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"E rave fov Mm u'Uo tow Dovnc ilto tmtitc, nua fox W uiitow una ovnluutf."
WASHINGTON, 1). 0., THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 1883.
VOL. II-NO. yO.-WHOL
ESTABLISHED 1S77.-N15W SERIES.
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vr.n T.uikHiiirva i, v"'. .-v-Wff. AMicr. i . .j.
-"- 'PflW;rHr;orfKr?VI rVi - -. Sr b::.E " l.lHl ,lli .Is.
Cji PROFS CAVALRY.
,i - -
Operations on the Tcnncssco River
Schoflokr Rctront Socurod lo
A VALUABLE PAPJDft
From Iho Personal Momolra or
General Mornco Cnpron.
lTpon tho full of Atlanta tny hrigadgo com
Irtimsl of the following logiiuonts and parts of
regiments, to wit,: The FeiurWcnth icgimonl
liifiioiRcavfiiry, Flgbth u'uncut Michigan env
nlry, Fifth roiciiiioiit Indiana cavalry, Twelfth
rciiimnil Kentucky envnlry,Hixtcciith regiment
Illinois cavalry having served tlirotifslt tho
Af IhiiIk ttnpai:ti iiUr (Jt'iiornl Siicrinnii, woio
ont back to NieholuRvillo, Kentucky, to bo io
mounted nutl rearmed with tin most . nppiovod
cavalry aims, and, with all possible dispatch, to
be ptcpsrcil to lejoln our army at Atlanta pio
imrntory to u further advance into tho Confed
eracy, Tho Fifth Indiana cavalry, having boon fur
loughod at NichohiRvillo for tho purposo of al
lowing thom to go homo to vote, did not rnlurn
in tinio to join tho brigade for this campaign.
Many from tho other regiments woro alfio
grunted leave of absence at tho same tlmo, thus
reducing my actual foico to about 1,200 men.
On arriving at Nichnlusvillo, undor tho or
ders of Mujor-Gcnornl .1. M. Hchoficld, I pro
ceeded without delay to niako tho pioper re
quisitions upon tho quuitormastor and onl
naneo oJlleow for tho horpon, efjuipinentfl and
cnvalry arms for tho command. It wiw undor
rUmmI that arms woro to hoof tho most ap
proved weaponB, including tho Speneor carbine,
tho one most popular at tho time. Under theso
nsBUranecP, the ctprit tin corps of Uio coiuiiiaud
was inspired, an, in their estimation, it was ai
evidence of tho appioval by tho coiiimiitidiug
geueml of their long and faithful Bcrvieos
through tho provioua cninpnigiiB in TonnosRuo
JlAPI.Y ItqUIl'J'KII roil RKItVICR.
On tho following Mth of October our homes
and equipments had been iucolved,butnoarms.
On that day 1 received a telegraphic dispatch
from Major-General Bchofield, then at Atlanta,
ordeiing me to report with my command, with
out delay, to JIajor-Uoncral (ieorgo II. Thomas,
nt Kahville, Tenn. Tlio order being peremp
tory, I was compelled to march without arms,
it being undemtood that cavalry aims would
be hoiit forward by rail to meet us on our ar
rival thero. On arriving at Nashville, on tho
i?0lh of October, no cavalry arms could bo ob
tained. The emergency of the service demand
ing that we should at omto take the field, and
no other weapons being obtainable, Hpringfield
mtitkels were served out to the command, a
weapon with which theso troops had no expe
rience, and a mora unsuilablo one for thosor
vico before them could not he, confronted, as
they wero likely lo bo, with one of tho host or
ganized and equipped forces in tho Confederate
service, with Forrest's famous cavalry as its ad
This had a most damaging effect. TIicfo
men had been much encouraged to expect that
they would bo propoily armed, and they ac
tually refused lo receive these muskets; many
broke them a ion ml the tiees, and an open mu
tiny was tho icsult, taxing their olllccrs heav
ily lo quell. As matter of course tho com
manding officer came in for his share of tlio
nponiibili(y for their being placed in so nil
dcnfiMble a position. General Thomas' un
gtiiitded luiimik, "they would answer to shoot
guetriilas with," was not calculated to lessen
Hie excitement, and I have since thouglit. that
at that Hiiticuhtr time ho could not have fully
anticipated the heavy task beforo "him. For
this command it piovcd tho most trying ordeal
that sny cnvalry could bo subjected to.
jw Tin: nm.i).
On Ilio.'WMIi of October tho following order
wan received from Oouuial Thomas' headquar
ters; CwoMti. Cawon, Comnwtidhijf Jlrluwlo.
Sia I hiii illriHilctl ! AlHJcn'-tJfiH'inl Thoiiinn It,
wiv tliHt IkmvWiuh you to iimvc your lutgiuli.iHl'
in til- iHitrolnu. lo AtlifiiM, via Aniifiii'loio .Slicf
bIHe, Kayctli'vlllt himI New Attn ltd. On your
iiunMl M'puit to ItriKudit-r-Oi'iicml Cioxton.
n(lnii'Hii'l till I tdl KocnilliiH in tlictsMindy over
vliM-li you mm. HlioiiM you liwir of any body if
tl.'in iKwr yMir Hue of iitHirh. ilclixli it Hiilllt'k'iit
foiw loovufpunurniHl ipttut iIhmii.
J. V. .lollNfON,
On tho Oth of "November 1 reported with
my comuiHud to (Jencral Btanly at I'iiIiikIu;
from Hist timo to the Kith, was eiiKagcs! in
m hiding out scouting imitiosin till ilircclions.
(n the 13th, under oiders from (Jenenil .Stanly,
movc1 my command to Mount I'leawiut.
On the 15Ui, rceciveil the following dispatch
from Mnr-(jtMicrul Sehoftrld, via Coliiinliiu:
V. H. AIlMTAItY'riCI.PMKArir. Nov. in, IHOI.
CVif4xi9.' (SriM'iiil Ilntt'li iciorlH iivnliy hihI iu
fuiiiiy moving tiotn MoH-iiw tinnlH WHyiien
Imiu'. qihI tliHikM 1I(mi' vnliie unity in uioviiiK
tM.rl Coluuiliiri. (ieiifixl HnU-li in moving liix
ut.n fonv in tlwt dirtM'lion. 'oiiiMiiiiiiiiit with
In it it wmhiiu iiit'li'lle. mihI when yourioicuH
ti '.!. Hct itiidfr hin ordi'm.
Jv- i Hit wHI l Uw fiuol. In tHft:n'e of the 'ii
r in niitl iofonn ok ol hlx movi'mi'iiUi; nlmj in
f.un Ihh1 Milokinnil, Mt Columbia.
(MKiHtlj J. M. Hiuii-i:i.i.
M.sjor Tottipkius, with a doiadimuutof tho
Fouil4'iitli Illinois csvHlry. had been detached
from my ivniuiiMiid at l'tilanki, to scout, towards
J.amcneeJMiig. On thovJ5lli, I teported to
Jfjr (Jeiier.il Sehotleld as follows, fiom my
c- Tni at Mount riussMiil:
Mnjor Tonijikiim ii'Miitc4l itito IhuI iiIkIiI. from
I ....it uivluti-K, n foliouM: "Ti-hIiw till in, via Co
in mhl.i. mm. rouU iiitiHtwmlih," A:f. Oilier wnil,
li-iiii vnriutia (HiccUoiim, Iwvt n-jnnted. Tlio iiioiI
I' i..lil toih'lu!iaiHi 1 ohii Mi'iivc at lire. Hint tlio
n Im-I fort ivMrUt Ht Wityne'tlmro1 wtw tlm irj;i
liunN nidtr Cloitl Kui'ki'r, Miit ni'iiHw tlitsTcn-
Mr IUii'N( lcriille hy fx'in'iiil ImiihI, hm
i ' U l Imck iii tin- liver Irom .IoIiumuimIIc. TIiIk
f iM' iwmmmI through AIiIhii'I on 1'iiilny, thence to
V n no (IhmV, ixwto-oi the 'IViiih'mh'I' itivi'molne
v!.n hIkivc. I'ihtcM. wmh t Cl.emkee. Hood
cioMHti m jmrt of hie force to the north niilu of the
It i, in soif, Henri tiUui)ih'H,oi Frality at lUo'eloek
in . wiieu tiM iiri'lK' K'lttiiK out or outer, lie. was
c .,iyel for ictMiir. 1 lmve out heavy wontintr
n tu towjKls iit.d in lyiiirriuelmnr. nod townrds
V . newlx.ro'. I hitvpiKMit teioiiH to Colninl.lii for
tr.-:id niid irther rutionfl. C4iuhl net no bread either
a? I'ulHski or Ctduiiilttu (H, ,r XVHV tiuuBif
ali.il! imyv fitrwHKl with liAlnnveol" inv voiiiiiiaud
at ht. OuriillMM leportwlou the hil'U between
Jl.i'- .ind Iauruiieubuit;.
iKigllMi; IIOKACK OaI'IIOV,
Colonel, GoniniHiuliiiK iingidc.
ON THK I.IJfB 01' TUB TKNXIM8KK.
Kovomber 15. Iiumudiatoly on tho receipt
X Gouoral Sghofiold'a order of this date, I
moved my command forward from Mount Pleas
ant in tho direction of Waynesboio, detaching
Migor Ueers with a portion of tho Fight h Mich
igan cavalry, via Luuioncoburg, to communi
cato with General Match, if possible, and to re
port to mo at Waynesboro' or at. any intermu
diato point most practicable.
On arriving at Waynesboro', on tho IHth of
November, I loported to General .Sehotleld, as
follows, by courier lo Columbia.:
WAVNiwnoitii', a p. in., Nov. 18.
MAJoitCRNititAi..!. M. Hriiorii'.i.i'.
nt J'tiliiiUi, 'l'enne:eo.
Hm: I have, the honor to lepoit. thiil I oeeujiled
this pliico with inv eoiiminnil thin day, driving out
a detiu'luiienlof iNtrreit'H eaviiliy, with n lo to im
of one killed, one fnlally wounded and onowiverely.
Ciitilnied two of Korient's men.
iMajor lleem. ent out hy me fiom Mount I'leim
nnt, tliroiih Ijiiiieiieehintx, Joined hi" nt thii
plnueiooii nflei my an ivnl. lleiejiotlM mi ichel
loiee, fxeepiug In hiiiiiII hniidnof Kierrlllniini I hi
hills near Caniiliellivllle. Jlehmt one videtl". kllleil
)v them. Iloilid not Hiieeeed in liudiiig ieneinl
llateh oecupviiig Ihnt jilaee.io mih expei led. The
Intelligence i have fiom vinioimseoiitH Mini eilieim
(lefngeeH) ii (hut HooiI'h niniy li at Finn-nee,
moHlly on thin nlde of the 1 1 vet, with hii iidviinee
out (iheeii inllei. iiimi'iitly inaklng piepaialion
for an immediate loiuaid movement. Km lent In
peouthig theeolinliy n lot hit point and Ijiuicuec
hoig. lean hear nothing fiom (Jeneinl Hate'- '
Hindi xend out heavy seonling piitlleH Inthedliee
tion or Kloienee, and imiki eveiy ell'oil in my
power to eoininnnieate w Ith Oeneial llateh.
1 wild yon a Hkcfeh of the londrt lailiating fi'"l
IIiIh place, hy which you will mco thai we aie Iho
Inteil our light and tear being entiiely epncd.
On our lell the neatet load eoniifiunicathig w lib
Jiiiteuccbuig ii in our inn, eighteen milew on the
toad to Mount l'leaanl. thence to Ijiuieiieehiiig
fouiteen niileH- inalting thiity-lwo miles. Theio
inodiicctlyeoininuiiicaling load between tho two
Fouige Is very scarce, then being none on either
tlio Mount I'leiitimt load oi in the eouulty mound
this. Weaie llfly-slx miles onl fiom Co
lumbia, our liano of supplies, with loads next to
I Irani fiom a reliable souiee thai theie Is n Cnn
fedrmto foi eo at CHftoii, illlecn miles west of this,
under Colonel I'alllle, and another lit Linden,
twenty-eight miles nmlhwest fiom lieu. Tho
forci's'd liven fiom Waynesboio' In-day sepiualed i'
fhoil distance out, messing guides, null going to
wiuds the two points above mentioned, which
Would appear lo eoulliin the icpoil of the pieseiico
of thelwoConfedeiatefoicesnl t'liftou and i.inden.
Veiy icspeetfully, V.,
JN TUP. I'KBSr.NCI! OK TUB BNBMV.
Immediately on our anival at Wnynesboto'
scouls wero suiUotit- in all directions- towards
Florence in our front, and on our right towards
tho Tennessee River, penetrating as far as Clif
ton, Savannah, and West Point, and twoiily-flvu
miles in tho direction of Florence and Mood's
army. These scouts weio constantly miming
upon squads of the enemy, indicating that tho
advancoof Geneial Mood could bo expected at
any moment. Tho result of these topoils were
almost hourly dispatched to General Hchollehl
by courier to Columbia and wire lo Pulaski.
That my position should bo perfectly under
stood both by Geneial Sehotleld at Pulaski and
Gonotal Wilson at Columbia, I sent the follow
ing report to General Wilson:
llKAi'QifAini-.its lri Hani. C. C, Din. Onto,
Wavnishiiouo', Tunn.. Nov. "0, 1M5I.
Ihevet MaJ.-Oeii. Vn.ut Cohinibla.
Kilt: I hnvo the lionoi to icjMiit that my senilis
have found no huge Coiifedeiab foiee within
twenty miles of this place. At Clifton they met
neoiils, and upon other muds encounleied small
jai ties, who appear to b watching out movements.
Our scouts in the dluellon of West Point went
within Ihice miles of the place, but the roads fmm
the iiiccsiint lains had become nliiiost, iiupiiusiihle.
They eiooscil over to the Kioieuee road, t poii tills
eioss-ioal they inn noon n cnuiler line, which ap
pealed to be iiilcndcu In extend to the Columbia
toad. It In wild by the ptofeswd Union clliycns heio
that this is the lino by which the Confedeialos sc
enic constant infoimallon fiom Colninbln of all our
moveineiits. This line will be bioken up lo-dny.
No iiileiligeuec liom (leneial llateh has yet been
oblitined, Ve., ,Ve.
The heavy seouting and tlio manner of foiagiug
which our men and horses aie subjected to is fust
using up the Iioim's. .I'.aeh man is compelled to
pack in Ills forage fot miles upon the back or his
iioisetliat lie has been scouting upon day and nighl.
There is iibolulelv nothing within a ladlus ol III
teen mllexof this place Tin eounliy Is completely
laid wnMo by the tmops of both aimicH constantly
Very lespcctfully. ..,
Coinmaiiding 1st iliigade C. (J., A. O.
On tho 21st of November, just beforo dark,
tho following dispatch from Major-Genoml
.1. M. Schoflold was handed mo by cornier from
JIUAtK'fAuiriis Aiimv or 'i mt Ohio,
I'i'i.aski, '1'it.NK., Nov. , I Mi I.
Colonel IIoitAf-r. CArims.
Commanding CIiv. Ihlg., Waynesbnio'.
CoMiMtl.: I have just iceelved your lepoit of tho
IHth. You seem to liue entiiely inisundeiHlood
your liisliuctlons, ami I expect to hear of theeap
tuieof youreoniniaiid. Move back at once lowaids
Mount I'lcasaiit, as far us the inleiei lion ol tlm
Ijiuieiuvhuig miyl. and fiom that point scout to
waids Ijiuieneebiiig and Waynesboio' nod on tho
Oeueial Hatch tepoits Ktnict's navaliy advanu
ingtowaids Uiuiepcebiiig yesterday noon,
l'ouslbly you may gel thlf in lime.
JlespdjUully, J. Al. Hcuoimi'.i.ii,
It is difficult fo undeiHliind how or in what
I mimiudcistood Cenentl Scholleld's older of
tho loth, which 1 lepcal bete:
"Oeneial Ibiteh icpoits envaliy ami infautiy
moving fiom Kloienee towaids Waynesboro', and
thinks Hood's enliie army Is moving towiiKli Co
lumbia. Oeueial llalcli is ihoviug his entile foico
In that dheclion. Coimuuiiiiiile with him as soon
ns piaclieablc,aud when youi (oicuh meet act under
"Keep out well lo the fiont, in picenee of tho
er.eiiiy, and infoiiu me of his movements; also In
foim Colonel Stiiekland, at Columbia."
Kov,my last two heavy scouting parlies sent,
out on my left to communicate with General
Hatch passed lliiougii Laurenceburg on the
lfith, Unco days alter General Hcliofield's order
was penned, but could bear nothing fiom Gen
eral Hatch ; and as Waynedioro' was (ho point
for which ho was heading I pressed forward lo
meet, him, ami also to find I lie enemy i was to
keep in presence of. One thing is evident, that
had I not followed out to tho very letter Gen
oral BcbofiohPs otder of tho Ifilh Mood would
have captured Columbia and cut off Geneial
On the sumo ovening (tho SJlst) I iceelved tho
following dispatch hy com iur from Columbia,
who from Pulaski:
Pulaski, Nov. 20, IBC.I.
Move your command back towaids Mounl I'h'iis.
hiiI.Jo the intellection of the Laureucuburg mad.
IaioIc out for Koi lent on your left.
J. M. Sciioi'iixn,
Another dis'iatch, through Colonel Strick
land, I iccuivedluring lliu nighl, sis follows:
Tell Colonel Caprou to watch and delay Koriest'a
movement, and try and unite with (leneial Hatch,
who will move iK-tweon Koiientaud Ihe laihoad.
J. M. .-'(.iioi'ii;i.i,
rAI.I.INOaACIC TO I.AUIlBNCBIilTtia.
Anticipating the older to retire from my ex
posed position, I had the day befoiu hent back
my wagons and ambulaucos with the wounded.
Thoy reached Columbia in safety.
At tho time of icceiviug General Hcliofield's
order to fall back it was nearly night. Main,
sleot, and snow was falling heavily. My scouts
wero out in the direction of tho Tennessee
llivor towards (lifton, West Point, and in our
front towards Florence, no ono could tell how
far, and tho roads wero in a most shocking con
dition. These scouts had to bo brought in. Jn
tho meantime my force was drawn up in column
in readiness to march at a moment's nolico. At
9 o'clock p.m. tho buglo sounded "forward,"
and thu march was commenced through sleet,
snow, mud, und black darkness, over roads al
most bottomloK. Wo reached tho Intersection
of thoLaurencohurg road towardu morning, und
immediately dispatched couriers in another at
tempt to communicufo with General Mutch at
Liiuioiicolnng, fourteen miles distant.
On (hoM 1 icceived tho following commu
nication from General Hatch, tho first icceived:
JlitAiigrAlt'iKiiH Hitonii Division, Cav. I 'oil cm,
I.AUiti-N'i-iiritu, Nov. 'i'i, lwt.
Colonel Cacuow, commaudlug Jhigadu of Cavalry
on Mount I'lcasaul I toad:
I learn you have fallen back from A'iiyneboio',
on tlm road to Mount Pleasant. If so, hold on
wliere you am until picsscd back. Scout well to
your light Hank; endeavor to learn If the enemy
are moving iiiouml your light lowaids Nashville.
I will keep your led well scouted. If pics'ied on
your right, full buck by your leil on ine.
Your obedient seivant,
On thoS'hl of November I inputted to Gen
eral Sehofiold at Pulaski, via Columbia, an fol
lows: lIltAIX'H'S Cv. Ulllfl . C. C , o. M..
At Ihe .lunctinn of Mount Pleasiuit und l.iuuenco-
Major-licncinl .1. M. HnmmM.i.
Hm . Your dispatch, by com ier, dated the 20th at
Pulaski, icceived. I inclose you cony of your tele
giaphie outer of the ITith, as It wamlullveied to me,
lor voui liinpectlon.
Tlm icsult of inv ieeonnalsancesto Waynesboio'
miller that older I have unwanted 3011 by coin ier
o 'olumbla as (bey tiauspired.
I fell back to Ibis point, agiceable lo your oideis
of the 2111 h. lids being the only poiul between this
and Waynesboro' wbeie linage eniihl be oblalneil.
I opened eoinmunicallon with Oeueial Hatch yes
lenlay nt Lauicnecbuig, and shall ml under his
oideis and seuiit Ihe eounliy on my light thor
oughly. IMsecitain Dial no eonsldeiable (nice of
Ihe enemy has passed in v light onlhlsslde of Ihe
Tcmic'sce Itivet in the dlicclluii of Nashville. All
scouts and squads of (be enemy thai we have Intel -eeplcd
wcie moving in u soiithcily diiectlon, piob
ably icluinlng fiom scouting duly.
Colonel, Coiumandlug Dilgiute.
PCOtniNd TO TUB UIOIIT.
Tmiiiediately upon tho receipt of General
Hatch's dispatch of tho d, I sent out
scouting parties -under competent. oIlieeiM
consisting of from fiffeon to twenty men each,
both on my front and lo my right,
Willi onlers lo extend their lecounainsauco to
Iho front until the enemy wero felt, and on
my tight as far at tho Tonnowo River, if
found necessary to obtain positive information
in regit id tunny movemeiitsoflheeneuiy pinning
in thu dircc lion of Nashvilh1, and to lepoit by
courier any impoitunt infoi'inalion.
During Iho night of the V!..d I became satis
fled that Hood's army wat advancing upon us
in force, and I determined thai, notwithstand
ing Geneial Match's assurance that he would
protect my left and keep open our communica
tion, I would have a thorough reeomuiissiiuco
made of tho country between mo and Laurence
burg, llefore daylight on the morning of Iho
VMlli I sent out a sliong puliol hearing a mes
sage to Geneial Match. Thoy hud been out
probably ono and a half hours when two of Iho
number mmo into the camp under iv full nin,
without the! reaps. Thoy had inn into a brigado
of FornMt's cavalry, who weio bailing their
homes in a largo corn-field about half-way
between the two camps. Tho balance of tho
party weio cither killed or taken prisoners.
Our situation was critical, tho emergency
demanding prompt action to secure my com
mand from being surrounded and captured.
Tlio first thing lo bo allonded to wal to btlng
in our scouts ; the ouoon my right, commanded
by my son, Lieutenant. Albeit II. Cnpron, of
company A, Fourleenth icgimcuL Illinois cav
alry, might havo found it important under tny
iiistiuc.ltonn to scout to tho Tennessee Jtiver
some twenty miles. Tho next in importance
was to arrango my command, to hold this posi
tion for those parlies (o fall back upon.
Our pteseiit position, with our left unpro
tected, could be easily turned, and was conse
quently untenable. Two miles in my lear was
found a more suitable position, with a straight,
open toad for a small force left in tho first
barricades to fall back upon if fotccd to icliout
Two squadrons under the command of Major
Connolly, of thu Fouilcoutli Illinois cavalry,
wero left in the first, barricades, with instruc
tions to hold them until our scouts came in, If
possible; or, if forced onl, to full back upon our
second position. With the balance of the com
mand I piocccdcd to otect a second lino of bar
ricades, leaving open a space sufficient for tho
foico left at tho front to pass freely through if
A NM1IIT ATTACK: IIY rOKUKHT.
It wait approaching night when all wan in
leadiuosH. Tlio I loops weio dismounted and
placed behind tho defensiM, with a strict cau
tion not to mistaken rapidly uppior.ching body
of our own men for the enemy. In momentary
expectation that tiumetliing important would
transpire, I waited the tcultat (lie opening in
our line of biiiricades. I5y my Hide was Major
Puck and my adjutant -general, Captain Wells,
both of the Kighlh Michigan cavalry, with ti
small susliiining foico. .lust as duilniess was
settling upon us, and it became too obscure to
distinguish troop1! by their drest at any dis
tance, a column of dust. iuicd by a rapidly
approaching cavaliy force appealed advancing
from the direction of our first po3ilioit. Onlors
were icpoulcd to withhold thu command lo flro
until assured that this was not apart of our
own men. In an iiibtnnt of lime a fotce of
Forrest's cavalry charged in upon un, and de
livered their llio over tho barricades directly
in the faces of our men. Thoy had flanked our
flrsf position, an it was conjectured they would.
Their fire was promptly luturued, and a rapid
inforchangu followed. In tho midst of tho
noise and confusion of tho battle a shout and
firing wero heard in tho roar of this allacking
foice, and in the next moment their Hue was
lent asunder, and our men from thu front
dashud into our linen, it appears that tho
scouts had been biotight in ami were mounted
for a leisurely rut ion t, upon our second position.
The uproar and firing was heatd, and their
precarious condition fully teali.ed. In an in
stant the resolution was formed to make tho
attempt to cut their way out through tho at
tacking forces. Tho column was Immediately
put in motion, headed by Major Connelly and
Lieutenant Caprou, of tho Fourteenth Illinois
cavalry, and Captain Smith, of tho Highlit
Michigan, with thu result as above staled,
I'ltBfAUlNO l-'Oll BMBIKIKKCIBH.
Our casualties woio: Major Huclc, severely
wounded ; Captain Wolln, mistaking tho at
tacking foico for our men, dashed through tho
gup to meet and guide them through, and was
cupluicd; Sorgoanl-Mnjor Allen and fifteen
men captured and others wounded ; Captain
Ucushaw, assistanlndjulant general, cupluiud;
Lieutenant llowcn, of tho Fourteenth, with
twonty-fivo men out on a scout, cutoff, but sub
sequently reported, having lost most of tho
horses and several of his men. Precautionary
measures against a second night attack upon
our weakened forces by this dashing, confident
enemy wero immediately tuken. Major Beers,
with a. battalion of picked men, was ordered
back somo six miles towards Mount Pleasant,
with instructions to select another defeufliblo
position and throw up another lino of barri
cades similar to tho present and for tho Biimo
purpose It was tho udYuuco-guard of Hood'a
grand army that, was upon us, and tho only
possible thing for us to do was lo oppose their
advance in every possible way, and at every
luwutd of being enplurodor ridden down. Gen
erals Sehofiold and Wilson, in (ho meantime,
wero fully apprised of our desperate condition.
During tlio night of tho ftld, tho enomy hav
ing been beaten oil" for tho time, ceased to an
noy un, but it was fully known that a heavy
force wiut concentrating fur u final capture of
my force in tho mooting. I therefore quietly
withdrew under tho cover of night from this
second lino of barricades In tho direction of
Mount Pleasant, passing through Major Meet's
position, leaving htm Instructions at the
proper lime to join meat' our fouilh position.
About four miles out from Odtimbia, and
near enough for unto roccivo support in case
of an attack in foico, which I well know thoy
weio advancing for, I selected as good u posi
tion an wan possible in tho tlitrknen:), and at
once llnew up another, tho fourth lino of de
fenses, and dismounting my men ulaced them
within them. Hourly couriers were sent lo
Geneial Wilson. Mo was notified of tho den
peiato condition of my command, and I lie do
toiinincdand resolute advance of tho enemy.
Hoforo daylight on tho morning of thoSMIb,
Iho following disp.'ildi was. icceived from Gen
eral Wilson's headquarters i
JlicAtx-i'Airi wis" IT. S. Fonei:i.
Coi.ii.MiuA,t'i:.vw Nov. 21, IBol.
Hm: I am dhectcd by tho)'sneial commanding
(o sav Hint you will Hold your position as mug as
possfhle, and ho will send thujKillh Iowa, eavnliy to
Hiippottyou. John H. Mi'U'.nv.
Lieutenant, A. A. A. O.
Thisdlspaleh wnsclowly followed by another,
both reaching mo befoiu break of day:
UicAiiotrAU'ir.its U. H. Foticw,
Col.U.MIIIA, 'I'JCNN., Nov. 21, 18(11,
Hut: The gcueinl commanding bus Jusl received
a dispatch fiom Oeueial Heliolleld tosend you wunl
to hold Mount Pleasant at all himmls.
.Ioijn II, M Lnav,
Lieut., A. A. A.G.
Having carefully considered tho condition of
my depleted and en'ppled force, I found that it
hud been reduced, whatwUh deaths, cnptuie,
disability, couiicrs, ''Hitched service, -by esti
mate, lo bo about six hundred men; of homes,
there was not one In thu command actually fit
for service; animuiiilion nearly exhausted;
bread, none. Ammunition had boon requested
ti long distance back, but not yet icceived.
With this small, disorganized foico I was left
(o face what was probably ono of tho most
thoi oughly organized and equipped forces of
this war, advancing full of confidence and en
thusiasm, many of llieui actually in full view
of (heir own homes and families, from which
thoy hud so long been shut. oft". Instructions
weio rained upon me to check, (o hold, at all
hnznnls, (ho advancing foe, and no signs of
iclief visible or teported, ami only tho short
space of four miles front tho hcadquuilurs of
Schofield'n army in thu fiold,
CONKIIONTtNU HOOJH AltMY.
Daylight, found un oncu moro behind these
temporary defences, (ho near approach of thu
enemy teported momentarily, by our vldollos.
At 7 o'clock on tho morplng of Iho Ulth, still
no lollef or support, but uu.othor tjrdor to hold
on. Tho advauco-guunl of Hood's army camo
Into sight, and began (o deploy with evident
intention of culling off and capturing my
whole command. From ait devilled position
I could plainly see through my field-glass
their movements. Aitlllery was visibly up
pioaohlng in tho disttinuu. Forrest's cavalry
were giadually developing hi (oroo on both my
flanks. Jt was apparent from their movements
that they woro expecting to bo opposed by ti
much moro powerful force, an lightly I hey
should havo been, at tho very threshold ot it
placeof so much importance to both approach
ing ni mics.
There was now no timo left for further
deliberation. I had given Up till hope of relief
from Columbia. Tho simple question wan
whether, by sacrificing my whole command, I
should gain mote limo for General Sehofiold
than I would by withdrawing them ami trust
ing to chaiico fur being able lo slill oppose
further icsistanco (o (heir advance. Tho ques
tion of our capture was reduced to a certainty
in a very few minutes niorq if wo lcmuiuod.
I lesolvcd to draw off my command with as
little show of an Intention (o retire as possible.
Leaving a small force bchiujl tho barricades to
keep up (lie appearance (osiill further oppose
them, (ho column was drawn out under an
older lo " walk match." Our rot rent wan pro
tected from tho view of iho enemy by tho
formation of the laud and sumo timber, In
which wan placed small detachments, partially
withdrawn to deceive thq enemy an far as
potsihlo of our intentions, and, in putt, to
mislead (hem in regaid lo tho strength of our
force, which I believed thoy weio Hontowhul
appteheuslvu of, the column was fairly in
motion, with no apparent oxcitument moro
than a consciousness upon tho faces of the men
of (heir critical position, and (heir utter help
lessness when mounted, encumbered by these
clumsy Spiinglteld uiuskots-'ovory cavalryman
can readily ui.dernlaml that.
ATTACK Bl) AND aOUTBI.
I had congratulated myself upon a successful
movement, when, upon a sudden, my reur
gitanl wan overwhelmed and driven in upon
un, with Forrest's command sabering (hem at
their discielion. 12 very effort was made lo
check (his charge and prevent a stampede.
Small parties wero thrown out when tlioro
appeared any possible chaiico for oven a tempo
rary chock, but with Ilttlo success. Jn this
maimer wo were forced back upon Columbia.
At about half the distance wo camo upon our
ammunition wagons (which, too late, had
started for Columbia) capsized directly across
the road. Hood's whole army closely followed
Near Columbia, a small stream crosses tho
road, with a somewhat sunken channel. Jlo
hind this a small forco wail rallied, and a few
volleys produced a momentary check upon Iho
impetuosity of tho enemy, while tho vory
sight of their homes upon the heights of Co
lumbia appeared to sllmululu thom into a perfect
frenzy of courage. Ono gallunt captain of
Fonett's command, mounted upon ft splendid
black ohiiigor, rodo fearlessly up to tho very
edgoof tho chasm anddomauded an immediate
surrender. A musket ball penetrated his bruin
and ho fell to' tho ground within sight of his
homo. J learned, hut havo forgotten his
name. His famous horse was captured by my
youngest son, Onnond, who rodo him through
KK-BKrOKCBD IN TUB NICIC OIT TIMB.
It was our last stand; not ft man had eomo
out from Columbia lo oinr support;, and all was
given up aa lost, when, tit tho vory hunt moment
of timo, tho head of a coltulm of infantry was
seen upproaching across a field from tho direc
tion of Pulaski. They woro on tho double
It proved to to-General Pox'a division of
Mnjor-Oouornl Scholleld's army, who, moving
back from Pulaski, and hearing (ho heavy fir
ing on tho lino of our retreat, and rightly con
jecturing tho true position of things, had di
yerged from his regular road, and thrown his
command between my forces and tho Confed
erated not one moment to soon to save us and
Columbia, from cap! tiro.
Thero can bo no questioning tho fact that
tho saving of Columbia from capture, and Gen
eral Sehofiold from being cut oil' and forced to
fight his way tint against Hood's powerful army
of -10,000 men, is attributable to (ho presence of
(his brigado at Waynesboro' at (hat pari leu lar
crisis. Whether (hero Ihiough a misapprehen
sion of General Seholield's order of tho Ifilh of
November or I ho execution of (hat older lo tho
vory let lor, ns understood by me, Is quilo im
material ; the result speaks for itself.
I have never known what portion of Mood's
army camo up through Lauieneelmrg, but that
tho direct advance upon Columbia was not.
materially delayed by the interposition, of
General Match's command on that lino in
shown by Iho fact that seven hours after my
command uul been driven into Columbia on
(ho morning of tho "lib by iv heavy force of
Mood's army coining up through Waynesboro',
before which wo had been pressed buck, light
ing over every inch of ground sinco thotst,
I tecoived thu following order from General
Wilson to send out a squadron lo look for Gen
eral Hutch's command, which had not been
heard from after U p. in. of tho li'M. My com
munication with him was severed on tho night
of the 'A'd, when a. foico of General Forrest's
cavalry was shoved In between us at tho Junc
tion of (ho Waynesboro' and Lauioncebiirg
reads. Tho following In u correct copy of Gen
eial Wilson's communication gyferred (o:
J.OOICINll I'OH OBNBKAI. IIATi'lf.
IlKAiK't'Atnnm Cavai.uv Couch, M. I). M.,
Coi.i'miiia, Ti:nn, Nov 21, 2 p. in., ISO I.
UnNmtAi.i Please send a sipiadion, under a good,
ml he ollk'cf, out on the Louisville pike, with
oideis lo go (III. he piesscs the icar of Waleis'
brigade, or lo Iho nelghboihood of the Cnnpbells
vllle toad, and endeavor to llud Oeueial llateh.
lie was, ti p. in. hiPt nighl, four miles beyond
Campbellsvllle, on the mad towaids Lain eneeburg,
and Irving to icaeh tho military mad. passing
thiougfi Cnmphcllsvillo Ibis morning. Alter (he
olllcer has found (leueral Hatch, let him older him
In iiiaich dheet to Ibis place by (he pilte If possible.
Should ho not be able to Ueepou Ihe ptkeiuid have
to pass to the castwaid, direct him tociouslliiek
Klver ns near Ihls place as convenient, and leport
his condition and location. I. II. Wn.n.v,
To Ihlg.-Ocn. 1. W. Joii.nsuw,
Coni'dg Cav. 1)1 v.
Tho above order was turned over lo mo with
tho following iiidoiseiiieut:
IIitAt'O.UAuir.itK, Cav. Hi v..
November 'I'I. IfsL
Hesprrlfully leferred lo Colonel Hoiaeo Caprou,
who will older the siuadiou as within.
I.leul. Mourns, I.lout., A. A. 0.
Hy older of Ih lg.-( Jen. .Ioiinroh.
It inuppaionl from tho abovo communica
tion (hat by Iho sudden advance of Mood in
forco upon Iho Waynesboro' load, which wan
bin most direct toiite, Geneial Match had been
flanked and his cominunicaiiou cutoff not only
with mo hut with Columbia, and forced (o
take a circuitous route lo icaeh Columbia via
Cumpbcllsvjllo qr further east In fact, across
the lino of General Schofleld's retreat from
J'ulaskl-reaching Columbia ton or moro hours
after tho two armies had coino la contact at
tho vory enhance Ihto (ho (own.
Jt was my dispatch of tho IHth from Waynes
boro (hat first slatted General Sehotleld from
Pulaski on the double quick, and subsequent
hourly couriers that kept him moving at (he
sumo pace which brought the advancu-guard In
not ono moment Hhi soon.
To tho Kdilor National Tkmiunk:
J have tend with consiileiablo interest (ho
novel nl articles which have appeared in your
paper, and havo found the incidents narrated,
so far as I had u peisoual knowledge, in tho
main correct. In your paper of February 8 is
a description of the fight at Mossy Cieek. Al
though I am quite sure I wan there ami on tho
Held In Iho immediate command of all the
troops engaged with tho enemy, yet thoso who
did not know I was there, on reading tlio said
article, would probably only infer that I was
with tho command, because, "In pumtuiiru of
onlors given by Geneial Grant," I "matched at
lliu head of two brigades of General K. M. Me
Cook, lo co-operalo with General Slurgin."
Tho returns for December 120, show " Fllioll's
cavalry, .5,r;i( J;" "ordois given Geneial Flliottby
Major Geneal Foster in pr-ison;"" General Flliott
reported by courier to Geneial Slurgis;" " tho
Union loss, mostly in General Klllolt'n com
mand, was eighteen killed, seventy -seven
wounded and 11 vo prisoners," Ac.
Without going into (lie details of (ho engage
ment at Mossy Creek, which, no doubt, will
appear fully in Iho form of official reports in
the "Ollleial Koeorcls of tho War or tho Uebel
Ilon," now being published, I will only add tho
following ox 1 1 acts from letlcrof General Gcorgo
If. Thomas, commanding Army of tho Cum
berland, mid nolo of Geneial S. D. Sturgis in
reply to my report of tho all'air near Mossy
Creek, Tenn. :
JlicAtaju'ns Dr.i-r. oi-Tiin CuMiu:iu,Am,
Nashville, Tenn., May 10, IKftTi.
riKMriiAi.' I respectfully recommend the piomo
lloiior Ihigmllci (Jencral W. L. Klllolt, IJ. H. vol
unteers, t,o llusiaiik of Major Oencrul of Volunteers
by Ihovel, iVe.
Having sered In various depiiriiuiuils rind dlUer
ent sections of tho country, llilgadler Uencral Kl
llott was, October i II, ISiKI, unleieil to duty in Iho Ue
piiiliiietit of thu Cumberland, anil coiuuiatided the
troopsou the Meld at Mossy Cieok, ICast. Tennesico,
December ill), ISS-'I, gallantly lepulsiug tho attacks
of asupeilor force of tlm enemy, Mindly following
than until daikncsH put mi end to the pursuit.
(Signed) Gr.o. H. q'noMAs.
Major (Jencral U. b. A., Commanding.
To Brig. Oen. L. Thomas,
Adj'tOcii. U. H. A., Washington, I). O.
Extract from note to General Flliolt in reply
to his report of engagement near Mossy Creek,
East Tenn essee, December L'O, 18IK5:
Or.siutAi.: Your welcome ellj-pnlch Is received.
I got up hi thuo In see a pnitaud heard tho balance,-
1 congratulate you on having (roops to
chaigo with such a vim. Vou havo done exceed
ingly well mid I will telegraph botoUcnoiul Fos
ter. Yours, Ace,
(Hignod) H. I). Sruaeiis
IJrliyidior General, fco.
Kcspcclfully, your obedient servant,
W. L. Ki.mott,
Brevet Major General U. S. A.
San Fbancisco, Cat..,
Eobruary 17, 1883.
Tho writer of Mossy Creek acknowledges
his negligonco in not giving moro credit to
General Flliott, tho bravo and elllclent chief of
cavalry of tho Army of tho Cumberland, and,
hut in hand, salulcs him across tho continent.
J. 0. Jrattcndehi, Twentieth Illinois infan
try, of Humboldt, Kan., closes a brief letter on
Pittsburg Landing with tho following sly dig at
Congress tuul-ox-Prcsident Grant:
If tho worthies In Congress wero ns much Inter
ested in Holdlura' righta jim they are hi Ilia welfare
eif Kit.-John 1'oitor wo Would ho better plcani-d
with thom. Hy tho way, I notice that General
Grant saya "thero aro many soldiers who are as
well off aa thoy would havo been if tlioro had been
no war." There uro also many Boldlera who think
ho Is u good dual butter oil' tuua ho would lmv
becu 1 Uicro hud been no war,
THE WAR THE WEST.
Viow of Iho Political Situation in
How it Affected tho People or
GAMP DTOFC KOBINSON.
EslubliAhmonlor tho First Mili
The anomalous iotillou of tho neutrality
(isity in Kentucky in I Hi! I bus mado it tho
subject of much unfavorable comment. Ab
a party It never had an existence. Tho ilis
cordaut elements that composed it in April
and May had produced disintegration in June.
Its waxen wings, Union ami secession, had
mulled beuealh tho penetrating sunlight of n
heated political contest for control of tho Legis
lature, am), while both thereafter lined itftsiv
shield, neither bad any confidence in tho
ability of tho Htato to maintain her neutrality
hy forco of arms. Tho Union portion again
divided after tho election which resulted in
seating a majority of Union men in tho Logiu.i-lure--
into aclivoand passivo Union men. Tho
former wero willing lo niako any mieriflco lo
support tho National Government in Iho strug
gle for life, while tho latter, preferring tho
Union to tho Confederacy, we're slill anxious
fo preserve Iho Stato from the horrors of civil
war. Chief among tho former wore lion. Gar
rett Davis, Or. (Cohort L IJieckourhlge, Lieu
tenant Wm. Nelson, James H. Jackson, 8. G.
Uurhiidgo, Hon. John W. Flnnoll, Thomas L.
Crittenden, Joshua F. 9peed, Hon.Joieph Holt,
Judge Goodloe, lion. C. 0. Burton, W. T. Ward,
J. T. P.oyle, John M. Hiuian, James Speed, and
TItn UNION I'RAon t'AHTY.
Hoii. John J. Crittenden, a lifelong Whig,
tho cherished friend of Henry Clay, was tho
acknowledged leader of tho peaco party. As n
man ho wai loved and honored, and as ft states
man ho was held in rovoronco by tho puoploof
his .Slato and Nation. Uuring n long public
career his voice had nover sounded an uncer
tain nolo whero tho honor of his country had
been involved. Untainted by tho political
fttmoiphoro of tho Capitol at Wanhington, ho
had preserved his integrity and led tv blameless
life In the midst of ft coiiRpiruey that impa
tiently bided Its tlmo lo accomplish its treason
ablo ends. .Tho Syren songs of tho secessionists,
that had ensnared so many weaker men from
the border Slates, had no charms for this Incor
ruptible patriot; tho dogma of "Stuto rights,"
which had precipitated ten Stales into rebellion
against tho attlhorllyof Iho National Govern
ment, formed no part of his political creed. Ho
loved tho Union as only tv great-hearted states
man can lovo lilsconntry,rccogiiizingnosecHon
as paramount in liisafi'ectious,and from tho fltst
approach of the night of rebellion which
now enveloped tho South his influence had
been oxerteel towartl conciliating tho men
whom hostill regarded as his misguided breth
ren. Animated solely by tho lofty purpose of
reuniting tho North and Soulh, Mr. Crittenden
ami his co-workors hoped and believed that tv
general war could bo avoided. That thoy con
tinued lo beliovo so long after tho fact was
patent lo ovory onoclso Inat tho war had actu
ally begun, must bo attributed to thoin(lexi
bllily of purposo that had always been a char
acteristic of tho courageous leader. Tho war
was deemed so Cftuseles, so wicked, and with
out tho shadow of provocation, that tho masses
who followed Mr. Crittenden belioveel, with
him, that something might hodouotoavort tho
horrible calamities that all felt must follow
a general war, but thero never was a. tlmo
when theso men hesitated as lo tho duty of
Kentucky, and her purpose, when tho tlmo for
action should come, if como it must.
A I.liTTKK. rilOM OHNKKAr. riNNIxr,.
Tho following extract from a. recent Idler
written by General Jno. W. Finnell to tho writer
conveys an intelligent Idea of Iho estimation in
which tho followers of General Crittenden iuo
"Tho lovo for tho Union which filled tho
"hearts of tho old Whig or Union and Douglas
Democrats of Kentucky was unspeakably ar
dent ami earnest, ami at no period was it moro
intense and abiding than at this timo. Tho
position of tho Union men in Kentucky was
exceptional. Tho entire military orgauiulioii
of tho State was under the control of tho "rebel
into! est. With Iho exception of 5,000 muskets,
furnished by tho Government, they wero with
out arms, and they woro totally without or
ganization. "They wero strangers to war. Whilo their
faith in the good reuse and patriotism of tho
great mass of tho people had been realized at the
polls, tho conviction that tho war was u strug
gle for tho existence of tho Nation camo upon
them but slowly. Besides, it very booh be
came manifest thatrto a vast number of Union
men it meant tho sacrifice of nearly every Ho
of interest and conminguinity. Neutrality,
therefore, was an expedient, and deemed of
value, in tho hope in llio pootio fancy and
fervid imagination of that day -that there, 'on
tho bosom of llio first born of thu Union, un
stained by fratricidal blood, tho altar might bo
built upon which tho mad passions of both sec
tions might bo burned to ashes;' mid it is
altogether possible that less imaginative pa
triots "regarded it as an exceedingly proper
thing until thoy could obtain another supply
of Lincoln guns.'
"Thero never was in all history a more horoio
spirit of Bclf-Kucrillco than that which animated
tho Union people of Kentucky in that struggle,
from tho attack upon Fort Sumter to tho sur
render of Fort Donolson. Thero never wtw
wiser statesmanship or moro masterly diplo
macy than was displayed by tho Union leaders
during the long season of doubt hi tho summer
of 1801. Nothing was clearer, oven then, than
that If tho war became general, national success
meant tho sacriflco of an immenso proporty
interest; that the position of tho Stato with tho
National Government Involved tho sacriflco of
friends, tho separation of families, possibly to
tho Union people ft surrender of their homes,
tho York of a lifotlmo of caro and labor, aud j
with that, expatriation from tho land thoy
"Stigmatized as 'AbolishlonMs' and 'Sub
missionists,' and with every epilhot mado
hateful by their education, history and tradi
tions, tho Union men workcel steadily on until
by thoir wisdom tind courage thoy wero ablo
at hist lo encircle tho Commonwealth in tho
arms of her loyal people, aud thus save hor to
Till: KOUTItEUN KIOHTfl PA TIT V.
Another formldablo class of people, by reason
of their wealth and influence, was competed ot
citizens who, while thoy had no intention of
taking up arms for the secession of the Stnto or
for the Southern Confederacy, sympathized
wilh Iho cause for which the South had re
belled, and wero styled Southern (light peo
ple. This chevi comprised a largo portion of
tho Rliivoholdors in Central Kentucky, aud
became moro numerous toward thu southwest,
until in. that portion of the Stato bordering
upon' Ten nesice, lying south of tho Cumber
land, known as tho ' Purchase," almost tho ou
tiro population woro in full sympathy wilh tho
rebellion. To ibis claw either Government
was acceptable, provided their right to hold
slaves was guaranteed. Tho establishment o
a Southern Confceleracy, based upon this right,
had at first presented tho attractive featuroof
permanent protection lo this specie's of prop
erty. Tho conciliatory mi'inures adopted by
Stato and National Legislative Assemblies to
ward tho South, followed by the ppoutaucotul
uprising of tho Northern people In responso to
tho call of the President, without regard to
former political alliances, convinced many thnfj
in tho ovent of ft general war solf-intorosd
pointed lo a passive resistance to tlto appeals of
either parly to tho contest. A proclamation of
emancipation at that lime would have precipi
tated Kentucky Into secession, with no powo
in tho bauds of tho Union men to avert it.
Hut thus far tho slavery question, had been
Ignored In tho measures neloptejd by Mr. Lin
coln for tlto suppression of tho rebellion, and
tho belief that the ultlmato triumph of tho
National Government would Ictivo shivery un
touched, nt least in thoso States that had nob
taken up arms against tho Government,
prompted many slaveholders to remain neu
tral, and even to discourago enlistments in tho
Confederato army, whilo thoy cordially sym
pathized with tho ciiuso for which tho Southern
DIVISION OF OOUNSKf.
This belieif, howover, was by no meant
gouoral. Tho prophetic soul of Mr. Vanry am
other Southern orators, who from time to tttnj
visited Koutucky, nided by nutlvo fccesilonlsi
scouted tho idea that tho Itepubliciiu partyJ
tho North, having elected ft President by
overwhelming majority, would accept halfviniy
measures in dealing wilh slavery, if they shoId
in thu cud find themselves in position to dictato
terms of peaco lo a vanquished enemy. Thd
advocates of secession, appealing to thoiiC
chlvalriouharactor, urged upon them thoir duty
to stand by thoir "Southern brothron who
woro engaged in battling fur rights that wcra
ns dear to Kentuckians as to themselves," and
asked if thoy woro indeed degenerate sons of
tho bravo pioneers who had shouldered thole
trusty rillcs and marched through the pathless
wilderness northward, to tho great lakes to
nvongo tho siivago atrocities of tho Indians
committed upon tho infant settlements In
It will thus bo soon that tho people Jn tltfff
portion of tho Stlo wero divided into discord
ant factious. Tho masses, distracted by alter
nate hopes ami fears, doubtful as to thoir duty,
woro subjected to tho constant harangues oi
somo who pleaded witli litem to stand by tho
National Government at all hazards, aud of
others to join llio fortunes of tho young Con
federacy, in whoso cause they had an equal in
terest. Thoy woro urged by tho secession wing of tha
neutrality inirty to maintain an attitttdo of
armed resistance to tho National authority, bub
to remain in tho Union, and by tho Union
wing of the samo party, to remain true to tho
Union audio tho Government, but to abstain
from any act that would Invito Invasion of tho
Stato from either Bide.
THK OOVKUNMKNT TAKES A HAND.
It now becumo tho fixed purposo of tho Gen
eral Government to protect the loyal citizen
of Kentucky and Tonuessco In their constitu
tional rights, and to this end, ou the 27th of
Juno, an order was issued at tho War Depart
ment consolidating Iho States of Kentucky ami
Tennessee in a military district, under command
of Brigadier-General ICobert Anderson, who was
directed to send an ofiicer lo Fast Tennossuo to
muster into thosorvicoof tho Unltcel Stales 10,000
men. Arms aud accoutrements aud an amplo
supply of ammunition wore entered to Cincin
nati for tho uso of that number of men, and to
transport them to their destination ho was au
thorized to muster into Hie service of tho United
Slates four regiments in Southeast Kentucky.
Tho olllcer designated for this duty wits Lieu
tenant William Nelson, of tho United Stutus
CAMP OICIC itoniNSON.
After couferenco with prominent National
Union men In tho adjoining countius, Nitlson
determined to locale his camp of instruction In
Garrard county, at tho farm of Mr. Dick UoU
imon, ii firm adherent to tho Government, at
thu junction of tho Danville turnpike with tho
pike leading froniNicholasvillo toCrabOrchanl,
in tho direction of Cumberland Gap. A rloh
and fertile country under a high slate of culti
vation surrounded tlio camp. A fair proportion
of tho inhabitants woro friendly to the outar
priso, many of whom were ardent supportara of
thu National Govornmout.
NicholaRVillo, eight miles distant, was tlio
southern terminus of tho Koutucky Central
Kail road, connecting it with Cincinnati;
whilo only twelve miles farther north, ou
tho lino of tho sumo road, is the city, of- Lex
ington, located in tho centre of that beautiful
portion of Kentucky known as "Tho Uluo
From Lexington two railroads were in opera
tion, tho ono to Louisville and tho other to
Cincinnati, whilo broad turnpike rowls leel by
various routes to the Ohio ICiver. With theso
separate routes for tho transportation of sup
plies communication with the base at Cincin
nati was regarded as secure. In case tiie railroad
bridges should be burned by tho seccsslonista
tho turnpikes to Maysvillo and other polntfj
afforded access to tho North. Iletween tho
camp and NIcholasvillo is tlio Kentucky Itiver,
whoo precipitous banks and eleep gorges af
forded many geod positions for succemAil resist
ance. In caso an attack from a superior forco
advancing from tho southeast made it UQCdssary
for tho recruits to fall back before thoy woro
sufiiciently well organized to protect thenisclvai
in the open eocntrj.
(3b be continued.