THE INDIANA STATE SENTINEL.

VOL. XXIII, NO. 46. | INDIANAPOLIS, IND., MONDAY, APRIL 18, 1864. | WHOLE NO. 1,292

ELDER, HARKNESS & BINGHAM,
Proprietors.

TERMS OF WEEKLY SENTINEL:

One copy one year	$1 50
Ten copies, and one to the maker of the club	15 00
Twenty copies, and one to the maker of the club,	25 00

Additions can be made to Clubs at any time at the above rates. The names will be printed on each paper, without extra charge.

☞ MONEY may be sent at our risk by Express, prepaid, or in Registered Letters by Mail, otherwise we will not be responsible for any loss that may occur.

Advertising.

One square, one insertion	$0 75
" two "	1 00
" four "	2 00
For each subsequent insertion, and for each insertion of each additional square	33⅓

☞ Advertisements must be handed in by Sunday to secure insertion in the weekly.

Advertisements published in both the Daily and the Weekly SENTINEL, will be charged the full Daily rates, with one-half the Weekly rates added.

Announcing deaths with funeral notice attached, $1; without notice, free.

Marriage Notices 50 cents.

Notices of Festivals, Picnics and Excursions, gotten up by individuals or associations, or by churches, at the regular rates.

Advertisements leaded and placed under the head of Special Notices, fifteen lines or over, will be charged double the usual rates.

Yearly advertisers to pay quarterly.

Announcing candidates for offices of every description to be charged at the rate of $1 50 for each name in the Daily, and $2 in the Daily and Weekly, the same to be, in all cases, paid in advance.

Legal advertisement inserted at the expense of the attorneys ordering, and not delayable for the legal proceedings, but collectable at our usual time. Publishers not accountable for the accuracy of legal advertisements beyond the amount charged for their publication.

ELDER, HARKNESS & BINGHAM,
Proprietors Indiana State Sentinel.
J. M. TILFORD,
President Indianapolis Journal Company.

THE DAILY SENTINEL

Will be sent by mail or express to subscribers at any point for sixty cents a month, or seven dollars a year. All subscriptions invariably in advance. Address
ELDER HARKNESS, & BINGHAM.

Gov. Morton on National Politics.

We give this morning the reply prepared by the Democratic State Central Committee to that portion of Governor MORTON'S speech which refers to national politics. The reader should bear in mind that His Excellency's address throughout was carefully and deliberately prepared. It was written and read to the Republican State Convention from the manuscript. His statements must then be regarded as having been put forth with not only deliberate forethought but *malice prepense*. If the premises, the under pinning of the Governor, are knocked from under him, as every candid reader must concede they are, it follows of course that his arguments, deductions and conclusions therefrom are unsound and worthless. The address of Governor MORTON upon both State and National affairs shows most conclusively that he is an intense and unscrupulous partizan. He not only misrepresents history and the views and actions of his political opponents most unblushingly, but he likewise conceals the truth to advance his partisan schemes. He also lends his official position to give character to his misrepresentations. This no man would do in the present crisis of public affairs, if imbued with a love of country and sincerely desirous of promoting its best interests. The Governor, and the partisans he represents, by an utter disregard of truth, stand self convicted of being willing to sacrifice their country to promote party success and to continue their hold upon power and the spoils of party triumph upon which they have surfeited. If the Lincolnites cannot go before the country and stand upon truth and facts, we ask if they are entitled to the confidence of the people? The gross misrepresentations contained in Governor MORTON'S speech, with the sanction of his party friends, are one evidence they cannot. In addition every effort made in Congress to expose by investigation the rottenness of this Administration and its utter incapacity to successfully conduct our public affairs, has been stilled by LINCOLN'S adherents, who control both branches of the National Legislature. But the antagonism between the different factions of the Republican party has had the effect to develop, and thus authoritatively, some of the corruptions, and to publicly expose the imbecility of the men who have the control of the Government. From the beginning it seems to have been the purpose of the party in power to retain their hold upon the government, no matter at what sacrifice of blood and treasure. It has made every effort to stimulate an artificial prosperity and to prevent the people realizing the immense burdens which it is fostering upon the country. It took the government powerful and prosperous, comparatively free from debt, with resources far beyond the anticipations of any one, and their four years' term will leave it with an indebtedness unequalled by that of the most tax-ridden nation upon earth. How long will this delirium which has seized upon the public mind continue—how long will the dance of death go on? We answer, just as long as the people place confidence in the demagogues at the head of public affairs.

But we started out only to commend the review of Governor MORTON'S speech to the careful consideration of the people. There is but one hope in the future, and that is through a change in the administration of the government. To aid that end is the object of the exposure of Governor MORTON'S erroneous statements and false reasoning. And if the people will only read and think, a revolution in public sentiment will assuredly take place which will save the country from impending ruin, by sweeping from power the cormorants who have fastened upon the nation and are controlling its destinies.

FACTS FOR THE PEOPLE,

In Answer to Gov. O. P. Morton's Erroneous Statements to the Republican State Convention, February 23, 1864.

PREPARED AND PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF THE DEMOCRATIC STATE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

[CONCLUDED]

The Governor then discusses the

RIGHT OF THE GOVERNMENT TOWARDS REBELS.

We may say, generally, that if the line of policy indicated in this address, were pursued, we would be, by it, thrown back hundreds of years in the scale of civilization. We would resort to the scenes of ages of barbarism in matters of warfare. From the time of the revolutionary war of our grandfathers, the cruelty of the British soldiers towards the families of soldiers of the colonies—towards non-combatants, and in the wanton destruction of private property, has been handed down as traditions that have kept alive hatred towards that powerful, but cruel, nation. The writer of this, when but an urchin, has leaned upon his grandmother's knee, and listened to many a recital of these scenes of cruelty and wrong, until there was planted in his bosom feelings towards England that time will never obliterate. The Governor points out the same course, only worse, towards the revolted States, and seeks, through such means, to *re-unite* the Northern and Southern people. What is it? Not only to destroy their armies, their arms, their munitions of war, their food and clothing for their armies, but also for *their families at home*, and to set free their slaves and compel the whites to associate with them on *terms of equality*.

"The right to *destroy* or appropriate to the use of our own Government their railroads, bridges, shipping, *growing crops*, and *whatever property may be useful to us*, or the *loss* of which may be injurious to them, is scarcely denied by the most bitter enemy of the Government."

Such inhuman, barbarous, and savage modes of warfare, without doubt, meet with the approbation of several classes of people. First, bands of thieves and plunderers, who invariably follow an army, will say, that is right. Second, army contractors, who will seize the private property found in the enemies' country, whether belonging to a Union man or a rebel, and sell it to our Government at a high price. Third, the fanatical part of the priesthood, for all history shows that in wars they are the most cruel and heartless of all people. Fourth, Abolitionists, because this is the mode of reasoning by which the Governor arrives at the right to strike down slavery. He reasons thus: Slaves produce food and clothing. We have the right to take food and clothing; therefore, we have the right to free the slaves who produce it. Now, as this is the only ground upon which he rests the right to abolish slavery, it is clear that his whole fabric of argument, upon that point, falls if the foundation is unsound. That foundation is our right to destroy food and clothing of non-combatants indiscriminately in the enemy's country seized by us.

Professor Kent shows, in his fifth section, that away back in the Gothic ages, "an enemy was regarded as a criminal and an outlaw, who had forfeited all his rights, and whose life, liberty and property lay at the mercy of the conqueror." He cites Grotius, b. 3, ch. 4 & 5; Bynkershoeck, b. 1, ch. 1, 2 and 3; and other works. Grotius wrote in the year 1632, and Bynkershoeck in the year 1733. The former was, it is said, born in Delft, and the latter in Middelburg, in Zealand. N. Am. Cyclop., vols. 4 and 8.

"But (Kent says) these barbarous rights of war have been questioned and checked in the progress of civilization. Public opinion, as it becomes enlightened and refined, condemns all cruelty, and all wanton destruction of life and *property*, as equally useless and injurious," p. 86.

And again, p. 88:

"The general usage now is, not to touch private property, upon land, (we may say that somewhat different rules maintain as to captures on the high seas,) without making compensation, unless in special cases dictated by the necessary operations of war. * * * * If the conqueror goes beyond these limits wantonly, or when it is not clearly indispensable to the just purposes of war, and seizes private property of pacific persons for the sake of gain, and destroys private dwellings, or public edifices, devoted to civil purposes only; or makes war upon monuments of art, he violates the modern usages of war."

He quotes Vattel (b. 3, ch. 9,) who wrote in the year 1758, and was a Swiss publicist and jurist. Am. Cyclop., vol. 16. So it is written:

"By the modern usage of nations, which has now acquired the force of law, private property on land is also exempt from confiscation, except such as may become booty in special cases, when taken from the enemy in the field or in besieged towns. This exception extends even to the case of an absolute and unqualified conquest of the enemy's country." Wh. Int. Law, p. 420.

So also: "All public or private individuals engaged in the ordinary civil pursuits of life, are exempt from the direct effect of military operations, unless actually taken in arms, or guilty of some misconduct in violation of the usages of war." *Id.* 419.—Rutherford's Inst., b. 2, ch. 9. See, also, the protest of our Government against the ravages of Cochrane in 1813, and the destruction of the Government buildings at Washington. Wh. 422-3.—Amer. St. Papers, vol. 3, 693.

This change in the mode of warfare Kent shows to have been brought about by Christianity, civilization, and by the law of nations, which is, "that code of public instruction which defines the rights and prescribes the duties of nations in their intercourse with each other. The faithful observance of this law is essential to national character; and, according to Montesquieu, it is founded on the principle, that different nations ought to do each other as much good in peace, and as little harm in war, as possible, without injury to their own interest"—p. 1-2. Wheat. International Law, p. 1-22. Wheaton was of Rhode Island, and wrote in 1836.

If all those writers were living now, they would conclude that, so far as Governor Morton's individual views were concerned, there had been a long step backwards taken in civilization. As to Christian views, we suppose he never had any upon that or any other subject.

What we have said upon this subject is not dictated by any special tenderness for rebels, as such, although the grandfather of the writer of this was an officer in the *rebel* army of the revolution for six years; but "because the observance of these laws (Kent says) is essential to national character." Suppose all Northern men were of the same mind with the Governor, and would carry out that mind by acts; we would, as Kent says, p. 88, "be held up to the general scorn and detestation of the world:" Kent was a Northern man—a New Yorker, and not a Democrat, and wrote in 1826.

As the Governor admits that "in time of peace there is no power vested in the President or in Congress to interfere with slavery in the States where it exists," we will not spend time discussing that point; although if he had stated otherwise, we could have overwhelmed him with authorities. See Webster's speech, March 7, 1850; Clay's speech, February 7, 1839; Action of Congress, March 23, 1790; Hildreth's His. of the United States, vol. 1, 2d series; 2d Art. of the Articles of Confederation; 1 Rev. Stat., p. 7; 4th Resolution of Chicago Convention and Lincoln's Letter of Acceptance; 11 Peters' Rep. Supreme Court United States, and 16 *id.* 539. But he says the right of the President so to act "is drawn from its resting place in the Constitution by the war." Sumner first advanced this doctrine, and was hooted at. "War, as it comes, treads down within its sphere all rights except the right of war," &c. Congr. Globe, 2964, 1861-2. But on this, as on all other questions, conservative Republicans have been led astray by ultra Abolitionists to act against the whole course of our Government.

In 1775, Dunmore, the Royal Governor of Virginia, after advising with his King, by "proclamation" declared all "slaves free who would rise and join him to teach the colonists their duty." Bancroft's History of the United States, vol. 7, pp. 276-7. This united all parties against the government (id. p. 247,) and even gave other colonies a reason for separation—secession. Notwithstanding a goodly number of slaves flocked to the British standard under this call, yet at the end of the war that power abandoned any claim of right under the war power to make freemen of them by stipulating in the treaty that they should be left as "other property," to be reclaimed by the owners. Art. 7, treaty of Sept. 3, 1783.—8th vol. U. S. Statutes at Large, 83. This treaty was signed by John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and John Jay—all Northern men.

So one of the causes in the original draft of the Declaration of Independence, as written by Jefferson, was, that the King was exciting slaves to revolt. Jefferson's Works, 1, 19.—Bancroft's History of the United States, vol. 8.

But during the war of 1812, England attempted to exercise the power to "proclaim" freedom to slaves; and in the discussions growing out of such act, John Quincy Adams, on the 18th of October, 1820, as Secretary of State, in instruction to our Minister to Russia, said:

"The British have broadly asserted the right of emancipating slaves—private property—as a legitimate right of war. No such right is acknowledged as a law of war by writers who admit any limitation. The right of putting to death all prisoners in cold blood, and without special cause, might as well be pretended to be a law of war, or the right to use poisoned weapons, or to assassinate."

Nevertheless, the claim of right under the war power to make freemen of slaves was again abandoned by Great Britain, in the 1st Article of the treaty of peace of 24th of December, 1814 in which it is provided that "slaves or other private property" taken should be restored. U. S. Stat. at Large, vol. 8, 218. This was signed by John Quincy Adams, J. A. Bayard, Henry Clay, John Russell and Albert Gallatin. The slaves not being returned, another treaty was made by which the matter was to be *referred*. U. S. Stat. 8, 250. It was so referred to the Emperor of Russia (Id. 282,) who decided that England must pay for all slaves so carried away. Id. 282. Upon this reference, Adams wrote the above letter.

So, in view of these settled rules of international laws of war, Bonaparte refused to so act in his Russian campaign, although he says: "I could have armed against her a part of her population, by 'proclaiming' the liberty of the serfs."

If the Governor insists upon not being controlled by the rules of the *laws* of nations on these war powers as promulgated often by our own government; still, if he would be taught by the experience of others, he would see the bad policy of such "proclamations" and indiscriminate destruction of private property. It is said by an Indianian, a friend and eulogist of the Governor, of a campaign in Virginia:

"General Pope had issued an order requiring the troops to subsist off the country. * * * But like all such orders, it soon spread into indiscriminate plunder. Everything was taken. The last cow. The last loaf of bread. The men helped themselves, and turned every citizen into an active enemy. * * * We secured the hatred of every man, woman and child whom we had robbed. This may be one reason why the enemy were kept so well informed of all our movements." Indiana's Roll of Honor, vol. 1, p. 291.

But, as before stated, the Governor assumes this position to show our right to abolish slavery, because slaves produce something to eat and something to wear. Upon like logic he might say, women produce soldiers, and, therefore, we will destroy all the women of rebels; or if the rebels should invade Indiana, they could as well say, six hundred women in Indianapolis have been manufacturing cartridges to shoot at us, and therefore we will destroy these six hundred women. We suppose the Governor, in reference to this matter, proceeds upon the same theory with the Abolitionist in Congress, who sold his vote, and when reproached therewith and asked how his constituents would view such conduct, replied—"Oh! so I vote right on the nigger question, my constituents will overlook everything else." So if Morton is in favor of abolishing slavery, it is no odds whether he can give a good reason, or indeed any reason at all therefor.

The Governor further says in regard to

PROCRASTINATING THE WAR.

"Lingering and protracted wars are the most terrible calamities that can befal nations. Not only do they consume the blood and substance of a nation, but they are attended with a demoralization and dissolution of the frame-work of society, more dreadful than the loss of even blood and treasure."

The Governor never uttered a truer sentence than this. And yet, strange as it may appear, he was one of the fiercest men for the war before it was inaugurated—before the South had taken one step towards it—yea, before a single State had seceded. When the question was being discussed in public prints, whether Mr. Lincoln, who had a few days before received a plurality of votes, should give to the South some informal assurance that their State rights and institutions should not be interfered with by his administration; we say about this time, to-wit, the third week in November, 1860, Oliver P. Morton, who had then lately been elected Lieutenant Governor, made a speech at the Court House in Indianapolis. See Indianapolis Journal of that date for a synopsis thereof. It was the fortune of many to hear that effort, and truly no dung-hill rooster ever strutted on one side of a fence, and crowed and bantered a belligerent inclined cock on the other side, with more flourishes and more gusto than he *defied* the South to attempt resistance to Abraham Lincoln. He was stirring up our people to the war heat, as savages do by reciting deeds of blood and carnage in their painted dances around the war post. He was for "*shoving the worm-eaten State of South Carolina into the ocean, if it was possible.*" At the same time, without doubt, demagogues of like degree, in Southern communities, were urging the people to the battle's dread array, by picturing to them their real or fancied wrongs. Now, after *three lingering* years of *horrors*—years in which the armies of the republic have swallowed more lives than any have in a like period since the days of Cyrus, of Xerxes, and of Alexander, he comes forward again, in the same city, and in a whining tone exclaims, these are "terrible calamities," this loss of blood and treasure; but still "more dreadful than this loss" is the "dissolution of the frame-work of society," and the "demoralization" of the citizens. Well he might say this, when the obligations of law have come to be regarded as but a rope of sand, by private citizens; and why? because they are totally disregarded by public officers. Look at the letter of the Attorney General. Look at the inaugural of President Lincoln, in which he says, "I have no purpose nor *lawful right* to interfere with slavery, nor inclination to do so;" and his reply to the Chicago clergymen, in which he avers like sentiments, and says it would be impolitic; and yet, nine days afterwards, he did, at the bidding of Abolitionists, that very "unlawful and impolitic act." Look at the Government bastiles all over the land, filled with private citizens of the loyal States, imprisoned without a charge or authority of law, and discharged without a hearing. Look at the official stealing and public plunder all through the country, from "cabinet officers down to drummer boys," (see speech of chairman of Investigating Committee in House of Representatives in Congress, February 7, 1862,) until more is stolen yearly than Democrats used in carrying on the Government. Look at the suspension of the great writ of right. Look at the acts of the Governor himself, proceeding in total disregard of all law, as we have shown, and yet have the effrontery to stand up and talk about "demoralization," after having avowed that whatever the law might be he had determined to do so and so. But a lingering war is a "*terrible calamity.*" Why did he advise war at all? Why did he, and other Governors of northern States, rush on to Washington and advise war? Why was the assembly at Altoona? Perhaps on that night in November, like the war horse, "he smelleth the battle afar off, the thunder of the captains, and the shoutings," (Job 39: 25,) and that he saw away down the vista of time, as if "through a glass darkly," (Cor. 13: 12,) the public plunder in store for high officials. Be that as it may, his voice was for war—no compromise. When Virginia, that mother of States and of statesmen (following her own example of 1832, when she had appointed commissioners to confer with other States—(Mansf. Life of Scott, p. 250) called upon the border States to meet in solemn, peaceful counsel, what did Governor Morton do? Appointed to represent Indiana *men of uncompromising hostility to any peaceful adjustment*—men that he knew would take no step to avert the "terrible calamities" of which he now talks, nor would they agree to any such being taken by others—men who were mere sectional partisans, and he prates now of *no party*. And what does he still say in regard to a continuance of these "terrible calamities," and ending them by

COMPROMISE.

"The man who would counsel the nation to stay the march of our victorious armies, and give the rebellion power to recover strength and vigor, under the vain pretext of compromising with our erring brethren, must be a traitor or a fool."

President Lincoln, three years ago, said, in his inaugural address, that "suppose you go to war, you cannot fight always, and after much loss on both sides and no gain on either, the same identical question which caused the strife remains open for adjustment." Adjustment—how? by settlement, arrangement, compromise, if you please. So General Jackson, after a long life in public affairs, in his farewell address, says:

"But the Constitution cannot be maintained, nor the Union preserved, in opposition to public feeling, by the mere *coercive powers* confided to the General Government."

Was Jackson a traitor and is Lincoln a fool? According to Morton, both these things must be true. So in the time of the whisky insurrection, when Washington was President, he compromised with the insurrectionists whilst they had arms in their hands. Hildreth's History of the United States, vol. 1, 2d series, p. 498 to 516. But we suppose, according to the Governor's logic, Washington, in this act, showed himself to be a traitor or a fool. So in 1832, when South Carolina proclaimed that they would not submit to the tariff laws, and proposed to "nullify" them by State legislation and State action, Gen. Jackson, who was President, declared that "the Union must and shall be preserved," although, in point of fact they had proposed nullifying, and yet remain in the Union; but, at the same time, Congress passed, and *he* approved, a law agreed upon as a "compromise," (Mansf. Life of Scott, p. 249,) and, in this, no doubt, the Governor thinks he was guilty of a treasonable or very foolish thing. Wilson's Hist. U. S., p. 334-5. But the extreme position Morton takes in opposition to those lights of history, only shows that "great men are not always wise men." Job 32: 9. But he is ready to dodge behind the subterfuge that "the man who would counsel the nation to stay the march of our armies," &c. But why the necessity of staying the armies whilst peace is being talked about? Washington sent forward commissioners and army together. Jefferson, as a member of his cabinet, advised him to send his peace commissioners before he moved his army. Jackson was preparing his army, and at the same time trying to and did compromise, and sent General Scott down on a mission partaking of a civil and military character. Life of Scott, p. 239. So in the war with Mexico Mr. Trist accompanied the army as a commissioner and made a treaty. Buchanan sent an army to Utah, and commissioners with it, who compromised without bloodshed. In the last war with Great Britain, the battle of New Orleans was fought after the conclusion of peace. Commissioners were in negotiation at Ghent from August, 1814, until December 24, when the treaty was signed. Wilson's Hist. U. S., pp. 325-6. But what single effort has been made by this Administration to reconcile the people of the South, except to *subjugate* them with the naked sword. Commissioners were at Washington from the South, awaiting the action of our authorities at the time the vessels were fitted out at New York and sent to Charleston, that produced the conflict of arms. What propositions they had to offer, whether of conditional or unconditional submission, we have never been informed, as they were not received by our Government. Again: Alexander H. Stephens, a man who fought against secession all over the South, but nevertheless was made their Vice-President, started to Washington on a peaceful mission, and notified our authorities thereof. They would not receive him. What were his propositions the authorities and the people know not.

But we had forgotten. President Lincoln did, in a proclamation, offer an amnesty, upon terms, to the people of the South. *But such terms!* None were promised forgiveness who had ever offended. Only those who had not offended were included in its provisions. And none were entitled to its benefits but those who would swear to support and abide by the proclamations he had issued, *and those he might issue*. What he may issue is only known to the powers of darkness. But if any persons insist that individuals who have been engaged in the war, on the rebel side, are included in the amnesty, if they will take the proposed oath, then the question arises, does the fact that a man will swear to support the Abolition proclamations of the President, clear him of the great guilt that is charged to him as a rebel, and so purify him as to entitle him again to the rights of citizenship? We ask the question in a moral as well as in a legal point of view. So far as any good can result from this measure, towards ending the struggle, it is not expected. At Washington it is viewed merely as a cunningly devised trick of the President to manufacture electoral votes for himself. See how it works. Florida has about ten thousand voters, and three electoral votes. He started a large army the other day to seize the seat of government, Tallahasse, which would be of about as much use to us, for military purposes, as an alligator swamp, and organize a State government. Under the proclamation, this would require one thousand votes. Who does not know that after a large army there is always a troop of camp followers, making more than a thousand that could be so used. But the result was that a battle ensued in which we lost over eighteen hundred men in trying to get three votes for Lincoln. No sensible man expects—Lincoln himself does not expect—any State to form a permanent government under these conditions. Nor would any State, if the *citizens* alone were to act, form even a temporary government.

But we must *subjugate* the South, the rebels must be "utterly crushed and blotted from the nation," the Governor says, and any person who talks about peace upon any other terms "are the guardians of slavery left on duty in the free States." He adds:

SUBJUGATION

Is the favorite term now in the mouths of all men of this class. In the time of the revolution of our sires, George III. proposed to "subjugate" the people of the colonies—nothing less would satisfy him. Bancroft's Hist. U. S., vol. 8,223. He would listen to no terms of compromise. Id., p. 129. He "subjugated" his reasoning powers in attempting it, and succeeded in producing a *final* separation of the colonies from the balance of his empire.

Spain proposed to "subjugate" Mexico, when as a province of that country she rebelled, but only succeeded in spending much blood and treasure; and following on, Mexico proposed to "subjugate" Texas, when but a feeble people under Houston; but after many acts of ruthless cruelty—such as are recommended by Morton, had to let the rebellious province go. But suppose you could "subjugate" (that is, from the Latin, *sub* and *jugo*, to *yoke*. Web. Dict.) the people in the South, what do you propose doing with them? The Governor says all talk upon the subject "is idle until the rebellion is crushed." Not so. The people North want to know whether you propose afterwards keeping them down by the heel of military power; if so, a standing army of not less than three hundred thousand men will be constantly necessary, and then, like the people of Poland towards Russia, Italy towards Austria, and Ireland towards England, there will be danger of revolts all the time. Soldiers now cost this Government twelve hundred dollars each per year. Such an army would be three hundred and sixty millions per year. No people can stand that. In the old country, where they maintain large standing armies, the people are taxed to the last cent they are able to pay, and yet the cost of supporting and paying an army is not one-fourth what it is here. As long as you keep up the armies they will necessarily be expensive. If you withdraw them, without making terms, the people will again rise up, although you may have thought they were "crushed." It is no use to talk; to be friendly, contending parties must come upon *terms*. Why not try that thing now, as well as after half a million more precious lives are spent?

Seward was to see the end of the rebellion in sixty days—Morton, in December last, said in three months, and now, we suppose, in six. The Governor declaims against a "lingering" war. Well, why has it lingered? First, because of the total incompetency of many political partisans of the President and the Governor, who were placed in commands, the duties of which they were in most blissful ignorance of. The consequence was the loss of many brave men by battle and by sickness; witness Great Bethel, Ball's Bluff, Vienna, Belmont, Fredericksburgh, Chancellorville, Cedar Mountain, Manassas, and Winchester. Secondly, and chiefly: If the President, in his first call, had said to the people, "I want seventy-five thousand men to free the negro slaves of the South," how many suppose you he would have got? Not many Democrats or conservative Republicans. But, as might well be foreseen, as the war has been suffered to linger and drag its slow length along, some men's passions have become aroused; others have become indifferent as to how the war is pushed, so it goes forward with a prospect of an early end; and all this time all the power and patronage of the General Government is brought to bear to inculcate into the Northern mind this one idea, viz: that "slavery was the cause of this war, and therefore slavery must perish with it." So, the President said to the Chicago Clergymen to the effect that the public mind was not yet ripe for an abolition effort. Feelers had been thrown out. Fremont was sent west; he issued an abolition proclamation; it was too soon. It startled the public. He was withdrawn. Hunter was sent to Hilton Head; he issued a like manifesto. From its effect it was seen the public mind still required to be yet more wearied out with the war. He was therefore withdrawn. In the meantime our armies in the field were not properly supported. They might do things too quickly. If they had, *at an early day, crushed the armed power of the rebellion*, the question would immediately have arisen as to the re-establishment of government in the seceded States. Eighteen months ago the administration would not have ventured upon the avowal that "no State should return without first abolishing slavery." It is thought the public will now stand it, and it is now made a test of *loyalty*, in the States that attempt to return, and in citizens of the North.

Lest some may suppose these are mere crude notions, not supported by facts, we will, for a little while, turn to facts, as written by officers of the administration, to-wit: Letter of the Secretary of War to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and report of Gen. McClellan in regard to the organization and operation of the army of the Potomac, as printed by the Senate.

The battle of Bull Run was fought on the 21st of July, 1861. On the 22d McClellan was ordered to Washington, and on the 27th assumed command of the army of the Potomac; and from that until in March, 1862, he was employed in organizing an army. On the 3d of February, 1862, (see p. 43,) in a letter to the Secretary of War, he pointed out the peninsula as the proper ground for a campaign towards Richmond, starting from Urbana, upon the Rappahannoc, and 110 to 140,000 as the proper number of troops. On the 13th of March, 1862, at a council of war, it was determined that a force of 25,000 was sufficient to leave to protect Washington, in addition to those in the forts. Page 60. This was approved by the President. Id. On the 31st the President took from him Blenker's division—ten thousand troops—for Fremont. "73,456 men and 109 pieces light artillery were left for the defense of Washington and its approaches," (pages 65, 66,) when McClellan started on this campaign. Page 68. On the 2d of April, the next day after he sailed on the campaign, the President wrote him,

"And now do you really think, allow me to ask, I should permit the line from Richmond, *via* Manassas Junction, to this city, to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than twenty thousand unorganized troops?"

On the 3d of April, the troops of Gen. Wool, to the amount of ten thousand men, at Fort Monroe, were taken from him by order of the President. Page 75. On the 4th, General McDowell's corps of 35,000 men were taken from him and detained in front of Washington. Page 77. He says: "To me the blow was most discouraging. It frustrated my plans of operation. It fell when I was too deeply committed to withdraw. It compelled the adoption of another, a different and less effective plan of campaign. It made rapid and brilliant operations impossible. *It was a fatal error;*" (p. 77,) and who committed that error? the President. See also a letter from Gen. Keys to Senator Harris, of April 7th:

"This army being reduced by 45,000 troops, some of them among the best in the service, and without the support of the navy, the plan to which we are reduced leaves scarcely any resemblance to the one I voted for. Page 80.

After McClellan had got into the enemy's country, to-wit, in front of Yorktown, in this crippled condition, the President wrote him on the 9th of April, in which this threat is conveyed: "And once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to *you* that you strike a blow." Page 84. With all these threats he could not force the General to precipitate his raw soldiers upon the field works and entrenchments of the enemy, where they would have met a certain death. But he overcame all obstacles at Yorktown and at Williamsburgh. On the 10th, and again on the 14th of May, from the banks of the Chickahominy he wrote to the Secretary of War and to the President, saying he would "fight the whole rebel army with whatever force I may have." "No troops should be now left unemployed." "If I am not reinforced, it is probable I will be obliged to fight nearly double my numbers (70,000), strongly entrenched." Pages 94, 95.

On the 18th of May, the Secretary of War replied: "The President is not willing to uncover the capital entirely," and then, at some length, explains that McDowell is ordered to advance and co-operate with thirty-five to forty thousand men by way of the Pamunkey. This again compelled a change of base from the James River to the Pamunkey (p. 96). Again, on the 24th, the President assured him McDowell would start on the 26th; but at a later hour on the same day notified him that he had "suspended Gen. McDowell's movements" to join him (p. 99). On the 28th of May, McClellan again wrote the Secretary of War: "It is the policy and duty of the Government to send me by water all the well drilled troops available" (p. 104). No reinforcements were sent, and then, on the 31st of May and 1st of June, the battle of Fair Oaks was fought, in which we lost 7,000 men (p. 112, 114). On the 4th of June the General again wrote: "Please inform me what reinforcements, if any, I can count upon" (p. 114), to which he received on the 5th as answer: "I will send you five new regiments," and there was a vague promise of "as many as you want" (p. 115). On the 10th of June, he asked to have "part of Halleck's forces" sent to him (p. 116). On the 25th, he wrote:

"The rebel force is stated at 200,000. * * I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity for reinforcements. * * * I feel that there is no use asking again for them" (p. 121).

No reinforcements were forwarded *until after the seven days' fighting* before Richmond, and then only 5,000 men at Harrison's Landing (p. 123). During the progress of this seven days' fight, to-wit, on the 28th, the General makes use of the expressions, in a letter to the Secretary of War, which have been so severely criticised:

"I now know the full history of the day. * * * * The loss on both sides is terrible. * * * * The sad remnants of my men behave as men. * * * * Had I twenty thousand, or even ten thousand fresh troops to use to-morrow, I could take Richmond. * * * I have lost this battle because my force was too small. * * * You must send me very large reinforcements, and send them at once. * * * I feel too earnestly to-night. I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the Government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now, the game is lost. If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you, or to any *other person* in Washington. *You have done your best to sacrifice this army*" (p. 131-2.)

On the first, and again on the third of July, the President informed the General that "if you are not strong enough to face the enemy, you must find a place of security, and *wait*, rest and repair. * * * Save the army at all events." And again: "If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to." And on the third: "I am satisfied that yourself, officers and men have done the best you could" (p. 141.) The General wrote again, July 4: "Send such reinforcements as you can" (p. 143.) On the same day the President wrote, promising reinforcements, and that "we shall hive the enemy yet" (p. 143). On the 7th, 11th, 17th, 18th, 28th and 30th of July, and on the 2d, 3d, 4th and 5th of August, the General urged reinforcements, and pointed out the mode to obtain them, remonstrated against withdrawing the army from where it was, twenty-five miles from Richmond on James River, to Acquia Creek, on the Potomac, seventy miles from Richmond; complained of being kept in ignorance of the purposes of the Administration, and declared a retreat would, in his opinion, be "a fatal blow" (see p. 144-54.) In the meantime, Halleck came in as Commander-in-Chief, and he undertook to show the reason for the withdrawal of the army, viz., that "the army of the Potomac is split in two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly between them. They cannot be united by land without exposing both to destruction, and yet they must be united. * * * I have not inquired, and do not wish to know, by *whose* advice and for what reasons the army of the Potomac was separated into two parts with the enemy between them. I must take things as I find them" (p. 156, 157.)

It is plain that General Halleck had been informed that the President's intermeddling had "divided the army," and as his superior he could not say to him directly that he had done a wrong, for which a General would have been court-martialed and cashiered, but he evidently thought so, from the tenor of his letters.

But to return: No man of feeling and judgment can arise from the perusal of this narration of the campaign to the James River, without a sad, but fearfully earnest conviction that Gen. McClellan spoke the horrible truth when he wrote, on that terrible night of the 28th of June, those ominous—ominous of evil—words, "THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT SUSTAINED THIS ARMY" Page 132. Every patriot will inquire, why was it not sustained? Up to that time the Administration had been furnished, by the people, with every dollar and every man it asked. Then, to answer this question correctly, each man should understand, first, that a *real abolitionist* is as cold as an icicle, as heartless as a rock, and as bloodless as a turnip. Witness the declaration of Senators that it would not be so bad to suffer *defeat* in battle, as it would for a saucy negro to be put out of a car. Second, that this Administration is controlled by this class of men. Third, that about the time McClellan started they ascertained *he did not coincide with them in their views*. See his letter to Burnside, when Commander-in-Chief, who was then about starting to North Carolina, January 7, 1862, in which he says:

"I would urge great caution in regard to proclamations. In no case, would I go beyond a moderate joint proclamation with the naval commander, which should say as little as possible about politics or the negro, merely state that the true issue for which we are fighting is the preservation of the Union, and upholding the laws of the General Government, and stating that all who conduct themselves properly will, as far as possible, be protected in their persons and property." Page 37.

On the 11th of November, the same thing was written to Halleck, the present Commander-in-Chief, who was then placed in command of the department of Missouri. Page 38. This was in consonance with his first proclamation to the people of Virginia. "All your rights shall be religiously respected." Roll of Honor, p. 41. So on the 7th of November he had said the same thing, in stronger language, to Buell, who was sent to Kentucky:

"The inhabitants of Kentucky may rely upon it that their domestic institutions will in no manner be interfered with, and that they will receive at our hands every constitutional protection. I know that I express the feelings and opinions of the President." Pages 38-9.

Of course he thought he knew his feelings, but events showed he was mistaken; or if the President was then honestly of that opinion, he afterwards changed—issued his proclamations of September, 1862, and January, 1863. McClellan did not give way to the demands of cold, bloodless Abolitionists—the President did; and then he turned against McClellan, influenced, no doubt, by these men, who direct his every important step. He *divided* the army of Virginia, posted his holiday Generals in front of Washington, with 100,000 men, to keep himself and cabinet safe, and sent McClellan off to do the fighting with less than that number. And McClellan had to withstand the whole power of the rebels for *seven* days, and then, from sheer exhaustion and want of men, retreated. This left the way open for Lee to attack the other branch of the army under Pope, and thus cut us up in detail. McClellan's army was taken from him, even to his body guard (p. 180), and sent to Pope. All day he could hear the fight, but was not allowed to go to it. Page 180. After Pope was defeated, they could say, "I beg you to assist us with your ability and experience." Page 181. He did assist, reorganized the army, and in ten days fought the battles of South Mountain and of Antietam, drove the enemy over the Potomac, and when the danger was past had his army again taken from him and placed under a political favorite (Burnside), who led them to the river bank opposite Fredericksburgh, and set down for twenty-two days, and "waited until the enemy had finished his last earth-work, dug his last rifle pit, planted all his artillery; and then, having no further excuse for delay, the army was ordered to storm the position in front." Roll of Honor, vol. 1, p. 334. The effect of that order was, that "those that had charge of the transportation, say that they carried twenty-five thousand wounded men to the transports at Aquia Creek," and yet "many of the wounded men were wandering around among the woods at Stafford, not knowing where to go." Id. p. 341. This, besides the killed that were left upon the field, the summing up would be:

First, we lost all advantage from the Chickahominy and the James River campaign, and men as follows, killed, wounded, and missing:

At Williamsburg (p. 91)	2,228
At West Point (p. 92)	194
At Hanover Court House (p. 104)	387
At Fair Oaks (p. 111)	5,737
At Old Tavern (p. 120)	516
Seven days' fight (p. 140)	15,249
At Turner's Gap (p. 199)	1,568
At Antietam (p. 213)	12,469
At Harper's Ferry (Roll of Honor, p. 321)	11,583
At Cedar Mountain, under Pope (Roll of Hon. p. 292)	1,800
At Groveton (Roll of Honor, p. 307)	6,000
At Groveton, second day, not given, more than first, (Roll of Honor, p. 309)	6,000
At Chantilly, not given, but heavy (p. 311) say	5,000
	68,727

Here is a grand total of almost seventy thousand men killed, disabled, and missing, to which add loss at Fredericksburg, 30,060, in eight months, besides all that died of disease, and this was the result of the "lingering" policy of dividing the army of Virginia.

It is a sore thing to believe that any American citizen, and especially any one in authority, would deliberately plan the endangering, and almost destruction, of a vast army of our friends. But any candid man who will sit down and, with an unbiassed mind, read the narration of the Virginia campaign, from which we have quoted, see a vast army of patriots in deadly peril, *placed there by the Government*, and witness the earnest, and sometimes almost dispairing appeals of their commander for succor, made day after day, from the 15th of April until the 1st of August—appeals that were made by a man that knew there was, for a great part of the time, near 100,000 unemployed men around Washington—appeals that were met by silence, or promises that yielded nothing, but like the apples upon the margin of the Dead Sea, turned into ashes at the touch; or answered by a single line of insult such as "I have no reinforcements to send you," (p. 150,) or by the suggestion of some foolish point foreign to the important question under discussion, such as, "I am very anxious about the Chickahominy, so close in your rear. Please look to it." Page 113. We say any man that will look and consider these things, must conclude that there were, controlling the President, a set of arrant scoundrels who desired the prolongation of the war for some sinister purpose—either to reap rich harvests out of fat army contracts, or to excite the public mind to the point of agreeing to strike down State rights and institutions and seize private property; or else a set of base cowards, who feared to stay in Washington in the absence of a vast army to shield them in their nefarious acts. But enough of this. A whole volume would not be large enough in which to write all the acts of turpitude committed by Abolitionists in causing this war to "LINGER." We turn to the Governor's lame apology for the

ARREST OF CITIZENS.

In speaking of the arrest of private citizens in loyal States, without authority of law, and attempting to excuse the same, the Secretary of War said, in his report of December, 1862, that the said political arrests which had been made in the various States were made by the advice and with the consent of the Governors of said States.

The House of Representatives, therefore, on the first day of the session, adopted the following:

"*Resolved*, That His Excellency, Gov. O. P. Morton, be requested to furnish this House with the facts in regard to the arrests that have been made in the State of Indiana." Br. Rep. p. 12, H. J. p. 13.

As it was a matter of no importance whatever, the Governor paid not the least attention to this request, although it was well known that the Government Bastile, within almost a stone's throw of his door, had been filled to overflowing, for months, with loyal citizens, some of them among the first men of the State. This silence can only be explained on the ground that the Governor had procured their arrest. In every instance they were his political opponents. In some cases they were public speakers; in others had been officers of nominating conventions, or had prepared resolutions at such. In no *single* instance was there a conviction of any man arrested, up to that time. A great majority were set at liberty without any charge being preferred against them, and informed that they were *honorably* discharged, as if anything could be done honorably in such a dishonorable manner by the mere minions of power. The House, not deterred from acting by the refusal of the Governor to act, or give them information, appointed a committee, who sent for witnesses and examined evidence in about *fifty* cases of arrests—how many more there were in the State we do not know. The evidence, in full, was taken down and reported to the House. That report is before us, making about 150 pages, and shows throughout the most bare-faced, arbitrary, unlawful, and tyrannical mode of proceeding resorted to in the attempt to *crush out* opposition—political opposition—that ever was adopted in any country professing to be free. Here the party in power, having the reins of Government in its hands, undertook to deter and overawe free born citizens from expressing the least dissent from their acts It was, in many instances, not anything they had ever said that caused their arrest, but, we suppose, fear of that which they might say; as the President said in answer to the committee in the Vallandigham case, it was not anything he had done, but anticipation of something he might do, that caused his arrest and banishment. The truth is, they knew their acts would not stand trying in the crucible of public investigation, and therefore investigation must be stifled—prevented by force and lawlessness. Now what does the Governor say in his speech about this, after this report was before him, showing the total absence of any cause for these arrests? "The Government of the United States has, in a few cases, arrested and imprisoned persons who, by speeches and writings, were trying to destroy the Government." And what reason does he give for this? Because Jeff. Davis was acting in the same tyrannical manner. In answer to this we only have to say, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons * * * * against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated." Amend. 4, Const. U. S.; sec. 9, art. 1, Const. of Ind. These instruments the Governor took an oath to support, when he assumed the duties of his office. And yet he did not raise a finger in behalf of those innocent citizens of Indiana thus arrested, but after their innocence is acknowledged, he justifies it on the ground that Jeff. Davis arrests men. On the same mode of reasoning he might tolerate eating men, because the king of the Cannibal Islands does the like. The truth is, Morton is a tyrant by nature, and, like all other tyrants, he is afraid to oppose superior power. If the people of Indiana desire to have their money squandered on favorites, their personal safety endangered, their liberties stolen from them, they can effect that object by voting for Mr. Morton for Governor.

But now let us, in conclusion, look for a few moments, to the grand result of three years

REPUBLICAN RULE.

First.—We have lost, by death and permanent disability, more than a million of men, from violence or disease, in this war. This may be disputed; but to the facts. Over two millions have enlisted altogether. There are not much over half a million in the field now. Where are the balance?

Second.—We have created a debt of over three thousand millions of dollars. The official reports of the Secretary of the Treasury do not show over one half the actual debt. It does not take into account the floating debt created by Quartermasters and other officers, for which receipts, certificates, and vouchers are outstanding.

Third.—By the Abolition and Confiscation acts, every vestige of Union feeling in the South has been blotted out, as Dunmore's policy united the colonies.

Fourth.—The nation's wealth was about twelve thousand millions of dollars. Three thousand millions of that has been destroyed and wasted. So we are that much poorer. Its place is supplied by irredeemable paper.

Fifth.—The whole country is one vast pest-house of sickness and disease, consequent upon congregating men in large bodies, and then scattering them throughout all the land.

Sixth.—In every direction that we may turn, we hear the voice of mourning and see the weeds of affliction. Each one we meet seems ready to exclaim, "My harp also is turned to mourning, and my organ into the voice of them that weep." Job, 30: 31. Well might the wise man say, that "When the righteous are in authority, the people rejoice; but when the wicked beareth rule, the people mourn." Prov. 29: 2. As "Rachel wept for her children because they were not." Jer. 31: 15.

Seventh.—"Demoralization" is spreading, as a leprous sore, through all the ramifications of society. Look at the police reports; there is no longer much regard for human life. Look around you, and see the "dissolution of the frame-work of society." But the other day two Republican papers were discussing the question whether, at the headquarters of Abolition officials, there were fifteen thousand, or *only* ten thousand, lewd women. Rascality and public plunder, as in the cases of Cameron and Fremont, are regarded and rewarded as special virtues, in officials.

Eighth.—Atheism and infidelity are seizing upon the public mind, and corrupting all the purer and better feelings of the human heart. But how could it be otherwise when the professed ministers of him who was ushered into the world by "a multitude of the heavenly host, praising God and saying, Glory to God in the highest, and on earth PEACE, good will toward man." Luke 2: 13, 14; or who forget the injunction to "live in peace," 2 Cor 13: 11; and to "follow peace with all men," Heb 12: 14; and that "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God," Matt. 5: 9. They have become "proud, blasphemous, unthankful, unholy, false accusers, incontinent, fierce, heady, high minded; having the form of godliness, but denying the power thereof, from such (the people have) turned away." Tim. 3: 2, 3, 4, 5. And why have the people turned away from them? Because they stand up daily, and in the name of the "Prince of Peace" (Is. 9: 6) call for the shedding of blood. Therefore what can be expected of such teachings but infidelity and atheism, seeing that these ministers, "having tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come, crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh, and put him to an open shame." Heb. 6: 5, 6.

Ninth.—God created the white man and the black man. The one he created superior, the other inferior. Our rulers are guilty of the folly of trying to make that equal which the Creator made unequal. The consequence is, the anger of the Lord has been kindled against the whole people, and he has afflicted us with war, with pestilence, and he has burnt and withered vegetation; for "by the breath of God frost is given." Job 37: 10.

That the Lord does thus visit the people because of the iniquity of the rulers, witness the plagues that were sent upon the people of Egypt for the obstinacy and wickedness of Pharoah in refusing, to let the Children of Israel depart. Exodus, chapter 8 to 14. As witness the famine of three years for the sins of Saul. 2 Sam. 21: As witness the death of the seventy thousand for the sin of David in numbering the people. 2 Samuel 24: 15: As witness "the smiting of Israel as a reed is shaken in the water," (1 King 14: 15), because of the sins of Jeroboam. Id. 16: As witness the "sore famine in Samaria," (1 Kings 18: 2), because Ahab did "provoke the Lord," (id. 16: 33) and "forsook the commandments." Id 18: 18: As witness the Babylonish captivity, because of the sins of Manasseh (2 Kings 23: 26), and of Jehoahaz (id. 31), and of Jehoiakim (id. 36), and of Jehoiachin (id. 24: 8 to 16). Many other examples might be cited from the sacred volume. But enough. If the people, both North and South, still desire to continue wicked men in high places, then may they expect, judging from the past, that the heavy hand of oppression will be yet more fearfully laid upon them. We, therefore, appeal to you, men of Indiana, to cast from before your eyes the heavy mist that blinds you; rise out of the darkness of the slough of Abolitionism into the light of liberty—the liberty of the WHITE MAN.

The Butter Speculation.

We have noted the speculations going on in butter all over the country, and charged on sufficient proof, that the present high prices are not the result of scarcity or currency. The Albany Journal, in copying one of the Express articles, says:

"The butter speculators now have their agents traversing the central counties of the State, contracting with farmers for their entire product the coming season, at forty-eight cents and upwards! By thus buying in advance of the manufacturer, they expect to control the market and permanently maintain the present scandalous prices. These prices are, of course, the result in good measure of combinations. In ordinary times, butter ranges from fifteen to twenty-five cents per pound. It does not cost a cent per pound more to manufacture it now than it did three years ago. The price of land has not essentially advanced; cents remain nearly the same. Help is dearer; but the increase would not amount to more than half a cent a pound on the cost of preparing a dairy for the market. The taxes on farms and farm products are nearly nominal. The inflation of currency ought not to enhance the nominal value more than six or seven cents a pound. So that making the most liberal allowance for the legitimate disturbing agency of the war, the best article of butter ought not to run beyond twenty eight to thirty cents per pound. Every mill above that is so much paid in the way of extortion.

"Is there no way to break up this *ring* of speculators? The coal monopolists had to compromise last winter. And yet coal is an article of necessity, while butter is an article of luxury. Why don't somebody start an Anti Butter-Eating Association? Let fifty of our principal citizens sign a pledge not to buy an ounce of butter while the price is above thirty cents, and how long would it be before the article would go a begging at rates even below that?"

As we said a few days since, the remedy is with the consumer. Either use no butter at all, or half the quantity, and the greedy mongers now buying up butter will be foiled in their selfish and mercenary purposes. The same rule ought to be adopted in regard to every article, the use of which can be dispensed with. Either a fair price, or no price, if possible, should be the rule of producers and sellers.—[New York Express.

Mrs. Lincoln's Sister.

The Norfolk correspondent of the New York World writes as follows:

The affair of Mrs. Todd White is generally commented upon here. I do not see by the papers that much has been said about her transit elsewhere. She called on General Butler before the flag-of-truce boat left, and asked if her baggage would be searched, and was informed by the general, that under the order which she had, he "did'nt care what she had." The lady persisted in disclosing the contents of her trunks, much to the edification of the general, probably, who felt himself completely powerless for once in his own department, with the *special order* of the President staring him in the face. He had not the courage to take the responsibility to stop the woman, even when she confessed what she had in her possession. Perhaps she had nothing "contraband" with her, but there was strong suspicion that she had, and it was Gen. Butler's duty to have seen for himself before he suffered her to go. The "policy" of General Butler was never seen to so much advantage as in the case of Mrs. Todd White.