War Department
RECEIVED.
LIBRARY
656

The National Tribune.

"To care for him who has borne the battle, and for his widow and orphans."

ESTABLISHED 1877.—NEW SERIES. WASHINGTON, D. C., THURSDAY, JANUARY 4, 1883. VOL. II—NO. 21.—WHOLE NO. 73.

GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN

The First Day's Fight at Willoughby's Run.

THE FIRST CORPS STEADY

The Eleventh Corps Driven Through Gettysburg.

ON CEMETERY RIDGE

Formation of the Lines of Battle on Both Sides

CHAPTER VI.

"Meantime, Robinson's division remained for awhile in reserve on the Seminary Ridge; but almost simultaneously with the arrival of these re-enforcements the advance division of Ewell's Corps, under General Rodes, came in from the direction of Carlisle, and, swinging round under cover and unperceived, seized a position menacing the right of the Union line. This brought a heavy pressure to bear on that flank, held by Cutler's command, and to relieve it Robinson's division was moved forward from the Seminary. First, Baxter's brigade of this division took position on the right of Cutler, resting its right on the Mummasburg road, [misnamed Mumfreesburg on our map,] and then, as the needs became more urgent Baxter's command relieved Cutler, and the brigade of General Paul was brought up on Baxter's right. These troops offered a vigorous resistance to Rodes' attack, and early in the action, by a skillful movement, captured three North Carolina regiments, under General Iverson.



Map of the Vicinity of Gettysburg.

RE-ENFORCEMENTS TO BOTH SIDES.

"With this series of successes the combat opened; but it was destined soon to be beclouded by an untoward sequel. Thus far the action had been sustained on the Union side by the First Corps alone, and on the Confederate side by the advance divisions of the corps of Hill and Ewell. But new actors now appeared on the stage. Hill was re-enforced by another division, under General Pender, and towards one o'clock the Eleventh Corps came up—General Howard having arrived some time before, and, by virtue of his rank, assumed command of the field. General Howard left a division [Steinwehr's] in reserve on Cemetery [Hill] and placed the divisions of Schurz and [Bar]low to the right of the First Corps, on a prolongation of its general line, and covering the approaches to Gettysburg from the north and northwest. Almost simultaneously with the forming of the Eleventh Corps, a fresh division of Ewell's corps, under General Early, arrived from the direction of York and took position on Barlow's front."

These re-enforcements enabled the Confederates to bring vastly superior forces against the entire Union line, outflanking its right and pressing it so severely that at about 4 p. m. the Eleventh Corps fell back in much disorder into Gettysburg, uncovering the right flank and rear of the First Corps. The latter, after a most stubborn resistance, also retired in some confusion, but without panic, to Cemetery Hill. This retrograde movement was closely followed by the enemy, who succeeded in capturing a large number of prisoners, mostly of the Eleventh Corps. About this time, General Hancock, who had been sent forward by General [Me]ade on learning of the death of General [Re]ynolds, arrived upon the field and took command, and, in conjunction with General How[ard], proceeded to post the troops on Cemetery [H]ill, and to repel an attempt made by the enemy to turn the right flank by ascending Culp's Hill.

FROM GENERAL EARLY'S REPORT.

General Jubal Early, fresh from his raid through York, Hanover Junction, and Wrightsville, Pa., leaving a track of fire in his wake, and with his baggage trains laden with the spoils of conquest, reached Heidlersburg on the evening of the 30th of June. He thus describes the action of his division, the effective strength of which he claims to have been 6,471 on July 1st:

"Having ascertained that the road from my camp to Hunterstown was a very rough and circuitous one, I determined next morning (July 1st) to march to Heidlersburg, and thence on the Gettysburg road to the Mummasburg road. After passing Heidlersburg a short distance I received a note from yourself, [Major A. S. Pendleton, A. A. G., to whom this report is addressed,] written by order of General Ewell, informing me that General A. P. Hill was moving towards Gettysburg against the enemy, and that Rodes' division had turned off at Middletown and was moving towards the same place, and directing me to move directly for Gettysburg. I therefore continued on the road I was then on, and on arriving in sight of the town I discovered that Rodes' division was engaged with the enemy to my right on both sides of the Mummasburg road. A considerable body of the enemy occupied a position in front of the town, and the troops constituting his right were engaged in an effort to force back the left of Rodes' line. I immediately ordered my troops into line, and formed them across the Heidlersburg road, with Gordon's brigade on the right, Hays' in the centre, Hoke's (under Avery) on the left, Smith's in the rear of Hoke's, and Jones' artillery in the field immediately in front of Hoke's brigade on the left of the Heidlersburg road, in order to fire on the enemy's right flank. As soon as these dispositions could be made, a fire was opened by my artillery on the enemy's infantry and artillery with very considerable effect; and Gordon's brigade was advanced to the aid and relief of Doles' brigade, which was Rodes' left, and was being pressed back by a considerable force of the enemy that had advanced from the direction of the town to a wooded hill on the west side of Rock Creek (the stream which is on the northeast and east of the town). When Gordon had become fairly engaged with this force, Hays' and Hoke's brigades were ordered forward in line, and the artillery, supported by Smith's brigade, was directed to follow.

CAPTURE OF GENERAL BARLOW.

After a short but hot contest Gordon succeeded in routing the force opposed to him, consisting of a division of the Eleventh Corps commanded by Brigadier-General Barlow, and drove it back with great slaughter, capturing among a number of prisoners General Barlow himself, who was severely wounded. Gordon had charged across the creek, over the hill on which Barlow was posted, and through the fields towards the town, until he came to a low ridge, behind which the enemy had another line of battle, extending beyond his (Gordon's) left. The brigade was halted here to reform and replenish its ammunition, and I then ordered Hays and Avery, who had been halted on the east side of Rock Creek while I had ridden to where Gordon had been engaged, to advance towards the town, on Gordon's left, which they did in fine style, encountering and driving into the town in great confusion the second line of the enemy on this part of the field. Hays' brigade entered the town, fighting its way, while Avery moved to the left of it across the railroad, and took his position in the fields on the left and facing Cemetery Hill, which here presented a very rugged ascent. This movement was made under the fire of the enemy's artillery from Cemetery Hill, which had previously opened when my artillery first opened on the enemy's flank, but Avery succeeded in placing his men under the cover of a low ridge which runs through the fields from the town. Hays' brigade was formed in line on a street running through the middle of the town. A very large number of prisoners were captured in the town and before reaching it, their number being so great as really to embarrass us. Two pieces of artillery (Napoleons) were also captured outside of the town, the capture being claimed by each brigade; but it is unnecessary to decide which reached the pieces first, as their capture was due to the joint valor of the two brigades (Hays' and Hoke's).

A FALSE REPORT.

"While these operations were going on with Hays' and Hoke's brigades, I saw farther to our right the enemy's force on that part of the line falling back and moving in comparatively good order on the right of the town towards the range of hills in the rear, and I sent for a battery of artillery to be brought up to open on this force and on the town, from which a fire had opened on my advancing brigades; but before the battery got up my men had entered the town, and the retiring force on the right had got beyond reach. I had at the same time sent an order to General Smith to advance with his three regiments, but he thought it advisable not to comply with this order on account of a report that the enemy was advancing on the York road, near which he was. As soon as my brigades entered the town, I rode into that place myself, and, after ascertaining the condition of things, I rode to find Generals Ewell and Rodes, or General Hill, for the purpose of urging an immediate advance upon the enemy before he could recover from his evident dismay, in order to get possession of the range of hills to which he had fallen back with the remnant of his forces; but before I found either of these officers, General Smith's aide came to me with a message from the General, stating that a heavy force of the enemy, consisting of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, was advancing on the York road, and that we were about to be flanked; and though I had no faith in this report, I thought it best to send General Gordon, with his brigade, to take charge of Smith's also, and to keep a lookout on the York road and stop any further alarm. Meeting with an officer of Major-General Pender's staff, I sent word by him to General Hill (whose command was on the Cashtown road and had not advanced up to Gettysburg) that if he would send up a division we could take the hill to which the enemy had retreated;—(I subsequently learned that my message was delivered by this officer to General Hill, but the latter said he had no division to send)—and shortly afterwards meeting with General Ewell, I communicated my views to him, and was informed by him that Johnson's division was coming up; and General Ewell then determined, with this division, to take possession of the wooded hill on our left of Cemetery Hill, which commanded the latter. (This was the hill mentioned in the accounts of the battle as Culp's Hill.) But Johnson's division arrived at a late hour, and the movement having been further delayed by another report of an advance on the York road, no effort was made to get possession of the wooded hill that night. [Johnson had come by the way of Shippensburg and the Greenwood and Cashtown Gap, and did not arrive until after the fighting was all over on that day.]"

FROM GENERAL LEE'S REPORT.

General Lee says: "The attack was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy's force being unknown, and it being considered advisable to await the arrival of the rest of our troops. It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance unless attacked by the enemy, but finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our large trains. At the same time the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies while in the presence of the enemy's main body, as he was enabled to restrain our foraging parties by occupying the passes in the mountains with regular and local troops. A battle became thus, in a measure, unavoidable. Encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement of the first day, and in view of the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack."

No further demonstrations were made by either army that day. On the Confederate side the battle had been fought by the divisions of Heth, Pender, Rodes and Early. Two more divisions (Anderson's and McLaws') reached the field after darkness had set in. Hood's division arrived early next morning. The Union troops engaged were the First and Eleventh Corps and Buford's cavalry.

ALIGNMENT OF THE TROOPS.

About dusk, Slocum's (Twelfth) and part of Sickles' (Third) Corps arrived and took position on the right and left of the troops already posted. Upon General Slocum devolved the chief command until the arrival of General Meade after midnight. By 7 a. m. of the second, Hancock's (Second), Sykes' (Fifth) and the remainder of the Third Corps, with the Artillery Reserve, had reached the ground. General Meade's entire force was now disposed as follows:

Howard's Corps retained its position on Cemetery Hill, where it had rallied, Schurz's division astride the Baltimore pike, Steinwehr's on the left, and Ames' (formerly Barlow's) on the right and rear; Wadsworth's division of the First Corps held Culp's Hill, to the right of Ames' line; Doubleday's was in reserve in the rear of Schurz's, and Robinson's on the left of Steinwehr's and across the Taneytown road, extending as far as Zeigler's Grove. On the right of Wadsworth was Slocum's Corps, under Williams, the line extending along the prolongation of Culp's Hill, and to the vicinity of McAllister's Mill, on Rock Creek, near the Baltimore turnpike. On the left of Robinson came Hancock's, and then Sickles', occupying the irregular ridge from Zeigler's Grove south to Round Top. Pending the arrival of Sedgwick's Corps, Sykes' was held in reserve in rear of the right flank.

The Confederate army occupied Seminary Ridge and the elevated ground to the left of Rock Creek, making an irregular curve along a line at least six miles in length. Hood's and McLaws' divisions of Longstreet's corps faced the corps of Sickles and Hancock. Hill's three divisions (Anderson's Pender's and Heth's) confronted Howard, on Cemetery Hill; and Ewell's corps, forming the left wing, occupied the town and its vicinity, with the divisions of Early and Johnson so posted as to menace Wadsworth's division and Slocum's corps, on Culp's Hill. Such was the general disposition of the two armies on the morning of July 2d.

During the preceding night each contestant had been actively employed in making preparations for a renewal of the terrible and bloody conflict. Breastworks were constructed, rifle-pits dug, and a large number of cannon put in position. The forenoon and part of the afternoon of the 2d passed with only slight skirmishing and occasional artillery firing. Neither commander seemed anxious to take the initiative of battle. At 2 p. m. the Sixth Corps arrived and was put in reserve, while the Fifth Corps was moved to the extreme left, near Round Top.

About 4 p. m. Sickles, who had advanced his corps to the Emmittsburg pike, one-third of a mile beyond the front of the designated line, was furiously attacked by Hood's and McLaws' divisions of Longstreet's corps. The Third Corps bravely sustained the assault, aided by re-enforcements from the Second, Fifth and Twelfth Corps, but was gradually forced back. Sickles himself was severely wounded. The conflict was especially fierce and obstinate for the possession of Round Top and Little Round Top, but the brave men of the Fifth Corps succeeded in occupying and holding both points against all the attempts of the enemy to dislodge them.

THE PEACH ORCHARD.

General Sickles, having been seriously wounded during this engagement, made no report of the action of the Third Corps on the 2d of July, but the reports of his division commanders, Generals Birney and Humphreys, are quite full, and the following extracts will furnish a correct idea of this sanguinary encounter. The Third Corps was ordered to take position on Cemetery Ridge, extending from the left of Hancock's Corps to Little Round Top.

Swinton says: "In the original ordainment of the line of battle Sickles' Corps had been instructed to take position on the left of Hancock, on the same general line, which would draw it along the prolongation of Cemetery Ridge towards the Round Top. Now, the ridge is, at this point, not very well defined, for the ground in front falls off into a considerable hollow. But at the distance of some four or five hundred yards in advance it rises into that intermediate crest along which runs the Emmittsburg road. General Sickles thinking it desirable to occupy this advanced position, which he conceived would if held by the enemy make his own ground untenable, assumed the responsibility of pushing his front forward to this point. The motive which prompted General Sickles to this course was laudable enough, but the step itself was faulty, for though in a superficial examination the aspect of this advanced position seems advantageous, it is not really so, and, prolonged to the left, it is seen to be positively disadvantageous. It affords no resting place for the left flank, which can be protected only by refusing that wing and throwing it back through low ground towards Round Top, but that in turn presents the danger of exposing a salient in a position which if carried would give the enemy the key-point to the whole advanced line."

General Birney's division at seven a. m. relieved Geary's division and formed line of battle, resting its left on Sugar Loaf Mountain, with its right joining the left of Humphreys' division, which extended to the right, joining the left of Caldwell's division of Hancock's Corps. The line Humphreys was directed to occupy was near the foot of the westerly slope of Cemetery Ridge, from which foot-slope the ground gradually rose to the Emmittsburg road, which runs on the crest of a ridge nearly parallel to the Round Top ridge. This second ridge declines again, immediately west of the road at the distance of two or three hundred yards, from which the edge of a wood ran parallel to it. This wood on the right of the Confederate line of battle was occupied by Longstreet's corps, Hood's division on the right and McLaws on the left, connecting with Anderson's division of Hill's corps. The Peach Orchards extended to the left of Humphreys' division along the Emmittsburg road, some distance beyond the point where the road from Willoughby Run to the Baltimore turnpike crosses the former road, as shown in the map. The ground in the immediate front of Humphreys' division was open. It became more broken towards the left in Birney's front, and further on was rugged and almost impassable in front of the Fifth Corps.

A MOVEMENT IN THE FRONT.

About 12 o'clock a movement in his front induced General Birney to believe that an attack was about to be made by the enemy, and he sent one hundred of Berdan's Sharpshooters, supported by the Third Maine, to feel the right of the force in his front. The reconnoissance discovered heavy columns moving to his left. Communicating this important intelligence to General Sickles, he was ordered to change front to meet the attack. This he did by advancing his left five hundred yards and swinging around the right so that it rested on the Emmittsburg road at the Peach Orchard. Meantime re-enforcements from the Second and Fifth Corps had been sent to take position on Birney's left. The troops in Birney's and Humphreys' divisions were aligned as follows: In the First division, Ward's brigade occupied the left, resting on the mountain; De Trobriand in the centre, and Graham on the right, in the Peach Orchard, with his right on the Emmittsburg road. Smith's battery of rifled guns was placed so as to command the gorge at the base of Sugar Loaf Mountain; Winslow's battery on the right of Ward's brigade, and a battery from the Artillery Reserve; also Clarke's and Ames' batteries to the right in rear of the Peach Orchard, supported by Graham's brigade, the Third Michigan from the Third Brigade, and the Third Maine from the Second brigade. Randolph's, Seeley's, and Turnbull's batteries were placed near the Emmittsburg road on the front parallel with it. These dispositions having been completed, Clark's and Smith's batteries opened, at half-past three, on the columns moving towards their left. Humphreys' division was formed, with Carr's (First) brigade in front, supported on its left by the Seventy-first New York. The Second brigade, Colonel Brewster, was formed in line of battalions two hundred yards in the rear of the first line. The Third brigade, Colonel Burling, was massed two hundred yards in rear of the second line opposite its centre. On the east side of the Emmittsburg road, opposite the centre of Humphreys' line, was a log house surrounded by an orchard. This was occupied at first by the Seventy-third New York, under command of Major M. W. Burns, but later by the Sixteenth Massachusetts, of the First brigade.

Shortly after these dispositions were made Burling's brigade was sent to the rear of Birney's division as support, and Humphreys was directed to call on General Caldwell for support in case it was needed. Soon after Birney's batteries opened, General Humphreys' line was advanced to a position on the Emmittsburg road, subjecting it to an enfilading fire, which, however, did but little damage.

[To be continued.]

The Death of McPherson.

To the Editor NATIONAL TRIBUNE:

In your last issue, in reply to Mr. Irvine's inquiry relating to the death of Gen. McPherson, there seems to be a good many different accounts of it, according to what I heard that day after I was taken prisoner; also an account of it given to Major Fitzgibbon, of the Fourteenth Michigan volunteers, by Major Schaaf, who, I think, belonged to the Sixty-sixth Georgia. He was not killed instantly, as Gen. Sherman in his account supposes. During a parley on the picket-line, August 12th, to fulfill the dying request of Lieut. William R. Ross to send a daguerreotype to Miss Emma Jane Kennon, his intended bride, who lived at Oxford, Ga., the rebel Major Schaaf said: "Your papers circulated a falsehood when they said we stripped and robbed the body of Gen. McPherson. I saw him when he fell and talked to him, and had sent for a stretcher to convey him within our lines, but we were driven back before we could do so." Now, if we could hear from Shaaf or Fitzgibbon, perhaps we could get his dying words. I saw him, I think, less than twenty minutes before he was killed in that same road, talking to Blair and some other general, I think it was Dodge. I heard him say "there is a heavy line of battle just over the hill in our front."

Respectfully, yours,

B. F. STELLEY,
Co. G, 20th O. V. I.

EXETER, NEB., Dec. 27.

CHICKAMAUGA.

An Incident of the Great Battle in Georgia.

THE VALLEY OF DEATH.

A Wounded Soldier Left for Dead on the Field.

TAKEN PRISONER.

A Leap for Life and Recapture by a Georgia Cracker.

I.

By noon, or a little later, we were in line of battle near an old mill on Chickamauga Creek. The roar of cannon and musketry on the extreme left of our line, near Rossville, was terrible, and we expected every moment to be engaged in battle, but, with the exception of some firing on the picket-line, we were not disturbed that day, and by dark the firing had ceased along the whole line. We bivouacked in line of battle that night. Sabbath morning came at last, beautiful and still. All nature was in repose, and it seemed almost impossible that the terrible storm of battle was about to break upon us in fury. A little after noon the division moved by the left flank about one-half or three-quarters of a mile, and formed in line of battle in an old open field with woods directly in front. We did not wait in suspense very long. The order was given to advance, and so soon as we entered the woods we met the rebel army advancing in line of battle. The order was given to fire. I distinctly recollect firing one round, or of attempting to do so, when suddenly a flash of light passed before my face, and I was dead—that is, unconscious. How long I remained in that condition it is impossible for me to tell. It must have been considerably past midnight when I regained consciousness, and then at first it was with great difficulty I could make out where I was, or what had happened. I finally regained my consciousness fully. My lips and tongue were parched and stiff, and my thirst was intense. It was as still as the valley of death.

IT WAS THE VALLEY OF DEATH.

All around me on every side lay the dead and wounded soldiers, Confederate and Union, side by side. The stars twinkled brightly through the tree-tops, but the din and noise of battle had ceased, and nothing broke the stillness of that midnight hour but the distant moan of some wounded soldier.

My canteen hung over my shoulder, but it was empty. Water I must have or die, and with difficulty I stood upon my feet and commenced my search for water among the canteens attached to the dead soldiers nearest to me. At last I found one partly filled, and I robbed the dead soldier of his canteen and quenched my thirst.

The wound which I had received bled copiously, and my face and clothing was covered with blood. The bullet had struck my head just behind my right ear, making an ugly wound and taking off part of the ear. I tied my handkerchief over the wound, and thought of making my escape from the battle-field, but I found myself too weak for the undertaking; besides, I did not know, if I had been able, which way to go.

Weary and sick at heart, I wrapped my blanket around me and lay down to rest, pillowing my head upon the limbs of a dead Confederate soldier. In this position, after a long time, I fell asleep. I was awakened by some one pulling my blanket. I started up suddenly, and there stood before me a Confederate officer, who seemed to be as much surprised as I was myself. The first word spoken was by the officer, who said: "Hello, you are not dead?" I answered, "No, sir, not quite." This officer had come upon this part of the battle-field with a large detail of soldiers to bury the dead, collect the war material, and remove the wounded. I asked him for a drink of water, which he granted at once. They took my gun and cartridge box, but left me my blanket, canteen, and haversack, which still contained some crackers. And I may as well say now that I never was harshly treated by any Confederate officer or soldier so long as I was with them.

TAKEN PRISONER.

I was conducted by a soldier to a part of the field where were collected together quite a number of other wounded prisoners and some that were not wounded.

We were taken to Dalton, a station on the railroad; the badly wounded in ambulances, the slightly wounded in army wagons, and those that were able were marched.

We arrived at the station towards night, and the surgeons were busy with the wounded men all through the night, and the next day my wound was dressed. It was very sore and painful for several days, and my horror of being a prisoner of war was aggravated by the scanty accommodations of the men that were worse off than myself, and I then resolved that I would in some way make my escape. The men were poorly supplied with rations, for the reason, no doubt, that they did not have them to issue.

In the course of two days a train of freight cars was made up and started with the prisoners for Richmond, Va. In the car in which I rode were at least fifty prisoners. The train had a heavy guard of rebel soldiers, a good share of them riding on the top of the cars, but there was one soldier in each car. I had made up my mind, come what would, to leap from the car at night when moving, and make my way back to our lines in the best way I could. I had made the proposition to several of the prisoners to accompany me, but they all declined, saying that it would fail, and that if I undertook it I would be recaptured, and then my condition would be worse than it was now.

I admitted it all, but as the wound in my head had ceased to trouble me very much, I was determined to make the trial.

One of the prisoners agreed to assist me, if I was determined to go, all he could.

It had been raining considerable, and the weather being warm and sultry, the side doors of the car were both left open while running. So soon as we arrived at a station the guard closed one door and stood in the other until the train started again. My plan was to sit in one of the doors, and when the guard's attention was called away to leap from the car.

My friend had agreed to stand by me, and the moment I left the car to take my seat in the door to avert the suspicion of the guard. We had passed the middle of the second night, and I was eagerly watching my opportunity after passing a station, when suddenly the train came upon a long high bridge, and I regretted my neglect, for I knew I would have to recross that river before regaining our lines. Soon after crossing the river I discovered that we were approaching a large town, and watching an opportunity while the guard was engaged in another part of the car, I made the leap in the dark for liberty. As good luck would have it, I was successful, not even receiving a bruise, landing on my feet in water and mud. I crawled up the bank, and by the light of the guard's lantern in the car I could plainly see my comrade sitting in my place in the door of the car.

The train moved on, and I knew the escape had not been discovered.

And now my troubles commenced in good earnest. In the woods and in the enemy's country, which I knew nothing about, with a deep and swift river and an unknown distance between me and the Union army, my condition was anything but enviable. But it was too late to recall what I had done, and I determined to make the best of it I could.

The country was densely wooded and uneven, and I made but little progress in the few remaining hours before daylight.

The night was dark and cloudy, and I took a northerly direction as near as I could calculate. When daylight made its appearance I found I had been traveling through the woods and brush, directly east instead of north, as I had supposed. I was farther from home than when I jumped from the car. But I had nothing to do but to secrete myself in the bushes, study my bearings, and prepare for another night's tramp. I still retained my blanket, canteen and haversack, and my fellow-prisoners had generously divided their scanty rations with me, wishing me success, but doubting my ability to accomplish my purpose. The rest and sleep through the day greatly refreshed and encouraged me, and early in the evening I changed my course and started in a northwest direction. I soon found a tolerably plain road, leading nearly in the direction I wanted to go, and I followed the road until it disappeared, but the woods were more open and I kept my course until daylight, when I came to a larger road bearing more to the west. My small stock of crackers were exhausted, and to keep in the road in the daytime would probably result in my capture. But hunger knows no law.

AN UGLY CUSTOMER.

I continued for several miles in this open road, hoping to meet o[illegible] I thought they would [illegible] get some assistance from them in order to continue my journey, when suddenly an old gray-headed man stepped out into the road from behind a clump of bushes, and presented a double-barreled shotgun and ordered me to halt.

I tried to reason with him, but he would listen to nothing, and ordered me to take off my haversack and canteen, and lay them down in the road. I saw there was no use at all to try to reason with the old man, and I obeyed orders.

He brought his old gun to a level, cocked both locks, and ordered me to march ten steps in front of him to his house, which was about one mile from where he met me in the road.

To be taken prisoner by Confederate soldiers was bad enough, but to be taken prisoner by such a specimen of poor white trash as that old man was, was humiliating.

I was ashamed of myself, but there was no help for it. When we arrived at his home—a tolerably good-sized house, part log and part frame, with a verandah in front running the whole length—he shut me in a small room at one end of the verandah and called up a small boy, ten or twelve years of age, and placed him at the door, with orders to shoot me if I attempted to escape.

He informed me that he should take me over the river to a railroad station, where there were soldiers, and turn me over to them either that evening or the next morning.

I told him I was very tired and hungry, and asked him for something to eat. He answered me short, saying that they had nothing in the house, and that he didn't believe in feeding the d—d Yankees nohow, and much of the same kind of talk. The boy seemed to be kind enough, and between him and an old negro woman that was about the premises I managed in the course of the night and day to get enough to appease my hunger. Early the next morning we started for the railroad station, where I was to be given up to the Confederate soldiers again a prisoner. The order of march was the same as before, myself in front a few steps and the old man behind with his gun all ready for use. The boy also was with him, and he was also armed with a shotgun. In this way we marched in silence some four or five miles, when we came to the river, and the old man ordered me to halt, and gave the boy orders to shoot me if I made an attempt to escape. He went into the bushes close by the river and hauled out a small boat, and made me take the fore part of the boat, while he and the boy paddled across, one or the other of them constantly on guard. When we were over we resumed the order of march the same as before.

AGAIN A PRISONER.

It was about two miles down the river to the station where he formally delivered me over to the guards. When the exchange was fairly made I gave the old man a little good advice, which he will not probably forget. I told him plainly that if I ever got back to the army again, and should happen to come this way, I would settle this little matter with him. I did not mind being a prisoner with soldiers, for they had some little humanity about them, but he had none.

My talk to the old man rather pleased the lieutenant who conducted me to the guard-house. He said there would be a train of prisoners along that day some time, when I would be sent on to Richmond. When the train arrived I was put aboard. The train was full, and was guarded the same way as before. I had had all the experience I wanted in jumping from trains, and I concluded to make no more effort to escape, at least before we got to Richmond. There was nothing happened of importance during the long and tedious journey to Richmond. It was the same old gaze by the residents of each station at the d—d Yankee prisoners, as they called them, with an occasional jeer, which was always promptly answered by some cute Yankee.

[To be continued.]