Newspaper Page Text
' vk l r4 PS & fca a RI X U VA
Zq nut frv liim ivlxa few Iiovno the Imttte, mut for W widow ana orphans"
ESTABLISHED 1877.-NEW SERIES.
WASHINGTON, D. 0., THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1882.
VOL. H-NO. 13 .-"WHOLE NO. 65.
SIEGE OF KUPXYI
The History of Longstreet's Campaign
THE EVE OF BATTLE.
"Wheeler's Cavalry Repulsed
ATTACK ON THE PICKETS.
Fort Sanders and Its Brave
Continued from last treefc.
On tholSth General Wheeler joined themain
body with his cavalry, and in obedience to orders
took position on the Tazewell road, from which
place lie was sent with three brigades two days
later to Kingston with orders to capture or dis
perse the garrison at that place. Wheeler's
report of his repulse at Kingston is as follows:
'Notwithstanding the rapidity of our move
ment, on arriving at the foot of a hill near
the town, we found it covered with long lines
of infantry and dismounted cavalry. I imme
diately dismounted the entire command, except
one regiment to guard my flanks, and pressed
upon the enemy, who had by this time opened
a warm fire of infantry and artillery, two of
their guns throwing twenty-four-pound shot.
Tnc enemy's line axtended along tho crest of
the ridge, the concavity being towards us.
Their flanks were thrown forward so as nearly
to envelope our lines, which enabled him to
fire upon our flanks and drive the rear of our
right. I hoped, from their oxtended position,
that I might charge their centre, but after a
careful personal reconnoissaucel found that that
were very strong at every point. To approach
the enemy it was necessary to advance up a
gentle slope through open fields, which tho
enemy swept by both direct and cross-fire.
Finding that I could gain nothing by continu
ing in my present position I determined to
withdraw Generals Martin and Armstrong
recommending it. At this moment the enemy
charged our right, but were most gallantly re
pulsed with considerable loss by a counter
charge from our troops. Wo then withdrew
quietly without being followed by the enemy."
. CoriitZ. ,r
Map of KNoyviux and Vicinity.
Tho f irec before which General Wheeler re
tire1 w.iii his three brigades was Col. Samuel
.. Mott brigade of White's division, Twcnty
t .iri ri'ty Corps, 1,700 strong, and was eom
j 1 of furregimenlsof infantry, tho Twenty
i Ah 'L'-iiigan, One llnndred and Eighteenth
r 10. bit eiith Indiamj, and Sixteenth Kcn
t'.y iiifawtry, and Klgin, Illinois, battery
cf nit ins,and a squad of twenty-six mounted
i ;:n. floncl Molt gives the following brief
tlc-JTij inn of tho aflair: "The attack was
j.ia 5 .it daybreak on the 21th of November,
a. 1 rurabriik engagement of seven hours'
dnr.l-'ii the enemy was handsomely whipped
i.:rl driven bade, with a loss of 230 killed,
wound' d, and prisoners. Among the killed
va: Colmel Itusscll, of the Third Alabama.
Two other colonels were among the wounded.
Too much cannot be said in prawo of
the cool and determined bravery of the ollicers
and mi n under my command. Each one did
is w hole duty. As an instance 1 may mention
t.i ace of Captain Murphy, of the Sixteenth
Kci tiu-ky, who with a single company charged
an !j!.1 regiment and dcmaudcdits surrender.
Tlurt wire many instances in which both oili
er, and men performed prodigies of valor."
(jtncral Martin attributed tho failure to
carry out Longstreet's order to capture or dis
perse Mott's command to "the strong position,
WMj-ht of metal of the artillery, and stcadi-nt-.
of the enemy's forces."
dr utr.il Whwlcr now surrendered the com
ia:uid of the cavalry corps to General Martin,
jud re turned to Bragg's headquarters at Mis
fcicury Kidgc. Martin returned with tho cav
alry t j Kubxvillc and took position on the left
of the line of investment north of the town.
Mu.nJiile Longstreet's engineer, Colonel
AU r.wli r, of the artillery, was vigorously at
work on the ridge north of Fort Sundeis con
necting his batteries with lines of rifle-pits, and
preparing to open the ball by a vigorous bom
bardment of tho fort.
On tho 25th Longetreot issued the following
) Ax . f - NJ
- v - - . - '- I I
order to McLaws: " General, I wish you would
double your pickets and reserves and advance
and occupy the lino now occupied by the
enemy's pickets and, at the same timo, make
your arrangements to assault as soon as the
weather lights up enough for our artillery to
play upon the enemy's position. Tho assault
will be made after ten minutes' brisk play by
our batteries. General Jenkins is ordered to
advance his picket-lino in the samo way and
advance to the assault following your move
ment. General Johnson's two brigades will
support you and General Jenkins."
The following correspondence passed between
General McLaws and General Longstreet on the
night of tho 23th:
"IIeadq'rs Division, Nov. 23, 1863.
"Liout.-Gen. J. Longstiu:i:t:
" It seems to be a conceded fact that thero has
been a serious engagement between General
Bragg's forces and those- of the enemy, with
what result is not known, so far as I have
heard. General Bragg may have maintained
his position, may havo repulsed the enemy, or
may have been driven back.
" If the enemy has been beaten at Chattanooga,
do we not gain by delay at this point ?
"If we have been defeated at Chattanooga, do
wo not risk our entire force by an assault
" If wo have been defeated at Chattanooga our
communications must bo made with Virginia.
"Wo cannot combiuo again with General
Bragg, even if we should be successful iu our
assault on Knoxville. If we should be de
feated or unsuccessful, and at tho samo timo
General Bragg should have been forced to re
tire, would we be in condition to forco our way
to the army in Virginia?
"I present these considerations, and, with tho
forco they have on my mind, I beg leave to say
that I think wo had better delay the assault
until we hear tho result of the battle at Chat
tanooga. Tho enemy may havo cut our com
munications to prevent this army re-enforcing
General Bragg, as well as to prevent General
Bragg from re-enforcing us, and tho attack at
Chattanooga favors the first proposition.
" Very respectfully,
" L. McLaws, Major-General."
To which General Longstreet replied as fol
lows: "IlEADQUAirrrjits, Nov. 23, 1S63.
"Gexebal: Yourletter is received. I am not
at all confident that General Bragg has had a
serious battle at Chattanooga.but there is a report
that he has and has fallen back to Tunnel Hill.
Under this report, I am entirely convinced that
our only safety is in making the assault irpon
the enemy's position to-morrow at daylight;
and it is tho more important that I should havo
the entire support and co-operation of the olli
cers in this command, and I do hope and trust
that I may have your entire support, and all of
the forco you maybe possessed of, in tho execu
tion of my views. It is a great mistake to sup
pose that there is any safety for us in going to
Virginia if General Bragg has been defeated,
for wo leave him to tho mercy of his victors,
and with his army destroyed our own had bet
ter be also for we will be not only destroyed
but disgraced. There is neither safety nor
honor in any other course than the ono I havo
chosen and ordered.
" Very respectfully,
" Licut.-Gen., Commanding.
"To Maj.-Gen. L. McLaws.
"P. S. The assault must be made at the timo
appointed, and must bo mado with a determina
tion that will ensure success. J. L."
The postcript was suggested by General Lcd
bctter, Bragg's chief engineer.
General McLaws gives the following descrip
tion of the operations preceding tho assault
upon the fort, which took place at six o'clock
on the following morning, Sunday, November
29. After referring to the delay in attacking tho
Union picket-lines, he says: " After this 1 pro
posed to General Longstreet that if he woild
delay the assault until daylight the next morn
ing, the 20th, I would drive in tho enemy's
pickets and occupy a line with my sharp
shooters which would command the enemy's
works, going beyond the line occupied by tho
enemy's sharpshooters, if such was found to bo
necessary in order to obtain eligible positions.
He assented, and the assault was put off until
daylight of the 29th. I then addressed tho
following circular to my brigade commanders;
" ' STIUCTI.Y CONFIDENTIAL.
"'General: Tho operations discussed to
day will take place to-morrow morning. I
wish you to make the necessary preparations
and advance your skirmishers to-night, so as to
occupy tho line of rifle-pits now held by tho
enemy and make them tenable for your men,
so that your sharpshooters can open fire on tho
main rifle-pits of tho enemy, and, firing into
tho embrasures of the main work, prevent
them from using their cannon with effect
when the main assault is made; and if an
opportunity is offered, which nmy happen, wo
may dash at the main works. Further instruc
tions will be sent if any arc thought necessary.
If any brigade commander is not fully in
formed, he is requested to muko proper in
quiries at once.'
"Copies of this circular were delivored to
each brigade commander."
The brigado commanders assembled at divi
sion headquarters, and it was agreed that the
attack upon tho Union picket-line should take
place at moonrise, which occurred at about ten
p. m. Tho signal agreod upon for the assault
was the opening of fire from Leyden's battery,
which had hren sunk in pits on the advanced
lino of Kershaw's brigade, near tho Armstrong
house, to be followed at daylight by a continu
ous fire by tho sharpshooters from their ad
" 1 ordered the assault in two columns," says
McLaws, "because thero was considerable felled
timber and much broken ground between the
positions of Humphteys's brigade and that of
Woflbrd's, and, besides, I thought that tho
spirit of rivalry between the two brigades
leading tho assault one being from Georgia,
and the other from Mississippi united to their
previous well-tried gallantry, would urge them
to their work with accelerating dasli and
vigor. I had been previously informed by
Colonel Alexander, of General Longstreet's
stall', that thero was no ditch at the northwest
angle of the work that offered any obstacle to
the assault, and by General Longstreet himself
that there would be no difficulty in taking tho
work so far as tho ditch was concerned ; that
he had seen a man walk down the parapet
across the ditch and dp on the outside without
jumping, and without apparent difficulty; and
as there could be no difficulty in running up
tho exterior slope of an earthwork, I was confi
dent that there would bo none in getting into
the work, and that tho obstructions offered by
the work itself would not be tho obstacles to be
He probably anticipated meeting nn obstacle
in tho form of a lino of men, which would not
be easily removed or surmounted.
A TEKUA INCOGNITA.
It will be observed that the existenco of a
ditch in front of the northwest angle, where
the assault was made, was entirely unknown to
tho confederate officers. No scaling ladders
were prepared, partly because it was supposed
that nono were needed, and partly because
thero were no tools with with to construct
them. Longstreet says : "Something was said
about fascines small branches of trees in bun
dles, and I said they might be useful to protect
tho men from bullets in their approach, but I
did not consider them essential in crossing tho
General McLaws's headquarters was a placo
of general rendezvous for general and staff
officers, and all these points were fully dis
cussed. Tho immediate vicinity of tho fort,
however, had been jealously guarded from
closo observation, and was a terra incognita to
citizens as well as confederates. Tho deop and
impassible ditch in front of Fort Sanders was
as much a surpriso to Longstreet's assaulting
column as was tho "sunken road" to Napo
leon's Imperial Guard as it made its last despe
rate charge at Waterloo.
McLaws claims that tho necessity for any ap
pliance with which to reach the summit of the
parapet was scouted by Colonel Alexander; that
ho did think of them himself, but as there were
"no tools or material with which to make any
thing" ho did not mention them, as " to do so,
and not to havo them, would create hesitation
and detract from the dash and determined pur
pose so necessary to succeed, although I did not
consider them essential."
AN ATTACK ON THE 1'ICKET-LTNE.
On account of the dense fog which hung over
tho river banks, obscuring tho movements of
both armies, the advanco upon the Union
picket-lines was delayed until about 11p.m.,
when they were carried by a dashing charge,
many of the pickets being captured in their
rifle-pits. This brought the confederate picket
line under tho guns of Fort Sanders, and suffi
ciently indicated tho movement about to tuko
place. Skirmishing continued during the
night, and a slow cannonading was kept up
from Alexander's batteries, directed priucipally
upon Fort Sanders, which was believed by the
Union officers to bo the real point of attack.
If tho confederate commander had designed
to give his antagonist timely notice of his in
tended assault, he could not have done so moro
effectually than by prefacing it by the midnight
assault upon the picket-lino. General Burn
side at once sent Keilly's brigade, which had
been really in reserve during the sioge, to re
enforce Fcrrero's line at the fort. The weather
had been most unfavorable for movements of
troops during the week that had passed. Bain
fell on tho night of the 27th, and the mercury
fell below the freezing point. Ice formed on
the water in tho ditch, and the almost perpen
dicular walls of the ditch and parapet were as
smooth and slippery as a wall of marble.
In advancing to the assault upon the Union
pickets, Humphreys's skirmish line becamo en
tangled in an abattis, which fact McLaws at
once reported to the commanding general, who
replied curtly, through his adjutant-general,
that "thafeant of an attack is not tho time to
make discouraging reports."
TORT SANDERS TO Hi: ASSAULTED.
About four o'clock a m. General McLaws, ac
companied by his staff, rode out to give personal
supervision to tho execution of his orders for
tho assault upon tho fort. Ho says: "It was
evident to mo that the enemy were aware that
one was intended, and I think it probable they
knew where it was to be made, for while I was
talking to Colon ol Bull' (commanding Woflbrd's
brigade) on tho railroad, the enemy threw a
shell which hursted over the woods, just in rear
of us, through which his brigade was passing,
assembling by regiments for the assault."
General Longstreet, after referring to tho at
tack upon the picket lines and capture of sixty
or seventy prisoners without loss to the confed
erates, enabling their sharpshooters "to engage
the onemy upon equal footing," says: "Tho
assault was ordered to bo mado by three of Gen
oral .McLaws's brigades, his fourth boing held
in readiness for other operations."
General Jenkins was ordered to advance a
brigado a littlo later than the assaulting col
umns and to pais the enemy's lines north of the
fort, and to continuo the attack along the ene
my's rear and flank. Two brigades of General
Johnson's division, having arrived the day bo
fore, were ordered to move in rear of General
McLaws, and at a convenient distance, to be
thrown in as circumstances might require.
M'LAWS PLEADS FOE DELAY.
Tho ground to tho right of Fort Sanders-descended
iriegularly to tho valley of Second
Creek. A parapet of three or four foot in
height ran from Fort Sanders to Temperanco
Hill, tho most easterly portion of which near
est Temperanco Hill was further protected by
the high water of the creek.
An open space of sufficient width for an as
sault existed between Fort Sanders and tho
dam, over which troops could move at least as
rapidly as over the ground in front of Fort San
ders. This was tho point designated in instruc
tions to General Jenkins for him to make his
assault, timing his movements by those of Gen
eral McLaws. Two of Jenkins's brigades, how
ever, were still south of the llotaton, where, in
a fruitless assault upon Cameron's brigado on
the 2.1th, thoy had lost ovor one hundred men.
There seems to bo no reason why these brigades
were not withdrawn and placed in position to
take part in the assault, as there seems to be
no good reason why Jenkins's assault was sub
ordinated to that of M;Laws. Tho entire
strength of Jenkins's and Johnson's divisions,
upwards of 7,000 effectives, thrown upon tho
lino northeast of the fort, would havo drawn
tho fire of tho batteries on that line, which not
being occupied in front, enfiladed McLaws's at
tacking column on its left.
It is equally difficult to understand why
Kershaw's attack upon tho lino south of Fort
Sanders should have been delayed until the
attack upon tho fort should prove successful.
The capturo of Eoemer's position on College
Hill on that line would have proven a series
loss to Burnside, and prevented an enfilading
fire from that battery. It was fully as feasible an
undertaking as to attempt to carry Fort Sanders
Accompanied by Lieutenant -Colonel Bab
cock, A. I. G., Ninth Army Corps, Geneial l'oo
rode over to the heights south of the river on
the 27th, and, under an apprehension that an
attempt would bo made to carry the position,
both ollicers decided that a battery for two guns
and a line of rifle-pits on tho first hill west of
tho Marysvillo Eailroad should bo constructed
THE roi:T AND ITS DEFENSES.
General Foe gives the following description
of Fort Sanders: ."It is a bastioncd earth
work built upon an irregular quadrilateral, the
sides of which are respectively 125 yards south
ern front, ninety-five yards Avestern front, 325
yards northern front, and eighty-five yards
eastern front. The eastern front was entirely
open and is to bo closed with a stockade. The
southern front was about half done, the western
front finished with the exception of cutting tho
embrasures, and tho northern front nearly
finished. Each bastion was intended to havo
npan coupe. In front of tho fort was a ditch
twelve feet wide, and in many places as much
as eight feet in depth. The irregularity of the
site was such that the bastion angles wero very
heavy, the relief of the lightest one being twelve
feet. The one attacked was thirteen feet, which,
together with the depth of the ditch, say seven
feet, made a height of twenty feot from tho bot
torn of the ditch to the interior crest."
As will be observed by roferenco to the map,
Fort Sanders was the salient of the lino of works,
and the bastion where the assault was made
was the salient of tho fort; to all appearances
tho correct point of attack. Tho position of
the salient at the angle of the fort has been
critioiscd as being unprotected by artillery, and
there is no doubt that had General Toe con
structed the fort with a view to withstanding a
siege by a forco of infantry and artillery of tho
strength now brought against Kuoxvillo the
form of the fort would have been materially
changed. It was originally intended as a work
to defend tho city against cavalry raids, and
when the necessity of completing it under tho
pressure of Longstreet's advanco was forced
upon him there was no timo to chango tho
original design. Tho salient was not unpro
tected by artillery, however, as the assailants
found to their cost.
THE HEROIC GARRISON.
Tho garrison of Fort Sanders consisted of
Lieutenant Benjamin's battery E, Second Uni
ted States Artillery, with four twenty-pounder
rarrottguns,and Capt. Buckley 's battery D.First
Rhode Island Artillery, four twelve-pounder
Napoleons, and two three-inch steel guns, part of
the Seventy-ninth New York and part of tho
Second Michigan infantry, making an aggregate
of about 220 men, all under command of First
Lieutenant Samuel N. Benjamin, Second Uni
ted States Artillery, chief of artillery Ninth
Army Corps. Such were the men who wero
called upon to repulso ono of tho most des
perate charges recorded in history.
Lieutenant Samuel N. Benjamin, now col
onel and assistant adjutant-general, United
States Arm-, to whose hands the defense of
Fort Sanders was intrusted, was a young artil
lery officer, twenty-four years of age. He had
graduated from West Point two years before,
eleventh in a class of seventy-eight cadets, and
was at once assigned to tho Second artillery
with "-ho rank of second licuteniint, from which
ho was promoted to first lieutenant on the 15th
ofMas', 1861. From the opening guns of Bull
Run through tho Peninsular campaign, siege
of Yorktown, Malvern nill, Manassas, .Chan
tilly, South Mountain, Antiotam, Fredericks
burg, and in innumerable engagements of lessor
note in which the Army of the Potomac was
engaged, to the siege of Vicksburg, the young
artillerist had served an apprenticeship in the
art of gunnery which eminently fitted him to
take command of the most important work in
the line of defense at Knoxville.
Captain William W. Buckley, commanding
battery D, First Rhode Island artillery, had
served with his battery in nearly tho same
campaigns. The battery was organized in the
summer of 1SG1, and had seen service in nearly
all the battles in which the Arm' of tho Poto
mac was engaged up to the departuro"of the
Ninth Army Corps for the West.
The Second Michigan and Seventy-Ninth
New York regiments had been seasoned in
many a hard fight. They had borne their ban
ners bravely through tho storm of battle in
Virginia and Mississippi, and now, reduced to a
mcro Jiandful of bravo men, wero gathered
within the fort to contest its occupancy in a
hand to hand conflict with a determined foe.
General Poe, in assigning tho Second Michi
gan to tho position, knew well tho temper of
the men to whose valor the important trust was
committed. He had been colonel of tho regi
ment, and had led it on that bloody day at Fair
Oaks, where Lossing says : " Kearney deployed
Berry's brigade to the loft of tho Williamsburg
road and Birney's to tho right, and at the same
time two companies of Poc's Second Michigan
wero pressed forward to cover the movement
and drive back confederate skirmishers, who
wero almost silencing the National batteries.
Tho battle, which "was lagging when Kearney
arrived, was renewed with spirit, and tho Na
tionals began to slowly push back. the foe."
General Kearney, referring to this engage
ment, said: "General Berry's regiments fought
most desperately. It was one of them (Colonel
Foe's Second Michigan) which maintained the
key-point of our position."
Major Byingtou having boon badly wounded
and taken prisoner, tho command of tho regi
mentdovolvcd upon Capt. J. V. Ruehlc. A por
tion of the picket-lines in front of Fort San
ders had been made up of details from this
regiment under Captain C. H. Hodskin. On
falling back they took possession of the ditch
in front of tho fort and prevented a further
advance on tho part of the confederates until
morning, when they retired behind tho works.
The Seventy-ninth New York, " tho High
landers,'' as they were familiarly known, had
served from Bull Run through the campaigns
of tho Army of the Potomac, and had won an
enviable distinction as a fighting regiment.
One after another of its field-officers had died
of wounds or been discharged for disability,
until fho command devolved upon Captain
William S. Montgomery ,;a brave and efficient
officer. Tho brigade of which these regiments
formed a part, under command of Colonel Wil
liam Humphrey, Second Michigan, had partici
pated in tho Vicksburg campaign, and lost
heavily under General Sherman at Jackson,
Mississippi, when they received especial men
tion in official reports.
The rear of the forfc being open, tho ground
was occupied by the remainder of Humphreys's
brigade, re-enforced by Reilly's. With ten bri
gades of infantry at his disposal Longstreet
hinged tho entire success of the movement
upon tho action of two brigades. If Wo fiord
and Humphreys succeeded tho others were to
push forward. If they failed, tho others were
To he continued
A Hi'li Opinion.
Capt. John J. Dawson, lato of tho British
Army, residing on Love street, between Man
devilie and Spain, this city, says ho used St.
Jacobs Oil with the greatest possible advantage
when afflicted with rheumatism. New Orleans
A DEED OF DARING.
The True Story of the Capture of a
Rebel Railway Train.
Tracks Laid Faster tlian Tliey
are Torn Up.
CONDUCTOR FULLER'S DISPATCH.
Setting Fire to the Bridge as a
Continued from la.it iceek.
At Calhoun Fuller scarcely made a full stop.
He told his talc in a few words and called for
volunteers. A number came just as he was
moving on again ; indeed, after the train was
well under way, ho secured a still more valua
ble prize. The telegraph managers at Chatta
nooga had found that tho wires were broken,
and wore endeavoring to discover the source of
mischief. By telegraphing to different stations
and asking for replies, they could easily make
an approximate estimate. But the difficulty
was coming "nearer: they discovered that one
station after another was being cut off from
communication with headquarters. South of
Calhoun they could get no reply at the time
the passenger train reached Dalton. They had,
therefore, directed the only operator at that
station a mere boy to leave his post and go
to Calhoun for the purpose of discovering and
remedying the mischief. Fuller recognized
him on the platform, and reached out his hand,
shouting, "Come!" The boy took hold and
was lifted on the flying engine. s"
Wo had no time for idle conjectures. The
fact was patent that a train was bearing down
upon us at full speed. " Shall we stand and
fight? Shall we attack them now?" wero
questions eagerly asked.
But Andrews still hesitated to depart from
the courso pursued so far. We had the rail
broken which would arrest tho enemy, and
probably give us time to fire the bridge ahead.
Then all might yet be well that is if the sta
tions ahead were not warned, and the t;rack
obstructed before us. Should that prove tho
case, then to stand and sell our live as dearly
as possible, or, abandoning our engine, to fly on
foot across the country, were all the alterna
tives. The crisis of our fate drew near, and our
haulcst and sharpest work lay just ahead. a ?
The Oostenaula bridge was in sight, and we
slackened speed for a desperate attempt to burn
it. But before we could come to a full stop tho
pursuer was close upon us, and very reluctantly
we steamed over the bridge and continued our
Above Tilton we succeeded in getting a full
supply of water from the tank. This was most
welcome, as tho water was nearly exhausted.
The wood-station was at another place, and as
our supply ran low we threw on fence-rails or
any other available fuel whenever .stopping to
cut the wires. "
Mile after mile tho terrible chase continued.
Station after station was passed without the
least lessening of speed. The idlers about tho
platforms started back in amazement and af
fright when they saw a train dash by liko a
thunderbolt, closely followed by three others,
tho latter screaming as loudly as their whistles
were able. "
But swift running alone could not save us.
In a mere trial of speed between the two engines
wo wero sure in the end to be worsted. To
wreck the pursuing train was our great object,
and to that end w? employed every expedient
we could devise. By this timo we had a few
more track - raising instruments, which An
drews and Wil?on had. simultaneously taken
from some switch-tenders. Farlier in the race
they would have been worth their weight in
gold, but it was now too late. Even with their
help we could take up a rail no quicker than the
confederates, with ample supplies of rails, in
struments, and trained workmen, could lay
another down. All the efforts we made in this
direction were a mere waste of time.
But the swiftness of pursuit was carrying
both parties over long spaces. The next sta
tion of importance that lay before us was Dal
ton, and this place, twenty-two miles from
Calhoun, was soon reached. This was the
largest town wo had approached sinco starting
in the morning. It was the junction of an
other road which led to Cleveland, on the main
lino to Richmond. It had a further and terri
ble interest to us, in tiie knowledge that thero
wo would learn whether our character had
really been telegraphed ahead of us by the way
of the coast lines and Richmond. But if it had,
avc would learn it too late to make the knowl
edge of any service. We would find a military
forco ready to receive us at the depot, and our
race would bo run. Yet wo approached cau
tiously, ready, if there were any suspicious
indications, to reverse the engine at once and
run back towards the pursuing train, with tho
intention of getting out of tho town and trying
to escape through tho fields. But wo saw no
more than tho usual number of persons about
tho depot, and Andrews at onco leaped from
tho engine, examined tho switch, which was
adjusted to throw a train on the Cleveland fork
of the road, had it changed, and answered all
questions as coolly and composedly as ever.
The whole had to be dono very promptly, as
tho appearanco of our poor battered train was
sadly against us, and we knew that in a town
the size of Dalton it would bo easy to find force
enough for our arrest. Besides, it was sure
that in a few seconds Fuller and his tireless
band would appear on the scene. In no period
of this eventful day does tho courage and self
control of Andrews shino out moro brightly
than in the manner in which he hero caused
the persons about the depot in a moment to i
obey his orders ami believe his story, even
wh'ilo thinking it possible that they might
have previous information of his designs, and
be only waiting tho arrival of assistance to
destroy him. The pursuing train waa heard as
expected. Before our foes came near enough
to reveal our character everything was ar
ranged, and taking tho left-hand road, that
which led directly to Chattanooga, we again
This was, however, a decisive point in tho
race. When wo thus passed Dalton without
having destroyed our pursuers, we knew that
all hopo of passing through Chattanooga with
our engine must be abandoned. All uneasiness
on account of a possible telegram from Rich
mond was at an end, but there was a nearer
danger, which defined the limits beyond which
we could no longer hope to pass. There was a
line of telegraph along each of the diverging
railroads. We could destroy but ono of these,
and it was certain that as soon as Fuller and
his friends arrived at Dalton and told their
story, warning would be sent ahead of us by
the other road. This will explain what somo
accounts have left doubtful our neglect to cut
the wire immediately after leaving Dalton. It
made no practical difference to us whether tho
fatal message was sent directly t? Chattanooga
and all intermediate stations, or whether it
went by the way of Cleveland and Chattanooga
and then back to the stations on our line. The
distance was twice as great in thus telegraph
ing around two sides of a triangle, but this
counted for nothing when lightning was tho
messenger. Our only resource was in tho
fact that we were now counting nearly as many
miles as minutes, and that we might be far on
our way towards Chattanooga, and possibly
have some bridges burned, before preparation
could be made for stopping us. As a last re
source, we now fully expected to havo to take
to the woods on foot.
Fuller well knew the decisive advantage ho
would have at Dalton. As he neared that sta
tion he wrote the following dispatch and gave it
to the young operator ho ha.l taken up at Cal
houn, with instructions to put it through to
Chattanooga, both ways, with the least possi
ble delay. It proves if it were not afterwards
written from memory and unconsciously modi
fied how correctly he had already estimated
the character of the men he was chasing.
This sagacity is scarcely less wonderful than
the daring with which ho encountered and
overcome so many obstacles :
." To General Leadrettei:,
" Commander at Chattanooga :
"My train was captured this a. ml at Big
Shanty, evidently by Federal soldiers in dis
guise. They are making rapidly for Chatta
nooga, possibly with the idea of burning the
railroad bridges in their rear. If I do uol cap
ture them in the meantime, sei that they do
not pass Chattanooga.
"William A. Fuller."
a - -2- & a
The telegram was sent ahead by this line as
well as tho other a minute or two before tho
wire was severed. It created a terrible ex
citement in Chattanooga, but did us no roaf
damage. Both the pursuing trains were near
us when we entered tho great tunnel north of
Dalton. Our supply of cross-ties was unfortu
nately exhausted, or they might have proved
very serviceable in tho darkness. Iu fearful
proximity and with unabated speed the tunnel
was passed. Murphy declares that he was
quite relieved when he saw by the gleam of
light ahead that our engine was passing on, for
he had quito made up his mind that we would
attack them or drivo our engine back upon
them in the darkness. But no such plan had
entered our thoughts. We would far have pre
ferred a fight in open day. .
TIIE FORLORN- HOPE.
We now resolved to play what had been re
served as our Iat card. Running more slowly
to economize fuel, though a high velocity was
still maintained, we tried to light a fire in our
only remaining car. It was already open at
both ends, and now as much of the sides and
top as could possibly be obtained was also torn
off and prepared for fuel. The attempt to light
these splinters by matches did not succeed,
for the wind caused by tho rapid motion
blew them out. Fire was then brought Imck
from tho engine, but this seemed to smoulder
rather than burn, for the rain, which fell in
torrents, blew through tho unprotected car, and
all the boards wero soaking wet. Xcvcr did
kindling a fire stem so difficult. When at
length it fairly caught, and began to burn
briskly, our dampened hopes began to brighten
in sympathy with it. Might it not be that our
persistent struggle against ill-fortune was to
win the victory even yet? Just then a Jong
covered bridge was approached, which it was
desirable on every account to burn. All of our
party, whom the heat had not already driven
forward, wore ordered into tho nearly empty
tender, and the car was uucoupled in tho
middle of the bridge. We did not leave it
hastily, but stopped near the farther end of tho
bridge to watch the result in breathless anxiety.
We had scarcely halted when the black smoke of
the nearest pursuer was seen, and he bore down
upon us at full speed. We were very loth to
leave our position. We could see that the flame
was rising higher, but could also see that tho
enemy's train had a largo number of men on
board, somo of whom had firearms. Oh, what
would we not havo given for a few of the mus
kets we had left in camp, to havo held our
position for even a few minutes, or even ono
minute! But our situation was too unfavora
ble to allow more than a momentary thought
of resistance. At long range we wero virtually
unarmed. But wo lingered still, until we saw
the enemy pushing our blazing car before them
over tho bridge; then, being in reach of their
firearms, and but poorly protected in our
engine and tender, wo again sought safety iu
flight. They pushed the blazing car beforo
them to the first side track, which happened
not to bo far away, andthen left it to burn at
its leisure. Thus our forlorn hope expired.
Future of Xlacam Falls.
Professor Tyndall makes somo curious pre
dictions as to the proximate future of Niagara.
At the rate of excavation assigned to it by Sir
Charles Lyoll, namely, a foot a year, Professor
Tyndall says that 5,000 years or so will carry
tho Horseshoe Falls higher than Goat Island,
and, as tho gorge recedes, it will drain, as it
has hitherto done, the banks right and left of
it, thus leaving a nearly level terrace between
Goat Island and the edge of the gorge; higher
up it will totally drain the American branch of
the river; the channel will become cultivatablo
land; the American falls will then bo trans
formed into a dry precipice, forming a contin
uation of the cliffy boundary of the river
Niagara, and, lastly, at tho place at present
occupied by the fall there will be a whirlpool.
The Khedive's myrmidons talk about getting
rid of Arabi by giving him a cup of bad coffee.
This is an occidental as well as an oriental
mode of torture to which all New York board-ing-housa
keepers are much addicted. Fuci,