

OUTLINE THE PLANS OF THE COMMANDER. It was necessary now to wait for Sherman's Corps to come up. Sherman's march was from Milliken's Bend. He reached Hard Times on the 6th, and arrived at Grand Gulf on that night and the following day. McClelland and McPherson were wholly upon the three days' rations which they had brought in haversacks from Bruinsburg. They now foraged vigorously, found plenty of beef and mutton, and with the little corn the enemy had left in the country were contented comfortably. Before undertaking any other movement, however, more liberal supplies were needed. The two corps were without camp equipment and ambulances. Field officers were on foot, and every division and corps commander was living like the rest of us.

FROM HANK TO MOULT. From the 3rd to the 8th of May, while McClelland's Corps lay in the neighborhood of Willow Springs, the horses, rations, ammunition and other necessities continued to arrive. The rations comprised only coffee, salt and hard bread, but with these and what could be gathered the troops could live. On the 6th McClelland's Corps came from Hankinson's Ferry, passed McClelland, and encamped near Rocky Springs. On the 8th Sherman's Corps arrived, and on the following day the whole army moved eastward toward Jackson. We of McClelland's (Thirteenth) Corps were lying on the banks of the Mississippi, and the Fifth (Fifteenth) Corps passed us on May 8, as above stated.

A MEMORABLE SCENE. While the corps was passing a scene was enacted that I shall not forget while memory lasts. Regiment after regiment, and company after company, were marching and attracting no special attention and eliciting nothing but the stereotyped question, "Say, boys, what regiment?" But finally came the 5th Wis. "The Live Eagle" regiment, with "Old Abe" standing broadside, and marching with piercing eyes upon the marching battalions, and listening with half-averted head, to the music of hands and the cheers of the multitude. On the 8th Sherman's Corps arrived in real life, who had gone through several campaigns with his regiment, made the soldiers wild with enthusiasm. I have seen "Old Abe" several times since the war, but never did he impress me as he did on the 8th of May, 1863.

McClelland's Corps took the left-hand road by way of Raymond; McClelland had the right, while Sherman's Corps took the middle road, and corps divided on both roads, watching carefully toward the left to guard the ferries of Black River, from which Pemberton might emerge and assail Grant's rear.

A CRISIS OF DEPOSITION. Soon after starting Grant heard that the enemy in force was fortifying Edwards Station, on the Vicksburg & Jackson Railroad, six miles east of where the railroad crosses the Big River. He therefore determined to strike the railroad and public buildings, and McClelland, whose men had done comparatively little fighting, was to continue on via Utica to Raymond and Jackson, at which latter place the Johnston and Sherman's Corps were to meet. McClelland was to cross from the right to the left, move directly northward, demonstrating against Edwards Station and striking the railroad east of that point somewhere near Bolton.

This would cut Pemberton off from rejoining Jackson, where McPherson, aided, if necessary, by Sherman, would capture and destroy the railroad and public buildings, and then return rapidly along the railroad and confront Edwards Station and Vicksburg. From Hankinson's Ferry to Raymond was 25 miles; to Jackson was 20 miles further. From Bolton to Jackson was 10 miles. Sherman's Corps kept his three corps within supporting distance of each other, no matter from what point they might be assailed.

On the 5th McClelland marched to near Utica on the road to Raymond, and McClelland marched to Pitt Creek, where he came up with the rear of a rebel force and skirmished with it without any important result, the enemy falling back about a mile. Sherman's Corps was to the right of McClelland, holding the center of the advance, with headquarters at Cayuga, to which point Grant moved on the 10th. He had then in hand 43,000 of men.

THEY WERE ALL VETERANS. They were all veterans, able-bodied, confident in the ability of their leader, and ready for anything. The important movements of Sherman and McPherson from the 11th to the 15th may be briefly indicated. At 3:30 on the morning of the 11th, Logan's Division of the Seventeenth Corps moved toward Raymond, followed half an hour later by the division of Crocker. At 11 o'clock in the morning Logan's leading brigade struck the enemy's rear, under Gen. Gregg, two miles west of Raymond. Ordering the train out of the road, Logan's remaining brigade was brought up on a trot, with Gregg's division in the lead, and with impetuous fury that before noon the advance force had the enemy routed and flying, with a battery, judiciously posted, making the retreating column. The engagement lasted only an hour, but it was a severe one, and 341 wounded. The enemy lost 100 killed, 325 wounded, and 415 prisoners.

A DREARY AND RAINY DAY. A dreary and rainy day on that afternoon, making the roads almost impassable, and McClelland's Corps, pursued Grant, and where he encamped for the night. The road to Jackson was now open, and Grant, learning that Gen. Joe Johnston was there expecting the enemy to re-advance, ordered the point determined to go there with the center of Sherman and McPherson. In order to receive Pemberton, who was in position in heavy force at Edwards Station, waiting to be attacked, McClelland was directed to strike the enemy in that direction. This was done, the skirmish line of Osterhaus's Division pushing to within two miles of Edwards Station, and developing the enemy in force. He decided this skirmish line to be the main line of attack, and his other divisions advanced by the flank and pushed on to Raymond, so as to keep within supporting distance of Sherman and McPherson, who were marching toward the rear of Johnston at Jackson. McClelland struck the railroad at Clinton on the 13th, cut the road and telegraph, capturing some important dispatches and some of the telegraph wires of Johnston and Pemberton, and then hurried on Jackson, which place was captured by the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps on the 14th. Johnston fled with the wreck of his army northward toward Canton, and Sherman was set to work destroying the railroad, the arsenal, bridges, military stores, and everything of value to the Confederacy. Hasting by one night, McClelland's two divisions crossed the advance, started back with all speed to the support of McClelland, who was now facing westward on the line from Raymond north to Bolton. Sherman's Division of the Thirteenth Corps was further west, at Clinton, but McClelland came up with it and both came on together, reaching Bolton about midnight.

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McClelland's two Divisions came up over the hill, Carr's Division on the right, being ordered across the road, coming up from the southeast. Grant met Carr at the fork of the road, told him that the enemy was in full retreat, and ordered him to follow up the advance, to pursue. The order was promptly executed. Osterhaus, on Carr's left, also got into the road as quickly as possible, and the two divisions came up to the summit of the hill. Five miles away, on the southern road, the rebels struck the rear-guard and attacked it sharply. A horse battery was rushed up to the front, and advancing by sections, shelled and drove the flying column.

AN EFFECTIVE BATTLE. A body of rebels, probably a regiment, was seen in a meadow nearly a mile to the left of the road, trying to escape across Baker's Creek. McClelland, having no cavalry, sent a gun to call them down. The rebels were ordered to advance, started back with all speed to the support of McClelland, who was now facing westward on the line from Raymond north to Bolton. Sherman's Division of the Thirteenth Corps was further west, at Clinton, but McClelland came up with it and both came on together, reaching Bolton about midnight.

ON THE MORNING of that day Osterhaus's advance led captured Bolton, striking with a number of prisoners, one of whom, a negro, the servant of a brigade commander in Pemberton's army, confirmed the report that the garrison of Vicksburg was at Edwards Station, marching eastward.

TO ATTACK MCCLELLAND. Grant's rear. McClelland accordingly faced his line westward, and the rear of the Federal army became its front. Three roads led westward from between the mountain and the Edwards Station. The two most northerly of these converge and unite at a point six miles east of the station, known as Champion's Hill. On the right hand of this point, the road was Hovey's Division of McClelland's Corps, and behind him McPherson, with his two Divisions commanded by Logan and Crocker. On the center of the line, Sherman, with the Divisions of Carr and Osterhaus on the left hand road, four miles from the center one, were Osterhaus's Division, which had just arrived from Grand Gulf, with 200 wagon loads of food (the only rations received by Grant's army during those memorable 12 days), and A. J. Smith's Division of McClelland's Corps; Blair, while belonging to Sherman's Corps, from his position at the time mentioned was temporarily under the command of McClelland.

THE BATTLE OF CHAMPION'S HILL. In the order above mentioned, Grant's army moved forward. A. J. Smith, on the southern road, struck the enemy first at 1 o'clock in the morning. He had in hand 10,000 men, and he pushed up a battery and opened fire briskly. The enemy, on his way to Clinton by way of Raymond, thinking he had struck the whole of Grant's army, withdrew, turned northward by a lateral road, and was followed by the northern route across Champion's Hill and

of in triumph. McClelland and his staff found in a man a sub-apple "preserves," and upon this they fed. Hovey's Division of heroes—the half that was left of it—remained on the battlefield to collect the wounded and bury the dead. Large fields of corn were destroyed. The skirmishers were driven in, uncovering the enemy in heavy force. McClelland's orders were to feed the enemy sharply, but not to bring on a general engagement unless he was sure of success. Meanwhile he was to establish communication with Hovey on the right, and Blair and Smith on the left. The responsibility which he felt in this situation was too much for McClelland; it made him over-tactful, and prevented him from pushing Osterhaus and Carr as they should have been pushed on that day. Instead of pushing Osterhaus, who had the advance of the center road, McClelland held him back, and endeavored to establish communications with Hovey, who, away to the right, was by 11 o'clock furiously engaged. Logan came up. Hovey's right went in impetuously, moving far enough around to the right to leave space for Crocker, who attacked with splendid spirit. Nothing in the war surpassed the fighting on the morning of the 19th. At 1 o'clock in the morning the three divisions were engaged. Hovey charged up the hill with fearful loss, capturing a battery of five guns. McClelland's failure to attack vigorously, left the enemy in his front free to march toward the left and

WREAK HIS WHOLE FURY upon Hovey and Crocker. Hovey's captured battery was lost, then retaken—captured and retaken not less than four times, the rebel and Union situated was too much for McClelland; it made him over-tactful, and prevented him from pushing Osterhaus and Carr as they should have been pushed on that day. Instead of pushing Osterhaus, who had the advance of the center road, McClelland held him back, and endeavored to establish communications with Hovey, who, away to the right, was by 11 o'clock furiously engaged. Logan came up. Hovey's right went in impetuously, moving far enough around to the right to leave space for Crocker, who attacked with splendid spirit. Nothing in the war surpassed the fighting on the morning of the 19th. At 1 o'clock in the morning the three divisions were engaged. Hovey charged up the hill with fearful loss, capturing a battery of five guns. McClelland's failure to attack vigorously, left the enemy in his front free to march toward the left and

Champion's Hill is a rough, irregular mound, 200 feet high, and is the only one of its kind on its slopes, and cut and nearly rugged ravines, filled with dense undergrowth, and almost impassible. The hill is two miles in length, from north to south, by a mile in width. The Union army, under Sherman, and McClelland, respectively, were advancing with it at its summit. Upon this hill was Pemberton, with 80 regiments of infantry and 100 regiments of cavalry, about 40,000 men. He had, in fact, more than he could use to the advantage, and the density with which his troops were massed only aggravated their slaughter. By 2 o'clock Logan had pushed his Division clear round the northern point of Crocker's Division into the gap on Hovey's right. The two fresh brigades attacked with superb valor. Hovey's exhausted men were inspired with new courage, and they fought gallantly up the hill, and after a desperate struggle of an hour, the whole left wing of Pemberton's army was broken and thrown pell-mell over against Osterhaus and Carr, who, by that time, two leagues to the rear, had advanced determinedly and become hotly engaged.

McClelland, unaware of what had taken place on the right, mistook the noise of fighting for the noise of the enemy upon him, and instead of changing his company, he took of Pemberton, simply held his ground, firing rapidly, but permitting

THE BROKEN REBEL ARMY TO ESCAPE down the southwestern slope of the hill toward Bolton. Our own regiment (the 42d Ohio) narrowly escaped destruction. As previously related, during the advance in the morning we had been deployed as skirmishers in advance of our (Osterhaus's) Division, and had been engaged sharply at the margin of the wood. After half an hour there, we were sent off to the right of the road and ordered to report to Gen. Garrett, commanding one of Carr's Brigades. Maj. W. Williams, who was in command of the regiment, Col. Sheldon suffering from a wound received at Thompson's Hill, and Lieut. Col. Parlin being on duty at Corps Headquarters, the command devolved upon me. I was then forming to charge through a line which thickened that fringed the wood. The 42d promptly took position. The line pushed rapidly forward through the thicket, which was so dense that the companies could see but one another. The 42d kept well in line, however, and was charging through the brush in handsome style, when the regiment suddenly came upon the main body of the enemy's infantry, which rose and fired through the opening foliage. The distance between the two lines was only a few paces, but the 42d was well covered that its losses from this volley were 300 men. The 42d was then ordered to advance, and a sharp skirmish was continued for several minutes. Soon we discovered that the enemy's fire, which had been wholly in front, began to wrap round the flanks of our line. The regiment was ordered to retreat, and our line was thrown back, and our line was 20 rods to the front of everything, with both our flanks exposed. There was but one way to avoid being surrounded, and that was to retreat and re-establish the line.

The 42d was therefore ordered back to a ridge some 300 yards to the rear, where the line was re-established. The rebels followed closely, but at the command the regiment faced about and

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