Newspaper Page Text
Pt,
C
u
'TO CARE FOR HIM WHO HAS BORNE THE BATTLE, AND FOR HIS WIDOW AND ORPHANS."
ESTABLISHED 1S77.
WA&HINGTOK, D. C, SATURDAY, JULY 1, 1882.
NEW SERIES VOL- L, N- 46.
,-
BUMSIDE m TEMESSEE.
JONES IN WESTERS VIRGINIA.
BRILLIANT MILITARY MOVEMENTS OF
BOTH ARMIES.
nw Reinforcements from the Army -rrcre "Witli-
lield from Participation in tlio Battlo of
Chickamauga The Toll) of Controlling
the Movements of Armies Iiy Tele-
graph at a Thousand 21iles from
tho Field of Action.
The sweep of the Union armies, under
Rosecrans and Burnside, westward from
Middle Tennessc an' Kentucky, in August
and September, loSIyf has been described in
foregoing numbers of The National
Thibuxe. The confederates, finding it im
possible to confront the line formed by both
Union armies, evacuated East Tennessee and
concentrated their entire strength upon the
Army of the Cumberland.
Burnside pushed forward with the Army
of the Ohio and captured Knoxville on the
2d, and Cumberland Gap on the 9th of Sep
tember. Major-General Sam Jones, in com
mand of the department of Western Vir
ginia, was directed by the confederate war
department to extend a protect orate over
the district of East Tennessee. Arriving
upon the scene of operations too late to pre
vent the surrender of Frazer at Cumberland
Gap, he turned his attention to the forma
tion of a command which should prevent the
advance of Burnside's troops eastward, while
by a show of force he should be able to hold
his antagonist from participation in the
struggle then impending near Chattanooga.
The value of the Salt "Works at Saltville,
fourteen miles east of Abingdon, was inesti
mable to the southern anny. Their de
struction would inflict an irreparable loss
upon the confederacy. Although the cap
ture and destruction of these works seemed
never to have entered into the calculations
of General Burnside or the "War Department,
the head of General Burnside's column had
no sooner turned in that direction from
Cumberland Gap, than General Jones at
once conjectured the objective point to be
the precious Salt "Works, which it had been
his especial duty to guard.
On the 14th the Union troops were re
ported to be moving from Cumberland Gap
on the "Salt "Works. General "Wharton was
placed in command of the defences, and
Otcy's battery ordered to report to him.
Majors Chenoweth and Prentice were or
dered to send scouts out and ascertain the
truth of the report. Colonel J. E. Carter, in
command of the First Tennessee cavalry
brigade, was directed to move via Reedy
Creek and Moccasin Gap, and " if the enemy
moves towards Saltville, get in his rear and
harass him."
Inquiries were next ordered to be made to
what extent ho could rely upon the home
guards
TO FROTECT THE SALT WORKS,
with the intention of removing "Wharton to
the front. It will be observed that the
mind of General Jones had become impressed
with two ideas, both of which were errone
ous. One, that Burnside had but a portion
of his force in East Tennessee, having sent
the greater portion of his troops to co-operate
with Rosecrans below Chattanooga; the
other, that General Burnside had designs
upon the Salt "Works. Both ideas were pre
cisely those which would naturally occur to
the mind of an intelligent antagonist, con
versant with the importance of both move
ments, and that he was wrong in his sur
mise reflects less credit upon his antagonist
than upon himself. General Lee, whose
mind embraced in its comprehensive grasp
the operations of the confederate army
throughout the whole arena of war, had
already responded to the call of General
Bragg for reinforcements by detaching one
of his strongest corps, under Lougstreet, for
service at Chattanooga, and now finding the
Salt "Works, upon which his army depended,
threatened, he had promptly supplied to
General Jones an additional brigade-under
command of Brigadier-General Corse. "Whar
ton's brigade was encamped at Glade Springs,
within supporting distance of the urtillery
in defence of the Salt Works. Corse was
brought to the front and preparations made
to defend the line of road leading into the
valley of the Upper Tennessee, and, if possi
ble, prevent Burnside from advancing upon
the Sail Works and also from detaching any
considerable portion of his force to reinforce
Rosecrans. In response to a telegram from
president Davis, 'asking tho strength and
position of his forces, General Jones replied
as follows :
" Jonesboro, September 15, 18G3.
"His Excellency Jefferson Davis,
"Richmond, Va.
"Your telegram of yesterday received last
night. I shall withdraw the troops from this
to the Watauga and Holston to await the
reinforcements and be in better position to
meet an advance on Saltville. No reliable
information of the movements of the enemy
from Cumberland Gap. Picket skirmishing
in front every day, our pickets behaving
well. Sam Jones, Major-General."
General Jones says in his report: "Under
all the circumstances of the case I thought
the best service I could render with the small
force under my command would be to check
and detain the superior force in my front
until the battle which I supposed was im
pending near Chattanooga should be de
cided." On the 9th of September Gen. Burnside
reported the capture of Cumberland Gap
and 2O00 prisoners and the occupation of
Eat Tennessee from Jonesboro on the north
east to Athens in the southwest. To this
report H.illcek responded on the 11th con
gratulating him upon hjs success, directing
him to hold the gaps in the North Carolina
mountains and to connect with Gen. Rose
crans at least with his cavalry, notifying
him that the latter would occupy Dalton
or some point on the railroad, to close all
access from Atlanta. On the 13th llalleck
telegraphed as follows: "It is important that
all the available forces of your command lie
pushed forward into East Tennessee. All
your scattered forces should be concentrated
there. So long as we hold Tennessee Ken
tucky is perfectly safe. Move down your in
fantry as rapidly as possible towards Chatta
nooga to conmci with liosccrans. Bragg may
merely hold tho passes in the mountains to
cover Atlanta and move his main army
through northern Alabama to reach the
Tennessee River and turn Rosccrans's right,
cutting off his supplies. In that case he will
turn Chattanooga over to you and move to
interrupt Bnigg."
Here is a positive order, as explicit as any
given to Rosecrans, for Burnside to move iiis
infantry down towards Chattanooga to con
nect with Rosecrans. The same order had
been given on the 5th of August, and had
formed a part of the plan of the expedition.
It was reiterated on the 5th of September,
when he was directed to keep Rosecrans in
formed of his movements and arrange with
him for co-operation. Oil September 11th,
when he was notified of Rosccrans's position
and need of reinforcements, and again on the
13th, as seen in the above dispatch, he had
in Tennessee a division of cavalry and
mounted infantry whose effective strength,
as shown by the field returns of September
20th, was: "Present for duty, equipped,
G700, with 3-1 pieces of artillery." Uis in
fantry and artillery, under Hartsuff. num
bered: "Present tor duty, equipped, G,5SG,
with 32 pieces of artillery." One has but to
imagine the grand results of the Chattanooga
campaign if these orders had been obeyed.
Burnside entered Knoxville with an army
of 10,000 men on the Gth of September, leav
ing a division of infantry and a brigade of
cavalry and mounted infantry at London
and Athens. He found supplies abundant,
besides which he had crossed the mountains
with 2,000 beef cattle. His advance, under
Foster, captured at Knoxville five locomo
tives, over twenty cars, and a large quantity
of provisions. After capturing the force and
subsistence stores at Cumberland Gap and
opening the route to and from Kentucky,
and arming the lo3al East Tcnnesseeans with
5,000 stand of arms brought with him for
that purpose, he had ample time and oppor
tunity in which to have dispatched at least
TEN THOUSAND INFANTRY TO CO-OPERATE
"WITH ROSECRANS.
On the 18th he acknowledgad the receipt of
Ilalleck's dispatch of the 13th, abovo quoted,
and also of one dated on the 14th, which read
as follows: "There are reasons why you
should reinfore General Rorsecrans with all
possible dispatch. It is believed that the
enemy Avill concentrate to give him battle.
You must be there to help him." To this
urgent appeal he replied on the 18th from
Knoxville: "Orders to go below will be
obeyed as soon as possible. I go to Green
ville to-night (in the opposite direction).
Dispositions for attacking tho enemy at
Jonesboro made. I will lose no time in
doing as you order. No direct telegraphic
communication as yet. Hope to get it to
morrow." The next day, while Rosecrans,
after the brilliant flank movement which
compelled the cvacuatipn of Chattanooga,
found his army on the eve of a terrible bat
tle, Burnside telegraphed from 'Greenville:
"Will obey your directions in reference to
Rosecrans. Our troops occupy Jonesboro.
Enemy retiring to Abingdon. Our cavalry
in pursuit. Am now sending every man
that can be spared to aid Rosecrans. I shall
go on to Jonesboro. As soon as I learn tho
result of our movements to the east, will go
down by railroad and direct the movements
of reinforcements for Rosecrans. I have di
rected every available man in Kentucky to
be sent here." On the 20th he received a
dispatch from Halleck stating that General
Meade did not believe that any of Ewell's
troops had gone west, as Burnside had feared;
that Longstreet, Johnston, and Bragg had
concentrated against Rosecrans, who was on
the Chiekamauga River, twenty miles south
of Chattanooga, closing thus: "He is ex
pecting a battle, and wants yon to sustain,
his left. Every possible effort must be made
to assist him." To this Burnside replied
from Knoxville on the 20th : " You may be
sure I will do all I can for Rosecrans. Ar
rived, here last night, and am hurrying
troops in his direction. I go tq the roud to
night for a day."
The following dispatch received by Rose
crans on the battle field on the 19th, and
that which follows on the 20th, shows that
llalleck fully expected a junction of the two
armies: "I have no direct communication
with Burnside or Halleck. On the 15th
Ilurlbut says he is moving towards Decatur.
I hear nothing of Sherman's troops ordered
from Vicksburg. A telegram from Burn
side on the 17th, just received, says my orders
to move down to reinforce you will bo
obeyed as soon as possible. Burn
side's cavalry ought to be near you by this
time." That on the 2Qth is as follows:
"General Burnside's instructions before he
left Kentucky were to connect with your
left. These instructions have been repeated
five or six times, and he has answered that
he was moving with that object. 1 think
HIS ADVANCE CANNOT HE FAR FROM YOU."
On the 21st: "Nothing heard from Burn
side since the 19th. He was then sending
to your aid all his available force. It is
hoped that you will hold out until he
reaches you. He waa directed to connect
with you ten days ago. I can get no reply
from nurlbut or Sherman."
So the correspondence went on from day
to day, and mJt a man was sent to Rosecrans.
The battle of Chiekamauga was fought on
the 19(h and 20th. The noble Army of the
Cumberland, struggling against terrible odds,
held its position even after the fatal blunder
which opened its lines and admitted Polk's
victorious legions upon its flanks. Obedience
to the positive order of General llalleck
would have brought the infantry of the
Twenty-third Corps upon the field in ample
time to retrieve the disaster if not to have pre
vented it. The force that required only a
small portion of Burnside's troops to drive
back from Knoxville.to Jonesboro, and which
virtually prevented the co-operation of Burn
side with Rosecrans, has been already stated.
This is how Burnside states it in his dis
patch to ILilleck of the 21st of September:
"Before I knew of the necessity of sending
immediate assistance to General Rosecrans
I had sent a considerable port ion of my force
to capture and drive out a large force of the
enemy under General Sam Jones, stationed
on the road from Bristol'to Jonesboro, which
amounts to at least six thousand men."
- While the correspondence above referred
to was going on between the two generals in
tho field and their respective governments,
active operations had been in progress along
the line of the railroad east of Knoxville.
September Sth Lieutenant-Colonel Hays, of
the One Hundredth Ohio, and 300 men, had
a skirmish at Carter's Station, where they
were repulsed by Captain McClung with a
bridge guard of 150 men in an intrenched
position, when they fell back to Limestone
Creek and awaited reinforcements. Mean
time General Jackson with a portion of his
brigade and Colonel Giltncr with his regi
ment 1,800 in all moved from Jonesboro
and encountered Hays's battalion. After an
engagement of two hours the Jatter sur
rendered 200 men with himself, the re
mainder having been killed or effected their
escape. On the 10th Foster's brigade and
the One Hundred and Third Ohio occupied
Greenville, where it was joined on the 16th
by Woodford's brigade and one regiment
under General Hascall. Colonel Foster ad
vanced on the 17lh, and on the following
day drove Colonel Carter's First Tennessee
confederate regiment which had escaped
from Cumberland Gap from the ford above
Kingsport after a severe fight, and on the
19th
DROVE THE ENEJrY OUT OF BRISTOL.
General Jones had concentrated his troops
at Jonesboro, where he joined them on the
14th. In his rear were the two railroad
bridges over the Watauga at Carter's Station
and over the Holston at Union. (The name
of the latter place had been changed by the
confederates to Zollicoffer, in honor of the
general oi that name killed at Mill Springs.)
As indicated in his telegram to Mr. Davis,
General Jones withdrew his command on
the lGth to Carter's Station, where it took
position. Corse's brigade, having - reached
Abingdon, was directed to advance to Zolli
coffer. Foster's advance upon Kingsport on
the 18th led' past Jones's right flank con
siderably north of his position and gained
his rear on the railroad at Bristol on the
State line between Tennessee and Virginia.
Foster deslroj'ed the railroad for some
distance on both sides of the town and a
quantity of subsistence stores and returned
the same night to Blountsville, sixteen miles
northwest' of Zollicoffer, to which place
Jones at once moved Corse's brigade with
the intention of attacking him at daylight
on the 20th. The Forty-fifth Virginia and
Pcttus's regiment, under command of Gen.
Williams, were ordered to take part in the
attack, but did not arrive until long after
sunrise. Colonel Tyler, with the Sixteenth
Georgia battalion and two companies of
Carter's cavalry, which had been cut off from
the regiment at Kingsport, moved forward
and drew Foster out on the Zollicoffer road,
where he encountered the infantry, under
General Corse, moving to turn his lct.
Foster came upon Williams, who had just
gained position.
A BRISK SKIRMISH .ENSUED,
when Foster fell back to Blountsville, and
thence towards Carter's Station, where on
the 21st he was joined near that place by
Cameron's infantry brigade of Hascall's
division. Foster moved to Johnson's to
wards Johnesboro, leaving Cameron with
his brigade, the Twelfth Kentucky cavalry,
and a part of the Second Tennessee mounted
infantry. The pickets" skirmished on the
21st. On the following day Colonel Gilbert,
with the First brigade of Hascall's division,
moved from Morristown towards Carter's
Station. General Corse had returned to
Blountsville to protect the rear from another
raid by Foster, who reached there on the
22d, and a fight ensued. The forces on each
side were about equal, and each had a bat
tery of artillery. Foster drove the enemy,
capturing seventy prisoners and one gun.
It was evidently General Burnside's in
tention to advance along the lino of the
railroad to the east. On the 22d he address
ed the following letter to General Jones:
"General: In the course of the movements of
this army I may find it necessary to fire
upon the villages occupied by your forces,
In order to avoid accidents to non-combatants,
I have-the honor to request that you
will cause immediate notice hereafter to lie
given to all such residents of those villages
that they may remove themselves to a place
of safety. No one of the villages will be
fired upon before five o'clock p. m., to-day
and the flag of truce bearing tin's will ter
minate one hour aftee my officer arrives at
your pickets. He is authorized to wait there
that long for my message from you." To
which General Williams replied as follows:
"General: I have received your communica
tion in tho temporary absence of my supe
rior officer, and the limited time set for the
return of your flag prevents mo fjoin refer-
ing it to him. The short space allowed for
the removal of .non-combatants from the
villages along the line of railroad occupied
by confederate forces, does not seem lo me
consistent with the usages of civilized war
fare, and particularly when you intimate
that you are prepared to fire on a number of
villages, and claim the right to do so at five
o'clock p. m. to-day. I will ask y5u most
respectfully how information can be con
veyed to them, when it is now half-past four
o'clock i). m." General Jones had become
convinced of the danger of occupying a posi
tion so far in advance of the Salt Works, and
ordered Williams to fall back from Carter's
Station towards Zollicoffer.
General Burnside says in his report: "I
reached the extreme advance on the night of
the 21sl, and on the 22d made arrangements
to attack the enemy's position at Watauga
Bridge early on the morning of the 23d. I
could see nb way of extricating this portion
of the command except by a demonstration
of this kind. A cavalry brigade, under Col
onel Foster, was sent around to threaten his
rear, and on that night he evacuated the
position, burning the bridge. I at once set
all the forces, excepting a small portion of
the cavalry, in motion down the valley to
the relief of Rosecrans. I arrived in Knox
ville latc.in the evening of the 21th."
The student of these campaigns cannot
fail to be impressed Avith the folly of the
War Department in attempting to dircqt the
management of two separate armies operat
ing upon parallel lines, eastward from their
respective bases, by telegraph from a point a
thousand miles distant, without giving to
one commander extraordinary powers in case
of emergency. The misfortunes that attend
ed the Army of the Cumberland could have
been arrested if Burnside had remained in
Cincinnati, sending Hartsuff into East Ten
nessee. Burnside's commission anti-dated
that of Rosecrans, as major-general, three
days, and for this reason the latter could not
order the Army of the Ohio to his assistance.
General Burnside told Hartsuff that he could
not go to Chattanooga, as he ranked Rose
crans, and confusion might arise; to which
Ifartsu ff responded, "let me go, I don't rank
him."
General Burnside, however, explains his
action in the same report, as follows: "It
should bo. remembered that ui to the night
of.'uD lGth I was acting under instructions
"V
to
racupy the upper country of East lenr
s-ee, ana aliofnny Available iorccs were
nevee.
wrli up the valley above Knoxville. All that
could be turned back were started at once,
and as soon :is possible the remainder were
withdrawn from the presence of the enemy
and turned back for the purpose of proceed
ing to the relief of General Rosecrans. The
point where the troops were turned back on
the 17th was 140 miles from Chicamauga,
where Gen. Rosecrans was fighting on the
19th, and the advance of our forces was over
200 miles distant therefrom. It will be
readily seen that under no circumstances
coiild we have reached even the neighbor
hood of Gen. Rosccrans's lorces during that
battle. The troops were moved in that di
rection as rapidly as possible. Many dis
patches passed between General Halleck and
myself after this, in reference to going to
Rosccrans's assistance after he had estab
lished himself at Chattanooga, and some
misunderstandings occurred in regard to the
purport of these dispatches. I was averse to
doing what would in any way weaken our
hold in East Tennessee, and he was anxious
lest Rosecrans should not be able to hold
Chattanooga. He was not disturbed at
Chattanooga, and we held our ground in
East Tennessee, so that what occurred in no
way affected tho result."
Regarding the two campaigns as one in
their objects and the two armies as but the
right and left wings of a grand army of in
vasion of confederate territory moving on
parallel lines, under a common commander,
it is reasonable- to suppose that reinforce
ments from right to left would have been
mido as-occasion demanded. The confeder
ates regarded the destruction of the Army
of the Cumberland as of paramount import
ance, and boldly massed an army in its front
of sufficient magnitude, in their opinion, to
accomplish that object. The temporary
evacuation of Chattanooga southward was
rendered necessary by the strategical move
ment of a large portion of Gen. Rosccrans's
army upon Bragg's communications, but the
feeling in tho confederate army was an un
wavering faith in their success. This feeling
was shared by the people at large, Ilun
dieds of families who had left their homes in
Middle Tennessee and Kentucky, ami kept
in the rear of the confederate army in
its retrograde movement, were congregated
at Rome, Georgia. They had led a nomadic
life, moving from Murfroc&boro to Winches
ter, thence to Chattanooga and Rome, and,
inspired.with the hope of returning to their
homes as the result of the defeat and pursuit
of the Army of the Cumberland, they had
their goods and luggage packed in wagons
ready to follow the victorious flag of the
confederacy northward to the Cumberland.
The fancy of many took a wilder flight.
Knowing that Rosccrans's army alone stood
between the powerful host of veteran troops
concentrating at Lafayette, and the Ohio
River, it w:is not too much to hope that a
vigorous pursuit of a disorganized army, de
moralized by defeat, Avould carry tho war
into the Northern Slates.
The arrival of Longstrcet's advance gave
promise of an easy victory. Whatever may
hove been' the overweening confidence of
General Rosecrans in the strength of his
army, and however much he may have un
derestimated that of his antagonist, as indi
cated hy the speedy evacuation of Chatta
noo".i, he no sooner became satisfied of the
approach of reinforcements to Bragg from
the Army of the Potomac than he saw the
necessity of a corresponding increase of his
own strength. A commanding-general, con
trolling tho movements of both Rosecrans
and Burnside, should, at this supreme mo
ment, have had his headquarters at Chatta
nooga. The simultaneous capture of that
city and Cumberland Gap took place on the
9th of September, and within three days
thereafter two facts were well known to
Burnside and Rosecrans. The former knew
that no considerable force confronted him
from the eastward, and that none was likely
to advance from that direction, as Buckner
had, in obedience to orders, evacuated the
A-allcy of the Tennessee a thing AYhich
would not be likely to occur if the confeder
ate Avar department designed to attempt
holding that territory. General Rosecrans
had ample evidence that a large army Avas
being concentrated to give him battle. Both
these facts would have been at once commu
nicated to the commanding-general. General
White's division of infantry, 3,000 strong,
and Byrd's division of cavalry and mounted
infantry, 2,000 strong, remained in the vi
cinity of Loudon and Athens, within three
day.-,' march of Chattanooga, until the 15th
of September, four days, before the battle of
Chiekamauga, Avhcn White was ordored to
Knoxville. The Ninth Army Corps Avas
moving by easy marches from Crab Orchard,
Kentucky,. via Cumberland Gap to Knox
ville. There was no reason why all Burn
side's infantry could not have been sent to
reinforce Rosecrans, leaving the cavalry and
artillery to defend Knoxville. Cumberland
Gap Avas amply defended by IJeCotircey's
brigade, and the advance of the Ninth Army
Corps reached its vicinity on the 17th, thus
providing against any possibility of its recap
ture. That a reinforcement of 10,000 effectives
Avould haA'e been ordered by forced marches
to Chattanooga from Burnside's army by a
commanding-general, stationed Avhcre he
should have been, as early, as the 13th, is as
probable as any supposition that could ue
made with regard to the moA'enients of
troops at any juncture during the Avar.
That the order was not given is due solely to
the absence of a common commander, and
his absence Avas what Napoleon termed
" Avorse than a crime a blunder."
EDISON THE INVENTOR.
The Great Electrician's Curious Courtship For
Srcttins all about his Bride.
The correspondent of the Buffalo Commcr
'ciiiftlfficrti&er, Avriiing aro.u this city, says :
I met Tom Edison, the electrician, on Penn
sylvania avenue the other day. He had run
down from New York to look after his pat
ents. Ho is looking Avell and is just as aAvk-A-ard
and ungainly as ever. There has been
a great deal of nonsense Avritten about Edi
son, as there always is about every man who
springs into fame with a bound. He is about
35 years of age and Avas born in Ohio.
" Stock " Griffin, Edison's private secretary,
once told me a funnily-characteristic story of
the manner in which Edison came to get mar
ried. The idea Avas first suggested by an inti
mate friend, Avho made the point that he need
ed a mistress to preside OA-er his big li'iie,
Avhich Avas being managed by a houti-k? pt-r.
and several sen-ants. I dare say the idea
never occurred to him before, for be it know n
he is the shyest and most bashful of men,
but he seemed pleased with the proposition
and timidly inquired whom he should
marry. The friend someAvhat testily replied
" anyone ; " that a man who had so little
sentiment in his soul as to ask such a ques
tion ought to be satisfied Avith anything that
Avore a petticoat and Avas decent, and con
cluded by saying: "There are a number of
nice girls employed in your factory over
yonder; they aren't especially refined or cnl-tiA-ated,
I must confess, but they are respect
able, and that is the main consideration after
all."
Edison looked them all oyer, and, after
making his selection, put the question
plumply to her. It Avas Edison's Avay of
doing business, but it embarrassed the young
lady all the same. She asked time to con
sider, and Edison granted her a Aveek. At the
end of that time she accepted him, and they
were married without delay. They had de
cided to visit the New England States and
Canada, and make quite an extended tour.
As the bridal party drove to the station they
passed his laboratory. Turning to his wife
Edison excused himself for a feAv min
utes, saying there Avere some matters that
needed his attention, and that he would be
at the station in time for the train. The
train came and Avent, and so did se-eral
others, but no Edison. The bride, Ahoknew
his peculiarities, finally drove back to the
house and waited her liege lord's pleasure.
She never saAV him again for forty-eight
hours. Immersed in some idea that had
suddenly occurred to him, he became oblivi
ous to brides, honeymoons, or anything else.
MISS LIVINGSTON'S SUIT.
A suit for breach of promise of m.-.rriage
has just been begun in the Kings County, N.
Y., Supreme Court oy Miss Mary Alice Al
mout LiA'ingston against Henry Fleming, a
wealthy young oil merchant of New York,
aa'Iio resides at an up-toAvn hotel. Miss LiA'
ingston, who is said to be a descendant of
Chancellor Robert R. Livingston, and is
about tAventy years old, claims 175,000
damages against Mr. Fleming. She claims
that after an acquaintauce'of several months
he engaged himself to marry her, and that
thereafter they associated intimately, but
after a time he ceased to visit hex-, and then
refused to keep his promise, although she
has been and is ready to marry him. Miss
LiA'ingston is attractiA-e, and it is said that
she Avill receive an estate of 350,000 when
she reaches her twenty-first birthday. Mr.
Fleming is a tall, stout man, of "blonde com
plexion, under thirty years of age, and is
said to havo inherited a million of dollars.
He recently received an increase in his for
tune of $500,000 by the death of his brother.
JrL Ii x
kf w 4 A ri fa
W
CLOSE OF THE BALTIMORE
ENCAMPMENT.
REPORT OF COM'R MERRILL.
STEADY GROWTH OF THEORDER-THE
NEW OFFICERS ELECTED.
Review of the Grand Farade and Other Features of
the Ccicbfation Sketches or the ew Grand,
Commander and Other Oluccrs The
i
"ext Encampment to be Held at
Denver Visit of Comrades
to the Capitol.
The Sixteenth Annual Encampment
Grand Army of the Republic, closed its sesl
sions on Friday of last week, at Baltimore,
and adjourned to meet at Denver, Colorado,
next year. As has been anticipated, the En
campment proved the most notabie in she
history of the Grand Army. For the orst
time since the Order Avas established the
Reunion Avas held in a Southern city; lor
the first time since the close of the aw mvil
war tb pro wa.ot- only a pleasant (Mitf-ru 43g&" "
ling of the " blue and the grey," buivt$vse
Avere unmistakable evidences of the ta.i ilnst
the soldiers of North and South the mm
Avho laced death on the battle-field iio.n
Bull Run to Appomattox, Avere sincen in
their expressions of friendship when luey
addressed each other as "comrades," ant.
declared that the past-must be forgotten;
and for the first time in the history of the
Order all the Posts appeared in full uniform,
thus heightening A-ery greatly the interest
in the public demonstration on the opening
day. As Tiik National Tribune has
j largely increased its subscription list sinco
i the last issue Ave reproduce, .suaieof the more
important features o:' the grand parade a
i full account of Avhith appeared in this jour
nal of last Aveek for the benefit of new-
readers, and also in order that the present
number may contain a complete record of
everything of special interest that transpired
at Baltimore. The convention met on Wed
nesday, June 21.
THE GKAXD PARADE.
The great feature of the day Avas, of conrse,
the parade, and it Avas in expectation of A'it
nessing the most brilliant military pageant
that had graced their streets since the Avar
that the citizens of Baltimore gathered early
in the morning along the advertised lino of
march, until it became almost impossible to
clear a passage for the procession itself. It
had been Avisely determined to form the line
in the eastern section of the city so as to
admit of the Philadelphia, New York aud
Eastern Posts, some of whom did not arrive
until quite late in the morning, taking posi
tion immediately upon leaving the cars, and
as a consequence, there Avas very little of the
delay and confusion usually incident to such
occasions. It Avas ten o'clock Avheu the head
of the column moved AvestAvard along Balti
more street, the main thoroughfare of the
city, and began to uncoil its brilliant length
of gorgeous uniforms, glittering riiles, and
gleaming banners before the cheering multi
tude. The line. Avhich Avas under the com
mand of General Romeyu B. Ayres, U. S. A.,
Avas in two divisions. The first, Avhich em
braced all the local and visiting militia, was'
commanded by General Jas. 11. Herbert, a gal
lant officer in the confederate army during the
late Avar, and the second, made up entirely
of uniformed Posts of the Grand Army, Avith
armed Posts, guards, and firing companies,
Avas commanded by Commander-in-Chief
General George S. Merrill.
With happy forethought the bands and
drum corps had been instructed to play quick
marching time (G-Stha,) and there Avas as a
consequence none of that painful lagging
Avhich so frequently characterizes the move
ments of large bodies. Naturally the mili
tary companies which composed tho first
division had for the spectators the greatest
attraction, and indeed they presented a daz
zling appearance in their showy uniforms,
and marched, as a Avhole, Avith the precision of
veterans. The Fifth Regiment, Maryland
National Guards, tho crack military regi
ment of the South, turned out nearly it3 full
complement of men, and in its summer uni
form of dress coat and white pants, made a
superb display in the line. But after all, the
chief feature of the parade Avas the imposing
array of uniformed Posts of the Grand Army
in the second diA'isiou. The "Three Big
Twos," as Dahlgren Tost No. 2, of Boston,
Post No. 2, of Philadelphia, and Post No. 2,
of Washington, have been humorously chris
tened, Avere applauded all along the lino for
their fine marching and soldierly appearance.
The Boston men, in their white dress coats
