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The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, November 02, 1882, Image 1

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ESTABLISHED 1S77 -NEW SERIES.
WxVsnmGTOx, d. a, Thursday, November 2, iss-;
YOL. n-NO. 12.-WHOLE MO. 64.
SIEGE
OF KNOXVILLE.
The History of Longstreet's Oampaign
Against Burnside.
DEFENSIVE WORKS.
Courageous Conduct of Two
AHcnigan Regiments.
LONGSTREET RE-ENFORCED.
Tlie Attack at Fort Sanders
Determined Upon.
Continued from Ictsl iced:.
On their arrival at Knoxvillo the troops of the
"Ninth Army Corps and Chapins's brigade of
the Twenty-third Corps marched at once to the
positions assigned them in the lines of defense.
General Poe, then chief engineer of the depart
ment, had taken occasion to familiarize himself
with the troops of the army and made the assign
ments -with reference to the fitness of tho sov
eral brigades to hold tho positions which they
were required to defend.
HjiiTTrzian JFMcam
Cnryerl. .
tnn::ir. "Vrtiurf SfCirtnthTJins
ConUZ. j, '
Map of Knoxville and Vicinity.
Roomer's battery of four three-inch rifle guns
were posted at the "University, supported by
Morrison's brigade. Benjamin's battery of four
twenty-pounder Parrot guns and Buckley's
battery of six twclvc-poundcr Napoleons at the
foot of the hill northwest of tho University,
Humphrey's ud Christ's brigades in support.
The ground occupied by these three brigades,
First division, Ninth Corps, extended from the
Holston River, near tho moutli of Second
Creek, around to the point where the railroad
crosses the creek. Gittings's battery of four
ten-pounder Parrots occupied a small earth
work near the depot. The Fifteenth Indiana
battery of three three-inch rifled guns occupied
the ridge between Gay street and First Creek ;
these two batteries were supported by Hart
ranft's division, tho ground covered extend
ing from Second Creek to First Creek, parallel
to the railroad. Captain Sims's Twenty-fourth
Indiana battery of six Jamas rifled guns and
Henshaw's Illinois battery of two James rilled
guns and four brass six-pounders were at the
fort on Temperance Hill, and the adjacent
ridge was supported by Chapins's brigade of
"White's division and Reilly's brigade of Has
call's division of the Twenty-third Corps, the
ground extending from First Creek eastward
to Bill's house. Shields's battery of six twelve
poundc r Napoleons and one section of Wilder's
battery of three-inch rifle guns on Mabry's
Hill, supported by Hoskius's and Casement's
brigades, the line extending from Bell's house
to the Holston River, at a point a little below
the glass-works. Two sections of Wilder's bat
tery of three-inch rifle guns and Kunkle's bat
Ury of four three-inch rille guns were stationed
on the heights south of the Holston, supported
by Cameron's brigade of Haseall's division.
One section of twelve-pounder Howitzers, man
ned by soldiers from the loyal East Tennessee
regiments, planted on Flint Hill, covered the
bridge -head.
THE KNTnEXCIIMEN'TS.
As fast as the troops arrived and marched to
their respective positions, they were at once
put to work entrenching themselves.
Knoxville stands on an elevated plateau, on
the nortli side of the Holston River, between
two streams called First and Second Creeks.
The line of defenses above mentioned com
menced at a point on tho river considerably
west of Second Creek and ran in an irregular
line northward at right augles with the river
to a hill northwest of the town, where the con
fedt rates had commenced the construction of a
fort called "Fort Loudon," but which General
Burnside christened "Fort Sanders," in honor
of General Sanders, who was killed while
holding the ground in its front. From this
point the works continued eastward past Tem
perance Hill to Mabry's Hill, near Bell's
house, where they turned southward to the
Holston. South of tho town, across the river,
there was no continuous line, the works occu
pied four prominent hills, about 350 feet high,
which commanded tho city as well as the coun
try south of it. These- heights were the same
which Wheeler had been sent to capture and
hold until Longstreet arrived, with what result
the reader is already familiar.
General Poe, before leaving Kentucky, had
organized an. engineer corps of 250 men, under
77
V. 1 "
3 f - Km S T 1 I
competent oflicers, and had, with great diffi
culty, brought over the mountains a quantity
of intrenching tools, which now proved to bo
of inestimable value. But for the prudence
and forethought of this gallant ofliccr it would
have been impossible to throw up works which,
on every side of tho town appeared equally
formidable, in tho brief time allowed for their
construction. Tho dam across First Creek
formed an obstacle in front of Temperance Hill
for one-third of a mile, which could only bo
crossed by building a bridge. That across Sec
ond Creek, although not so favorably located,
created a considerable obstacle. At daylight
on tho 19th tho position was much strength
ened, and a feeling of security pervaded tho
entiro army. Every man was impressed with
the necessity for exertion, conscious that upon
his cflbrts tho successful repulse of an assault
depended. Days passed by, and no attack was
made, but day and night the picks and shovels,
plied by willing hands, were at work upon the
defences.
CITIZEN'S HANDLE THE SPADES.
The citizens of tho town and all tho negroes
within reach were impressed into the service
to relievo tho exhausted soldiers, who had
not rested for more than a hundred hours.
General Poe says: "Many of tho citizens were
rebels, and worked with a very poor grace,
which blistered hands did not tend to improve."
Further on General Poe says: "I feel it my
duty to refer to tho great value of the services
of the ' contrabands.' Tractable- and willing,
many of them came to mo and volunteered
their services; they did an amount of work
that was truly astonishing. Day and night
they worked without a murmer. For tho first
week they labored regularly eighteen hours
per day, and, during the whole siege, out of
nearey two huncred that we had at work, only
one asked to bo excused, and ho only for one
afternoon. The question of supplies at onco
assumed great importance. Tho beef-cattlo,
and hogs belonging to the subsistence depart
ment, and many that belonged to citizens, wcro
driven into tho city, slaughtered, and salted
down. Orders reducing tho ration were at
once issued, and that portion of it suitable to
the sick at once turned over to the medical de
partment for use in hospitals. All useless
animals were killed and thrown into tho river
to save forage. Tho cflbrts of tho quartermas
ter and subsistence departments to collect
forage and provisions along tho French Broad
River and out tho Scviervillo Road, east of tho
town, wcro quite successful, owing to tho cour
ageous co-operation of loyal Tennessccans in
collecting and sending down tho French Broad
River largo quantities of grain and meat in
flats during the dense fogs of tho night. Gen
eral Burnside says : " Captain Doughty, a most
excellent oflicer, maintained a small force up
that river, during the whole siege, and directed
the cflbrts of tho people of that section in our
behalf." By care in the uso of provisions, and
tho failure of Longstreet to close this avenue
of approach to the city, tho Union troops and
inhabitants not only did not suffer from fam
ine, but oven accumulated a supply for future
uso sufficient to last ten days after the siege
was raised.
SO WEAK TOINT IK TIIE "VVOKKS.
Mcantimo General Longstreet had formed
his lines of investment and made preparations
for a siege. His lines were thin, however, and,
as has been mentioned, did not avail to prevent
the besieged from having almost unrestricted
access to the country on the northeast of the
town. He had no entrenching tools, but this
want was supplied by a capture of several wagon
loads of picks and spades at Lenoir's, which ho
sent his cavalry to bring up on their horses.
It had been the opinion of General Jenkins
that a vigorous assault upon Burnside's lines in
his front would result in breaking them, and to
this end he was ordered to advance his skir
mishers a little before dark on the 20th and
make arrangements for an attack at daybreak.
After a more careful examination, however, he
reported the plan impracticable, and it was
abandoned. Longstreet says: "Our line was
then about seven hundred yards from the
enemy's. After careful examination I became
convinced that the true key to the enemy's
position was by the heights on tho south side
of the Holston. I crossed a small force (Law's
and Robertson's brigades) in flat-boats, and ob
tained possession of one of the heights near
and opposite the lower end of the enemy's line."
This position gave him command of Fort Sand
ers, but the distance was too great for his artil
lery. GALLANT EXPLOIT OP TIIE 17X11 MICniCAN.
The pontoon bridge at Lenoir's reported
destroyed was in reality saved by the confed
erates, and with a view to operating on a more
extensive scale it was brought up, and the boats
used in crossing troops to the south side of tho
river, about 1,000 yards wast of Fort Sanders,
on the Kingston road. Within the newly estab
lished lines of General McLaws stood a large
brick house, which with its outhouses afforded
convenient shelter for his sharpshooters. The
Seventeenth Michigan was designated to cap
ture and burn the building. Five men volun
teered for burners, under command of Major F.
W. Swift, and were equipped with axes, port
fire, cotton, turpentine, and matches. William
H. Brcarley, a member of the regiment, thus
describes the execution of the order: "At nine
o'clock the evening of the 20th the regiment
was withdrawn from its position, and passing
to the rear ancl'l;l3iSjLthc fort and scaling the
breastworks to the rHJfcc of the Thirty-sixth
Massachusetts, were advanced to the skirmish
lines, and after slopping a few minutes to re
form, the men began a cautious advance. When
within a hundred yards of the enemy's skirmish
lino their men discovered our advance and
opened fire, our signal for a charge. Our Col.
(Comstock) gave orders in a loud voice, as
if commanding a brigade, and with cheers
which were full loud enough to convey
such an impression to the confederate skir
mishers, the line advanced on a run. Their
men fled with very little ceremony, and our
regiment advancing beyond the houses and
halting, tho burners took possession of the
buildings. The brick house had evidently
been used as headquarters of tho picket reserve.
One of the burners, while opening the door, met
a confederate soldier, who dodged out under his
arm. There were evidences of tho hasty re
treat of the other inmates in an overturned
chair and an officer's sword hanging on a nail
in the parlor. In two corners of the room
blankets were spread out which had evidently
been occupied but a moment before ; these, with
a baking-kettle full of warm biscuits, which
was standing on the fire-place hearth, showed
how perfect had been tho surprise and how
precipitate tho retreat. Jt was but the work
of a moment to fire the house, but at first it
seemed an almost hopeless t:isk to set fire to
tho barns. Chairs and tables wcro brought
from the house and broken up into kindling.
Still tho logs, being damp, did not readily take
fire. Tho house, however, was all ablaze, and,
thinking the work had been completed tho
regiment began retreating. Seeing that with
out support the barns could not be effectually
fired, word was sent to the regiment, which
was about-faced at once, but mistaking tho
order to advance to the former position for
one to begin firing, a heavy fire was opened,
which for a time placed the lines of tho burners
in tho greatest danger from our own bullets.
Tho mistako lasted but a few moments, how
ever, and soon the former position was regained.
The buildings having been effectually fired, a
retreat was ordered. The enemy had evidently
been totally deceived, and it was not till tho
light from the buildings revealed to them our
two hundred men, full half way back to the lines,
that they learned that the anticipated attack
was instead a successful sortie. A furious can
nonade was at onco opened from their batteries,
and the surpriso was transferred from them
to us, for it, will always remain a matter of
surprise to us that but two of our men wcro
killed."
XKWS TP.OM OnATTAXOOOA.
On the 22d General McLaws seemed to think
his line near enough for an assault, and ho
was ordered to make it at dark that night.
Jenkins was to co-operate, but tho plan fell
through on account of tho disinclination of
McLaws's oflicers to make a night attack over
unknown ground. Next day came a noto from
General Bragg informing Longstreet of the
assault and capture of Orchard Knob by Gran
ger's Corps, and on tho 25th a telegram from
General Bushrod R. Johnson at Loudon con
veying the intelligence- that "tho enemy's cav
alry was advancing upon Charleston. This
cavalry was Long's brigade of 1,500 cavalry,
sent out on tho morning of the assault upon
Missionary Ridge to cut off communication
between Bragg and Longstreet. Tho latter
seems to havo divined its object. Refer
ring to tho reception of Johnson's message,
Longstreet says: "As I had received noth
ing from tho commanding -general on tho
21th, I concluded that the enemy had moved out
on the 23d for the purposo of threatening him
whilst he pushed his cavalry out for tho pur
poso of making a raid on Charleston, and thus
cut off the rc-enforcemonts then on their way
to me."
KE-ENEOKCEMENTS ON TnEIE WAY.
Tho rc-enforccments referred to were tho
division of Bolivar Buckncr, which at that
timo had advanced as far as Loudon on its way
to Knoxville. Brigadier-General Bushrod R.
Johnson, commanding the division of General
Buckner, opens his report with tho statement
that "On the 22d of November this division
moved from Rossvillc, Tennessee, at the foot of
Missionary Ridge, under written orders and
additional verbal instructions from headquar
ters Army of tho Tennessee, for the purpose of
being attached to Lieutenant-General Long
street's command, at this timo operating before
Knoxville, where tho Federal forces under
Burnside, routed in tho open field, had found
shelter." He might have added: "And for all
the good it accomplished during tho siego it
might better havo remained at Rossville."
Johnson quotes the cflectivo strength of his
command, excluding officers, at 2,(525 two bri
gades of infantry and one battery, increasing
the strength of Longstreet's command to about
15,000 infantry and artillery and 5,000 cavalry.
Buckner's division was composed of four
brigades, commanded by Generals Johnson,
Gracic, Reynolds, and Vaughn, all of which
started to re-enforce Longstreet, but tho two
latter were recalled and placed in tho rillc
pits at tho foot of Missionary Ridge.
POMETIIIXO MUST HE DON):.
Alluding to tho contemplated night attack
upon the works in his front, General McLaws
says: "On tho 21st I received from General
Longstreet a communication, of which the fol
lowing is a copy :
" Headquarters, Nov. 21, 1SG3.
" General McLaws.
" General Bragg telegraphs me that the ene
my is threatening his left, and wants to know
if it is not possible to bring the enemy here to
battle. The only chanco that I see of doing
anything in time to do good is an assault upon
tho redoubt. This made in the moonlight by
three of your brigades, I think, would result in
a great success. Yet I am loth to put the troops
at it when there is a disinclination to it. Suppose
you organize an assault to-morrow, and have a
talk with tho oflicers and see if you cannot
impress tho importance of it upon them. The
loss, I feel assured, will not be great'eompared
with tho importauco of the move. I will be up
to see you in tho morning. Tho oflicers and
men must understand that once the' start they
must movo rapidly on till the work is over.
"J. Loxgstkekt, Lieut.-Gen'l."
The reasons urged by McLaws's oflicers for
their disinclination to assault Fort Sanders
were that the ground had not been rceon
noitered, and the depth of the ditch in its front
was unknown. The work had been commenced
by General Buckner while in command at
Knoxville. Several officer.) who had seen the
work in progress at that timo reported tho fort
to be built upon the apex of a hill, and that the
eartli to build the parapet had been obtained in
smoothing off the surface of the hill. Conse
quently no ditch existed in front of the works.
There were contradictory reports in circulation
about tho ditch. Close watch was kept upon it.
On one occasion a soldier was seen to pass out
of tho fort and advance some distance, during
all of which timo his head was distinctly
visible; at another time a dog ran out, and
had no difficulty in passing tho ditch, if,
indeed, theio was any ditch there. TJiero
were said to bo holes, but they were separated
by high ground. General McLaws proposed
that in the assault each soldier was to carry a
bundle of straw and throw in the ditch, if any
ditch was found, to fill it up. A suggestion
was made to use scaling ladders, but none were
prepared.
IIKAVE WORK OP TIIE 2d MICHIGAN".
The picket-line of Woflbrd's brigade, on
the left of McLaws's division, having been
advanced to connect with the right, and un
supported by a corresponding movement on the
right of Jenkins's division, afforded an oppor
tunity to the Union forces to drive it hack.
The Second Michigan was assigned the task of
driving them from their rifle-pit, which was
about eighty feet long, and filling it up. The
reason for sending a small regiment of only
197 men on a duty of so much peril is not
given. General Ferrero says: "Tho enemy
having dug rifle-pits within 500 yards of Fort
Sanders, I received instructions to make a
sortie with a regiment and drive the enemy's
sharpshooters from tho position. -I ordered
General Humphreys, commanding Third bri
gade, to detail a regiment for the duty. Ho
accordingly sent the Second Michigan. They
gallantly charged tho rifle-pits and drovo tho
enemy out, but were compelled to fall back,
after having held their newly-gained ground
for one hour, which resulted in tho severe loss
of four killed, sixty wounded, and twenty-four
missing."
Major Byington, commanding the regiment,
was reported mortally wounded and left on the
field.
With the intention of cutting off the troops
on tho south side of tho river, tho confederates
constructed a raft at Boyd's Ferry, which was
to lc set adrift in the river, with tho expecta
tion that it would carry away tho pontoon
bridgo and thus sever their communication
with the city. General Poe, however, was on
the alert, and in one night spanned the river
above the bridge with an iron cable a thousand
feet in leugth, which was afterwards supple
mented by one of logs fastened together with
chains. "While these operations were going on
outside tho works, there had been no cessation
of labor upon the entrenchments. A second
line of works within tho exterior works was
laid out and tho work prosecuted with tho ut
most rapidity.
The hill on the south side of tho river, occu
pied by two brigades of Jenkins's division and
a battery of artillery, was distant from Fort
Sanders but 2,S00 yards, and enfiladed the line.'
It became necessary to defilade it by construct
ing traverses to protect the gunners. This was
done, but subsequent events proved it to be, like
the second lino of works, an unnecessary pre
caution, as Longstreet declined to waste his
ammunition in firing at that distance. On the
25th he made an attempt to obtain possession of
the hill on which Cameron's brigade was en
trenched, but was repulsed with considerable
los?.
THE CONTEMPLATED ASSAULT.
Mabry's Hill, at the northeastern anglo of
the Union line, was, after careful examination,
selected by Longstreet for attack, and McLaws
sent a brigado to co-operate. Longstreet says.
"On tho 25th General Lcdbetter joined mo.
We made a hasty rcconnoissancc of the client's
entire position on the 2(Ith. From the heights
on tho south side he pronounced the enemy's
fort in front of General McLaws assailable.
After riding around the enemy's lines, however,
he expressed his xreferenco for an attack against
Mabry's Hill. On tho 27th a more careful ex
amination of Mabry's Hill was made by Gen
eral Lcdbetter, General Jenkins, Colonel Alex
ander, and myself. The opinion of all on this
day was that the ground over which tho troops
would have to pass was too much exposed, and
the distance to be overcome under fire was too
great. General Lcdbetter was urgent that some
thing should bo done quickly, but admitted that
tho way to tho enemy's position was by the
heights on tho south side of the river. Tho
attack on Mabry's Hill was, therefore, aban
doned, and McLaws's brigado returned to its
position in the line." Conflicting reports of a
great battlo having been fought in front of
Chattanooga continued to reach tho ears of
General Longstreet, and determined him to
mako a supremo effort to obtain possesion
of Knoxville. The arrival of Johnson's di
vision of infantry and Giltnor's brigado of
cavalry increased tho force at his disposal
to fifty per cent, more than that of his antago
nist. Bushrod Johnson's division consisting
of his own brigade, commanded by Colonel Ful
ton, and General Grade's brigade took position
on tho 23th in rear of McLaws's left, on the
Kingston road, with orders to take part in the
attack in conjunction with Jenkins's three bri
gades, following tho assault of McLaws upon
Fort Sanders; for, after due examination, Gcn
oral Longstreet had determined to make tho
a;sault upon the Union lines at tho very point
which would havo been selected for him by his
antagonist if he could have had a voico in tho
selection. Ten days had elapsed since the arri
val of the confederate army in front of Knox
ville. Ten days of unremitting toil to the
Union troops and of deep and anxious solicitude
on tho part of their commander. Under tho
intelligent supervision of his chief engineer a
line of works had been constructed which from
every point of view appeared equally defensi
ble. Advantage had been taken of natural ob
stacles to render them insurmountable. Tho
two cree-ks had been dammed and the works on
the north of the town protected from assault
by a deep and unfordablo canal. Telegraph
wires were stretched from stump to stump in
front of the most important positions. In front
of Colonel Hoskius's position, between Bell's
house and the Holston, a chevaux dc frisc of
pikes fastened together with telegraph wires
was constructed. Night and day tho work
went on.
To be. continued.
Monopolists vs. Tuintl-omiprs.
From the Philtuhlphia liccord.
Great ancestral estates in England, liko that
of the Marquis of Westminster, whose yearly
revenue is itself immense wealth, are the result
of centuries of increase in land valuations.
The uncounted millions of tho Vanderbilts
havo all been accumulated within thirty years.
Financial kings of Europe, liko tho Roth
childs, have laboriously acquired through four
generations the property they hold. Jay
Gould's hundred millions have nearly all been
acquired within eighteen years. The tenden
cies which make possible this difference between
Old and New World capitalists exist in undis
turbed operation to-day, and have apparently
grown powerful enough to cut deep dividing
lines in the social plane of tho American peo
.plo. Ce'iisus-takliijj in India.
In thoTRinuxi: of recent date a statement was
quoted from tho London Times in regard to the
failure of Christian missions in India. Tho
,S7. James Gazette tells of a ludicrous attempt
on the part of a census-taker to cover up this
failure, and to mako tho Christians out to be
more than tiiey really are. It appears that in
tho census returns from ono plantation near
Sylhet it was stated that there were 112 Chris
tians on this particular tea-garden alone. The
chief commissioner, being of an inquiring
mind, proceeded to personally ascertain who
these Christians were. The reply justified his
suspicions, for they wero admitted to be "all
the coolies who were not Hindoos," their Chris
tianity consisting in their willingness to." cat
anything." It may be feared that this is a
typical c:ise, and that investigations elsewhere
would be followed by similar results.
An Afco of SiiMiirion.
Truly, this is an ago of suspicion. Neverthe
less, Capt. F. M. Howes, of the steamer William
Crane, Merchants' & Miners' Transportation
Lino between Boston and Baltimore, who suf
fered severely from rheumatism, caused by tho
exposure incident to his profession, was cured
Ijy St. Jacobs Oil. This is no suspicion. JJoston
Globe.
Tho diflerenco between a dandy and a fat
hog ono is dressed to kill and tho other killed
ito dress. Lowell Courier.
A DEED OF DARING.
The Truo Story of the Capture of a
Rebel Railway Train.
A HOT STERN-CHASE.
Tlie Conductor Follows on a
Hand-Car.
SIXTY MILES AN HOUR.
Ready, at Last, to Begin the
Bridge Burning.
Continued from last week.
Before describing the terrible struggle abovo
Kingston, it will be well to narrate the opera
tions of the persons whose train had been so un-
ccrimoniously snatched from them at Big
Shanty. From printed accounts published con
temporaneously by several of those engaged in
the pursuit, as well as from personal responses
to inquiries made regarding the most material
points, the writer is confident that he can tell
the strange story without essential error. It is
a striking commentary on the promptness of the
seizure, that the bystanders generally reported
that only eight men, instead of twenty, had been
observed to mount the train.
"William A. Fuller, conductor, Anthony Mur
phy, manager of the State railroad shops at
Atlanta, and Jefferson Cain, engineer, stepped
oil their locomotive, leaving it unguarded save
by the surrounding sentinels, and in perfect
confidence took their seats at the breakfast table
at Big Shanty. Rut before they had tasted a
morsel of food tho quick car of Murphy, who
was seated with his back towards the window,
caught the sound of escaping steam, and he ox
claimed, "Fuller, who's moving your train?"
Almost simultaneously the latter, who was some
what of a ladies' man, and was bestowing polite
attentions upon two or three fair passengers,
saw the same movement, and sprang up, shout
ing, " Somebody's running off with our train ! "
No breakfast was eaten then. Everybody
rushed through the door to tho platform. The
train was then fully under way, just sweeping
out of sight around tho first curve. With quick
decision Fuller shouted to Murphy and Cain,
" Come on ! " and started at a full run after the
flying train ! "5f
A FRUITLESS FOOT CIIASK.
For a mile or two the three footmen ran at
the top of their speed, straining their eyes for
ward for any trace of the lost engine which they
expected to sec halted and abandoned at almost
any point on tho road. But they wcro soon
partially undeceived as to the character of their
enemies. About two miles from the place of
starting they found the telegraph wire severed
and a portion of it carried away. The fugitives
were also reported as quietly oiling and inspect
ing their engine. No mero deserters would be
likely to think of this. The two actions com
bined clearly indicated tho intention of mak
ing a long run, but who the men were still re
mained a mystery. A few hundred yards from
this place a party of workmen with a hand-car
was found, and these most weleomo re-enforcc-ments
wero at once pressed into the service.
Extensive iron furnaces were located on tho
Etowah River, about five miles abovo tho sta
tion. These works wero connected with the
railroad by a private track, which was the
property of Major Cooper, as well as the works
themselves. Murphy knew that Major Cooper
had also bought an engine called the " Yonah."
It had been built in the shop over which Mur
phy presided, and was one of the best locomo
tives in the Stato. r
The pursuers seized their inestimable prize,
called for all tho volunteers who could snatch
guns at a moment's notice, and were soon swiftly
but cautiously rushing with the power of steam
towards Kingston. '" "
Fuller reached Kingston at least an hour
earlier than would have been possible with the
hand-car, and a single glance showed that the
adventurers were gone, and his hopes of arrest
ing them at that point wero ended. They were,
however, barely out of sight, and all their start
had been reduced to minutis. But here again
tho pursuit was cheeked. The foresight of An
drews had blockaded the road as much as pos
sible with the trains which had so long hindered
his own movements. Two large and heavy
trains stood on the main load; ono of the two
side tracks was occupied by the third freight,
and the other by the engine of the Rome branch.
There was no ready means for the passage of
the "Yonah." Some precious time was em
ployed in giving and receiving information, in
telling of the seizure at Big Shanty, and hear
ing of the deportment of Andrews and his men
at Kingston. Then a dispute aroso as to the
best means of continuing tho pursuit, which
threatened to disunite Fuller and Murphy.
Tho latter wished to continue the chase with
tho "Yonah," which was a fino engine, with
largo wheels; but Fuller would not wait to get
the freights out of the way, and, jumping on
the Rome engine, he called on all who were
willing to assist him to come on. A large, enthu
siastic, and well-armed company instantly vol
unteered ; tho new engine, tho " Shorter,"' pulled
out, and Murphy had only time to save himself
from the disgrace of being left behind by jump
ing on the hindmost car as it swept past. With
all the time lost in making this transfer, and in
mutual explanations, tho pursuers left Kingston
just twenty minutes behind the Federals.
What Fuller and his friends learned at King
ston left no doubt on their minds that some
deliberate and far-reaching military movement
was on foot. Whilo its precise nature was yet
concealed, tho probability that the road itself,
and possibly confederate towns and stores, were
to bo destroyed, was freely conceded. All
agreed that tho ono thing to bo done was to fol
low their enemies closely, and thus compel
them to turn and fight or abandon their enter
prise. A large force ono or two hundred well
armed men was taken on board, and instruc
tions left that as soon as the track could bo
cleared another armed train was to follow for
tho purposo of rendering any needed assist
ance. When Kingston was left behind, it was be
lieved by our leader that, notwithstanding all
our vexatious delays, we still h.irt a margin of at
least an hour's time. Our movements wero
arranged on that supposition. The next con
siderable station, Adairsville, was about ten
miles distant, and the intervening country
comparatively level. There wero no considera
ble bridges in this space, and the most we could
do was to run swiftly, and occasionally to ob
struct the track. Our speed was increased to
about forty miles an hour, and this swift run
ning, after a long halt at Kingston, was exquis
itely delightful. Looking out from the crevices
of the box-car, we saw the hills and trees glid
ing swiftly by, and felt that each moment wo
wero getting farther away from the foes who
had so long surrounded us, and nearer safety
and triumph. Whilo wo were actually under
way, our prospects did not yet seem very unfa
vorable. There were yet one freight and ono
passenger train to meet, which wo would now
encounter an hour farther south, because of our
long hindrance ; but we felt confident of our
power to deceive or overpower them, and they
did not cmbarass our running because they
were on the regular schedule. The freight was
now almost due at Adairsville, and we expected
the passenger train to overtake and go ahead of
it from that point. If they were both on timo
we would also meet them there, and then havo
an absolutely open road to Chattanooga. Ifc
will show the tremendous risks that encom
passed our enterprise, when we. reflect that so
trifling a'circumstance as the delay or misplace
ment of a tram could introduce an "if" into
our most hopeful plans. - ?
We reached Adairsville before tho expected
freight, but had only just taken our place on.
the side track when its whistle was heard.
When it came up, Andrews, who still person
ated a confederate oflicer, and exacted and re
ceived the obedience which in those days of
conscription and impressment was readily
yielded to military authority, ordered the train
to be run past the station and back again on
the sido track behind his own, to wait for tho
expected passenger train. The usual explana
tions about the powder train were repeated to
credulous ears. Then came fivo minutes of
suspenso and waiting. The train was behind
time, a trifling matter in itself, but, in our
situation, each minuto might turn the scalo
between death and life. We could not afford,
to repeat the experience of Kingston. Not one
bridge had yet been burned, and all we could
show for our hazard, besides our captured train,
were a few cross-tics and lifted rails. After a
whispered word of consultation with his engi
neer, who was willing to assume the most
deadly risks rather than to lie still, Andrews
remarked to the bystanders that a government
powder express must not be detained by any
number of passenger trains, and then gave tho
word, "Go ahead!"
A FLYING TRAIX.
We started quite moderately, but, as soon as
the station was out of sight, wo noticed a won
derful acceleration of speed. The cars seemed
almost to leap from the track, and wo whirled
from side to side at a bewildering rate. Thero
was scarcely any slackening for curves or
grades, and our whistle rang out with scarcely
a moment's cessation. In tho box-car we could
retain no position for moro than an instant,
and were jostled over each other and against
the sides of tho car much oftener than was
pleasant. No one of us had ever ridden at such,
a rate before. Though we had no means of
measuring the speed, none of us estimated it afc
less than a mile a minute. What was tho
meaning of such a break-neck pace ? Had An
drews discovered that wo wero pursued, and
was ho making a desperato effort to escape from,
the enemy? Or was he simply hurrying to tho
bridges we were to burn ? Such questions wero
easier asked than answered, for two cars and
tho tender intervened between ns and the loco
motive, on which our leader was. At any rate
the moments wero rapidly carrying us towards
our own lines, and a very few hours of such run
ning would see us delivered from the series of
perils which had so long environed us. We had
learned that just beyond Calhoun, a station
only ten miles from Adairsville, there was a
largo bridge, which we know was marked for
destruction. If that was passed without stop
ping, wo would be convinced that an enemy
was on our track, and that the race was simply
for life. A fow minutes would decide. But in
the mean time, as an enemy might be following
us, it occurred to tho writer that it would bo
well to continue obstructing the track. This
was accomplished by breaking open the hind
end of the last box-car, and shoving out, ono
by one, the tics previously loaded. A part only
of the tics on board were thus employed, as wo
thought it possible that the remainder might
bo more useful in other directions. Many of
those sprinkled on the track showed a pervcrso
disposition to jump oil', but we felt sure that
enough remained to make a pursuer cautious.
Nothing more impressed us with the fearful
speed of our train than the manner in which
these ties seemed instantly to vanish when thev
touched tho ground.
By thus exerting the full speed of the cngiuo
Andrews hoped to reach Calhoun before tho
belated passenger train should arrive. Tho
engineer stood with his hand on tlie lever
ready to reverse his engine the moment an op
posing train was sighted. Tho open character
of tho country in this part of tho route per
mitted a good outlook. The whistle was also
kept sounding that an opposite train might bo
warned and cheeked. It was the intention of
Andrews, in case of meeting the expected train,
to reverse his own engine only long enough to
escape the danger or collision, and then to per
suade or compel the other to back before him
to the first siding. This lightuing-liko run
was bold and full of peril, but it was wise.
Had the same risk been promptly assumed at
Kingston, the whole future of the enterprise
would havo been different. But wo reached
Calhoun beforo any train was met. When wo
slackened speed, just beforo arriving at tho sta
tion, we shoved out one moro cross-tie, and
then carefully concealed the hole in the car by
piling other ties across it. As we drow nearer,
great was the satisfaction of Andrews and his
engineer when they saw the belated train our
last obstacle lying quietly at tho station. It
hail been just starting, but, on hearing our
whistle, it awaited our arrival. We ran down
almost against it, aud, without getting oft his
locomotive, Andrews shouted his orders to havo
the road cleared for an impressed powder train.
The news from the north aud west tho panic
causod by tho rumored approach of General
Mitchol made this sudden demand seem les3
unreasonable, and if was unhesitatingly obeyed.
The passenger train w:is switched out of tho
way, and wo glided smoothly by the last train
wo wero to meet. Thus, at length, wo had
reached tho ground whero bridge burning was
to begin, and all obstacles wero out of tho way;
what could hinder full and decisive success?
ITq be continued.
J
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