees are those paid at our custom-houses. These are somewhat numerous and exceedingly embarrassing. The present law says to the importer "pay duties upon your goods," and then tells him "pay for receiving them," and then "pay for leave to take your goods." This is both unfair and vexatious. The government should take all it wants at one bite, in the shape of duties, and do everything possible to relieve the entry of goods from useless forms and ceremonies. Simplify the entering of imports so that merchants may make entries, instead of being compelled to employ those who have learned to do so as a professional business. It is impossible for the collector to keep account of the fees now paid and render it with any knowledge of its correctness. All collectors, like those on the northern frontiers, should be paid a salary, and those who assist them should be compensated the same way. More than twenty years since Gen. Jackson suggested this mode of remunerating custom-house officers, and at his instance, and that of Mr. Woodbury, the Committee on Commerce, with great labor, prepared and reported a bill to regulate their compensation. Their report was made the 24th March, 1836, and accompanied House bill 464. The system then proposed, with suitable modifications, may now be adopted. It would relieve the custom-house officers as well as the government from endless perplexities and numerous lawsuits and difficulties. The salary system of compensating the officers we have named would strike out of existence their employment accounts, which annoy everybody who has any thing to do with them, and which have made more rogues than they have saved the government dollars. The people must pay their public servants in some way, and we think, when practicable, the open and sunny way of giving a salary is best for the officer and safest for the public. Then the statute will show what officers get, and there can be no cheating as to the amount paid.

POSTAGE TO PORTS OF THE BLACK SEA, AND OVER THE DANUBE, BY FRENCH MAIL.

We are requested to state that the French government has recently established post offices at Yolo, Yarna, Sulin, Pultcha, Galatz, Ibraila, Includ, Sitrope, Samson, Kerasnan, and Trebizon, and that correspondence of every description originating in or destined for those cities will hereafter be transmitted in the mail, via France, upon the same terms and conditions as correspondence of the like nature originating in or destined for the cities of the Levant in which France has post offices.

The single rate of letter postage between the United States and those places by the French mail will, therefore, be 30 cents the quarter ounce, and 60 cents the half ounce letter; prepayment optional. Printed matter of every description may also be transmitted to those ports, by way of France, on prepayment of the United States postage—viz: 2 cents on newspapers; 1 cent an ounce, or fraction of an ounce, on pamphlets and periodicals; and the regular domestic rates on other kinds of printed matter. The same rates of postage must be collected at the office of delivery in the United States upon printed matter from those places received by French mail.

MISSISSIPPI.

An adjourned session of the legislature of Mississippi was to have commenced at Jackson on Monday last.

VINDICATION OF MR. CALHOUN AGAINST THE CHARGE OF MR. BENTON, IN REGARD TO THE POWER OF CONGRESS OVER SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES.

AMERICAN, (Mississippi),

October 24, 1857.

Sir, I address you without formal introduction. Truth should be spoken without indirection or excuse. The cant courtesy of an affected apology deserves contempt; and, in this case, you would be excused for deeming it trivial. To defend from reproach the obsolete doctrine is a privilege which personal friendship may claim. To vindicate, against wrong and misrepresentation, the illustrious dead, whose opinions and history constitute the chief element of a nation's character and fame, is a work of patriotism, and the duty of every citizen.

Your susceptibility to a canting prejudice which colors and poisons everything into which it mingles, joined to an arrogant self-sufficiency, (I say it without offence,) which chafes at contradiction, are traits that so strikingly distinguish you as not to be denied by any man in the slightest degree cognizant with your character. Your dislike and distrust of Mr. Calhoun—not to say your malice toward the man—has long since become a theme so trite and stale as neither to attract nor deserve notice. When, therefore, you were stung to write your "Thirty Years in the Senate," it was properly asserted by many, and felt and feared by all, that you would be incapable of doing justice, by stating the truth, or, at least, the whole truth, in relation to that eminent statesman. If, then, it shall be ascertained that you have done him injustice, though by mistake, the coincidence will be most unfortunate for the character both of yourself and your book. If, furthermore, it shall be found that this mistake as I am not unwilling to believe it consists in a palpable misrepresentation of a public record and published debate, (things about which you profess and are admitted to be unusually accurate,) it will tend but little to soften the criticism which such a discovery may fairly provoke. But, lastly, if, on still further investigation, it shall be developed that your mistake consists in a gross misrepresentation of the opinions of Mr. Calhoun upon a subject involving the dearest rights of the South; that you committed this mistake at a time when the rights of the South upon that subject were trembling in the balance, and when your opinions and wishes and action had been in the opposing scale—if this should be established, surely it must be confessed that a fatality of incident has attended your mistake, which might well silence just men in your defence, and sharpen, with the keenest poignancy, the invectives of the uncharitable.

That you have thus misrepresented that eminent defender of southern and State rights, upon such a subject and at such a time, I respectfully submit.

In chapter XXXIII of the 2d volume of your "Thirty Years' View," you charge Mr. Calhoun with having recognized "the constitutional power of Congress to legislate upon the existence of slavery in the Territories," with having yielded the power to Congress in his resolutions upon the subject of slavery offered to the Senate in that year, and with having placed his objections to the exercise of that power "solely on the ground of expediency." You also charge that the idea of the unconstitutionality of such a power in Congress had not then (1838) entered his head; that it was an afterthought, a new dogma, first brought out in his (Mr. Calhoun's) resolutions of 1847, inconsistent with all his antecedents on that question, and which he was avoided from promulgating.

In order to avoid doing you injustice by mistake, through an improper interpretation of your words, I submit the charges as contained in your own language. You say:

"Every memorial and petition (abolition) had been disposed of according to the wishes of the senators from the slaveholding States. Mr. Calhoun declined to do so. He was to go further, and to obtain from the Senate declarations which should cover all the questions of federal power over the institution of slavery, although he had just said that paper reports would do no good. For that purpose he submitted a series of resolutions in numbers, which derive their importance from their consistency, or rather contrast, with others on the same subject presented by him in the Senate; two years later, and which have given birth to doctrines and proceedings which have greatly disturbed the harmony of the Union and palpably endangered its stability."

"The 5th relative to the Territories and the District of Columbia, and was the only one that excited attention or left a surviving interest. It was in these words: 'Resolved, That the Intermeddling of any State or States, or their citizens, to abolish slavery in this District, or any of the Territories, on the ground of expediency, or that it is immoral, or sinful, or the passage of any act or measure by Congress with that view, would be a direct and dangerous attack on the institutions of all the slaveholding States.'

"The dogma of 'No power in Congress to legislate upon the existence of slavery in the Territories' had not been invented at that time; and, of course, was not contained in this resolution, intended by its author to define the extent of the federal legislative power on the subject. The resolve went upon the existence of the power and deprecated its abuse. It put the District of Columbia and the Territories into the same category, both for the exercise of the power and the consequences to result from its interdiction of States or citizens, or the passage of any act by Congress to abolish slavery in either; and this was admitting the power in the Territories as in the District, when it is an express grant in the grant of all legislative power. The intermeddling and the legislation were deprecated in both solely on the ground of expediency."—P. 136-7.

After quoting a short extract from the speech in which Mr. Calhoun admitted that his "impressions" had been in favor of the Missouri compromise, but asserting that he had "entirely changed," you say:

"This declaration is explicit. It shows that Mr. Calhoun was in favor of the compromise at the time it was adopted, and had since changed his opinions—entirely changed them—not on constitutional but expedient grounds. These are reasons (alluding to those assigned by Mr. C.) of expediency, derived from after experience, and exclude the idea of any constitutional objection. Of all this, the Missouri compromise, Mr. Calhoun, in his own favor, and 'not' (Hearst) 'not' receding from reason, explains, and they are not facts, as he says. His expressed belief now (1838) was that the measure was dangerous—he does not say unconstitutional, but dangerous—and this corresponds with the terms of his resolution then submitted, which makes the intermeddling, to abolish slavery in the District or Territories, or any act or measure of Congress to that effect, a 'dangerous' attack 'on the institutions of the slaveholding States. Certainly the idea of the unconstitutionality of such legislation had not then entered his head.'"—P. 133-7.

Again, on page 140, you say:

"Mr. Calhoun declared his favorable disposition to the Missouri compromise and his opposition to Mr. Randolph, its chief opponent, for opposing it; and his change of opinion since, not for unconstitutionality, but because he believed it to have become dangerous in consequence of the spirit of abolition."—P. 133-7.

approved it in 1826, and further remembered that he saw nothing unconstitutional in it as late as 1838. The charge being now shown, and the imperfection of his memory made manifest by his own testimony, it becomes certain that the new doctrine was an after-thought, disowned by its antecedents, a fragment of the brain lately hatched, and which its author would have been estimated from promulgating it if these antecedents had been recollected."

The above are the leading paragraphs upon which I predicate my understanding of your charge, as stated in the lines which precede these quotations. I do not say that you are without qualification, either by your own charge, or that he did not admit, either by his fifth resolution or by his speech in the Senate in 1838, the power of Congress to legislate upon the existence of slavery in the Territories; but that, both by the said resolution, as declared to be understood by himself, and in his speech on that occasion, he asserted the existence of such a power most distinctly.

In refuting your charge, and in proving my assertion, I will yield to that departed statesman what you have denied—the right to speak for himself.

And first, let me say, with what justice or fairness you can represent Mr. Calhoun as having made "an explicit declaration" of having favored the Missouri compromise, as if upon deliberate thought and conviction—as "fully avowing" the power in question—(page 143)—"as having changed his opinion on the constitutionality" of that measure, when he says simply, "That his impressions were in its favor!" Does an "impression"—a "first admission"—a deliberate and binding "opinion?" Admit that Mr. Calhoun in 1826 had embraced a deliberate opinion in favor of the Missouri compromise, but declares that since that time he has "entirely changed," by what authority do you assert that his "change" was based "not on constitutional but expedient grounds," so as to represent him as still admitting the constitutional power in 1838? Let it be remembered that what you state in the above quotations on that point are your own deductions; not one word to that effect is uttered by Mr. Calhoun in the speech from which you direct the short paragraph copied in your "View"; but directly the reverse, as I will show.

I now call your attention to the very debate, and upon the very resolution quoted by yourself; and in and by which you assert that in 1838 Mr. Calhoun admitted the power of Congress to legislate upon the existence of slavery in the Territories, and charge that the thought of "doing" such power had not then entered his head; that it was a new dogma, first advanced by him in 1847, and contradicting all he had ever said or done on that subject.

When the fifth resolution of the series offered by Mr. Calhoun in 1838 came up, a substitute was moved by Mr. Clay, which, after amendments, was adopted. In support of his own resolution, and in opposition to the substitute and amendments by which it was at length perfected by the friends, Mr. Calhoun, on different occasions, made the following declarations. He said:

"The great and governing principles which pervade all these (Mr. Calhoun's) resolutions are non-interference on the part of any State or their citizens with the institutions of the other States, and the non-discrimination on the part of any State in reference to the institutions of the several States—principles which lie at the foundation of our political system—principles that cannot be departed from without bringing the whole superstructure to the ground—principles which place slavery in this District, or wherever it may exist in the Territories, under the same broad and protecting principles which place slavery in the States. To attack it in one State would be to attack it in all; and in like manner, and for the same reason, to attack it here, or in the Territories, is to attack it in the States. And this fifth resolution now proposed to be struck out directly offends. He regarded slavery wherever it existed, throughout the whole territory, as one common question; and as such under the protection of the constitution here and in the Territories as in the States themselves; and herein lies our only safety. Abandon this, and all is abandoned."—Ap. Con. G., 1837-'8, p. 61.

Again:

"The deluded agitators must be plainly told that it is no concern of theirs what is the practice of our institutions, and that they must not be touched here, or in the Territories, or in the States, by them or the government; that they were under the guardian protection of the constitution, and that we stood prepared to repel all interference or discrimination, be the consequence what it might."—Ib., 61.

Again:

"The 5th resolution would ask—he would make a solemn appeal to his associates from the South—which proposed the more inappreciable position on these exposed points: the high and lofty ground of non-interference and non-discrimination assumed in the fifth resolution, or that of expediency in the amendment now proposed as a substitute? And he would ask on what motive of policy or duty would they surrender the stronger and occupy the weaker—give up the constitution and rely on expediency?"—Ib.

Again:

"With these views (said Mr. Calhoun) he could not vote for the resolution (Mr. Clay's) as it stood; and they were great strengths when he contrasted it with his fifth resolution, which had been struck out to insert this. That resolution (his fifth) declares that any attempt by any State or States, or their citizens, in any act or measure of Congress, to abolish slavery in this District or the Territories, on the ground that it was immoral or sinful, or that it was dangerous to the institutions of all the States—now, what have we done? What have southern senators done? Struck down the strong barriers which placed this District and the Territories under the same high and constitutional protection with the States themselves, and which made an assault on them, an assault on all the slaveholding States, and have created in their place the most feeble of all barriers—that of mere expediency."—P. 70.

This paragraph, which declines to Congress upon "high constitutional" grounds the right to adopt "any act or measure" with reference to slavery in the Territories, which declares his fifth resolution as designed to occupy that ground, and which denounces the mere ground of "expediency," immediately follows the scrap from the same speech, copied in your book, and from which you labor to sustain by inference the charge that Mr. Calhoun did not mean to deny the constitutional power to legislate, but placed his objection to its exercise "solely on the ground of expediency!"

How "grounding strange" at least, if not "unnatural," the fact that, in all that debate, you should have only read the only sentence, and that in the very middle of a speech upon which, even by tortured inference, you could have extracted a thin shadow upon which to base your charge!

If that is a specimen of your plan for "abridging" the "debate in Congress," your promise so to do "would be more honored in its breach than in its observance." To return from this digression.

The answer from South Carolina could not reconcile his judgment to vote for the resolution now under consideration. He (Mr. Calhoun) thought the declaration in the resolution, that abolition was expedient, was not strong enough, and that higher grounds ought to be asserted. But what higher grounds? Was any one prepared to say that the moral power of abolition did not exist? He spoke of the naked power, and not of its exercise; but the abstract question of the existence of the power. Now, though it did not exist in relation to the States, on the mere question of abstract power, he thought the senator from South Carolina would not declare that it could be unconstitutional for Congress to abolish slavery in the District or Territories."—Page 70-1.

Mr. Calhoun's answer to this challenge must settle the question as to what were his opinions on the point in issue in 1838. Away with flimsy, unfair inferences and deductions! Hear him! Hear him!

"The senator from Kentucky asserted that his fifth resolution abandoned the constitutional ground as to this District and the Territories; and asks if there is any one who denies the right of Congress to abolish slavery here or in the Territories? YES, said Mr. C. HE DENIED IT, and also that his fifth resolution abandoned the constitutional ground, as asserted by the senator from Kentucky. He said that the protection of slave property here under precisely the same constitutional guarantee that the first four placed in the States. In a word, it placed slavery here, and in the Territories, under the shield of all the slaveholding States, where alone can be safely placed, and that no principles which he believed impregnable."—Page 71.

Mr. Calhoun then proceeds to say that his fifth resolution is not to be construed by itself, but in connection with the four others which preceded it; and in explanation with the high constitutional ground he designed to occupy, in the said fifth resolve, by showing its dependency upon those by which it was immediately preceded. He says:

"The first four resolutions, taken together, asserted the right of Congress to abolish slavery in the States and in the Territories, with the domestic institutions of other States, and that this great principle of non-interference is particularly applicable to the institution of domestic slavery as it exists in the South. These have been voted by large majorities, and are, therefore, fully established, so far as they can be by a vote of a single State. The senator from Kentucky will not deny this great constitutional principle of non-interference which lies at the bottom of our political institutions."

"Now, sir, what did my fifth resolution, which has been struck out to make room for the senator's amendment, assert? It declares that the attempt of any State or States, or their citizens, or any act of this government, to abolish slavery in this District or the Territories, (on the ground) that it is sinful, immoral, or otherwise obnoxious, is a dangerous attack on the institutions of all the slaveholding States. Will the senator deny this? Will he deny that the abolition of slavery here, or in a State or States, or an attempt to abolish it, with the avowed object of effecting its abolition in the States, is a dangerous attack on the domestic institution of slavery in all the slaveholding States—a dangerous intermeddling with those institutions, within the meaning of the first four resolutions of the constitution, and subversive of the entire fabric of our political institutions."

"The next great constitutional principle on which he relied is that of equality between the States, and non-discrimination on the part of this government between the States in reference to their domestic institutions, which applies to legislation over this District and the Territories, or any citizen, or any act of this government, to abolish slavery in this District or the Territories, (on the ground) that it is sinful, immoral, or otherwise obnoxious, is a dangerous attack on the institutions of all the slaveholding States. Will the senator deny this? Will he deny that the abolition of slavery here, or in a State or States, or an attempt to abolish it, with the avowed object of effecting its abolition in the States, is a dangerous attack on the domestic institution of slavery in all the slaveholding States—a dangerous intermeddling with those institutions, within the meaning of the first four resolutions of the constitution, and subversive of the entire fabric of our political institutions."

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the substitute as proposed on through amendments, he declared he "would not do so," and that when, finally, overcome by the "urgent wishes of his friends," he complied, it was with the solemn declaration upon his lips "that it was against his own judgment!" If you plead ignorance of these facts, silence alone must give an implied consent to the validity of your excuse. If you knew, and only "remembered to forget" them, your age and long "public services, I trust, will awaken a gentler sentiment than that of anger at this manifestation of an infirmity of which you are, more than others, have been made a victim during an eventful life!

In the speech of Mr. Calhoun which instantly followed the introduction of the substitute of Mr. Clay he said:

"The difference between him and the senator from Kentucky was as wide as the poles. That gentleman was for concession. He was utterly opposed to concession in any shape or form. For this reason he was decidedly opposed to the amendment. While he was ready to yield to any modification going to the mere phraseology, he would not agree under any circumstances to surrender the principles on which they were drawn."—Page 59.

Again:

"He had examined the amendment of the senator from Kentucky, offered as a substitute for the fifth resolution, and that it was inadvisable for him to bring his mind to give it his support, or vote for it. If it should be adopted in anything like its present shape."—Page 60.

Several amendments were made, Mr. Calhoun was appealed to by his friends to support the substitute. He says:

"He could appeal to the Senate that he had shown throughout this discussion a liberal spirit of concession, and a perfect readiness to make any modification of these resolutions that did not sacrifice the principles on which they were based. Further he could not go; and he had intended, so to the friends of these principles who had thus far supported him would ask him to go further. To vote for this amendment to strike out the fifth resolution and substitute what the senator from Kentucky proposes, even as now modified, would be an utter abandonment of the entire ground assumed in the resolutions already adopted."—P. 61.

Again:

"He regarded the grounds assumed in the resolution as amended worse than useless. They are calculated not to repel but to attract attacks."—P. 70.

Again:

"The abolitionists knew perfectly what they were about; and in praying that slavery may be abolished in the Territories, they intended to establish a general principle, not only that it should be abolished in Florida, where it exists, but that hereafter no Territory should be created in which it should not be prohibited. This was clearly their intention; and when the senator limits it to Florida, he declines to meet this broad issue, and surrenders the whole ground, except Florida, to the abolitionists. He intended, however, to surrender all constitutional grounds on both Territories, and place their protection on the ground of expediency, and to surrender all territory hereafter to be created without even the poor protection of this feeble word, vote for the resolution as amended. As to himself, he would give no such vote. He never would consent to give his rights on such a frail foundation. He stood on the constitution—on the great principles of non-interference and non-discrimination; and he never would surrender them, and put the question on mere expediency."—Page 72.

"Twenty years ago, and continue more of blaring words—twenty years ago, when all was at 'vass in Zion,'" the prophet statesman of the South, as, wrap in more than "Isaiah's hallowed fire," his far-seeing eye scanned the dim vistas of the coming time, and foretold the calamities and desolations which would befall his people. But we stoned the prophet, scouted his counsels, and would have none of his prophecies. Time, the great revealer, has consecrated his history what was contemned as fanaticism. Our house is hereby "left unto as desolate." Well may the stern Genoa of the South bend, a repentant pilgrim, at the tomb where slumber the ashes of his mighty child; but it shall find "no place for repentance, though it seek it carefully with tears." But to return.

When at last this protracted and momentous debate had drawn to a close, and the vote on the substitute was about to be taken, Mr. Calhoun rose and said:

"In compliance with the urgent wishes of his friends, rather than with his own judgment, he would consent to vote for the resolution as amended. It had undergone important modifications, making it, not stronger than at first, but yet it was still very feeble, and not at all suited to the occasion."—P. 74.

These latter declarations of Mr. Calhoun, showing that he not only opposed, but execrated and despised the substitute, stared you in the face on the turn of every leaf of that debate, and silently implored you to "say nothing of the dead but what was true."

You tumble back and bury them in the silence and forgetfulness of the grave you were ransacking "for materials to write (your) history." You array the skeleton facts that Mr. Calhoun voted for the substitute, (which, let it be marked, did not occur, only did not deny the power in question,) and roundly assert that, as between his own resolution and the substitute, he had a bare "preference;" that he "agreed" to it when he found it "preferred to the doctrine" of the power of Congress to legislate with reference to the existence of slavery in the Territories. "Alas! Heaven has issued its injunction against 'retrospection.' Alas! the motives of our fellow-men, passing judgment upon 'children's no evil,' 'happily and commends a chariot a multitude of sins.' Your life, I fear, will furnish one occasion, at least, for the exercise of this sentiment in our ears, though your history will hardly be treated as a very remarkable illustration of the virtue.

This misrepresentation, as I conceive, of the opinions of Mr. Calhoun upon a subject of the most momentous consequence to the South, was put forth at a time when his rights, as involved in this case, were involved in the Kansas difficulty, was dividing the Union into parties more strictly sectional than at any former period of our history—when a report of the Missouri Compromise threatened a dissolution of the Union, by the North, and its restoration a disruption of the confederacy by the South. Your object in making such a charge against Mr. Calhoun, at that particular time, has not been left to conjecture. You boldly admit that you made the "disclosure" and "brought to light" the alleged endorsement by Mr. Calhoun of the power of Congress to legislate with reference to the existence of slavery in the Territories "as an entrapment against his followers"—"to concentrate the forces of his now and dangerous opinion" that no such power existed, and, consequently, to weaken the South, defend of her rights, and to diminish the number of her defenders, so far as an opposing opinion of her most eminent chief could have that effect. The decision of the Supreme Court in the "Scott case" had not then been made, sweeping your flimsy sophistry into this air, and fully sustaining as "constitutional law" what you so sneeringly stigmatize as the "new dogma" of Mr. Calhoun, which was so patriotically "denounced by the writer of the View," "discountenanced by the other senators," and which Mr. Calhoun never dared "press to a vote."

This decision, which caused a storm to enter into the whole herd of abolition fanatics, seems also to have agitated "that demony which stirs within" your own bosom. A consciousness of the pitiable and ridiculous attitude, however, in which it places yourself, by contrast with certain chapters of your work, might well excite a character less sensitive to ridicule and contempt than the "author of the View." It is stated you design writing another book reviewing that decision. The prayers of your worst enemies will be granted. Should you find it necessary, however, to the conclusiveness of your argument, to invoke some greater name than your own, as presented by Mr. Calhoun, upon the point in issue, as insisted by yourself, should save him the infliction of that honor. You presently seek to vindicate your bitter and elaborate assault upon Mr. Calhoun by declaring some noble motive than that of stabling a dead dog, the flesh of whose falchion was ever feared. Your very disclaimer, however, involuntarily suggested the proverb, which speaks of him whose fight is without pursuit, and

of that conscience which smites not for occasion. You declare he "would not do so," and that when, finally, overcome by the "urgent wishes of his friends," he complied, it was with the solemn declaration upon his lips "that it was against his own judgment!" If you plead ignorance of these facts, silence alone must give an implied consent to the validity of your excuse. If you knew, and only "remembered to forget" them, your age and long "public services, I trust, will awaken a gentler sentiment than that of anger at this manifestation of an infirmity of which you are, more than others, have been made a victim during an eventful life!

In the speech of Mr. Calhoun which instantly followed the introduction of the substitute of Mr. Clay he said:

"The difference between him and the senator from Kentucky was as wide as the poles. That gentleman was for concession. He was utterly opposed to concession in any shape or form. For this reason he was decidedly opposed to the amendment. While he was ready to yield to any modification going to the mere phraseology, he would not agree under any circumstances to surrender the principles on which they were drawn."—Page 59.

Again:

"He had examined the amendment of the senator from Kentucky, offered as a substitute for the fifth resolution, and that it was inadvisable for him to bring his mind to give it his support, or vote for it. If it should be adopted in anything like its present shape."—Page 60.

Several amendments were made, Mr. Calhoun was appealed to by his friends to support the substitute. He says:

"He could appeal to the Senate that he had shown throughout this discussion a liberal spirit of concession, and a perfect readiness to