Indiana State Sentinel.

SEMI-WEEKLY.

ETERNAL VIGILANCE IS THE PRICE OF LIBERTY.

INDIANAPOLIS, JULY 28, 1847.

☞ *In this paper are published the Laws, Treaties, and other public Acts of the United States, by authority of the Government.*

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The following will hereafter be the *permanent* terms of the *Weekly Indiana State Sentinel:*

☞ Payments to be made always in advance.

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Bounty Lands for Volunteers.

The undersigned has received the forms and specific instructions from Washington City, for procuring the Land Warrants or Scrip for Volunteers entitled to the same; and having printed forms, he is enabled to attend to the same on short notice, and at a low fee.

GEORGE A. CHAPMAN.
Sentinel Office.

To Correspondents.

A. W., Ellettsville. We do not think it expedient to accept the proposal made in yours of the 23d, as to the six subscribers. We must adhere to our terms as printed, and treat all alike.

☞ ALBERT. G. PORTER continues to be a candidate for County Prosecutor. The announcement of his candidacy was accidently omitted in a few of our last numbers.

The Journal vs. Gen. Taylor.

The Journal wants peace with Mexico "*without any of her territory.*" It thinks it would be rascally to take a foot of California or northern Mexico, even in payment of the debts owed to our citizens, and which she may be willing to relinquish for that purpose. It knows that the territory in question would necessarily be *free*, and for that reason its acquisition would be unfavorable to the designs of the Calhoun division of the whig party. And, extremes meeting, it would thus give "aid and comfort" to both Calhoun and Corwin, who advocate the same policy for totally opposite reasons. But how can the Journal justify its course on this subject with the position of Gen. Taylor, as developed in his famous letter to Gen. Gaines? Has the Journal *forgotten* that position? It would so seem, or it would not be guilty of the weakness of advocating a course directly opposite to that recommended by its candidate for the Presidency. We will refresh its memory by copying an extract from the Gaines letter, in which Gen. Taylor wrote as follows upon the subject in question:

"It seems to me, the most judicious course to be pursued on our part, *would be to take possession at once, of the line we would accept by negotiation*, extending from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific, and occupy the same, or keep what we have already possession of; and that, with Tampico, (which I hope to take in the course of next month, or as soon as I can get the means of transportation,) will give us all on this side of the Sierra Madre, and, as soon as I occupy Saltillo, will include six or seven states or provinces, thus holding Tampico, Victoria, Monterey, Saltillo, Monclavia, Chihuahua, (which I presume Gen. Wool has possession of by this time,) Santa Fe and the Californias, and say to Mexico, "Prove us from the country!"—throwing on her the responsibility and the expense of carrying on offensive war,—at the same time closely blockading all her ports on the Pacific and the Gulf. A course of this kind, if persevered in for a short time, would soon bring her to her proper senses, and compel her to sue for peace."

Under this recommendation of Gen. Taylor, a slice of Mexico sufficient for "all practical purposes" could be taken and held, and the consent of Mexico to its relinquishment could be enforced by the sword. This, course, he thought, would soon bring Mexico "to her proper senses."

Now what has the Journal to say to this recommendation, this proposition of "conquest?" Will it condemn in him what it has condemned in others? It has not the chance of relieving itself or him from the responsibility of the suggestion, as it has done in other matters, by charging that "he acted under orders," and therefore was not responsible for statements and acts which it charged to be false and unlawful and wrong in every respect,—as though any man, in such a case, could be justified in a wrong and unlawful course, by such a wretched plea. The recommendation was voluntarily and deliberately made by Gen. Taylor, on his own responsibility. Nobody "ordered" him to make it, but he did it of his own volition. Now we should like to have the Journal put Gen. T. in the category of others condemned by itself and Tom Corwin; or else crawfish out of its unpatriotic position the best way it can. It is a matter of indifference to us which course it pursues.

"Why do Mr. McCarty and the Liberty party talk of the difference between the acquisition of new territory by conquest and purchase? Who has ever advocated the conquest of any portion of the Mexican territory as a permanent acquisition? The democratic party has never taken that ground."—*State Sentinel.*

☞ The above extract, attributed to us, seems to cause no little fuss in the Whig camp. They go to work vigorously in assailing it, and endeavoring to show its inconsistency as compared with the speeches of certain members of Congress, and of the proclamations of our Generals in Mexico. They will not make any allowance for the *poetry* contained in those speeches and proclamations; and forget the sober reality of the language we use.

The article from which the extract is made appeared in our columns of the 30th of June. That, and another article which appeared on the 3d of July, fully state the ground we occupy, and disprove any imputation of inconsistency, as is alleged to exist between us and the aforesaid speeches and proclamations.

The war has never been sanctioned or sustained by the democratic party for the purposes of conquest *per se*. But no reasonable man can expect a settlement of our difficulties with Mexico, except by a relinquishment of a portion of her territory to satisfy the just demands and claims of this country, especially those which existed before the war. None but Corwin and his followers have dared to suggest any other result as desirable in any view of the case. And the State Journal is the only newspaper which we now remember to have justified Corwin in this particular. The Journal does not desire a foot of Mexican soil: it would prefer to give up a part of Texas. Does Mr. McCarty entertain similar notions?

☞ We learn by the Versailles Flag of July 22d, that Cravens, the Corwin candidate, had made Hackleman, the regular whig nominee for Congress, take water on the subject of the resolution in favor of prosecuting the war, passed by the whig convention which nominated him: that Hackleman, by repudiating that resolution, and agreeing to oppose supplies of "men and money" for the war, as a condition, had effected an arrangement with Cravens, by which the latter agreed to withdraw, and permit H. to run alone. The disgraceful particulars of the bargain by which Mr. Hackleman thus stultifies himself and the whig party, are given in the Versailles Flag of July 22, and we shall copy them hereafter as a beautiful specimen of whig honesty and consistency.

A similar arrangement has been effected by the whig and abolition candidates in the 4th district.

False Imputations.

The Journal of the 26th contains a string of false imputations against the administration, which have been made the basis of justification or excuse on the part of the Whig politicians and editors generally, for the unpatriotic course which they have pursued in the matter of the Mexican war. The three first of these imputations are as follows:

"1st. That for want of the proper means, General Taylor was unable to follow up his victory at Palo Alto or Resaca de la Palma, by pursuing the retreating Mexicans across the Rio Grande.

"2d. That for lack of sufficient means of transportation of ammunition, provisions, &c., Gen. Taylor could not with safety have done otherwise than he did in accepting the capitulation of Monterey, upon the terms condemned by the administration.

"3d. That at Buena Vista, Gen. Taylor was left by the government with a force so small as to render his defeat more than probable, in the minds of the people as well as the administration."

Not one of these imputations can be sustained by good evidence; nor indeed any evidence at all, except mere assertion, unsustained by a single fact. In our semi-weekly paper of July 3d, we copied an article from the Cincinnati Enquirer, demonstrating so far as it went, the untruth and injustice of the imputations, by a review of facts derived from official sources. The Enquirer has since followed up the subject, and in that paper of July 9th, we have the results in the following article. Every fair-minded man, whig or democrat, who examines these facts, will admit that the whig statements above quoted, are utterly groundless.

REDUCTION OF GEN. TAYLOR'S ARMY.

A pressure of other matters upon our time and attention, has prevented as early a recurrence to this topic as we could have desired. We shall endeavor to dispose of it this morning, and that in as brief a manner as possible.

We have seen that Gen. TAYLOR was fully consulted by the President in relation to the movement of forces, and all other active operations in Mexico. We have also seen that he was not only made acquainted with the change of operations from the Rio Grande to the Gulf, but that he counselled it, as the only movement that could successfully be made upon the city of Mexico, and indicated Vera Cruz as the point. We have not been able, after considerable search, to lay our hand upon the letter of Gen. TAYLOR to Gen. GAINES; but in that document General TAYLOR pronounces the route from Saltillo to San Luis Potosi, an impracticable one. All these things concurred to determine the War Department in favor of the attack upon Vera Cruz, and that line of operations towards the city of Mexico, which General SCOTT has thus far so signally conducted. It should be borne in mind, too, that in all the correspondence with General TAYLOR touching this matter, he has been repeatedly advised that it was not designed to take from him any force, *that he should deem necessary for conducting his operations upon the Rio Grande.* Those operations, from his own correspondence, the Secretary infers, will be confined to securing the position of the army at Monterey, and keeping open the line of communication with the Rio Grande. General TAYLOR, however, is not restrained from making excursions beyond that point, if he should see proper to do so,—but any such movement is rested solely upon his discretion.

On the 13th of October, 1846, the Secretary forwarded a dispatch to General TAYLOR, in which after advising him that the season for military operations upon the Gulf has arrived,—and that in the descent upon Vera Cruz, a larger regular force will be required than that assigned to the Tamaulipas expedition,—he remarks:

"It is desired to know if in your opinion a detachment of two thousand of this description of force can be spared for that purpose from those under your command, *without essentially interfering with your plans and operations.* It is not *desired or intended to weaken the force with you at Monterey*, or to embarrass you by diverting troops from the Rio Grande *which you may deem necessary* as reinforcements to the execution of your own contemplated operations."

In a subsequent dispatch under date of October 22d, the Secretary again recurs to this subject in the following terms:

"If the expedition could go forth without the object being known to the enemy, it is supposed that four thousand troops would be a sufficient force for the enterprise, receiving as they would, the co-operation of our naval force in the gulf; but at least fifteen hundred or two thousand of them should be of the regular army, and under the command of officers best calculated for such an undertaking. Whilst the government is anxious that nothing should occur to prevent the expedition to Vera Cruz, regarding it of great importance, *yet if by withdrawing from your immediate command the force necessary for this purpose, the army with you may be placed in danger, this expedition must for the present be either* DEFERRED *or* ABANDONED—a result deeply to be regretted On the spot, *you will know the strength of the force advancing against you and the number of troops necessary to resist it; you* WILL BY NO MEANS WEAKEN YOURSELF *so as to expose the army under your command to the probable hazard of disaster.*"

A copy of this last dispatch was sent to General PATTERSON, and he was advised that the expedition was a suggestion of General TAYLOR, and depended upon his concurrence. On the 25th of November, the Secretary advised Gen. Taylor that General Scott had been designated for the command of the expedition against Vera Cruz. He further informs him that the despatch of the 13th of October, detailing the plan of operations in this quarter, has been intercepted by the enemy, and that being informed of the project, a vigorous resistance might be expected,—and that this might possibly render necessary a larger force than had been indicated.

On the 12th of November, General Taylor replies to these communications. He considers 4,000 men too small a force with which to move upon Vera Cruz. He considers 10,000 as sufficient to take and hold the place, of which 4,000 should be regulars;—but to move into the interior and preserve, at the same time, the base upon the Gulf, he thinks will require 25,000 men. He then goes on to remark:

"A force of ten thousand men cannot be spared from the occupation of the line of Sierra Madre. Four thousand may be diverted from that object; and if to these six thousand fresh troops from the United States were added at the proper time the expedition might be undertaken with a promise of success. I propose, therefore, to proceed with the preparation for a movement on Tampico; and after accomplishing every thing that is to be done in that quarter, *I will*, if the department approve, *hold four thousand men, of which perhaps three thousand regulars*, ready to embark at some point on the coast, and effect a junction with the additional force from the States."

This is all the correspondence between the War Department and Gen. Taylor, upon this point. It establishes the following propositions:

1st. That Gen. Taylor was advised and consulted with in regard to this movement.

2d. That he counselled it, as well because it afforded a better line of operations, as that the one upon which he was operating did not safely admit of advance.

3d. That from his own correspondence the department was authorized to consider that Gen. Taylor's operations would be confined to holding Monterey, and keeping open his communications with the Rio Grande.

4th. That the interception of the despatches of the Secretary, by the enemy, induced the belief that the whole Mexican force would at once be concentrated for the defence of Vera Cruz—leaving little to apprehend in any other quarter.

5th. That no direct requisition was made by the Secretary upon Gen. Taylor for force; but that when asked if he could part with 4,000 men, he was expressly told not to diminish his force so as to incur disaster,—and that if he could not part with this force, with perfect safety, the enterprise must be postponed or abandoned.

6th. That he voluntarily tendered 4,000 of his troops, including 3,000 regulars; and

7th. That Gen. Scott, who was the senior officer, was sent in charge of this expedition, of which Gen. Taylor had notice.

And the fact further appears, from Gen. Taylor's letter, of January 7th, 1847, that he was advised of Gen. Scott's arrival in Mexico, and remained in Monterey "*in order to hear from him, and determine* what disposition to make of the troops." This becomes important from the further fact that General Scott sought no consultation with him; but proceeded, as his senior officer, to make such disposition of the force as he saw proper.

It only remains, therefore, for us to see what were the instructions under which Gen. Scott was dispatched upon this expedition,—and what his own views and course in regard to it. And in this connection it is proper to remark that before leaving Washington, Gen. Scott was undoubtedly fully advised of the correspondence which had passed between the War Department and Gen. Taylor, in the premises.

We find then that on the 23d of November, 1846, the Secretary of War addressed to Gen. Scott the following note:

"SIR:—The President several days since communicated in person to you his orders to repair to Mexico, to take command of the forces there assembled, and particularly to organize and set on foot an expedition to operate on the gulf coast, *if on arriving at the theatre of action you shall deem it to be practicable.* It is not proposed to control your operations by definite and positive instructions, but you are left to prosecute them *as your judgment, under a full view of all the circumstances, shall dictate.* The work is before you, and the means provided, or to be provided, for accomplishing it, *are committed to you*, in the full confidence that you will use them to the best advantage.

"The objects which it is desirable to obtain have been indicated, and it is hoped that you will have the requisite force to accomplish them.

"Of this you must be the judge when preparations are made, and the time for action has arrived."

It is hard to conceive of language more clear or more definite. The purpose for which General Scott is sent is to "take command of the forces in Mexico," and consequently to have the control of all military movements in that quarter. He is to make the movement upon Vera Cruz, *if he "shall deem it practicable."* He is not controlled by any specific orders, but all is left to his own judgment. Means, force, time, propriety,—all are left to him, as senior officer in command. He is not ordered to reduce the force of General Taylor—nor yet, as has been asserted, *absolutely* directed to move upon Vera Cruz. All is left to his own discretion. If, in the exercise of that discretion, he erred, and it be no crime in him, it certainly can cast no blame upon the administration.

Immediately after receiving this direction,—on the 25th of November,—Gen. Scott addressed Gen. Taylor, from New York, before he had arrived "at the theatre of action," in which, after speaking of his movement on the Gulf, upon which he had *then* decided, he goes on to speak of his disposition of troops, in the following terms:

"But, my dear General, I shall be obliged to take from you most of the gallant officers and men (regulars and volunteers) whom you have so long and so nobly commanded. I am afraid that I shall, by imperious necessity—by approach of yellow fever on the gulf coast—reduce you for a time to stand on the defensive. This will be infinitely painful to you, and for that reason distressing to me. But I rely upon your patriotism to submit to the temporary sacrifice with cheerfulnes. No man can better afford to do so. Recent victories place you on that high eminence, and I even flatter myself that any benefit that may result to me personally from the unequal division of the troops alluded to, will lessen the pain of your consequent inactivity."

Accordingly he did take such force as he considered necessary,—and as, in full view of Gen. Taylor's position, and that of the enemy, he considered, in the exercise of his wide discretion, could be safely transferred from the Rio Grande to the Gulf. In addition, therefore, to the propositions heretofore stated, we have the following made out by this correspondence:

1st. That Gen. Scott went to Mexico to take command of *all* the forces there assembled.

2d. That he was not ordered to make the descent upon the Gulf coast, unless "in view of all the circumstances," upon "*arriving at the theatre of action*," he should deem it "practicable."

3d. He was not directed to weaken the force of Gen. Taylor;—nor, by implication, authorized to do so, unless, in his discretion, he should consider it perfectly safe to do so.

4th. That without waiting to reach the seat of war, and determining *there* the practicability of the movement, he resolved upon it at New York, two days after his orders were issued, and from that point advised Gen. Taylor of the necessity there was of taking his troops.

5th. That in the exercise of his discretion alone, Gen. Scott withdrew the troops of Gen. Taylor, and produced the state of things upon the Rio Grande, of which the federal leaders and papers complain.

It is not our purpose to censure Gen. Scott for this act. Whether it was right or wrong we shall not undertake to determine. He had a broad discretion; if he erred, it was unfortunate—if he abused his trust he has a right to a hearing before condemnation. A simple statement of the facts was necessary for that other purpose we had in view, and which we think we have accomplished, of acquitting the administration of all blame in the premises. We have shown that the President did not control or direct the reduction of Gen. Taylor's army, farther than to confide the propriety of dividing the force to the discretion of Gen. Scott;—and certainly that neither he nor Gen. Scott made that division with the INTENTION of sacrificing that army to the Mexican forces.

A "Democratic meeting" was recently called in N. York, to assemble in the Park, to nominate General Taylor. It was a failure. Not more than twenty-five mercenaries were present.—*Chapman's Sentinel.*

Thus Chapman stigmatizes every Democrat, who goes for Gen. Taylor, as a "*mercenary.*" Will he tell us how many "mercenaries" there were, including French and Daniel, at the Democratic Taylor meeting in Mount Sterling—how many "mercenaries" there were in the large Democratic Taylor meeting in Harrisburg—and how many "mercenaries" there were in the two large Democratic Taylor meetings in New Jersey!—*Louisville Journal.*

The assertion in the first sentence is *false*. This is in character, however. It is impossible for the Louisville Journal to contain an editorial paragraph which is not marked by at least one falsehood.

As to the questions of the Journal, which follow its false assertion. We cannot tell "how many" *mercenaries* there were at the Mount Sterling Taylor meeting; but we think the Journal names two of them, French and Daniel. The first we are told, by Kentuckians who know him, is a broken down party hack, who does not possess any considerable degree of the confidence of the party to which he professes himself attached; and the second is the person who murdered his brother-in-law in a Court-room, about a year since, the horrid particulars of which we published at the time. He somehow escaped the gallows, as many murderers contrive to do; but we cannot think that his standing as a man or as a politician was improved by his infamous crime, even in a State where some of the Whig nominees for high offices have committed similar violations of the law of God and man.

Neither can we tell "how many" mercenaries there were at the Taylor meeting at Harrisburg; but when we know, as we do, that they were the same men who but a short time ago were the professed staunch and unyielding friends of Gen. Cass, and who, at one time were apparently willing to risk every thing in the shape of party integrity under the pretext of rewarding him for his services to the country both in the field and in civil life,—we cannot but regard the sudden change in their personal relations, affecting Cass and Taylor, as being prompted as much by a hope of immediate profit to themselves as by any other consideration. Under the circumstances they cannot be governed by principles of honesty and fidelity. That is evident.

The meeting in New Jersey we understand to have been like that in New York, a *failure*. It is not a matter of much concern to us who were its concoctors. The people had no confidence in their purposes, and had the good sense to leave them "alone in their glory."

VERA CRUZ.—The health of the squadron at Vera Cruz is said to be very good. The sickness in the castle had entirely subsided, and the fever in the town very much abated. The best authorities say that the general healthiness of the place is superior to that of New Orleans. We never had a doubt that such would prove to be the fact.

"DOG DAYS."—In passing from the office to our residence a few nights ago, we were near being bitten by a dog on the street.—*New Albany Bulletin.*

That dog was a lucky one, no doubt, for had he bitten the editor he might have learned the truth of the epigram, the burden of which is—

"The man recovered from the bite,
"The dog it was that died."

We try to be honest.—*Louisville Journal.*

That *is* a rich joke, 'pon honor! If even sincere in making such a profession, Prentice is so totally depraved by nature that he could not be successful, if he tried to be honest ever so hard. The Ethiopian could more easily change his skin.

Died, recently, at Philadelphia JOSEPH C. NEAL Esq., the well known writer.

REPORT

Of the shipment of contributions sent by the Executive Committee of Indianapolis, to the famishing of Ireland and Scotland.

The Executive Committee for the relief of the suffering poor of Ireland, of Madison, Indiana, would report to the Executive Committee for the suffering poor of Ireland and Scotland, of Indianapolis, Indiana, as follows:

RECEIPT OF CORN TO BE EXCHANGED FOR KILN-DRIED CORN MEAL AND CASH.

409 bags corn, 975 46-56 bu., at 40,	$390 30
409 empty bags,	73 62
1 bag peaches, 4 bu.,	4 00
Cash per draft,	77 00
	$541 92

DISPOSAL OF THE ABOVE RECEIPTS.

Cash paid labor on corn and flour,	5 35
Cash paid on cooperage,	1 00
Drayage to store,	7 50
Postage to Pittsburg,	20
Drayage on meal from mill,	3 40
Scotch committee per Jno. Nevin, ¼ proceeds draft after drawing expenses on all the stuff,	16 00
Bills lading,	05
Cash paid 126 bbls. corn meal, per D. White & Co. at 3:50 per bbl.	441 00
Scotch committee, per J. Nevin, ¼ proceeds 20 bags corn,	5 90
Insurance, per Lexington office,	22 92
Bills lading,	05
Cash paid on the freight,	35 00
do drayage and labor on 120 bbls. to steamboat,	2 65
Cash on hand for postage, &c.,	90
	$541 92

RECEIPT OF FLOUR &C., AND THE KILN-DRIED CORN MEAL

160 bbls. flour and middlings,	
7 " " Belfast Co. Down	
2 " beef,	
5 " beans,	
1 bag "	
2 bbls. flour, Sabbath school, for Ireland,	
2 bbls. flour, Sabbath school, for Scotland,	
126 " corn meal purchased.	
305 barrels.	

DISPOSAL OF THE FLOUR AND MEAL, &c

32 bbls. corn meal, ¼ of the 126 bbls purchased,	
40 bbls. flour and middlings, ¼ of 160 bbls.,	
2 bbls. beans,	
1 bag do	
2 bbls flour, Sabbath school children.	
All of the above handed over to the stock committee, per J. Nevin.	
94 bbls. corn meal to N. Orleans, per steamboat St. Cloud, for Ireland,	
127 bbls. flour, } Shipped to	
3 " beans, } N. Orleans	
2 " beef, } per S. B. S. America for Ireland.	
2 bbls flour handed over to Messrs. Polleys & Butler, claimed by them for Mr. Underhill.	
305 barrels.	

MADISON, Indiana, July 10th, 1847.

JAS. M. RAY, ESQ., AGENT FOR COM., SIR: Above you will please find a statement of all the breadstuff sent in here for the suffering poor of Ireland and Scotland. We have taken pains to have every thing done according to the direction in your letter, and have shipped it to New Orleans in the way you directed, and will send you the bills of lading when we get them from New Orleans, and also when we hear from the Society of Friends at Dublin. You will see in the report, that we had to hand over two barrels of flour to Polleys & Butler, by order of Mr. Underhill, of your place. We could not send you an account of the flour and middlings separate, as there was a great many barrels only marked with your donation brand, which did not show whether it was middlings or super-fine flour. We have not heard from New Orleans, as yet. Before we shipped any to N. Orleans, we wrote to Pittsburgh, in hopes that the canal companies would take it from Pittsburgh free of charge, but they refused, as they had done before. Hoping that our attention will meet your views, and be satisfactory to your generous donors, we remain

Yours, ob'ly,
O. K. DONOHUE.
FOR EX. COM. of Madison.

INDIANAPOLIS, July 26, 1847.

MESSRS. EDITORS—SIRS: I have lately been informed that one of the candidates for the Legislature, to wit, G. A. Chapman, has been complaining that I was not going to vote the entire democratic ticket this year. It is true, sir, I have frequently stated that I did not see how I could vote for said Chapman, owing to the cool treatment I received last year from your office, for I do assure you that not only myself, but many of my friends were much chagrined and mortified when I was a candidate last year for the office of Sheriff of Marion county, to see and know as we did, that I was not getting that warm and hearty support which I thought I had a right to expect from the conductors of a democratic journal. But notwithstanding all that, I am determined to rally to the standard of democratic principles, and bury in oblivion the past, and carry out in practice what I have long professed, to sacrifice all personal feeling for the sake of my country. I should have spent some considerable time this year for the furtherance of our good cause, but my pecuniary concerns forbid it. I have, as you very well know, been defeated twice, and my loss of time is considerable; this makes it necessary at this time to attend close to my domestic affairs. But I do assure you, and all my friends, that I will not be wanting on the first Monday of August, and I hope that every democrat will be at his post and do his duty on that day.

Please give this room in your paper and oblige me.

BANNER LAWHEAD.

☞ Mr. Lawhead is informed that I never made such a "complaint." I had *heard* that such was the case; but I do not remember of ever having even *mentioned* it to but one person, as after mutual explanations last year, I had no reason to believe it.

G. A. C.

☞ The Louisville Journal of the 17th July repeats a statement concerning Mr. Pettit, a candidate for Congress in the 8th district, which it says it considers "sufficient to damn Mr. P. forever and ever in the estimation of all decent men." This might be the result could the Louisville Journal be relied upon. But that cannot be. It has been so long and so notoriously in the habit of lying; it lies so causelessly and continuously, about every thing and every man to which it is politically opposed; it is so well known to be addicted to an incorrigible habit of falsehood on every subject immediately or remotely allied to politics, that it does not obtain credence when it happens to tell a truth, and its most solemn asseverations are doubted by its own readers generally, and disbelieved by a majority of them; while its opponents do not feel safe in relying upon any assertion it makes, unaccompanied by the most positive and unequivocal proof. It illustrates in itself, better than any thing else we know of, the old fable of the boy and the wolves.

CORWINISM.—The following is from a whig paper published under the nose of Tom Corwin, and who exercises a controling influence over its columns:

RIGHT SPIRIT.—Both the candidates for Congress in the Brookville district, Indiana, have been endeavoring to make capital out of the war. The anti-war men of that district have held a convention, and nominated an anti-war candidate, whom we hope will get a good vote, though he cannot be elected.

Col. Lane failed to receive the nomination in the Tippecanoe district. David Brier, a sound anti-war whig was chosen; and if the friends of right do their duty, he will be elected.—*Hamilton, O., News.*

OREGON.—In the recent intelligence from Oregon, the Governor's message exemplified that the community there had taken a high stand in the temperance reform. Notwithstanding the Governor's recommendation of confining its sale exclusively to medical men, it appears that finally, the settlers would have whisky, whether or not! The Oregon Legislature, which adjourned Dec. 20, passed a bill to authorize the manufacture and sale of spiritous liquors. Gov. Abernethy vetoed it—but they passed it again by the constitutional majority.

☞ The two American officers who refused to pay the fine imposed on them by the authorities of Havana, for an alleged breach of the sanatory regulations, Lieut. Twiggs, aid-de-camp to General Twiggs, and Lieut. J. H. Jones, of the Marines, arrived at New Orleans on the 10th. It appears that these officers, after consulting with the American Consul, paid the fine, $200 each, under protest, and were released, being anxious to be on the theater of war, to which they were on their way.

THE ISSUE.—A Whig Convention assembled at Exeter, N. H. a few days since declared:—

"We regard the great question now at issue before the country to be that of SLAVERY"

Huzza for Gen. Taylor, a Louisiana slave dealer!

From the Union, July 19.

Important.

Correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Mexican government, relative to the mission of Mr. Trist.

An *extra* of the *Republicano* of Mexico, of the 28th of June, has been received at the Department of State, containing copies of two notes from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, dated the 22d of June last, and a translation of the letter addressed to the Mexican government, by our Secretary of State, on the 15th of April previous. We here present translations of the two notes first mentioned, together with a copy in the original of Mr. Buchanan's letter; all of which will doubtless be read with interest in every part of our country.

Historical documents published in the Republicano of the 28th of June, 1847.

[TRANSLATION.]

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AND FOREIGN RELATIONS.

To the most excellent Secretaries of the Sovereign Congress:

GOD AND LIBERTY—Mexico, June 22, 1847.

MOST EXCELLENT SIRS: By order of his excellency, the President *ad interim* of the republic, as resolved in a council of ministers, I have the honor to place in the hand of your excellencies, that you may submit it to the sovereign Congress, at its first meeting, a copy of the official note, addressed by the Secretary of State of the United States to this government, under date of the 15th of April last, in which he declares that the President of that republic intends to despatch, as a commissioner, to the headquarters of the army operating in Mexico, Nicholas P. Trist, esq., with full powers to conclude a definite treaty of peace with the Mexican United States.

I likewise transmit to your excellencies, for communication to the sovereign Congress, a copy of the answer which the most excellent President resolved, in a council of ministers to have made to the above mentioned note; his excellency feeling assured that the august assembly, to which is reserved the determination on the affair to which the present communication relates, will despatch it with the promptness and wisdom to be expected from its patriotism and its distinguished enlightenment.

I repeat to your excellencies, on this occasion, the assurances of my high consideration.

DOMINGO IBARRA.

[COPY]

To his Excellency the Minister of Foreign Relations of the Mexican republic:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, April 15, 1847.

SIR, I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's note, of the 22d February last, in answer to mine of the 18th January, proposing, on the part of the President of the United States, immediately to despatch either to the Havana or Jalapa, as the Mexican government may prefer, one or more of our most distinguished citizens, as commissioners, clothed with full powers to conclude a treaty of peace with similar commissioners on the part of Mexico, as soon as he shall be officially informed that the Mexican government will appoint such commissioners."

The President deeply regrets the refusal of the Mexican government to accede to this friendly overture, unless the raising of the blockade of our (the Mexican) ports, and the complete evacuation of the territory of the republic by the invading forces, shall be previously accepted as a preliminary condition."

The President has instructed me to inform you that this "preliminary condition" is wholly inadmissible.—Such a condition is neither required by the honor, nor sanctioned by the practice of nations. If it were, this would tend to prolong wars, especially between conterminous countries, until the one or the other power was entirely subdued. No nation which, at the expenditure of blood and treasure, has invaded its enemy's country, and acquired possession of any considerable portion of his territory, could ever consent to withdraw its forces, as a preliminary condition to the opening of negotiations for peace. This would be at once to abandon all the advantages it had obtained in the prosecution of the war, without any certainty that peace would result from the sacrifice. Nay, more: should such a negotiation prove unsuccessful, the nation which had thus imprudently withdrawn its forces from the enemy's territory, might not be able to recover, without a cost of blood and treasure equal to that first expended, the advantageous position which it had voluntarily abandoned.

Fortunately for the cause of peace and humanity, the history of nations at war affords no sanction to such a preliminary condition. The United States are as jealous of their national honor as any power on the face of the earth; and yet it never entered into the contemplation of the great statesman who administered our government during the period of our last war with great Britain, to insist that the latter should relinquish that part of our territory of which she was in actual possession, before they would consent to open negotiations for peace. On the contrary, they took the initiative, and appointed commissioners to treat for peace whilst portions of our country were held by the enemy; and it is a remarkable fact, that the treaty of Ghent was concluded by the plenipotentiaries of the two powers whilst the war was raging on both sides; and the most memorable of the conflicts to which it gave rise took place upon our own soil after the negotiators had happily terminated their labors. History is full of such examples. Indeed, so far as the undersigned is aware, there is not to be found, at least in modern times, a single case, except the present, in which it has been considered a necessary preliminary that an invading army should be withdrawn before negotiations for peace could commence between the parties to the war.

It would, also, be difficult to find a precedent for the course pursued by the Mexican government in another particular. The President, anxious to avoid the war now existing, sent a minister of peace to Mexico for this purpose. After the Mexican forces had attacked the army of Gen. Taylor on this side of the Rio Grande, and thus commenced the war, the President, actuated by the same pacific spirit, made repeated overtures to the government of Mexico to negotiate for its termination: and although he has, from the beginning, solemnly declared before the world that he desired no terms but such as were just and honorable for both parties, yet the Mexican government, by refusing to receive our minister in the first place, and afterwards by not acceding to our overtures to open negotiations for peace, has never afforded to this government even the opportunity of making known the terms on which we would be willing to settle all questions in dispute between the two republics. The war can never end whilst Mexico refuses even to hear the proposals which we have always been ready to make for peace.

The President will not again renew the offer to negotiate—at least until he shall have reason to believe that it would be accepted by the Mexican government. Devoted however, to honorable peace, he is determined that the evils of the war shall not be protracted one day longer than shall be rendered absolutely necessary by the Mexican republic. For the purpose of carrying this determination into effect with the least possible delay, he will forthwith send to the headquarters of the army, in Mexico, Nicholas P. Trist, esq., the officer next in rank to the undersigned in our Department of Foreign Affairs, as a commissioner, invested with full powers to conclude a definitive treaty of peace with the United Mexican States. This gentleman possesses the entire confidence of the President, and is eminently worthy of that of the Mexican government.

The undersigned refrains from all comment upon the concluding paragraph, as well as some other portions, of your excellency's note; because the strong sense which he entertains of their injustice towards the United States could not be uttered in the friendly tone which he desires to preserve in the present communication. He turns from these, therefore, to dwell—as he does with unfeigned pleasure—upon the sentiment contained in an early part of the same note, where the Mexican government expresses how painful it is "to see disturbed the sincere friendship which it cultivated with your [our] republic, whose continued progress it has always admired, and whose institutions have served it as a model."

This feeling is most cordially reciprocated by the President, whose earnest desire it is that the United Mexican States, under institutions similar to our own, may protect and secure the liberty of their people, and maintain an elevated standing among the nations of the earth.

The undersigned embraces this occasion to offer to your excellency the assurance of his most distinguished consideration.

JAMES BUCHANAN.

[TRANSLATION.]

To his excellency the Secretary of State of the United States of America.

FEDERAL PALACE, June 22, 1847.

The undersigned, Minister of Internal and Foreign Relations, had the honor to receive your excellency's note, dated 15th of April last, in which you declare that his excellency the President of the United States intends to despatch, as a commissioner to the headquarters of the army operating in Mexico, Nicholas P. Trist, esq., the officer next in rank to your excellency, with full powers to conclude a definitive treaty of peace with the Mexican United States; and the most excellent President *ad interim* of this republic, to whom the undersigned immediately made known the contents of your excellency's said official note, has determined that you should be informed, in reply, that the decision on the affair in question being reserved to the sovereign Congress of the nation, your excellency's said note is transmitted by him to that body, in order that it may determine what should be deemed most proper on the subject. Its resolution shall be communicated in due time to your excellency, by the department under the charge of the undersigned, who leaves for that occasion the answer to the points embraced in your excellency's said note.

The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to offer to your excellency the assurances of his distinguished consideration.

DOMINGO IBARRA.

News from Mexico.

We lay before our readers the very interesting letter from Mr. Buchanan to the Mexican government, with two notes from the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations, published in the papers of the capital, and translated for the "Union." We also lay before them so much of the last advices received from Mexico as are published in the New Orleans Picayune.

It is highly probable, as a private letter from Vera Cruz states, that General Scott is either in the city of Mexico, or in the midst of an overture for peace.

It is now for Mexico to indicate her disposition for negotiation. Mr. Buchanan shows how repeatedly we have tendered the olive-branch; and surely nothing would have justified our frequent repetition of pacific overtures, but the comparative feebleness of the nation to whom we offered peace.

There is nothing decisive, in these accounts, of the determination of Mexico. Whether we shall have peace, or a continuation of the war, depends upon her. Santa Anna has not, so far as we are advised, declined this last offer for negotiation. There is nothing in the notes which shows a determination to reject it. But, on the other hand, the private accounts which appear in the "Picayune" are rather opposed to the prospect of pacification. No man, however, can tell, nor form any positive opinion upon the subject. Our government is certainly preparing for either fortune. Its desire is peace; but, instead of relaxing its efforts, it is making vigorous preparations for active war. Is Mexico altogether infatuated? Is she really so maddened as to be rushing on her destruction? Is she not beginning to see that she can no longer confide in the vomito as her most efficient ally; that it is not so fatal as she had expected; and that the season of mortality is abating? She trusts to her guerillas. She will soon see that Gen. Scott has troops enough to occupy her capital; and that the most active and efficient means are now being taken by our government to enable the commanding General, without serious difficulty or opposition, to keep open the communication from Vera Cruz to Mexico. She is misled, too, by the factious, if not traitorous, misrepresentations of the federal press. Our government is bent on vigorous war, if it cannot obtain an honorable peace. The next Congress will not stop the supplies; for a free and patriotic people will not permit their representatives to flag in the prosecution of a war, upon which the rights and honor of the whole nation are at issue. Better, then, for Mexico to heal up the breach at once, and make peace, since she can no longer hope to gain anything by war.—*Union, July 19.*

Mexican News.

By the politeness of the editors of the New Albany Democrat, we have a copy of the N. O. Picayune of July 15.

The news is derived chiefly from Mexican papers, and should be received with caution. A council of war is said to have been held in Scott's camp on the 28th ult. One general is said to have argued that it would be an act of madness to march to the city of Mexico with less than 20,000 men. Gen. Worth was of a different opinion, and maintained that every invader who hesitated was lost; that six or eight thousand Americans could conquer 20,000 Mexicans. Scott approved these sentiments, and determined to commence a forward movement on the 28th; but subsequently hearing of the arrival of reinforcements at Vera Cruz, he postponed his march to the 10th July, to allow them to come up.

The *Republicano* blames the Government for not communicating at once with Mr. Trist, without referring the subject matter of Mr. Buchanan's letter to Congress. It holds that it is the business of the executive thus to manage negotiations, and refer the result to the wisdom of Congress. Besides, it says, that in all probability it will be impossible to procure a quorum of Congress. To refer overtures thus is to break them off in the outset. That paper takes good care to prevent the inference from this remark that it favors peace. It is on the contrary open-mouthed for war. It would not grant a truce for a single day