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The New Draft.

The new draft ordered by the President, and which was published to the country last Monday morning, caused no little surprise. It came like a clap of thunder in a cloudless sky. The assurance was given when the last draft for three hundred thousand was ordered, that that would be ample to crush out the rebellion—which the public authorities assured us then, as they do now, was upon its last legs. About the first of December last it was announced, semi-officially, that in three months from that period armed rebellion at least would be subdued.

On the 4th day of December last, about two months ago, Governor Morton, then just returned from Washington and New York, addressed a great war meeting held at Masonic Hall, in this city. His Excellency remarked, with great emphasis and dignity, as follows:

"The great business on hand now was raising troops for Indiana. *This would be the last call.* The rebellion was rapidly drawing to a close. He thought that three months, or at most six months, would see the war triumphantly closed. Indiana had responded to the demands of the General Government in the prosecution of the war promptly. Shall we now, *at the conclusion of the war*, when the bounties offered are enormous—shall Indiana now prove laggard? * * * Let each man do his duty; here where unwonted prosperity obtained, he desired all to step forward and give him their individual aid that a draft should not occur in Marion county. Otherwise the draft must come, and all must submit."

He also remarked "that probably the soldiers now enlisting might never go to the field."

These were the promises that induced the people of Indiana, individually and in their municipal and county organizations, to come forward and with great liberality offer the bounties to raise the quota demanded of Indiana, by volunteering. With extraordinary effort that quota has been about raised, but now more is required. Still further sacrifices are demanded, when the Governor of the State, evidently speaking by authority, expressly declared that the call then made would be the last, and even more than that, that probably the soldiers enlisted under that call might never go to the field. But it appears, notwithstanding these fair promises, that we are not yet at the conclusion of the war. Two of the three months have expired, when the people were promised that they should "see the war triumphantly closed." Now it appears, according to Republican authority, that a dribbling, inefficient policy has thus far characterized the conduct of the war, and a demand is made for more energy and vigor in its management, so that it should be virtually ended within the current year. The Cincinnati Gazette, a leading Administration organ, makes the following comments upon the draft just ordered, which are worthy of consideration. It says:

It is manifest that this war should be virtually ended within the current year. It is the popular impression that it may be thus ended. But to give the rebellion a finishing blow in the approaching campaign, our armies must be promptly and largely recruited; not by the re-enlisting of veterans, or figuring up quotas on paper, but by furnishing new, full grown, stout fighting men—men who will count in the field as well as on the muster roll. This is the most economical way both as regards blood and treasure to end the war. *To dribble along, as we have been doing for a year past,* calling for three hundred thousand men, and receiving fifty thousand; ordering a draft, and then postponing it, and finally, executing it in spots, is a waste of time, of men and of means. It is important therefore, that a new leaf should be turned at once; that the army should be speedily reinforced to the strength deemed necessary to give the staggering rebellion a finishing blow; then to march over its prostrate carcass, and make clean work of the business during the summer. This cannot be done with our present army; but it may be done by adding to the troops now in the field, the new men which this last order is intended to bring forward.

Every demand of the Administration for men and money has been promptly met. The party in power in that regard is without excuse for its failure to overthrow the rebellion. But upon the heels of this experience, the country is advised "that a new leaf should be turned at once; that the army should be speedily reinforced to the strength deemed *necessary* to give the staggering rebellion a finishing blow." This has been said over and over again during the past three years, only to be renewed at the expiration of every few months. Now we are told that five hundred thousand are necessary to "make clean work of the business during the summer." Yet two months ago Governor Morton, referring to the call for three hundred thousand additional troops, assured the people that it would be the last call and that probably the soldiers enlisting under it might never go to the field.

But enough. Either the Administration has wilfully deceived the people, or else it is sorely deficient in sagacity and administrative ability. What confidence can the country place in such an administration of public affairs, or what right has it to ask the public confidence in the face of such a record? There is an old adage which reads that if a beggar is put upon horseback he will ride to the devil rapidly, and its truthfulness has been exemplified by placing the Republican party in power. Under its rule the country, with its boasted free institutions have been going to destruction with railroad speed, but it appears a little more "dribbling" is necessary to reach the end.

"The Union and the Government."

The Cincinnati Commercial, under the above caption, attempts to criticise the recent opinion of the Supreme Court of this State, in which the war power of the President is necessarily and most ably discussed. It quotes the following paragraph from that opinion as a text for its comments:

"The rebellion itself did not originate in an attempt, as we have read its history, to overthrow the Government of the United States, and is not now ostensibly prosecuted for that purpose. The rebellion consists in an attempt, if we have read aright, to withdraw a certain portion of the people and territory from under the jurisdiction of the Government of the United States—*to divide the Union*, leaving the North under the existing Government, and placing the South under a newly created Government."

This statement is true. During the five months succeeding the Presidential election of 1860, the leading Republican press expressed an entire willingness that the dissatisfied States—the States now in rebellion—should separate from the Union. The New York Tribune, the Chicago Tribune, the Buffalo Express, the Indianapolis Journal, and even the Cincinnati Commercial were most decidedly in favor of a division of the Union, "leaving the North under the existing government, and placing the South under a newly created government." Not one of these papers then even mooted the idea, that a separation of one or a dozen States from the Union would "overthrow the Government of the United States." These organs of the Republican party now so fierce for a vigorous prosecution of the war to preserve the life of the nation or government, then attempted to demonstrate the advantages of a division of the Union to the North. If we recollect aright, all the papers we have named regarded the loss of a dozen States a less calamity than civil war; and they have repeatedly stated that all the now rebel States asked was to be let alone, to be permitted to dissolve their connection with the Union in peace. It is also a matter of history that the Confederate States, after the adoption of the Montgomery Constitution, sent Commissioners to to Washington to agree upon terms of separation, and they were instructed to negotiate upon the basis of an equitable division of the public property and the public indebtedness, "leaving the North under the existing government and placing the South under a newly created government," and the papers now so fiercely "unconditional Union" were willing to let the dissatisfied States depart upon these conditions. It is most absurd to argue that the loss of a portion of its territory from whatever cause destroys the existing government. The history of our own nation refutes this fallacy. The separation of the colonies from the British crown, and that too by force, did not destroy the then existing government of Great Britain. Although by the revolution she lost one of her brightest jewels, yet Great Britain retained the same identity, power, and even vigor that she possessed before that event. The people of the colonies not only rebelled against British rule, but left the jurisdiction of the British Government, *divided the Union*, leaving Great Britain "under its existing government," and "placing the" colonies, "under a newly created government." We do not apprehend, nor can any sensible man, that the existing Government of the United States would be overthrown even if the rebel States should succeed in securing their independence. They have in fact been separated from us about three years; yet the government of the United States is not overthrown. Its territory is lessened, but the existing government remains in all its vigor and power to the States which adhere to the Union. The paragraph we have quoted from the opinion of the Court, to which the Republican press now object, is correct in every respect. The rebellion did not originate in an attempt "to overthrow the Government of the United States, and is not ostensibly prosecuted for that purpose." The war would never have been commenced if the Government of the United States would have consented to a peaceable separation of the States, and to day the existing government could have peace if it would recognize the Independence of the Southern Confederacy. Can it be denied then, in the language of the Court, that "the rebellion consists in an attempt to withdraw a certain portion of the people and territory from under the jurisdiction of the Government of the United States?"

Church and State.

Dispatches from New Orleans state that "Bishop Ames has been empowered by the War Department to take charge of the Methodist Church, and he is now proceeding in that direction." So it appears that military necessity requires that the Administration shall assume the charge and control of spiritual affairs as well as temporal, and a permit is required from the Government to save souls and administer religious consolations. The next step may be to make Bishop Ames Pope Ames and confer upon him the general administration of religious affairs. There is nothing too ridiculous for the party in power to attempt.

Gold in Utah.

The Latter-day Saints, with their very liberal and extended views of matrimonial relations, have long had it pretty much their own way in this richly endowed Territory. These pious neighbors have been busily engaged in carving out homes in the wilderness, sealing their spiritual wives, stealing from travelers, and doing about as they pleased. But Providence, through the instrumentality of money and Irishmen, has been building up a great empire of civilization on the Pacific coast, and railways—which somebody terms greater civilizers than missionaries—will soon open the way for a reformation of Utah. Gold, and the passion for it will draw the more enterprising to this region, and the development of its resources will necessarily follow. The rich gold fields which have been lately discovered in the mountains which wall the Great Salt Lake Valley, will bring thousands to seek it, and introduce another element—an army of gold diggers—which will soon root out polygamy. Brigham Young boasts that there is more gold in sight of Salt Lake City than is now used in the commerce of the world. The "Gentiles" will go for it.—[Detroit Free Press.

Radicalism.—We see that Senator Wilson, in a very sullen and ungracious manner, has withdrawn his resolution proposing the expulsion of Senator Davis. He had better never have drawn it, so far as he and his party are concerned. The Senator from Massachusetts mistook the present temper not merely of the people but of the Senate. He is ahead of his time, though probably not more than a year or two, if his party should continue in power, which God and the people forbid.

On the whole, we are not sorry that this form of radical tyranny has so distinctly cropped out thus early. It serves to forewarn the people of the real character and tendency of the party which is raising heaven and earth and hell to perpetuate its power in the government. Forewarned is forearmed.—[Louisville Journal.

GEN. McCLELLAN'S REPORT.

A Succinct and Consecutive Summary of the Entire Document—Original Scheme of the War—The General's Letters to the President, Secretary of War and Military Commanders—The Virginia, Peninsular, and Maryland Campaigns—How the Army of the Potomac Fought, and how its Sacrifices were Rewarded in Washington—Gen. McClellan's Tribute to his Soldiers.

[We are indebted to the New York World for the following synopsis of Gen. McClellan's report:]

Gen. McClellan has at last been permitted to tell his own story of the great campaign for which the administration has endeavored to make him responsible to history and the country. When we say that this story proves, beyond cavil or contradiction, that for the campaign of 1862 Gen. McClellan is in truth responsible only so far as concerns the salvation of an army imperilled by the reckless and ignorant strategy of a knot of selfish politicians, we say what the most passionate and prejudiced reader of these clear and quiet and manly pages will find it hard to gainsay, at least in the secret of his own brain and heart. The whole story, be it remembered, too, is not told, cannot possibly be told by a commissioned General of the army writing to the head of the Department of War, that head being the very man whose hand has been weighing for evil upon him and upon his gallant troops for so many weary and worse than wasted months. Of what still remains to be made known we shall here and now say nothing. We shall even refrain from commenting upon the narrative which has been made public, and confine ourselves to the simple duty of stating, in a brief synoptical form, what it is that Gen. McClellan tells us of the annals of this mighty war.

The General's report, when we consider that it embraces the history of nearly sixteen months, crowded with events, is singularly brief and condensed. It takes up the story of his connection with the army at his arrival in Washington after the first disaster of Bull Run, and passes on through the whole period of the organization of the Army of the Potomac; through the preparations made in the winter of 1861–2 for the invasion of Virginia; through the movement against Richmond, by the way of Yorktown and the Peninsula; through the fiercely contested battles of the seven days; and through the short but splendid campaign of Maryland, down to the surrender by the General who had formed and developed, and disciplined, and saved the finest army in the Republic, of his baton of command on a wild November night in the camp at Warrenton, in Virginia.

The report is dated at New York, August 4, 1863, and is addressed to Brig. General Thomas, Adjutant General of the United States Army. It is accompanied by the reports of corps, division and subordinate commanders, and by many illustrated documents, such as maps, charts, and the like.

Passing briefly over his brilliant campaign in Western Virginia, with the statement that he was preparing for a campaign in the Upper Kanawha Valley when he learned at Beverly of the disaster of Bull Run, Gen. McClellen observes that he had received no notification of the movements of the eastern army, and was not therefore prepared to co-operate with it. Late on Sunday the fatal 21st of July, an order came, from Washington, directing him to move into Eastern Virginia—without, however, informing him of the vital fact that Gen. Patterson had been unable to prevent the junction of Johnston with Beauregard. He was preparing to obey this blind and tardy order, when, on the 22d, there came another requiring him to turn over his command to Gen. Rosecrans, and to repair in person to Washington.

Leaving specific directions as to the fortification of the most important points then held by us in Western Virginia, Gen. McClellan on the 23d set out for the capital, and, on the 27th, assumed command of the "Division of the Potomac."

He found this army—to which was assigned the double duty of protecting Washington and of threatening Richmond, neither capable of threatening others nor protecting itself. The extent of the resources of the South for resistance had been most imperfectly appreciated, and it was necessary at once to alarm and to encourage the official mind.

GEN. McCLELLAN'S SCHEME OF CAMPAIGN IN AUGUST, 1861.

On the 4th of August, 1861, the new general laid before the President his scheme of the war.

In this scheme, it was laid down that our best, if not only hope of a speedy and lasting peace, lay in convincing the disloyal populations, at the outset of hostilities, that resistance to the government must prove impracticable.

It was pointed out that our reverses at Bull Run had made this task at once more imperative and more difficult, since they had emboldened our enemy and injured our own prestige both at home and abroad.

Virginia having been made the battle field, it became necessary to fight there; but, in order to success in the campaign against Virginia, General McClellan pointed out the necessity of opening the Mississippi, of pacifying Missouri, and of advancing through Kentucky into Eastern Tennessee for the purpose at once of assisting the Union men of that region and of seizing the railways leading from the Mississippi to the East.

The importance of availing ourselves as far as possible of every case of water transportation, was strongly urged, as well as of naval diversions against the leading cities of the southern coast. The importance of these points was shown to be much enhanced by the existence of the great railway system of the South, which would enable the enemy to concentrate rapidly upon interior lines; and the inference was drawn that the operations of the main army ought to be strictly connected with all subsidiary operations wherever undertaken.

One of the subsidiary operations through Nebraska and Kansas into Western Texas, in connection with a movement to the same end from the Pacific through Arizona and New Mexico, was specially designated for its importance in a political as well as in a military sense, and it was suggested with far-reaching sagacity that an intimate alliance with Mexico might be effected which would materially facilitate the results of such a combined movement.

To effect these grand objects General McClellan estimated would require an army of about 300,000 men, to be thus distributed:

Main army	273,000
Defense of Washington	20,000
Western advance (Kentucky being loyal)	20,000
Line of Potomac	10,000
Baltimore and Fortress Monroe	8,000
Total	331,000

With this force, acting under the control of a policy strictly protective of private property and merciful to private soldiers taken in arms, General McClellan was of the opinion that the organized strength of the rebellion might be overwhelmed, and the populations of the South compelled to recognize the futility and folly of persisting in an attempt to resist a government which designed simply to hold them to their constitutional obligations, and to respect its own constitutional limitations while performing its constitutional duties.

At the time when these suggestions were submitted to the President the all-absorbing thought of the government was the safety of Washington. No plans for general operations were considered, and it was believed by the majority of those whose counsels swayed the administration that the policy of the government ought to be simply a concentration of force around the capital and an advance against the army of the Confederates before Richmond.

CONDITION OF THE ARMY IN AUGUST, 1861.

General McClellan found the army at Washington thus constituted:

Infantry	50,000
Cavalry	1,000
Artillery	650
Total	51,650

with nine imperfect field-batteries of thirty guns.

This force was scattered through the environs of the city, with no general organization, and with no regard to purposes of instruction or defense. The city was defended by a few insignificant earthworks, and "there was nothing to prevent its being shelled from heights within easy range, which could be occupied by a hostile column almost without resistance. The *morale* of the army was miserable, and desertions were the general order of the day."

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

Steps were at once taken to restore order in the city of Washington. Camps of instruction were located and filled with the new levies; fortifications were pushed forward under a systematic plan.

By the 15th of October the number of troops in and about Washington was as follows:

Present for duty	133,201
Sick	9,290
In confinement	1,156
Total	143,647
Making, with absent troops	8,404
A grand total of	152,051
By the first of March, 1862, this total had been raised to	221,987

From this number the defences of Washington, the protection of its communications, and the main operations against Richmond, a strong and central defensive position of the enemy, protected by an army in Virginia of at least one hundred and twenty thousand men, were to be supplied.

General McClellan shows that the Army of the Potomac proper, subsequently reached at three different periods the following totals:

April 30	126,387
June 29	145,813
July 10	144,886

The history of the progressive organization of the army is given at length, from its formation into brigades to the adoption, under the direct authority of the Executive, of the organization into army corps, of which the General observes: "Though I was always in favor of this organization, as an abstract principle, I did not desire to form the corps until the army had been for some little time in the field, in order to enable the general officers first to acquire the requisite experience as division commanders in active service." He dwells also upon the great difficulty of developing the artillery and cavalry arms to the state of efficiency which would justify risking the fortunes of the nation upon a grand and trying campaign. He bestows special praise upon General Barry, Chief of Artillery, and the artillery officers of the regular army, for their inestimable services in relation to this supremely important part of his great work; and upon the zeal and intelligence with which the volunteers availed themselves of the instruction and example of these officers.

The brigade organization was effected August 4, 1861.

The divisional organization was effected October 15, 1861.

The organization into army corps, by special order of the President, was made March 8, 1862, the army not having taken the field in a body at all.

Of the important organization of a general staff, Gen. McClellan states that it was begun in September, 1861, by the appointment of Gen. Marcy as Chief of Staff.

The history of the various departments of the army is then rapidly but fully sketched, with details which show how vast was the labor to be performed in perfecting them, and with due mention made of those who, in the discharge of their duties in the Engineer, Medical, Commissary and Quartermaster's Departments, especially signalized themselves by their skill, fidelity and energy.

General McClellan particularly dwells upon the sanitary state of the troops, which is declared to have been on the whole "better than that of any army of the United States," and this, notwithstanding the trying nature of the campaign of the Peninsula and the haste with which, after the battles of the seven days, the troops were removed from Harrison's Landing to Alexandria, leaving behind them all manner of necessary hospital stores and accommodations.

The remarkable development of the telegraph corps is also noticed, and the importance of the services rendered by the Aeronautic Corps which accompanied the army.

PLANS OF ACTION IN OCTOBER, 1861.

Early in October, 1861, General McClellan addressed a letter to Secretary Cameron, at the request of the President, in which he set forth the then position of affairs, and the course open to the government and himself.

In this letter he showed that the force under his orders was greatly inferior to that asked for by him in August for the prosecution of a vigorous and successful invasion of the South. He urged the concentration of the national forces on Virginia for the purpose of "striking the rebellion at the heart." He showed that for the defence of Washington there would be required, according to Gens. Barnard and Barry, of the

Engineers and Artillery	35,000
For Baltimore and the Potomac	15,000
For operations against the enemy	150,000
For Lower Potomac	8,000
Total effectives required	208,000

The actual effective strength at his disposal he then showed to be, including all points held, 147,695, with 228 field guns—some of the batteries being raw and unfit for active service, and the whole force being 200 guns less than was estimated on all hands as necessary.

The entire force of the Union elsewhere employed was stated by the War Department at 161,000 and the reserves organizing at 100,000.

Gen. McClellan accordingly recommended a complete and vigorous concentration of all the forces not required for defensive purposes upon the active campaign in Virginia; the War Department estimating the force of the enemy in Virginia at not less than 150,000 men. "Unity in councils, the utmost vigor and energy in action," he added, "are indispensable. The entire military field should be grasped as a whole and not in detached parts." * * * * "The rebels," he continued, "have displayed energy, unanimity, and wisdom worthy the most desperate days of the French revolution. Should we do less?" Were such a concentration as he proposed to be effected, Gen. McClellan expressed his conviction that the rebel organization might still, by a well-planned and well-executed movement, be overthrown before the winter should set in.

While these propositions were under consideration, the disaster of Ball's Bluff took place. Of this Gen. McClellan states that the movement of Gen. Stone was ordered by him as a demonstration which he thought it possible might induce the enemy to abandon Leesburg—being made, as it was, contemporaneously with reconnoissances in force toward Drainesville under Gen. McCall. Gen. Stone having accomplished on the morning of October 20th, all that he was expected to accomplish, Gen. McCall was recalled from Drainesville to his camp at Langley. The fact that Gen. Stone's troops were in action on the Virginia side was telegraphed to Gen. McClellan on the 21st, and, reaching the ground the next day, he learned the full extent of the disaster which had followed from this movement, and by 4 A. M. of the 24th had caused the whole command to recross the Potomac in safety.

Appointed to the command of the Potomac Army, all Gen. McClellan's attempts to get the army actively in the field in Virginia, had been defeated through a variety of causes enumerated by him. On the 1st of November, he was appointed to the chief command of all the forces of the Union, and at once began active operations.

The theatre of the war had now extended about the whole circumference of the South; and it became necessary as well as practicable, to plan a large and sweeping combination of military operations.

An organization of New England troops for occupying the coast line of the South on the Middle Atlantic, and which had been suggested by Gen. McClellan in September, 1861, took shape in January, 1862, as an expedition under Gen. Burnside designed to facilitate the movement of the main body in Eastern Virginia by an occupation of the coast line of North Carolina, Gen. Burnside being ordered when he should have seized Newbern, to occupy and destroy the Weldon and Wilmington Railroad as far west as Goldsboro, and, should circumstances favor, to push as far as Raleigh, Wilmington being, however, his ultimate objective point. "Caution about proclamation" was recommended, the General being urged "to say as little as possible about politics or the negro," and to state merely "that the true issue for which we are fighting, is the preservation of the Union and upholding the laws of the General Government."

At the same time, letters were sent to Gen. Halleck (appointed to the command of the Department of the Missouri), to Gen. Buell (in command of the Department of the Ohio), to Gen. Sherman (commanding in South Carolina and Georgia), and to Gen. Butler (commanding the Department of the Gulf). Gen. Halleck was charged with the duty of "reducing chaos to order" in a department which had been wonderfully mismanaged. In respect to military operations, he was ordered to hold the State by fortified posts and concentrate his force on the Mississippi, in readiness for ulterior operations.

Gen. Buell was instructed as to the vast importance of the military occupation of Eastern Kentucky and Tennessee. In Kentucky itself he was advised "the conduct of our political affairs is perhaps more important than that of our military operations," and he was urged to bear in mind "that we shall most readily suppress this rebellion and restore the authority of the government by religiously respecting the constitutional rights of all." In accordance "with the feelings and opinion of the President" Gen. McClellan requested Gen. Buell to assure "the people of Kentucky that their domestic institutions will in no manner be interfered with;" and "to allow nothing but the dictates of military necessity" to cause him to "depart from the spirit of his instructions."

In respect to Tennessee, Gen. Buell was ordered to throw the mass of his troops "by rapid marches, by Cumberland and Walker's Gap, on Knoxville, in order to occupy the railroad at that point," and "cut the communication between Eastern Virginia and the Mississippi."

Gen. Buell was further counseled to avoid "widening the breach existing between us and the rebels" by "causeless arrests and persecutions of individuals." "I have always found," adds Gen. McClellan, "that it is the tendency of subordinates to make vexatious arrests on mere suspicion."

Gen. Sherman was advised that the favorable moment for a *coup de main* against Savannah had been lost, and that the best course before him would be "to isolate and reduce Fort Pulaski." But the "reduction of Charleston and its defenses" was held up as the great moral advantage to be sought for, and this was stated to be an object for which Gen. McClellan was actively maturing his combinations. Gen. Butler was instructed as to the obstacles to be encountered in reducing New Orleans, and was ordered, as soon as possible after the fall of that city, to "seize all the approaches leading to it from the east," and particularly "Jackson, in Mississippi," with an ultimate view as well to the capture of Mobile as to the opening of the Mississippi.

The instructions thus issued to the Generals named comprehend the entire scope of the plans of Gen. McClellan, of which plans the movement of the Army of the Potomac under his own orders was the central feature. It was considered by him necessary to the success of these plans that they should be carried out simultaneously, or as nearly so as possible, and the advance of the Potomac army upon Richmond by the Lower Rappahannock was kept in hand by him to be delivered as the decisive blow in conjunction with all the rest of the general movement.

THE PRESIDENT ASSUMES COMMAND.

On the 27th day of January, 1862, President Lincoln, without consultation with Gen. McClellan, assumed command of all the armies prepared and preparing for these general movements. He issued on that day his "War Order, No. 1," prescribing that on the 22d of February, 1862, a general movement of all the land and naval forces of the United States should be made against the insurgent forces.

This order was followed four days after by a second order commanding the Army of the Potomac to occupy a point "southwestward of Manassas Junction."

On the 6th of February Gen. McClellan received a note from the President, reasoning with him on the choice he had made of a route to Richmond. Gen. McClellan replied substantially, in a letter to Secretary Stanton, reciting what had been done with the Army of the Potomac, and what remained to be done with that and with all other armies of the Republic; stating his reluctance to "waste life in useless battles," and his desire "to strike at the heart;" and pointing out the military reasons for preferring the base of the Lower Chesapeake to that of Washington for operations against the army intrenched at Manassas.

"For many long months," he said, "I have labored to prepare the Army of the Potomac to play its part in the programme; I have labored to place all the other armies in such a condition that they too could perform their allotted duties." "I know," he concludes, "that His Excellency the President, you, and I, all agree in our wishes, and that those wishes are to bring this war to a close as speedily as the means in our power will permit. I believe that the masses of the people have entire confidence in us. Let us then look only to the great result to be accomplished, and disregard everything else."

The President, after reading this letter, forbore to urge his war orders. Conferences were held; the base of the Lower Chesapeake was finally selected for the movement against Richmond, and steps were taken to prepare the necessary transports, under the exclusive direction of the Secretary of War.

The Navy Department had been invited, as early as August 12, 1861, by Gen. McClellan, to take steps for protecting the navigation of the Lower Potomac. Nothing had been done, however, and Gen. Barnard, Chief of Engineers, reported that it would be "impossible" for the army to prevent the erection by the enemy of batteries at "High Point and thence down to Chopawampsic." As the navy took no steps to prevent the erection of batteries on the Virginia shore, nothing was left but to maneuver so as to compel the enemy to evacuate.

THE ADVANCE TO MANASSAS.

After detailing the measures taken by him to secure the reconstruction of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, Gen. McClellan begins the history of the Peninsular campaign. On the 8th of March the President renewed his objections to the Chesapeake movement, but after a full conversation again withdrew them; and the plans of Gen. McClellan being laid by him the same day before a council of Division Generals, they were by the majority approved. Still the complete secrecy necessary to their success had now by the course of the Executive been sacrificed; and on the same 8th of March the President issued two new orders, still without consulting General McClellan, by which the situation was greatly modified. One of these constituted the army into army corps; the other limited the army of operations to fifty thousand men in the event of certain contingencies; made the safety of Washington paramount to all other considerations, fixed a date for the commencement of operations, and ordered a combined land and naval assault on the Potomac batteries, which it was Gen. McClellan's intention to turn by his strategic movement.

Gen. McClellan was thus at the outset made responsible for a great movement, all the essential points of which he was forbidden to control, and the President deliberately took upon himself the moral responsibility of all the disasters which were to follow.

The appearance of the Merrimac modified the Peninsular campaign in the respect that it made the York and not the James River the line of the army's communications with Fortress Monroe; but the evacuation of Manassas by the enemy, which followed the publicity given to Gen. McClellan's plans proved the accuracy of his stragetic calculations, and prepared the way for the full success of his plan of operations.

With the hope of harrassing their rear, and the certainty of employing the troops usefully in the interval before their embarkation for the Peninsula, Gen. McClellan ordered an advance upon Manassas as soon as he learned that the enemy were moving. This advance began on the 9th of March.

At that time the force of the enemy, as reported by the chief of the secret service corps, was as follows:

At Manassas and vicinity	80,000
At Lower Occoquan and vicinity	18,000
Leesburg	4,500
Shenandoah Valley	13,000
	115,000

With about 300 field guns and 30 siege guns.

A striking account is given by Gen. McClellan of the strength of the Confederate field-works at Manassas and in the vicinity—a strength which "civilians" cannot well appreciate, but of the importance of which the history of war gives every competent military man a full sense.

While at Fairfax Court House, three days after the advance had begun, Gen. McClellan was informed by a telegram from one of his staff that an order had been published in the newspapers of that day, signed by the President and relieving him (Gen. McClellan) of the command in chief of the Army of the United States.

By this order, the plans of a campaign begun and intended to be executed in conformity with a general scheme of operations, were eminently interfered with at their very inception.

Gen. McClellan, though uninformed of this most important step till it was taken, at once wrote to the President, reiterating what he had said before, that "no feeling of self-interest or ambition should ever prevent him from devoting himself to the service."

March 13, a council of generals commanding army corps decided in favor of the Peninsular campaign. The President, renewing his entreaties that Washington might be kept perfectly safe, gave his assent to this movement, and Gen. McClellan details at length the history of the steps by which it was finally carried out.

THE MOVEMENT TO THE PENINSULA.

Just before the expedition moved, the President met Gen. McClellan and informed him that he had been strongly pressed to separate Blenker's division from his army and give it to General Fremont, but that he was opposed to doing so, and would not do so. A few days afterward, Blenker's division was ordered to join General Fremont, and General McClellan was thus deprived of 10,000 of the troops upon which he had counted. The President, however, assured him that no political pressure should again induce him to deprive the Army of the Potomac of any more of its force.

On the 1st of April Gen. McClellan, then on his way to Fortress Monroe, estimated the troops left to hold Washington, Manassas, and the Lower Potomac, with the Shenandoah Valley, at 73,456 men, with 100 light guns, a larger force than had held the same region during the eventful and perilous months of July, August and September, 1861. Gen. Barry, Chief of Artillery, states that at Washington there were left 32 field pieces, with men, horses and equipments.

The testimony of Gen. Hitchcock, who reported to the President on the 2d of April that the force left for the defence of Washington was inadequate, is adduced to show, in his own words, that it was clear that the enemy "had no intention of reoccupying Manassas Junction, and that, therefore, no large force would be required to hold that position."

The President, however, on the 9th of April, telegraphed to Gen. McClellan at Fortress Monroe his fears for the capital, based on the alarming fact that the "line from Richmond to Manassas Junction was entirely open."

The Navy Department is shown to have declared that "the Merrimac was neutralized, and that the naval forces could co-operate efficiently, and break through between Yorktown and Gloucester Point.

Gen. McClellan also shows that March 16, 1862, he gave orders for the intrenchment of Chester Gap and of the point at which the Manassas Gap Railway crosses the Shenandoah. This was for the purpose of preventing precisely such a movement as was made in May following by General Jackson. The change made by the President in the command of the army prevented the fulfillment of these orders.

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

The causes of the delay in the transportation of the army are fully sketched by Gen. McClellan. On reaching Fortress Monroe it was found that no steps had been taken to secure accurate topographical information at that point of the enemy's positions, and of the country occupied by him. It was also found that, in direct contradiction to statements made by the Navy Department, Flag-Officer Goldsborough was unable to do more than watch the Merrimac and her consorts in the James River. It consequently became necessary to remodel the campaign, and Gen. McClellan details at length the causes which again and again occurred to produce the same effect—disorganizing plans once arranged and necessitating the abandonment of projects already in process of accomplishment. A letter from Gen. Keyes to Senator Harris, of New York, is here given, which fully explains the operation of the most fatal of these causes in the sudden withdrawal by the President from the expedition of the 1st Army Corps, under Gen. McDowell, scarcely a week after his Excellency had promised that no such step should, on any account, be taken.

In the same letter the opinion is emphatically expressed as that of all competent judges that the lines of the enemy at Yorktown were too strong to be carried by assault in the face of the force which could be there assembled by Gen. Johnston.

The President, however, April 6, had advised Gen. McClellan to "break the enemy's line to Warwick River at once."

This advice was followed a few days afterward by a letter in which the President urged "action" upon Gen. McClellan as necessary to his (the General's) popularity, irrespectively of any military reasons for or against. To this Gen. McClellan replied that he could not possibly be influenced in regard to his duty as a commander by such considerations.

At this time the whole force under the orders of Gen. McClellan for operations on the Peninsula amounted to 85,000 effectives, the command of Gen. Wool being detached and independent.

By the report of Gen. Barnard it is shown that the approaches to Yorktown were "swept by forty-nine guns, nearly all of which were heavy, but many of them the most formidable guns known, besides that two-thirds of the water batteries and all the guns of Gloucester bore on our right batteries though under disadvantageous circumstance. "The line of the enemy's works," added Gen. Barnard, "is certainly one of the most extensive known to modern times." If we could take Yorktown, or drive the enemy out of that place, the enemy's line would be no longer tenable. It was deemed too hazardous to attempt the reduction of the place by assault."

The details of the siege of Yorktown are given in the reports and journals of Brigadier General Barnard, Baigadier General Barry, and Brigadier General Fitz John Porter.

Early in the morning of May 4, information was received that the enemy was abandoning his works, and General McClellan at once ordered his whole available cavalry force, with four batteries of horse artillery under Gen. Stoneman, into pursuit by the Williamsburg road, Gens. Heintzelman, Hooker and Smith being moved forward to support Stoneman. These were afterwards followed up by the divisions of Kearney, Couch and Casey, General Sumner, second in command of the army, was then sent to the front to take charge of the operations.

About two miles east of Williamsburg, Gen. Stoneman came upon the enemy's works, four miles in extent, nearly three-fourths of their front being covered by the tributaries of Queen's Creek and College Creek. The main works were a large fortification called Fort Magruder and twelve other redoubts and epaulements for field guns. The woods in the fort were felled, and the open ground dotted with rifle pits. From this position the enemy opened fire upon Gen. Stoneman as his advance guard debouched from the woods. Gen. Stoneman, having no infantry, was forced to retire, but held the enemy in check with great credit to his troops, until the arrival of Gen. Sumner, with part of General Smith's division, at half-past 5 P. M. The cross movement of this division, made necessary by the impassable character of the road on which it had been moving, had delayed the movement of Gen. Hooker's column between three and four hours; but Heintzelman and Keyes reached Sumner during the afternoon. Early in the morning of the 5th Hooker came up. The weather was exceedingly bad during the day of the 5th, and the condition of the ground grew hourly worse.

Gen. Hooker began the attack on the enemy's works at 7½ o'clock in the morning of the 6th, and for a time silenced Fort Magruder. But the enemy being heavily reinforced attacked in his turn. Hooker lost seriously in men, five of his guns were taken, and between 3 and 4 P. M., when his ammunition wagon was giving out and his men with it, Gen. Kearney came up, after pushing with immense energy through the deep mud and dense forest. Kearney drove the enemy back and saved Hooker. About 1 P. M. of the 7th Gen. McClellan, who had remained at Yorktown to move forward the whole army, received information for the first time that a serious conflict was going on in front of Williamsburg, and that the situation of affairs was not wholly favorable. He at once pushed forward to the front, about fourteen miles, through a most difficult country, obstructed by troops and foragers. He reached the front about half-past 4 P. M., and took a rapid survey of the field. He learned that there was no direct communication between the center and the left under Heintzelman, and, hearing heavy firing in the direction of Hancock's command, he moved the center forward, attempted to open communication with Heintzelman, and sent Smith and Naglee to the support of Hancock. Before these Generals reached Hancock, however, the latter General, finding himself confronted by a superior force, had feigned a retreat, awaited their onset, and then, turning upon them fiercely, had driven back the whole force at the point of the bayonet, routing them terribly with a total loss to them of between five and six hundred men, himself losing but fifty-one. For his course at this time Gen. Hancock received from Gen. McClellan the highest praise, his engagement having given the Federal army possession of the decisive point of the field.

The total loss of the army is set down at 2,228 men.

The troops were so much exhausted by the marches and conflict which resulted in the victory of Williamsburg, as to render an immediate pursuit of the enemy impossible in the then condition of the country.

On the 9th, also, Gen. Franklin's division, then landing, had a most creditable affair with the enemy under Gen. Whiting.

On the 10th, headquarters were established nineteen miles from Williamsburg, and communications established between the force moving by land and the force moving by water.

On the 15th and 16th, Franklin, Smith, and Porter reached White House, five miles beyond, the roads being so bad that one train occupied thirty-six hours in passing over this short distance.

About this time, two provisional army corps were organized, the one under Fitz John Porter, the other under Franklin.

Headquarters reached White House on the 16th, and a permanent depot was at once organized there.

On the 19th, headquarters, and the corps of Porter and Franklin, moved to Tunstall's Station five miles from White House.

On the 20th, more rain fell.

On the 21st, the position of the troops was as follows:

Stoneman's advance guard, one mile from New Bridge; Franklin's corps, three miles from New Bridge, with Porter's corps in supporting distance in its rear; Sumner's corps on the railroad about three miles from Chick-

(CONCLUDED ON FOURTH PAGE.)