

received instructions from Washington to fortify Cumberland Gap strongly, making it as nearly as possible an impregnable base of operations against East Tennessee—a veritable Gibraltar. In pursuance of these instructions Morgan dispersed his troops to the best possible advantage in the pass and its environs, and proceeded without delay to the fortification and armament of the place.

The works partially destroyed by the rebels were repaired, and rifle trenches and covered ways were cut. The Government dispatched from Washington Lieut. W. R. Craighill, of the Corps of Engineers, to Superintend the work. Lieut. Craighill put a large force of men to work on the fortifications, and in two weeks the main pass was absolutely impregnable.

Against direct assault, supplies were brought from Lexington, the road having been in the meantime graded and repaired and put in good condition. An arsenal capable of storing several thousand stands of small-arms was erected. The armament of the place consisted of four 30-pound Parrott guns mounted on siege carriages, in addition to the artillery Gen. Morgan had taken with him over the mountain. The rebels had skinned and left four 65-pound smooth-bore cannon and two sea-coast howitzers, which Morgan did not utilize, they being interior ordnance and without ammunition.

A large magazine was constructed on the slope of the mountain, and was amply supplied. Depots were constructed for the Commissary and Quartermaster's Departments, with capacity sufficient to supply 20,000 men for six months. The buildings, however, were not completely stored; had they been when Kirby Smith invaded Kentucky, in August, 1862, the history of the Seventh Division during the following six months would have been vastly different from the one I am now writing. During the occupation of the Gap the duties of the soldiers were varied between fatigue duty on the fortifications, drill, guard, and picket duty. The health of the troops, however, was excellent, with plenty of healthful exercise, was excellent. A short time after Morgan's occupation of the stronghold the enemy posted a large force of men on the southward, on the Morristown road. Morgan soon began to chafe at a host with him. He became anxious to dislodge the rebel army from East Tennessee, with the stronghold as a base of operations.

The citizens of East Tennessee still adhered to the Union with unswerving loyalty and devotion, and were impatiently waiting for an opportunity to rise and aid in the expulsion of their despised enemies from their territory. Morgan had already five Tennessee regiments in his Division, composed of men who had fled from their homes.

Like hunted animals, leaving their families to the doubtful mercy of their bitter and implacable foes. These were now anxious to return to the defense of their homes and families. Gen. Morgan repeatedly besought the Secretary of War and Gen. Buell for reinforcements and an order to invade East Tennessee, representing that the occupation of that important territory and the destruction of the Virginia & East Tennessee Railroad would strike a telling blow upon Lee, would seriously cripple him, and would lead to the abandonment of all Northern Virginia. On August 22 from Memphis, Tenn., he telegraphed to Secretary Stanton and Gen. Buell:

I might as well be without eyes as without cavalry. The enemy is well taken upon a strong position in the Clinch Mountains, the direction of Morristown. I would advance if authorized, but this place would be threatened from the enemy's present position. One strong brigade, with 200 cavalry to act as foragers and scouts, should be sent to the Gap, strengthened by two brigades of infantry, one battery of artillery, and two regiments of cavalry. With such a force I could sweep East Tennessee of every rebel soldier.

On the 1st of July he again telegraphed: I believe that the enemy's force in East Tennessee has been more than doubled since the evacuation of Cumberland Gap. It would seem that the success of the late campaign has led to the concentration of a large force of rebels in East Tennessee from Atlanta to Chattanooga.

Morgan did not receive the desired reinforcements, and Secretary Stanton forbade him to advance without the approval of the War Department, was concerning itself more especially with Gen. Buell's operations with a vast army in Middle Tennessee, who was allowing Bragg and Forrest to sweep into Kentucky. Morgan was forbidden to advance, and his movements, and compelled to swallow his disappointment and content himself with the petty business of holding Cumberland Gap.

About Aug. 10 Kirby Smith advanced northward into Kentucky, moving in two columns, one crossing at Rogers and the other at Big Creek Gap. He cut off the Federal supply depots and stores, and again made his headquarters in the mountains. He suffered the loss of his trains, was prevented from accumulating supplies.

FROM THE HARVEST FIELDS to augment his reserve stores, and was compelled to fall back upon his scanty stock previously accumulated. Morgan came to the point where he had more than half his force from first to last during the time of occupation, and much of the time they had less than one-third of the strength which they had at the beginning, and repeatedly and persistently for food and relations without avail. On Aug. 10 he telegraphed Secretary Stanton:

I have only three weeks' supplies, and these are half rotten. That was his last communication with Washington, and he emerged from the wilderness and reached the Ohio River in the month of October, 1862. The night of the 10th John Morgan, with a considerable cavalry force, the vanguard of Kirby Smith's army, struck the telegraph line near Cumberland Gap, and cut off all communication with the War Department. Kirby Smith advanced to make his northward movement by investing Cumberland Gap on the south side by Gen. C. L. Stevenson's army of about 20,000 men. A second objective of this movement was to preclude the possibility of a Federal raid upon Knoxville from Cumberland Gap, shut Morgan up in his expedition, and eventually starve him into a capitulation, and then march on to the position. The investment of his train by Smith seemed to make his ultimate capture sure. Stevenson, hoping to hasten this movement, closed his lines around Morgan, and Morgan's foraging ground to the limited area under the range of his cannon. The foraging had up to the investment been general and unrestricted, within a radius of 20 miles around. A sharp encounter with the enemy was a result of one of these foraging raids.

THE TAZEWELL EXPEDITION. On the morning of Aug. 2 Morgan dispatched Col. John H. De Courcy with the 16th and 42d Ohio and 14th Ky. and sent the 1st W. Va. battery, in all about 1,300 men, with 200 wagons, on a foraging expedition to Tazewell, a hamlet 12 miles to the southward of the Gap. The expedition reached Tazewell late in the afternoon of the same day. De Courcy camped his brigade near the town during the night, and in the morning moved four miles to the southward, to the edge of water in the neighborhood of Big Springs.

At the crossing of the stream the main road branches, the right leading in a westerly direction to the station, and the left leading to the Clinch Mountains easterly, to Bean's Station. The first object of De Courcy's attention was a mill two miles up the creek valley, said to contain a large amount of corn. The corn there stored was wanted by Morgan, and De Courcy determined to seize it. The train passed the fork of the road, where a strong guard was left to prevent its capture and secure the return of the laden train. Col. De Courcy took the 16th Ohio and 14th Ky., and companies D, E, H, F and G of the 42d Ohio, with the train, and left Lieut-Col. Don A. Pardee, of the 42d, with companies A, B, C, F and K of the 42d Ohio, and Foster's two guns, to guard the fork of the road.

Very soon signs of the enemy were visible in the vicinity of the junction of the roads where Col. Pardee was posted, and the Colonel quickly made his dispositions for defense. He planted one gun near the fork, so posted as to rake the road leading toward the Clinch Mountains, as his attack was expected from that direction. The other gun was posted on a sharp rise of ground to the right and rear of the other gun, in a favorable position to command the approach of any force that might come from the rear. The other gun was posted on a sharp rise of ground to the right and rear of the other gun, in a favorable position to command the approach of any force that might come from the rear.

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without the loss of a man or a horse. De Courcy and his little command watched the exploit with intense and nervous interest, and when Hackett galloped up he and his detachment were heartily congratulated on their daring feat and fortunate escape. Col. De Courcy, however, cautioned him not to do so daring and reckless a thing again.

The enemy swarmed in still augmented force on the distant hill, and De Courcy began to be fearful that he could not hold him in check until night. Reliable scouts and prisoners informed him that he was confronted by four full brigades, numbering 17,000 men. He required no argument to convince the veteran soldier, De Courcy, that the situation was critical in the extreme, and that it would be very hazardous to attempt to retreat to Cumberland Gap by daylight. To make an exaggerated show of strength he repeated Col. Pardee's tactics of the day before. He spread out his brigade in single rank, marching and countermarching companies over exposed positions, to give the appearance of an army corps forming a line of battle. Gen. Stevenson's headquarters were a mile away, from which he studied De Courcy's deceptive tactics through a fieldglass. Hourly

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AN APPEAL

To Congress to Help the Department of the Potomac.

THE RELIEF COM. DEPT. OF THE POTOMAC, GRAND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC, G. A. R. HALL, COR. 9TH AND D STS., N. W. WASHINGTON, D. C., Dec. 18, 1886.

To the Hon. Board of Managers, National Home for Disabled Soldiers.

GENTLEMEN: Representing the Grand Army of the Republic of the District of Columbia, we have the honor to state your Honorable Board that, under the peculiar and anomalous circumstances of our location, our organization in the District of Columbia is under an unusual and anomalous and a most deplorable state of affairs.

Our organization in the District of Columbia is under an unusual and anomalous and a most deplorable state of affairs. We are a body of men who have served our country bravely and faithfully, and who are now in need of the aid and assistance of our country.

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"OLD BEN."

And How He Silenced the Guns of a Rebel Battery.

CORONER NATIONAL TRIBUNE: Benedict Von Train, an old German, came to my company (11th Pa.) in September, 1863. He had served 24 years as a soldier in the Prussian army. "Old Ben," as we used to call him, went as a substitute for some brave fellow of the type who are now howling so much about pensions. Old Ben showed himself a soldier and gained the respect of all his comrades and officers.

On one occasion during the Atlanta campaign, near Lost Mountain, Ga., our regiment got uncomfortably close to a rebel battery. Its fire was very annoying to our troops. I was at the time in command of my company. Old Ben came to me saying: "Captain, our lot me go out dere to dot big tree I will learn dem tam shells soundings already. Ich can't stand dot shells coming ober hars all day."

I asked him how he alone intended to stop them if he went to the big tree. It would be very dangerous for him to go out there, as he was fully exposed to the enemy's pickets. But all Ben came to me saying: "Captain, our lot me go out dere to dot big tree I will learn dem tam shells soundings already. Ich can't stand dot shells coming ober hars all day."

Ben wanted permission, and he would show us the rest. I consented, and Ben armed himself with three muskets and his hatchet. John Smith, another private, volunteered to accompany and lead for him. Smith took the muskets and Ben picked up a chunk of a log and shouldered it, and over the breastworks they went on the run. The tree was a large elm with great flanking roots, and stood 20 rods in front of our line. They soon arrived at their little forest in safety, and Ben made a dash for it. He went to work with his hatchet, and in a notch in a roof facing the battery, he hid his log up to protect his head, and he was ready for business. Sticking his gun through the little hole he began to shoot. The enemy's shot ground next day there were 11 graves of men from the battery. No doubt as many more were wounded.

Nothing was Old Ben's reward for such a brave act? The Division General made a report that he had at last silenced those troublesome guns, and Gen. Sherman thanked him very kindly for his services in holding the line, and remain a private soldier to the end of the war, when he received an honorable discharge for his bravery and good conduct. I hope Old Ben is still alive and enjoying good health, and should like to see him. I would be glad to hear from him.—C. A. LANG, Sergeant, Co. I, 11th Pa., Cochranton, Pa.

THE COYOTE.

Sagacity of the Dog-Wolf of the Plains. [From "Lugger" in Popular Science Monthly.]

It is during the weeks going just before and following immediately after the birth of the puppies that the old coyotes work their hardest and best. They are hunting at this time, our wolf adds to his ordinary pertinacity and zeal, the sagacity and endurance necessary to turn his victims and drive them back as near as possible to their lair, knowing that otherwise his mate and her whelps will be unable to partake of the feast.

A remarkable picture of this was given some years ago by a writer in an English magazine, and is one of the best of the kind. It has ever been my fortune to read, detailed such a chase as witnessed by him in the grand forests near Lake Nicaragua. "Certainly," he writes, "but the conduct of the hunt is certainly no training could have bettered that dog's run. To drive a grown buck back to his starting place, to send on a portion of the pack to that point where he would strive to break cover, to head him again and again into the cover where his speed could not be exerted to the full, were feats which might well puzzle all the best dogs in England, and the human intellect would be at a loss to explain them. His game and his getting are not always so noble as this, however, and the coyote knows well the pinch of famine, especially in winter. The main object of his life seems to be the satisfying of a hunger, which is always craving; and to this aim all his cunning, intelligence and audacity are mainly directed. Nothing comes amiss. Though by no means swift-footed, he is a very good runner upon the plains, he runs down the deer, the pronghorn and others, tiring them out by trickery and then overpowering them by force of numbers. The buffalo follows him, and he is an unflinching supply, in the shape of caribou or moose, which he has followed to the white wolves—who steadily followed the herds, as upon some desert or aged stag, or upon an antelope, he is able to surround and pull down. In such piracy the coyotes themselves often engaged, though it tried their highest powers; and success followed a system of tireless waiting. The deer was driven upon which they concentrated, might trample and gore half the pack, but the rest would "stay by him" and finally nag him to death. I remember once seeing a pack of coyotes, strategy by which a large stag was forced to succumb to a pack that had driven it upon the ice of a frozen lake. Part of the wolves formed a circle about the pond, within which the exhausted stag was driven, and he was chased round and round by patrols, frequently relieved, until, fainting with fatigue and loss of blood, the noble animal fell to be torn to pieces in an instant.

GEN. GRANT'S MEMOIRS.

The second volume of the Personal Memoirs of Gen. U. S. Grant, published by Webster & Co., is at length issued and ready for delivery. Many of our readers have been supplied with copies of volume one of this National Tribune, and we are prepared to furnish them volume two upon the same terms. Volume two is a trifle larger than the first, and is bound in the same style. The press work and binding, however, of the second volume is rather better, owing to less haste in execution than in the first. The price of each in cloth is \$2.50, or \$7 for the two. We send either volume upon these terms postpaid to anyone desiring the work.

CONDENSED LETTERS.

Robert Batscher, Co. G, 70th Ind., Stewarison, Ill., is content that his regiment, which belonged to the First Brigade, Third Division, Twentieth Corps, had something to do with the capture of the four-gun fort at Roscoe. He says he received a wound in the right elbow that laid him up until the following November, and his regiment lost 26 killed and wounded in less than 15 minutes.

James Ayer, Co. I, 1st N. Y. Cav., New Brunswick, N. J., would be glad to hear from any of his comrades who were captured and paroled with him at Manassas Junction during the retreat of Gen. Pope. After being paroled he was sent to a hospital in Georgetown and afterward to the prisoners' camp at Annapolis. J. McVittie, Lockport, N. Y., thinks the treatment of the disabled soldiers by the Government in its failure to keep its pledges, furnish another example of the ingratitude of republicans. He says that many who are seriously disabled receive a beggarly pittance of \$2 a month, which he thinks is wholly disproportionate to the injuries received and services rendered.

J. H. Reed, Sergeant, Co. H, 15th Iowa, Circleville, Kan., says in regard to a permanent place to hold a reunion, that Fort Riley, Kan., is not only a geographic center, and the fort grounds are large enough to accommodate all that may come. Besides, it is one of the prettiest places to be seen, and a railroad center. He thinks the Government can well afford to give the entire reservation to the soldiers as a place to hold Reunions and Encampments. A. B. M. Ellis, Co. C, 29th Iowa, Montpelier, Iowa, says that at the battle of Jenkins's Ferry, Kan., he and his comrades, the 24th Kan., was a colored regiment and its members "fought nobly."

Robert Bryant, Co. A, 50th Ind., Lawler, Ind., sends a copy of the official report of the services of his regiment at the battle of Jenkins's Ferry. C. M. Crandall, Co. D, 64th N. Y., and 13th N. Y. H. A., Independence, Mo., referring to the article from a Kansas comrade suggesting that a permanent place be chosen for holding Reunions, unions, says: "I think we ought to raise money and buy 640 acres of land centrally located, with good railroad facilities, put up barracks, set out shade trees, fences, and make it permanent. There are 125,000 old soldiers in Kansas and several thousand more in the border Counties of Missouri, and an average contribution of \$1 from each would insure us magnificent grounds for holding Reunions, and set the ball moving, and the comrades of Missouri will respond."

Samuel P. Burke, Q. M. Sergeant, Co. B, 11th Ind. Cavalry, Wash. D. C., says that thousands of the old comrades on the Pacific coast and thousands more coming. He says the Pacific coast territory was acquired by the United States through the blood and sweat of the Mexican war soldiers, and was reclaimed from the savage tribes of Indians by Gen. Custer and others of his kind. He thinks the Government can well afford to not only give homes in the West to its great debtors, but also to encourage and assist them in emigrating and do much toward developing the country. T. E. Buckingham, Box 93, Clinton, Mo., inquires how many of the 98th Ill. were killed and injured by the railroad smash-up at Bridgeport, Ill., in August or September, 1862. He would be glad to hear from any of his old comrades of Wilder's Brigade, to which he belonged.

W. H. Webster, Lansingburg, N. Y., thinks that great injustice has been done by the decision of the Secretary of the Interior by which the retained non-combatants were allowed to remain a private soldier to the end of the war, when he received an honorable discharge for his bravery and good conduct. I hope Old Ben is still alive and enjoying good health, and should like to see him. I would be glad to hear from him.—C. A. LANG, Sergeant, Co. I, 11th Pa., Cochranton, Pa.

Thomas Little, Engineer of the wrecked train at Rio, had a gallant soldier in the 24th W. Va. Of the terrible loss of the wreck at Rio—Where, pent in a flaming prison, The lives of a score were lost.

You have heard how "some one blundered," And how a single bullet, flying through the air, The flying express train thundered Through the open gates of death; While firm as a man of iron, Her brave old engineer, Retaining but the conduct of his train, Stood staunch, without a fear!

You may tell of history's heroes; But find me if you can One man who has plighted more freely His life for his fellow man. One thought of the souls behind him—Of the horrors before—and then His hand had grasped the lever, And the strength of a dozen men; One sigh for the friends who loved him, For his comrade's "good-bye," But never a thought of flinching— He would do his duty.

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