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Original Poetry.

My Kansas Home.
By Mrs. C. E. C.
In the valley where flows the calm Kansas river,
And the sycamore casts its soothing shade,
Where the prairie is decked by a beautiful river,
The wild bird and the meadow-lark have strayed,
Where the blue-crowned teal and the golden plover,
Come dancing on flowers in beauty arrayed;
Where the sun sinks to rest in glory forever,
There, oh, there, my dear western home is made.
Where the blue ocean sweeps New England's
rough shore,
Stand the home of my youth, old, stately, and
loved;
Its hills, vales, and meadows I fondly adore,
And miss its full streams, by whose banks I
have roved.
There a mother watched o'er my young tender
years;
A father taught, caressed, was proud of his child;
We parted in sorrow—we parted in tears—
Yet the words of affection were never
forgotten.
Though my sweet sisters wept as I turned to
depart,
Yet to him who had stolen my young, trusting
heart,
I had promised to be a true loving bride;
The grief of our parting no language can tell;
We mourned as we gazed from our dear native
soil.
But my home I've made in this beautiful field,
For my husband, my country, and my God.

Important Speech.

Slavery in Kansas.
To show our readers that slavery does not exist in Kansas at the present time only in violation of law, we publish below the speech of Hon. J. R. FRANKLIN, of Maryland, delivered on the 28th of March last, in the House of Representatives, while the Kansas-Nebraska bill was pending before that body. Mr. F. is a southerner by birth and education, and of course would say nothing which would compromise in the least the rights of the South. We are glad to know that all the most prominent men of the country, and among this number are included Messrs. Cass, Douglas, and Benton, take the same view of the question, and concede that slavery only exists in Kansas at the present time by the law of might, and that every slaveholder who brings his human chattels into the Territory by such act virtually emancipates them.
Mr. Franklin, after speaking of the general features of the bill, continues:
But, Mr. Chairman, the main point to which I wish to direct the attention of this committee, and particularly that of southern gentlemen, is the condition, in regard to slavery, in which the adoption of this bill in its present form would leave this Territory. I would ask any gentleman representing a slaveholding constituency on this floor whether he is willing to stand as a monument of the crisis which produced it, than to commit myself to such a principle.
It was evidently the intention of those who framed this bill to wipe out all traces of slavery from Kansas and Nebraska. Let us see with what effect they have accomplished their object. Those who fondly think that after the passage of this bill, these Territories may be sold by slaveholders with their slaves, and that in the enjoyment of that species of property, he himself upon one of two propositions, or upon both: First, that the law of nature will allow slavery wherever there is no positive law prohibiting it; and, second, that in all the territory of the United States, which is the common property of all, the constitution will establish it, or in other words, that the constitution so far recognizes property in slaves, that it will protect it as property, in all the Territories over which it has municipal jurisdiction, while there is no law prohibiting it.
I propose to examine these positions; and I think I shall be able to show that upon neither one of them can slavery ever be carried into Nebraska or Kansas; that they must forever remain free, unless the Territorial Legislature pass laws introducing it. The result of which will be, that southern men will be excluded from all participation in making these very laws which are to operate upon this subject, until it is too late, and the condition of the country is irrevocably fixed. This when we were amused with the fool who swore he would never again touch the water until he had learned to swim.
I must be pardoned if, in the examination of these questions, my remarks assume somewhat the form of a forensic argument; and I must also be pardoned if, in the views which I shall submit, I run counter to those prejudices, if I may so term them, or those feelings which slaveholding southern gentlemen in regard to slavery. It becomes us to look the legal consequences of this bill boldly in the face, and to meet them like men. I am not of that school of politicians who are willing to leave this matter to the judicial tribunals of the country, with the expectation that, if they do not decide

with us, we will dissolve the Union. I am willing to leave it, for better or for worse, to the courts of my country; and therefore I wish to come to the examination of its judicial consequences with all the calmness and clearness of comprehension which its great importance so eminently demands. Those gentlemen who argue that slavery, sustained by the law of nature, may exist in any Territory where it is not prohibited by positive law, rely principally upon the history of that institution. They say that it has been a necessary condition of civilized man from the earliest periods; that all the most polished nations of antiquity recognized and protected it; that the barbarian practiced it as a master of slave, according to the circumstances; that you find it everywhere an element of society, but nowhere can you find the time or the manner in which it became such; and therefore, they argue, it must spring from an ordinance of nature, universally recognized and universally binding. This account of the matter I conceive to be true, at least to a considerable extent. But the moral sense of the world upon this subject has very much changed within the last one hundred years. Let us inquire upon what particular law of nature the right of one man to appropriate the labor and services of another without remuneration rests. The matter can certainly be analyzed, and modern lawyers have found no difficulty in arriving at the truth. They all agree that slavery rests, not upon the right of a captor to the life or the perpetual services of his captive taken in war; and with such unanimity they agree that in morals this whole principle is wrong, and has been exploded in all civilized countries; and that this mode of acquiring a slave is no longer to be tolerated. The language of Judge Eschsch, as reported in the 5th Georgia Report, is full upon this point, and is as follows:
"Whist! it seems to be conceded by jurists of all civilized countries, that the slave trade is contrary to the laws of nature, upon the principle that every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labor, and therefore no other person can rightfully deprive him of them, and appropriate them against his will; yet it is also well settled that it is not prohibited by the laws of nature. This principle of the law of nations originated in the rights which war originally held to confer. One of these rights was that the victor might enslave the vanquished. This idea has been exploded by the States of Christendom, but obtains still among many of the heathen. Acceptance of this principle is the doctrine that traffic in slavery is lawful commerce."
This, sir, is the language of truth, and finds an echo in every heart. There is no other principle but this upon which slavery can be based; and if it has been exploded, then has the natural right to the fruits of his own labor, and the rights of all Christians in their native country, (except Turks and Moors in any with his Majesty, and such who can prove their having been free in England, or any other Christian country, before they were shipped for transportation here,) shall be accounted, and be slaves, and as such, be brought into this country since that time, and who had used for their freedom, had uniformly recovered it. That the same court still insisted upon his former argument, and considering the court's address to the bar as a misdirection to the jury, had prayed this certificate to be entered at the foot of the judgment."
Upon what principle is this decision based? Certainly upon the ground that Indians taken captives in war could be reduced to slavery, except in consequence of a legislative act of the colony of Virginia; and when the act was repealed, leaving the law of nature alone to its full operation, they could no longer be made slaves. And all who, under such circumstances, used for their freedom, had uniformly recovered it. There is another case, in the same volume, which I will not weary the committee by reading. In it the judge gives a general resume of all the laws which had been passed in the colony in reference to the enslaving of Indians and negroes, showing, incontrovertibly, that at that day slavery was considered to rest entirely upon the positive laws which had been enacted to sustain and control it, and that there was no other source to look to for its existence.
The next case bearing upon the point I will cite from the Kentucky Reports of 1810. The question was raised whether it was necessary for a master claiming a slave, who was admitted to have been brought from Delaware, to prove the existence of a law in Delaware tolerating slavery. Charles J. Boyle decided that it was not necessary; but the ground upon which the decision was made renders it applicable to the point at issue. He says that slavery was originally introduced into the colonies by a regulation (mark the word) of the mother country, of which the course of all the colonies were equally bound to take notice; and that the courts of the colonies were bound to notice, and as such laws were not repealed by the Revolution, they must be presumed to exist until the contrary is shown. Thus leaving us necessarily to infer that, had it not been shown that the known law of the State of Delaware anterior to the Revolution, the burden of proof would have been thrown

upon the master, upon the principle that, by the law of nature, all men are presumed to be free until the contrary is shown. It is a well known principle that the positive enactments of a foreign government must be proven, but that the laws of nature are supposed to be known, and to govern in all courts. The name of William Wickham will be recognized, at least by every Virginian, as that of a lawyer whose opinion is entitled to the greatest weight. And I will conclude this array of American authorities by quoting a remark of his reported in the case of Butt against Rachel, in 2d Henning and Munford. It was *arguendo*, and is as follows:
"Mr. Witt contends that Indians are naturally entitled to freedom—so are negroes. But this does not prevent their being slaves. I admit, the right to make their slaves must depend on positive institution. Our right is founded on the act of Assembly for the better government of servants and slaves."
Thus, where it was to the interest of his cause to have maintained the natural right to hold human beings as slaves, he concedes the point, and bases it where alone it can be found, upon the positive municipal regulation of each particular State or Territory. I think, sir, I have demonstrated that the law of nature will never carry slavery into the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas, or maintain and protect it when there. Southern gentlemen need not
"Lay that flatteringunction to their souls."
I proceed now to show that quite as little in that respect is to be expected from the constitution of the U. S. That blessed instrument will protect slavery, and the rights of slaveholders, whenever the municipal laws of any State or Territory recognize it, its broad edge will be extended over it; but it is powerless to establish; and whatever may be the sentiments of the North as to the extension of slavery, I am proud and happy to believe that a majority there are willing and ready to do all that may become them to preserve and enforce the constitutional guarantees which, as slaveholders, we claim at their hands. Upon what principle is it said that the constitution of the United States authorizes and establishes slavery in its Territories. It is, I believe, always placed upon the ground that the Territories are the common property of the whole Union, purchased in instances with the common blood, and sometimes with the common sweat of all, and that it cannot be so governed as to exclude any interest therefrom.—There seems to be some plausibility in this argument. Let us examine it. If it is true at all, it ought to apply to all the common domain, and Congress has no right to dispose of it as to make it inalienable to any great interest in the country.
But what is the fact upon this subject? The government owns millions of acres of land in precisely this category, which lies within the limits of States which are excluded from its slave property as well as from the common soil of the United States. No man from any quarter of the Union complains that the public lands lying within the State of Illinois are precluded from slave settlement; and yet upon the principle contended for, the public domain in that State belongs as much to the southern as to the northern man, and ought to be as free to settlement by him with his property as to any citizen of the United States. The true principle, sir, I conceive to be, the public land as property, wherever it lies, belongs to the general government, and is the common property of all, to be used, enjoyed, and appropriated in subordination to the municipal law which prevails over it. In the State of Illinois this municipal law making power resides in the State government; in the Territories it resides in the general government; in both it is supreme, and is always to be distinguished from the ownership of the soil. It makes no difference that the supreme municipal power and the ownership of the soil is lodged in the same individual, as is the case in the Territories. They are essentially distinct, and must forever remain so. The one relates to the rights of the individual, and the other to the control of the whole.
There is another view of this matter which I think quite conclusive. Slavery, by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, is a municipal law. It is dependent for its existence upon the law of the particular place, which is not merely declaratory of a natural right, but is supposed to be enacted with reference to the interests of those to be affected by it. Now, those who say that the constitution of the United States will carry slavery into any territory, upon the ground that the territory is common property, must further contend, for the same reasons, that Congress has no right to abolish it therein; because, if they have the right, they might commit that injustice upon the South, which southern gentlemen say the constitution protects them from. We then have this melancholy dilemma in which the people of the Territories will be placed. They have a municipal law, which ought to have reference alone to the happiness and the interests of those to be governed by it, fixed upon them, without their consent, and absolutely irrevocable by any power on earth, no matter what exigency might arise to demand it. This, I submit, is a *reductio ad absurdum*. No principle of free government which places any people in such a dilemma can be recognized.
If the proposition just stated be correct, its converse also must be true; and gentlemen who admit that Congress has the right to legislate upon the subject of slavery in the Territories, are compelled to abandon the position that the constitution, *proprio vigore*, would carry that institution and establish it there.
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There is another view of this matter which I think quite conclusive. Slavery, by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, is a municipal law. It is dependent for its existence upon the law of the particular place, which is not merely declaratory of a natural right, but is supposed to be enacted with reference to the interests of those to be affected by it. Now, those who say that the constitution of the United States will carry slavery into any territory, upon the ground that the territory is common property, must further contend, for the same reasons, that Congress has no right to abolish it therein; because, if they have the right, they might commit that injustice upon the South, which southern gentlemen say the constitution protects them from. We then have this melancholy dilemma in which the people of the Territories will be placed. They have a municipal law, which ought to have reference alone to the happiness and the interests of those to be governed by it, fixed upon them, without their consent, and absolutely irrevocable by any power on earth, no matter what exigency might arise to demand it. This, I submit, is a *reductio ad absurdum*. No principle of free government which places any people in such a dilemma can be recognized.
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But, sir, even if the constitution of the United States would establish slavery in the Territories, I should like to call the attention of those gentlemen who think that the known law of the State of Delaware anterior to the Revolution, the burden of proof would have been thrown

upon the master, upon the principle that, by the law of nature, all men are presumed to be free until the contrary is shown. It is a well known principle that the positive enactments of a foreign government must be proven, but that the laws of nature are supposed to be known, and to govern in all courts. The name of William Wickham will be recognized, at least by every Virginian, as that of a lawyer whose opinion is entitled to the greatest weight. And I will conclude this array of American authorities by quoting a remark of his reported in the case of Butt against Rachel, in 2d Henning and Munford. It was *arguendo*, and is as follows:
"Mr. Witt contends that Indians are naturally entitled to freedom—so are negroes. But this does not prevent their being slaves. I admit, the right to make their slaves must depend on positive institution. Our right is founded on the act of Assembly for the better government of servants and slaves."
Thus, where it was to the interest of his cause to have maintained the natural right to hold human beings as slaves, he concedes the point, and bases it where alone it can be found, upon the positive municipal regulation of each particular State or Territory. I think, sir, I have demonstrated that the law of nature will never carry slavery into the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas, or maintain and protect it when there. Southern gentlemen need not
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"Glorious News."
Great news! glorious news! was the shout of the vendor in the old war time, and at the sound of the tin trumpet the lady looked anxiously from the window, while the maid stood with ready eye at the door; the workman hurried down from his garret; and the serving maid, from the area steps, thrust forth a plump red arm to grasp the fluttering prize—"Great news! glorious news!" But the tin trumpet is heard no longer, nor does the great voice of the nation vendor resound in our public streets; yet the War Gazette finds its way as quickly to our tables, and a myriad of readers eagerly devour its contents of joy and sorrow, as they are set forth in the columns of the Times.
Here it lies in the boudoir of a countess, folded, and refolded, lest the stain of vulgar fingers should have profaned its whiteness to desecrate my lady's touch. Here lies, bathed in the delicious fragrance of freshly-gathered flowers, among costly volumes of romance, and costly works of art, this daily record of the world's life—this chronicle of its evil deeds and wasted hours and its owner of the room has entered. There is pride in heretofore and glance, as she "reads the crimson carpet," and "breathes perfume;" there is pride in each graceful movement, as she seats herself upon the luxurious ottoman; but there is a fearful anxiety in that trembling hand as she draws the paper quickly towards her. One glance of that flashing eye upon the printed page and the color fled her cheeks—her lips—and with an aspect of marble, terrible in its quietude, "my lady" lies lifeless amid the cushions.
In a small room, where a thick steam lies heavy upon the windows, and the damp vapor clings to the rotting walls, from which the plaster is dropping piece-meal to the ground, that paper is read, and the owner of the room has entered. There is pride in heretofore and glance, as she "reads the crimson carpet," and "breathes perfume;" there is pride in each graceful movement, as she seats herself upon the luxurious ottoman; but there is a fearful anxiety in that trembling hand as she draws the paper quickly towards her. One glance of that flashing eye upon the printed page and the color fled her cheeks—her lips—and with an aspect of marble, terrible in its quietude, "my lady" lies lifeless amid the cushions.
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Uses of the Beard.
The beard upon the human male face was heard by God for the express purpose of subserving a use that nothing else could subserv. Physiologists know that each hair composing the human beard is furnished with a distinct gland, elaborately and beautifully complex. Underneath are innumerable nerves, immediately connected with the various organs of the senses, ramifying in every direction, and performing important functions. In shaving the upper lip with a dull razor, the eyes water,