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ESTABLISHED 1S77.-ITEW SERIES.
WASHINGTON, D. C, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 20, JSS2.
YOL. II-NO. 11.-WH0LE NO. 63.
The History of Longstrcet's Campaign
A FLANK ATTACK.
Burnside Retreats from.
Canrpo ell's Station.
Longstreet Follows at a Re
Conl inucd from lasl ircrl;.
It was now twelve o'clock, noon, and the at
tack referred to by Longstreet was immediately
begun by McLaws, while Jenkins was execu
ting his flank movement.
McLaws says: "After -waiting several hours,
for the purpose, as I have understood, of allow
ing General Jenkins to get into position to
make a flank movement upon the enemy's left,
I was ordered to form the brigades of Kershaw,
"Woflbrd, and Bryan in line of battle across the
valley, and move upon the enemy." Bryan's
brigade was held in reserve, and tho remainder
moved forward at once and continued to ad
vance until checked by orders from Longstreet,
who desired McLaws's attack to follow that of
Jenkins's on the flank. "When Totter withdrew
to his second position, Humphreys's brigade of
McLaws's division, -which had up to this time
been posted on a hill to the left, advanced along
tbe ridge, his skirmishers exchanging sbots
with the Union troops on Potter's right. Mc
Laws makes little mention of his repulse at
Referring to the flank movement on tho left
of General Potter's line, Jenkins says: "Gen
eral Law, being on tho right, -was ordered to
move, followed by Anderson's brigade, far
enough along tho hills upon tho enemy's left
to bring the next to tho last of Anderson's regi
ments opposite the enemy's guns, so that not
ouly tho guns but their supporting lines might
bo struck in flank and rear by tho two bri
gades. Beuning was ordered to cover tho right
ilank of tho attacking lino with his brigade,
withdrawing Jenkins's brigade (commanded by
Colonel Bratton) by a flank movement from the
open field in the front of tho enemy into the
woods. I directed the primary movements of
the other brigades to be made with tho utmost
promptitude. The hills and ground over which
our column was required to pass was very diffi
cult, being covered with a close undergrowth
of scraggy oaks, and tho distance having been
increased by the enemy's front lines retiring
under the flra of our artillery, it required con
siderable time to attain the' desired position
upon their flank, their lines having open
ground to retire upon, and being able to move
at least as fast as our columns. Hastening the
movements, however, about the time Bratton's
brigade reported, Law reported himself in tho
directed position, and I ordered Anderson im
mediately to the attack. Upon reaching Law's
brigade, I found he had not gone far enough to
tho right to put Anderson in position, but his
own brigade, by advancing, could strike the
battery and enemy's flank. Sending to stop
Anderson, I directed in person General Law to
make the attack with his brigade, indepen
dently of Anderson. Having received my as
surance of support and protection to his flanks,
he commenced his advance, and the other brig
ades were promptly placed to support and
follow the attack. In a few minutes, greatly
to my surprise, I received a message from
General Law that, in advancing, his brigade
had obliqued so much to the left as to have
gotten out of its line of attack. This causeless
and inexcusable movement lost us the few mo
ments in which success from this point could
A feeble attempt to gain tho rear of Potter
followed, but was prevented by a vigorous at
tack by Hartranft. "While this movement had
bef n progressing McLaws had mado an equally
futile effort against the centre.
GOOD CONDUCT OF THE NINTH COUPS.
Ferrero says: "The enemy attacked our
lines in force with infantry and artillery, but
were repulsed at every point. Never did
troops manoeuvre so beautifully and with such
precision as during this engagement; changing
j itions several times under a severe tire, it
pinned more like a drill for field movements
than otherwise; brigades moving forwaid to
relieve each other, others retiring, having cx
1 air-t d their ammunition ; changes of front
I ii-ing of defiles, were executed hymen and
c'lirf rs. so as to draw forth exclamations of the
h g'lst praise by those who were so fortunate
as to behold their movements. The losses up
to this time were quite heavy in my command,
including the engagement at the forks of the
read, but the enemy must have suffered very
sewn-ly, as they advanced their lines against
a murderous lire from our forces, compelling
them to fall back, which muht have told effect
ually upon their lines. They did not attempt
to advance again, but contented themselves
with fchclling our position and endeavoring to
flank ns with part of their infantry."
Colonel Chapin is equally pleased with the
performance of his men. He says: "At 12
o'clock in. we opened fire from the batteries and
droe back the onemy, who were advancing in
three lines. My whole brigade was now en
jagid. Some demonstrations were made to
i'uiik us, but detachments of the Ninth Corps
u re thrown on our right and left. After the
engagement had lasted some time and our bat
ttI hud about exhausted their ammunition,
tl. enemy brought three heavy batteries to
btur on ours and I was obliged to order the
k.tlcries to the rear, the infantry still romain
ii.;';uid holding tlte line, although the enemy's
fire from both artillery and infantry was very
6' vcrc. About .'J o'clock I was ordered to cover
the it'treat of the Ninth Corps which we did
bj fiivtchinga line of skirmishers across the
ei.tirc field and moving my brigade in line of
bat'le slowly to tho rear, occasionally halting
a . 1 checking the enemy. During this move
ment the fire from the enemy's artillery and
infantry was very heavy, but the movement
was performed deliberately and steadily, as
though tho regiments were on drill, falling
back slowly until wo reached the ridge we were
ordered to hold. Here wo baited, took up po
sition, and again a portion of the Ninth Corps
assisted us. This position we held until dark,
when tho Ninth Corps was withdrawn, and for
a short time we wore alone in the field. As the
Ninth Corps loft the field tho enemy charged
on our left flank, but were handsomely repulsed
b the One Hundred and Seventh Illinois.
Shortly after this we were ordered off the field
to bring up the rear on the road to Knoxville,
where wo arrived at daybreak next morning."
CHA PIN'S GALLANT I1RIGADE.
Colonel Chapin closes his report with a glow
ing tribute to tho gallantry of Colonel W. E.
Hobsou, Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan, and Major
Estes, and their regiment, the Thirteenth Ken
tucky; Colonel Lowryand Major Brooks, and
the One Hundred and Seventh Illinois. Colonel
Kelly, of tho latter, whose resignation had
reached him several days before, declined to
leavo the field, but remained, animating his
men by voice and example. Major Sherwood,
of the One Hundred and Eleventh Ohio, and
Major Wheeler, of tho Twenty-third Michigan,
with their regiments, receive hfgh praiso for
their gallantry and soldier-like conduct on this
occasion, as well as tho officers and soldiers of
Henshaw's Illinois aud tho Twenty-fourth
Colonel Chapin gives a list of killed, wounded
and missing in tho two days in which his bri
gade was engaged, which foots up fourteen
killed, ninety-six wounded, and sixty-six cap
tured and missing.
In withdrawing from Lenoir's at dawn of day
one company of the One Hundred and Eleventh
Ohio, of Chapin's brigade, on picket, were left
in position and captured bj- Jenkins's division.
The movement on Potter's left was discovered,
before Jenkins had an opportunity to mako a
demonstration on his flank, by a detachment of
the One Hundred and Twelfth mounted infan
try sent out to reconnoitre on tho Concord
road. General Burnside, being present upon
tho field, about 4 p. m., ordered the entiro lino
to be w ithdrawn to a more favorable position.
Hartranft had scarcely formed his lino and
thrown out his skirmishers on the left when ho
received a fire from his left flank and rear.
He at once changed front with his left, throw
ing some skirmishers into tho woods. At this
moment Jenkins was moving through the
woods, and was.reported to be getting a battery
into position on a high hill commanding Hart
ranft's position. Simultaneously Law's brigade
came in sight moving across tho cleared
ground on Hartranft's left.
BURNSIDE ItETIRES TO KNOXVILLE.
Potter says: "Eoemer, who was just getting
his battery into position, changed front to the
left and opened a hot fire upon them. They
immediately fell back precipitately and in con
fusion, and wcro followed by their skirmishers,
who ran out of tho woods to our left. Tho
enemy's infantry now seemed to have conio to
a halt and mado no further aggressive move
ment. Their batteries, however, kept up a hot
fire until sundown."
Just before sunset General Burnside oVdered
Potter to retire to Knoxville. Sending Ferrero
forward, followed by tho artillery and wagons
with Hartranft next, and sending Biddle and a
section of United States artillery, under Lieu
tenant Bartlett, to report to General White,
who had orders to cover the rear, tho field was
vacated about G o'clock, and at daybreak next
morning the entire command was safely within
the works at Knoxville.
Referring to tho cngagment at Campbell's
Station, General Burnsido says: "Great credit
is due the officers and men for the gallantry
and coolness shown on this occasion. Tho
entire command consisted of littlo over 5,000
vinen, while the enemy's force was at least
double that number. Our loss in killed,
wounded and missing was about COO, and that
of the enemy must have been very severe, as
ho was the attacking force."
The withdrawal of a force of 6,000 men from
the presence of ono of double its numbers, com
manded by an officer of such distinguished
ability as General Longstreet, may well rank
as one of the most skillful of General Biirnside's
BLUNDERS OF Till". CONFEDERATES. '
On the part of the confederates a series of
blunders, commencing with the detachment of
Wheeleron the 13th, continued by thescparation
of the divisions of McLaws and Jenkins after
having crossed tho Jlolston, culminated in a
repulse at Campbell's Station. A rapid move
ment upon Knoxville, covered by a cloud of
cavalry, would have cut off Potter and White
at Lenoir's, and left an easy passage for Long
street into the capital of East Tennessee.
Deceived by the report of Biirnside's strength,
given him by General Stevenson, Longstreet,
instead of acting as if ho had a force of 20,000,
as he claims to have done, moved with tho
caution of a commander of an inferior forco
invading territory defended by a force vastly
superior to his own.
The golden opportunity to crush one-half of
Biirnside's available troops was offered him
after Potter fell back to Lenoir's, but, instead of
moving rapidly to Campbell', Station, McLaws
occupied the whole of the 1th in marching
fifteen miles, while Jenkins moved thirteen
miles to his right, with no other effect than to
march to Campbell's Station in the wake of Pot
ter's retreating army.
Either wing of Longstrcet's army was equal
in numerical strength to his antagonist, both
failed in getting in his rear. When finally
concentrated, liesitation to attack enabled Pot
ter to gain possession of the Knoxville road,
which he availed himself of as soon as his trains
had passed Campbell's Station. The battle for
the possession of East Tennessee was fought at
Campbell's Station, and decided in favor of the
Union troops. No opportunity was again of
fered the confederate commander to fight on
O'ten ground, and the blundering tactics that
marked the opening of the campaign forms its
most conspicuous feature at its close.
The failure of General Longstreet to cut off
tho retreat of General Biirnside's advanced
troops from Lenoir to Knoxville changed tho
entire character of the expedition. Intended
as a diversion upon ono flank of tho Union
armies, it became an independent campaign.
From a sudden aud destructive blow upon tho
Army of the Ohio to be delivered by a dctach
ineut from tho main army, after delivering
which it was to return to its po-iition in the
line of investment before Chattanooga, the
expedition now assumed the character of a
campaign under an independent commander.
THE EXPEDITION A FAILURE.
In tho light of .subsequent events po move
ment could have been more ill-advised. From
his post of observation on Missionary Ridge,
General Bragg had seen the Union lines
gradually widening, until the con federate lines
of investment were such only in name. The
capture of Brown's Ferry by General Hazon
and the defeat of Jenkins by General
Geary at Wauhalchio had opened communi
cations with Bridgeport aud afforded a short
route to the base of supplies. Both Bragg and
Longstreet had scon from their perch on Lookout
Mountain tho long lines of rc-enforccmcnts, led
by General Hooker, march through Lookout
Valley and pitch their tents within supporting
diManco of tho Army of the Cumberland.
Both confederate generals had agreed upon
the necessity of rapidity of movement, and
General Longstreet, impressed with the perilous
posilon of tho main army, with the daily
augmenting forces of General Grant en
camped "almost in its midst," had urged
its withdrawal beyond Chickamauga Creek.
Bragg's reply that ho "would not be dis
turbed" had not quieted the apprehensions
of his subordinate, who hoped by rapidity in
executing tho object of tho expedition to
leturn to his position before the Union com
mander would be aware of the absence of so
largo a portion of the army in his front.
Twelve days had now elapsed since his de
parture from Missionary Ridgo and his expedi
tion had thus far been totally ban en of results.
To return to tho main army was tho course
dictated by every principle of interest in its
safety to General Longstreet, and to recall him
was equally imperative upon General Bragg.
A succoring army was already on its way fiom
the banks of tho Mississippi, and its arrival
was to bo tho signal for an assault upon his
lines. Longstreet would doubtless havo wil
lingly obeyed an order to turn the head of his
columns southward after his failure to engage
Burnside at Campbell's Station, but no such
order was sent him. The blind confidence of
General Bragg induced him not only to rely
upon tho Army of tho Tennessee to hold his
position, but to add to tho expeditionary forco
by detaching Buckner's division from the
main army. As late as tho 2ith of November,
when Sherman was attacking his right and
Hooker was moving from Lookout Mountain
across Chickamauga Valley upon his left, while
the Army of the Cumberland lay in his front,
ho wrote: "Though greatly outnumbered,
such was the strength of our position that no
doubt was entertained of our ability to hold it,
and every disposition was made for that pur
pose." What would have been the result if
Longstrcet's 23,009 troops had been in position
on the left of his lino is a question that will
be decided according to the bias of the reader.
LONC.STKEET'S ADVANCE ON KNOXVILLE.
Tho concentration of Biirnside's army in
Knoxville was evidently a surprise to Long
street, who had anticipated an attempt on tho
part of tho former to withdraw his army to
Cumberland Gap. While tho Union troops
were marching into tho positions to which
they had been assigned in defense of Knox
ville at daylight on tho 17th of November the
confederates were rousing from bivouack upon
the battle-field fifteen miles in their rear.
Mention has been made of a dotachment
from Wheeler's cavalry left on tbe ITinwasso
when he mado his movement against Wolford
at Maryville. This force, which Longstreet
calls a brigade, under command of Colonel
Hart, now came to tho front and took the ad
vance in tho leisurely pursuit of Biirnside's
retreating army to Knoxville.
Longstreet says : " Wo advanced at daylight,
hut only camo up with the enemy's rear-guard
of cavalry. There was more or less skirmish
ing with this forco until our line of skirmish
ers and advanced battery camo under the guns
of tho enemy's fort at the northwest anule of
his line at Knoxville. His line of skirmishers
was about 1,000 yards in front of his works.
General McLaw's skirmishers encaging those
of the enemy, Colonel Hart's brigade of cavalry
was ordered over to the Clinton road to drive
in the skirmishers of the enemy, and as soon as
Jenkins's division camo up it was ordered over
to that road. Hart's cavalry was sent on to
tho Tazewell road, so as to prevent, a fur us jws
siblc, the esaipe of the enemy. I rodo over to tho
Clinton road to make an examination of the
country and select some position for Jenkins's
division before night. The next day, on riding
to General McLaws front, I found that the ene
my's pickets occupied tho same ground that
they held the day before and that his line had
been strengthened during the night by making a
defence of rails. Colonel Alexander was ordered
to use his guns against this defense, and suc
ceeded once or twice in driving tho enemy off
from some points of it, but our skirmishers did
not move up to occupy it and tho enemy re
turned to it."
Meantime tho Union troops wero working
like beavers to construct earthworks that should
euablo them to resist the assault that all felt
would not be long deferred.
DESCRIPTION OP KNOXVILLE.
General Burnsido gives the following descrip
tion of tho topography of tho country" in the
vicinity of Knoxville: "The sito occupied by
the city of Knoxville, which we were to de
fend, was on a plateau of about one-half mile
in width, running parallel to and close to the
liolston River. This plateau was intersected
by three creeks, 'Firt,' 'Second,' anil 'Third,'
giving the position the appearance of separate
hills. First Cieek separates Knoxville from
East Knoxville or Temperance Hill, Second
Creek separated tho town from College Hill,
and Third Creek emptied into the river below
our lines. To the north and west of the town
the plateau descended gradually to a valley or
basin of about ono mile in width, beyond which
was a second plateau similar to tho one first
described and of about the same height."
On this ridge northwest of tho town, beyond
Fort Sanders, and separated from it and tho
town by tho valley above mentioned, the con
defcrate force was stationed with their batter
ies on prominent points. Tho valley was al
most entirely cleared of timber, and was at
every point under the firo of tho Union artil
lery. From the able and exhaustive report of
General O. M. Poe, then captain U. S. Engin
eers, under whose intelligent direction the de
fenses at Knoxville wero constructed, the fol
lowing description of the works is taken : "The
defenses thrown up at first were nothing but
mere rillo pits, having a profile four feet wide
by two aud ne-half feet in depth with a parapet
of two f - in height, making the height from
the bottom of the trench to tho interior crest
of the parapet 'four and ono-half feet. Two
forts wero in a defensible condition, vis:., that
occupied by Benjamin's buttery and the one on
Temperance Hill, tho work upon them having
been done by the engineer battalion. The
troops worked all day and night, and by day
light on tho morning of tho loth wero toler
ably well under cover, still the work was con
tinued, tho enemy being hold at bay on tho
Kingston road by tho cavalry, undor General
Sanders, and on the Clinton road by Colonel
Pennebaker's mounted regiments. The hours
in which to work, that tho gallant conduct of
our cavalry secured us, wero worth to us a
thousuud mon each. It ia cad that they wero
bought at such a price as the life of that most
gallant, chivalric soldier and noble gt ntleman,
Brigadier-General William Fitt Sanders. I
hope I may bo pardoned this allusion to tho
only classmate I had at the siege of Knoxville.
General Sanders falling in front of the work
occupied by Benjamin's battery, it seemed ap
propriate that tho fort should bo named for
The death of this heroic soldier, whose adven
turous military career was described in The
National Tribune of May Gth, cast a gloom
over tho entire army. General Burnside refers
feelingly to tho sad event: "The troops worked
all day and night of the 17th, and by noon of
tho ISth they were pretty well covered. Dur
ing all this timo tho gallant 'Sanders with
his dismounted cavalry held tho enemy in
check. Just as I sent out orders to him to
withdraw within the lines I received informa
tion that lie was mortally wounded. Ho was
brought into the city, where ho received all
possible attention, but he died the next day.
The service lost in the death of General Sanders
one of tho most noble spirits, and we, his com
rades, a beloved friend." His faithful aide-de-camp,
Major R. E. Lawdcr, thus describes tho
DEATH OP GENERAL SANDERS:
"We wore dismounted and formed in line of
battle, with instructions to hold our position
. r. i. i ii.. t. v i i j- ! ?n
in iiuiiL oi iiiu uumiisucd woiks ac jiuoxviuc
until withdrawn. About three p. m. there
was a furious assault made by Longstrcet's in
fantry upon our left flank, commanded by
that brave and intrepid soldier, Colonel C. D.
Pcnnebakcr, of the Twenty-seventh Kentucky
mounted infantry. General Sanders had up to
this timo occupied his proper position in rear
of his line, whore a slight depression in the
ground afforded cover from the enemy's sharp
shooters, some of whom were in the house now
occupied by Mr. Anderson, noc moro than 400
yards in front of our line. On hearing the
rapid firing going on in Colonel Pennebaker's
front, Gencial Sanders immediately walked up
to the top of the littlo rise in the ground whero
Pennobaker was posted, and saw tho assault
upon that fine brigade and tho gallant repulse.
Tho balls from the rifles of the sharpshooters
were whizzing through tho air close to our
hcadsvnnd I was well pleased when he turned
deliberately (after having satisfied himself that
his presence in the front was no longer re
quired)' to walk down to his headquarters.
Just as ho was turning I heard the thud that
tells ihvunmistaklo language that some one has
been Struck. Then I saw General Sanders
staggcfI caught him in my arms and eased
him tOjtho ground. He told me to leave him
thcrejthat ho was no further use, and go on ;
but that was an order I could not obey. Two
other Micer3, one Adjutant Smith, of a Michi
gan regiment, and another whose name-1 have
forgotspuftcame to my assistance, and together
wo caiEled him to aplace of temporary security,
and ISmnicdiatclv started in search of an am-
bula- ' gSDu tho way towards the city I met
r-wl tnll liim nf flif nnlini
.U1UII1UU . ....J ...I.. ... 5f Vr .j"-J"
jfiarmoi-a; U?r Conerat Sanders had
on moro tho confidential friend of
' Burnsido than tho ordinary stall'
The General was greatly shocked, and
orderly at once for an ambulance, when
ncd to the side of tho wounded and
man. in anotner Hour wo iiad him
coiu$gAably provided for at the Lamar House,
whiles tho surgeons, among whom was Dr.
HatcJiitt, an old personal friend of his from
Kentucky, wero doing all that surgical skill
oouldppuggcst to save the life so dear to us all.
It wa$.soon known that the wound was mortal.
TlioJ,! had entered his side, tearing through
tho spleen, I believe, and tho surgeons shook
their heads when wo asked if thero was any
" Pfl-is a young man then, and full of martial
ardof.r The most attractive object in all tho
worldfto mo was a bravo, handsome, well
dressm. officer, mounted on a good horse, going
into'lnttle. I have seen many such men since
then,almt novcr ono who equalled General
Sanders. Ho was in tho prime of life, tall, and
perfectly proportioned, exceedingly graceful,
and c(,irteous to all. He rode his superb steed
as if jo was part of himself, guiding and con
trolling him as if by his will. He was brave
as JuUus Ca'sar in battle, but modest in refer
ence to his own part in a fight, giving credit
to oywy one else, reserving none for himself.
He was my prince, and 1 would havo followed
whorefer ho chose to load. This was tho feel
ing tlfroughont his division, although ho had
only recently assumed command of it. All
kucnfhim as the attcntivo and experienced
chieibf cavalry, and every soldier knew that
his pmeticed eyo detected, and his care sup
"Tlie hour camo very soon when the eyes
wcro qlosed and the manly form was to bo laid
in tiiejcarth. Any ono who was present at that
solemn funeral never forgot it. It was mid
nighfcjivhen a small procession of oilicers bore
the btidy of their friend to its final resting
place.) A niufiled drum was our only music,
and a time was chosen when tho soldiers wero
at their quartets. Silently tho procession
wondo! its way through tho streets to an old
churchyard, where, in a corner, a gravo had
been dug. We lowered tho coffin, filled up the
grave, and, that a military salute should not
be wanting, we filed our pistols over his grave.
"Thus closed a military career that lacked
ouly timo and opportunity to develop into
grand and brilliant proportions, for it is my
ilelibwato judgment, in which I know General
ISurnsjdo coincided, that General William P.
Sanders would havo inscribed his name high
upon the roll of famous generals of tho war."
Dr. jJ. G. Hatchitt, medical director, in a
letter 'to tho writer, alludes to tho death of
Gcncril Sandors as follows:
"It, was tho saddest death I over witnessed
in tin) army. In his delirium before dying ho
continually thanked God that ho was not shot
in thl) back. Such was tho confidence tho
army had in him that General Uurnsido re
quested that his dcatli should not be mado
known, and tho surgeons wero accordingly
urged, to keep up tho impression that Sanders
was living somo timo after he w:is dead."
Tho sketch of the military career of General
Sandors, abovo referred to, closes as follows:
"One of tlie forts in rear of tho position ho
gave lis I'1'0 t ''M W:ls named in his honor,
licfore it raged one of tho fiercest confiicts
of tic war; but, as if the gallant Kon
tucki:ai whose name it bore had imparted a
portion" of his own daring spirit to its defend
ers, tl'o flag upon its crest was never lowered
to the enemy."
i To be continual.
1 , o
Mi ApitroeiiiUvo Citizen.
) From the Ntitcek (Muss.) Citizen.
Tiis National Tkihune comes to us this
weokwith a new heading. Wo never open this
excellent paper without wondering how our G.
A. 11. boys can get along without it. It gives a
great fund of information and story for a dollar
A DEED OF DARIE.
The True Story of the Capture of a
Rebel Railway Train.
How tlie "Wires Were Cut and
tlie Enemy Cneckrnatecl
THE POWDER-TRAIN RUSE.
A Long Run with. No Sign of
the Foe in the Rear.
Continued from lasl uxch.
After the firo had been made to burn briskly
Andrews jumped off the engine, ran back to
the box-car, about the door of which wo wcro
standing, and clasped our hands in an ecstasy
of congratulation. Ho declared that all our,
really hard work was done, and that our diffi
culties wero nearly passed; that wo had tho
enemy at such a disadvantage that ho could
not harm us ; and exhibited every sign of joy.
Said he, " Only ono train to meet, and then we
will put our engine to full speed, burn tho
bridges that I havo marked out, dash through
Chattanooga, and on to Mitch el at Huntsville.
We've got the upper hand of the Tcbels now,
and they can't help themselves!" How glad
we all Avere! When, three years later, the
capture of Richmond set all the bells of the
North ringing out peals of triumph, the sensa
tion of joy was more diffused, but less intense
than we then experienced. Almost everything
mankind values seemed within our grasp. Oh,
if wc had met but one unscheduled train !
This reference of Andrews toone train which
he expected to meet before we began to burn
bridges, has been quoted in many public
sketches, and has led to some misapprehension.
He did expect to meet three trains before reach
ing Chattanooga; but two of these wcro regular
trains, and, being also further up the road,
were not supposed to present any serious diffi
culty. Their position at any given timo could
be definitely ascertained, and wo could avoid
collision with them,' no matfthowar wo ran
', I ahead of ttnie "Hut eo InnWA-; .
.11 I " ''.-. -.-
safety wasinkeepingtheregulartimeof thecan-
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but if we exceeded it we lost the right of way,
and wero liable to a collision at any moment.
This risk was greatly increased by ourinability
to send ahead telegraphic notifications of our
position. The order of southward-bound trains,
according to the information we then had, was as
follows: First, a way freight, which was very
uncertain as to time, but which we expected to
meet early in tho morning, aud felt sure that it
would beat Kingston or south of that point.
This was the only real hindrance, according to
our programme, and it was to this train that
Andrews referred. Behind this were the reg
ular freight train, and still farther north tho
regular passenger train. As a matter of fact,
we did meet these trains at Adairsville and
Calhoun, the latter being somewhat behind
time; but we might have met them farther
north had it not been for unforseen hindrances.
DISCREPANCIES IN PREVIOUS TURLICATIONS.
Thero is considerable discrepancy in the many
published accounts of the following chase,
which the writer has not, in every case, been
ablo to perfectly reconcile. In tho intense ex
citement and novel situations involved, men
were not likely to observo or remember ovory
ovent accurately. But no pains have been
spared to combine fullness and completeness in
tho following account. L'sing the best of my
own recollections, consulting my comrades,
reading carefully all published accounts, and
especially going over the wholo route years
after, with Fuller and Murphy, two of tho pur
suing part', who kindly gave me all the infor
mation in their power, it is hoped that substan
tial accuracy has been obtained. Some of the
incidents of tho chase, such as tho number of
times tho track was torn up, and whether we
wero fired upon by pursuing soldiers, allow
somo room for a conflict of memory. But the
variations are not material.
Side by side with the road ran the telegraph
wires, which were able, by the Hashing of a
single lightning inessige ahead, to arrest our
progress and dissipate our fondest hopes. There
was no telegraph station where we had cap
tured tho train, but we knew not how soon our
enemies might reach one, or whether they
might not have a portable battery at command.
Therefore we ran but a short distance, after re
plenishing the furnace, before again stopping
to cut the wire.
THE TELECUA PII WIRES CUT.
John Scott, an activo young man of tho
Twenty-first Ohio, scrambled up tho polo with
tho agility of a cat, and tried to break tho wiro
by swinging upon it; but, failing in this, ho
knocked oil' tho insulating box at tho top of
the polo and swung with it down to the ground.
Fortunately, a small saw was found on the
engine, with which tho wiro was severed in
two places, and tho included portion, many
yards in length, was taken away with us, in
order that tho ends might not bo readily
Whilo ono or two of the party were thus en
gaged, others worked with equal diligence in
taking up a rail from tho track. No good
track-raising instruments had been found on
tho train, and wo had not yet procured them
from any other sourco. A smooth iron bar,
about four feet long, wns tho only instrument
yet found, and with this somo of the spikes
wero slowly and painfully battered out. After
a few had thus been extracted, a lever was got
under tho rail and tho remainder were pried
loose. This occupied much moro timo than
cutting tho wiro, and it required no prophet to
foretell that if ao did not procure better tools
rail lifting would have to bo used very spar
ingly in our programme In tho present in
stance, howovor, tho loss of time was no mis
fortune, as wo wero ahead of tho scheduled
time, which we still felt bound to observe.
After another rapid but brief run, wo paused
long enough to chop down a telegraph pole, cut
tho wiro again, and placo the polo, with many
other obstructions, on the track. We did not
hero try to lift a rail; indeed, wo had littlo
serious fear of any pursuit at this time, and
merely threw on thee obstructions because of
having spare time to employ.
A TOWDER TRAIN TOR EEIJELS.
We thus continued running a little ahead
of time, then stopping to obstruct tho track
and cut the wire; until Cass Station was
reached, where wo took on a good supply of
wood and water. At this place we also obtain
ed a complcto time schedule of the road. An
drews told tho tank-tender that we were run
ning a powder-train through to the army of
General Beanregard at Corinth, which was
almost out of ammunition, and that the great
est hasto was necessary. He further, claimed,
to be a confederate officer of high rank, and
said that ho had impressed this train for tho
purpose in hand, and that Fuller, with tho reg
ular passenger train, would bo along shortly.
Tho whole story was nono too plausible, a3
General Mitchcl was now interposed between
our present position and Beauregard, and wo
would never have been ablo to get a train to
the army of tho latter on this route; but tho
tender was not critical, and gave us his sched
ule, adding that ho would willingly send his
shirt to Beauregard if that general needed it.
When this man was afterwards asked if he did
not suspect the character of the enemy he thu3
aided, he answered that ho would as soon havo
suspected the president of the confederacy him
self as one who talked so coolly and confidently
as Andrews did !
Keeping exactly on regular time, wo "pro
ceeded without any striking adventures until
Kingston was reached. This place thirty-two
miles from Big Shanty we regarded as mark
ing the first stago of our journey. Two hours
had elapsed sinco tho capture of the train, and
hitherto we had been fairly prosperous. No
track-lifting instruments had yet been obtained,
notwithstanding inquiries for them at several
stations. Wo had secured no inflammable ma
terials for moro readily firing the bridges, and
the road was not yet clear before us. But, on
the other hand, no serious hindrance had yet
occurred, and wo believed ourselves far ahead of
any possiblo pursuit.
TIIE FIRST STAGE FINISHED.
But at Kingston we had somo grounds for
apprehending difficulty. This little town is at
the junction of the road to Rome, Ga. Cars
and engines were standing, on the side track.
Hero we fully expected to meet our first train,
and it would be necessary for us to get tho
switches properly adjusted before we could pass
it to go on our way. When we drew up at tho
station thero was handed to Andrews our first
and last communication from the management
of the road, in the shape of a telegram, order
ing Fuller's train now ours to wait at Kings
ton for the local freight, which was consider
ably behind time. The order was not very
welcome, but wo drew out on the side track, and
watched eagerly for tho train. Many porsons, .
fLpf" - WWspfl f" SSB
l.sonatctt tne cbnuucior oi our tram, an?
showered upon him many curious anu somc-
what SUSpiciOUS (UtCStionS. OurS WaS ail irrCg-
ular train, but the engine was recognized as
Fuller's. The best answers possible were given.
A red Hag had been placed on our engine, and
the announcement was made that Fuller, with
another engine, was but a short way behind.
The powder story was emphasized, and every
means employed to avoid suspicion. Andrews
only, and the usual complement of train-hands,
were visible, the remainder of the party being
tightly shut up in the car, which was desig
nated as containing Beauregard's ammunition.
The striking personal appearance of Andrews
greatly aided him in carrying through his de
ception, which was never more difficult than at
this station. His commanding presence, and
firm but graceful address, marked him as a
Southern gentleman a member of the class from
which a great proportion of the rebel officers
were drawn. His declarations and orders were,
therefore, received with the greater respect on
this account. But all these resources were hero
strained to the utmost.
At length tho anxiously-expected local freight
train arrived, and took its place on another
side track. Wre were about to start on our
way, with tho glad consciousness that our
greatest obstacle was safely passed, when a red
flag was noticed on the hindmost freight car.
This elicited immediate inquiry, and we wero
informed that another very long freight train
was just behind, and that we would be obliged
to awai f its arrival also. This was most unfor
tunate, as wo had been already detained at
Kingston much longer than was pleasant.
Thero wero many disagreeable elements in tho
situation. A crowd of persons was rapidly as
sembling. The train from Rome was also
nearly due, and though it only camo. to tho
station and returned on its own branch, yet it
was not agreeable to notico the constant in
crease of forco that our enemies were gaining.
If any word from tho southward arrived, or if
our true character was revealed m any other
way, the peril would be imminent. But we
trusted that this second delay would be brief.
Slowly tho minutes passed by. To us, who
were shut up in the box-car, it appeared as if
they Avould never be gone. Our soldier com
rades on the outside kept in tho background as
much as possible, remaining at their posts on
tho engine and tho cars, while Andrews occu
pied attention by complaining of the delay, and
declaring that the road ought to be kept clear
of freight trains when sn much needed for tho
transportation of army supplies, and when tho
fato of the whole army of the West might de
pend upon tho celerity with which it received
its ammunition. Thero was plausibility enough
hi his words to lull suspicion in all minds
except that of the old switch-tender of tho
place, who grumbled out his conviction " that
something was wrong with that stylish-looking
fellow, who ordered everybody around as if tho
wholo road belonged to him." But no one paid
attention to this man's complaints, and nofc
many minutes after a distant whistle sounded
from tho northward, and wo felt that the crisis
had passed. As there was no more room on tho
side track, Andrews ordered the switch-tender
to let this train run by on the main track.
That worthy was still grumbling, but he re
luctantly obeyed, and the long succession of
cars soon glided by us.
nOPE AGAIN DEFERRED.
This meant release from a suspense more in
tolerable than tho most perilous action. To
calmly wait where wc could do nothing, whilo
our destiny was being wrought out by forces
operating in the darkness, was a terrible trial
of nerve. But it was well borne. Brown,
Knight, and Wilson, who wcro exposed to
viow, exhibited no more impatience than was
to bo expected of men in their assumed situa
tion. Thoso of us in tho box-car talked in
whispers only, and examined tho priming of
our pistols. We understood that we were wait
ing for a delayed train, aud well know tho