FIGHTING THEM OVER.

What Our Veterans Have to Say About Their Old Campaigns.

BANKS'S EXPEDITION.

Shaw's Brigade at Pleasant Hill, La.

EDITOR NATIONAL TRIBUNE:

FROM the first reception of THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE I have welcomed its weekly visits. Its pages have been read with interest, especially those containing accounts of marches and battles in which I was a participant. I think it important that the private soldier should be given an opportunity to relate his experience, for his story may often reveal errors that have crept into history. We as soldiers know that some of the general reports are not strictly correct.

During the years that I have been a reader of THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE I have never contributed a line to its columns, but since the correspondence relating to the Red River expedition, and especially the letters of J. E. Cutter, 29th Me., in the issues of Aug. 21 and Sept. 18, in answer to Bryson, 27th Iowa, and others, I have been prompted to venture a shot.

Not being skilled in the use of the "mightier weapon," the reader will not find a fluent sketch, but what I have to say I will endeavor to do it frankly and plainly. I harbor no jealousy or distrust toward, neither have I any abuse to give, the comrades in the ranks of the Nineteenth Corps, and believe I can safely say the same feeling is shared by a large majority of my comrades in Shaw's Brigade, Sixteenth Corps. The bravery and soldierly conduct of the men composing the First Division, Nineteenth Corps, is not called in question. Many of them had been tested on too many battlefields to doubt their fighting qualities, nor do we desire to hold them responsible for the action of their commanding officers. Some of the latter we of the Sixteenth Corps do censure severely.

The whole controversy hinges on the position and action of the Second Brigade, Third Division, Sixteenth Corps, commanded by Col. Wm. T. Shaw, 14th Iowa, in the battle of Pleasant Hill, La., April 9, 1864. Being a member of that brigade, I was with it throughout the expedition, participated in all its engagements, and profess to know something of what it did on that occasion. I know it not only from memory, but also from notes entered in a diary the next day. First I will endeavor to give a brief statement of our action on that day, and then take the liberty of throwing a few hardtack for Comrade Cutter to masticate.

The morning of April 7 found us at Grand Ecore, with orders to march in the direction of Shreveport. The Nineteenth Corps preceded us one day. It commenced raining about 10 o'clock a. m.; heavy marching; rain increased toward night; went into camp at dark, making less than 20 miles; rain continued through the night; morning of the 8th found us early on the road; the day was cloudy; occasionally a light shower, until 4 o'clock p. m. the clouds broke and the sun shone out bright and warm. At the time we first heard the sound of battle in front. We went into camp at sundown, just east of the village of Pleasant Hill.

About 2 o'clock on the morning of the 9th we were aroused from slumber by the noise of a rabble passing along the road near our camp, going "pell-mell" to the rear. Upon investigation found the crowd composed of negroes and riff-raff of the army, together with straggling soldiers, both armed and unarmed, all declaring Banks's forces were all cut to pieces up at Mansfield.

Not seeing any wounded among them we commenced to taunt them, asking where the troops were, and if they were not making pretty quick time for fellows that were all cut to pieces. They did not stop to answer. Dick Taylor was coming, and they must git. Shortly after this we were instructed to hold ourselves in readiness on the arrival of the Nineteenth Corps to cover the retreat to Grand Ecore.

We awaited orders until near 9 a. m., when Gen. Banks ordered Shaw's Brigade to the front. We moved out on the Mansfield road, through Pleasant Hill and some 600 yards beyond, where we relieved a brigade of the Nineteenth Corps, which I take to be the Second, as it contained a Pennsylvania regiment. I talked with a Sergeant of the regiment, who gave me an account of the disaster at Sabine Crossroads the previous day. And according to the assignment of Comrade Cutter there was but one Pennsylvania regiment in the First Division, Nineteenth Corps, and that he places in the Second Brigade. When relieved it withdrew to the rear, and that is the last I know of its location.

Col. Shaw moved his brigade still farther to the front, took position, and formed line of battle in the east edge of an old field at right angles with the Mansfield road. Facing due west, some 200 yards in front of our line, and running nearly parallel with it, was a high ridge declining to the south, extending a little past the center of the brigade which obstructed the view of the right of the brigade, but on the left the view was unobstructed across the field, broken only by a few scattering thickets. Immediately in our rear up to and near the Mansfield road was a dense growth of young pines. Off to the right and front the ground appeared more broken.

The position of the regiments in the brigade from right to left were, respectively, 24th Mo. on the right and north of the Mansfield road; 14th Iowa, right resting on the road; 27th and 32d Iowa on the left. My company was ordered forward as skirmishers, and we took position on the ridge previously mentioned, where we had a clear view of nearly the whole field. Our orders were to fire only when attacked. I was now about 10 o'clock a. m., and there had been no fighting on any part of the line, except occasionally between the skirmishers. The main line of the enemy had not advanced beyond the western edge of the field in our front. From our skirmish-line we could see them arriving and going into position.

Between 12 m. and 1 o'clock p. m., Gen. Banks's Chief of Staff (Gen. Stone, I think) rode along our line and pronounced the position "well chosen," and one that must "be held at all hazards," promising Col. Shaw that the flanks of his brigade would be protected. But notwithstanding repeated requests from Col. Shaw, those supports failed to come.

Comrade Cutter testifies to this fact in THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE of Sept. 18th, when quoting from his regimental history, which says, "Gen. Dwight was appealed to and refused." I assert that at no period from 9 o'clock a. m., when Shaw's Brigade first took position in the line already given, until the close of the battle, was there any portion of the Nineteenth Corps aligned with it in that position, and am confident I am supported in the assertion by every member of the brigade who was in a position to note the fact.

At 4 o'clock p. m. we could see the rebs deploying their line, extending their right far beyond our left. At 4:30 they opened on us with artillery, pouring shot and shell hot and heavy into the right of our brigade, the most accurate artillery firing I witnessed during the war. Had we been at the other end of the guns, would have thought it splendid, but it was more accurate than interesting to us. This they continued for some 20 minutes, then came a lull. Every old soldier knows what that means. Soon we heard the rebel yell, and knew by the sound their cavalry were coming. The order was sent along the line, "Hold your fire, boys, until you can see the horses' knees on the ridge." On they came, swinging sabers and revolvers, their line covering the front of the 24th Mo., 14th Iowa, and lapping a little on the 27th Iowa.

When they came within prescribed distance we let them have it, tumbling men and horses in one indescribable mass, almost annihilated them, as but six or eight were seen to escape. Their leader fell dead from his horse in the rear of our line. Soon their infantry were pouring their fire into us, but we gave them better than they sent, and checked their advance.

Let us look to the left of the brigade. The 27th and 32d Iowa, who received the first infantry attack made that day, were now, and had been since the cessation of artillery firing, fighting against fearful odds. They repulsed the enemy two or three times, were holding their ground firmly, and were not aware of any enemy except in front, until they were assailed in the rear. The enemy had passed to the left of the brigade, moved by the left flank, pushed up in the rear of the 32d and well on to the 27th Iowa. Col. Scott, 32d Iowa, seeing the position untenable, nor any possibility of taking ground to the rear, moved his regiment with, I think, three companies of the 27th Iowa by the left flank, making a lengthy detour around the enemy's right, and rejoined the brigade in Pleasant Hill about 10 or 11 o'clock that night.

Going back to the right of the brigade, Gen. Smith, seeing its critical position, had ordered Col. Shaw to withdraw his command. Col. Shaw reached as far as he was able to the left with the order, and we fell back. The 27th Iowa retreated but a short distance before they encountered the rebs, when occurred that desperate fighting spoken of by Comrade Bryson. Looking up the line a similar condition existed: the 24th Mo. were fighting their way back, the enemy's balls coming obliquely from the rear, both right and left. After retreating 200 yards or more, we passed through a line of the Nineteenth Corps. (Stick a pin here; I wish to refer to it.) Some two or three hundred yards in the rear of the Nineteenth Corps we halted and reformed our shortened line. It was now sundown. This was the "little while," says Comrade Cutter, that Shaw's Brigade "fought and was sent flying to the rear."

The Nineteenth Corps gave the enemy a warm reception—repulsed them, when darkness closed the conflict, with the rebs in retreat.

Our brigade remained in line until near daylight, when with depleted ranks we fell in rear and covered the retreat of the army to Grand Ecore, leaving a detail of Surgeons and men to bury the dead and care for the wounded. The casualties in Shaw's Brigade amounted to 500, the 32d Iowa alone losing 210.

Col. Shaw is correct in saying "My men were the first in the fight, the longest in the fight, and in the hardest of the fight, and the last to leave the battlefield."

In answer to Comrade Cutter's letters in THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE of Aug. 21 and Sept. 18, I will endeavor to compare his testimony with others, which, when carefully considered, will, without question, reveal a want of harmony in official reports. But we will let the reader draw his own conclusions and solve the problem. I am frank in saying I believe the comrade is honest in his statement, and believes he is giving true history. Carefully reading his narrative, we note he gives but one incident connected with Shaw's Brigade, that came under his personal observation, and that he quotes from his regimental history. Admiral Porter, from whom the comrade quotes largely, together with Horace Greeley, equally as reliable a historian, were miles away from the scene of conflict, consequently obtained their information from another source, and we of the Sixteenth Corps contend that the information on which they base their reports are not in accordance with the facts. A careful compiling from all the sources of information will show we are correct.

Greeley's American Conflict, Vol. 2, page 542, says: "Our line of battle was formed, with Franklin's three brigades in front, supported by Smith's, whereof the Second, composed of the 14th, 27th and 32d Iowa and the 24th Mo., under Col. Wm. T. Shaw, 14th Iowa, were formed directly across the main road to Shreveport, whereon the rebels must advance."

Comrade Cutter gives Admiral Porter, page 507, saying the same thing, giving the order of the brigades. Now we know that at no time previous to our being driven from the first line of battle were we held in rear supporting any portion of the Nineteenth Corps.

Greeley, page 543, says: "But now a rebel battery opened, and their infantry advanced; when their intentions of turning our right becoming manifest, Emory's Third Brigade, Col. Benedict, moved to the support of his First, on that flank, and Shaw's Brigade, of Smith's Corps, aforesaid, moved forward and took its position in our front."

Comrade Cutter quotes Admiral Porter, page 507: "The enemy moved toward the right flank of the army, and the Second Brigade withdrew in good order from the center to support the First. A. J. Smith's Brigade, in support of the center, moved into the position vacated by the Second Brigade."

Mark the words in the above quotation, "withdrew in good order." Can there be any other inference than that they were fighting? Would it require any great skill to withdraw a brigade from the line except under fire? Again, is it probable that a brigade while under fire would be ordered from the line and sent away as a support when there was a brigade in its immediate rear for that very purpose? Novel tactics indeed.

Comrade Cutter gives us still another move, quoting from regimental history: "Just before Shaw's Brigade broke, our brigade (the First) was ordered toward the center of the field." Of these three statements which is correct? If they are all correct, and occurring, as we are left to infer, between the time of opening and closing of the battle, would it not result in a confused state of affairs? Look at it. Gresley has the Third Brigade, Porter has the Second Brigade moving to the support of the First Brigade, while Cutter has the First Brigade moving to the center to support the Second and Third, or both. The Nineteenth Corps must have been pretty closely consolidated at some point on that line. Somewhat of a tangle, was there not, comrade? If such was the condition of the Nineteenth Corps, how was it with Shaw's Brigade, left on the line to cover the front of two brigades?

Let us look at the condition on the left of our line. Greeley, Vol. 2, page 543, after saying, "The most of the fighting took place on the right of the road," in which he is surely incorrect, he also says: "Our left being refused, with strong reserves posted upon and around Pleasant Hill."

If that was the condition in the formation of the line, how was it after removing Benedict's Brigade to the right? Also, Comrade Cutter, quoting from Gen. Emory's official report, says: "My right stood firm and repulsed the enemy handsomely, and the left would have done so, but for the great interval between it and the troops to the left, leaving the flank entirely exposed."

Comrade Cutter also, quoting from regimental history, "Just before Shaw's Brigade, our brigade was ordered toward the center." So we find by his own report the enemy was not troubling the right very much. All these reports reveal, if they reveal anything, that the weak place in our line, and the key to our position, was on the left, and the enemy found it. With all these conflicting statements, the inquiry comes, Where was Benedict's Brigade when Shaw's Brigade retreated? Was it on the left, and in line with the latter brigade? If so, is it probable, knowing the fighting qualities of Benedict's Brigade, I repeat, is it at all probable, that the enemy would pass through or brush away that brigade, and pass in the rear of and reaching nearly the center of Shaw's Brigade before being observed? We know by hard fighting the rebels were just there.

Again, I know nothing of the arrangement of regiments in brigades of the First Division of the Nineteenth Corps, only as given by Comrade Cutter, and he places the Zouave battalion in Third Brigade. But this I do know (going back to where we stuck the pin), that when the 14th Iowa retreated 200 yards or more to the rear, I passed through ranks composed of Zouaves. Of this I am positive; their uniform was too conspicuous to be mistaken. If there was but one battalion of Zouaves in the First Division, have I not good evidence that Benedict's Brigade was posted in our immediate rear?

The reader can draw his own conclusion. After collating and comparing all the statements, together with my own observation, the only reasonable conclusion I can draw is, that Benedict's Brigade was not in line on the left when the engagement opened, nor in the fight until after Shaw's Brigade retreated.

And after 26 years' discussion, I am more confirmed in the declaration made at the time, "If Shaw's Brigade had been properly supported as promised, that line would not have been broken, and would have prevented the needless sacrifice of many brave men."

My letter has expanded beyond my first intentions. Still, I ask the reader to bear with me a little further in referring to a matter that has passed into history, yet may be unknown to Comrade Cutter and others of the Nineteenth Corps, which, in my opinion, reveals the source and inwardness of much of this controversy. When Col. Shaw formed his line of battle on the morning of the 9th, and was promised supports on his flanks, and after repeated requests through the day failed to secure them, his ire was aroused. On such occasions he was usually more emphatic than polite; somebody got a warm cursing, which incensed some of the leading officers in the Nineteenth Corps to the extent of endeavoring to down the old Colonel.

Byers's "Iowa in War Times," page 282, 3, says: "At Pleasant Hill one-half of the killed and wounded had fallen to Shaw's Iron Brigade. The bravery and skill of Col. Shaw in holding that force to the front as he did was appreciated by the country; but among the general officers of Banks's army there sprang up at once a feeling of envy and hatred of the man whose troops saved the army from defeat. They determined on his destruction. Injudiciously he gave them a basis to work on. In a letter to a public journal, printed under his own name, he published several of the officers of Banks's army as incompetent and drunken imbeciles on that day of Pleasant Hill. There were many reasons for believing that he stated the simple fact." (Comrade Cutter speaks of a general officer being the night before inspired by distilled molasses or fine commissary.) "But he stirred up an awful hornets' nest of sting and hate. Technically, he had transgressed the military law in printing his letter. Not less than 25 of Banks's officers, as well as Banks himself, joined in charges against the fighting Colonel.

"They did not stop with citing this violation of law in printing the letter. They charged Shaw with incompetency, with fear, with cowardice, with ordering his men to run, while terror had seized upon himself. The Secretary of War accepted these outrageous falsehoods, and Col. Shaw was dismissed the army in disgrace. That was his reward for gallantry at Pleasant Hill! Gen. A. J. Smith, Shaw's corps commander, who witnessed his gallantry and his perfect obedience of orders at Pleasant Hill, testified to it all in an official letter. Shaw demanded that this justification be printed in the official journal that had contained the order of dismissal. The Secretary of War refused it, and yet knew that Shaw had been dismissed without even a hearing.

"Shortly, however, the authorities at Washington, including the President, realized that an outrage had been committed on a gallant and meritorious officer. On Dec. 23, 1864, the order of dismissal was revoked, and Col. Shaw was given an honorable discharge from the service, to date from the 18th day of the previous November, the date on which his noble old regiment had left the service."

As there has been no retraction of these charges, to our knowledge, by any part of the Nineteenth Corps, it did and does arouse the resentment of the men composing Shaw's Brigade against the officers making them and the manner in which they were instigated. Col. Shaw had his faults, but fear, cowardice, incompetency, and disobedience were not among them. We had seen his courage and firmness too well tested, not only in this battle, but such as Doneison and Shiloh, to remain silent when disgrace was heaped upon him. Is our resentment honest, or not? I leave the answer with the reader.

Permit me in closing to say I have written, not for the purpose of "mud-throwing," or to cast undeserved reflections on any one, but, if possible, to elicit the facts, that the Second Brigade, Third Division, Sixteenth Corps, and its commander, may be accorded at least a measure of the merit they won.

Would be glad to hear, through the columns of THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE, or otherwise, from any comrade who took part in this expedition, knowing there are many whose talent and position better qualifies them for giving information.—WM. T. MCMAKEN, Orderly-Sergeant, Co. K, 14th Iowa.

Read "Better than a Pension" on page 7.

BATTLE OF FRANKLIN.

A Michigan Comrade's Account of How the Gap Was Filled.

EDITOR NATIONAL TRIBUNE: While I have been very much interested in reading in your valuable paper the accounts of comrades of the many battles in which the writers claim to have participated, I have also been somewhat amused with the often widely conflicting accounts of different comrades of the same battle, and sometimes persons, members of the same company or regiment, will differ more or less in their accounts of the same engagement, and as I, too, "was there," I have been deeply interested in the various versions of the battle of Franklin, Tenn., and if you will kindly allow me a small space in THE TRIBUNE, I wish to correct some few errors, more particularly in the versions of Comrades James Davis, First Sergeant, Co. C, 23d Mich., and that of Comrade Shellenberger, who he (Davis) justly criticises.

As I shall confine my relation entirely to the part taken by the Second Division, Twenty-third Corps, in order to make all plain we will go back to the evening of Nov. 29, 1864. The Second and Third Brigades, all that was present of the Second Division, as train guards, had a slight brush with the enemy about three miles south of Spring Hill, driving them back, and successfully evading a large force of rebel infantry then posted in line of battle near Spring Hill; moved on with our train, reaching Franklin about sunrise on the morning of Nov. 30. After taking our breakfast we moved out, taking our position on the line to the right, or west side, of the Columbia pike, and the command forming reliefs went to work on our light fortifications, which were scarcely finished, when Hood advanced in his first charge, about 4:30 p. m. In forming our brigade line the works we had built were longer than we had men to fill, and there being a short space left between the 23d Mich. and the 107th Ill., this space was filled by two companies of a new Ohio regiment, I think the 183d. There had also been a regiment posted on an advanced line to check the advance of the enemy, thus giving those on the main line time to be in perfect readiness to give our friends the Johnnies a proper reception. This regiment was, of course, driven back on the main line, the enemy following close upon their heels. This regiment, instead of halting on the main line, were moving off to the rear, in good order, however, when I heard Col. Moore, commanding the Second Brigade, direct one of his Aids to halt that regiment and move them back on the line, which he promptly did, and to their credit be it said that to a man they about-faced and moved back to the line and remained until the close of the action, materially aiding the 111th Ohio and 107th Ill. in maintaining their position. I know not what regiment this was, but had the impression at the time that it was that same new Ohio regiment (183d).

Now for that wonderful "gap" in the line, what caused the gap, and how and by whom it was closed. At the first charge of the enemy when that advanced line was driven in and Hood's serried hosts were rushing on after them, those two companies of the new regiment left their position and ran to the rear, and these two companies were no doubt the troops which the imagination of Comrade Shellenberger magnified into "two brigades," as they were the only troops that vacated the Second Division lines until the close of the battle. Now, kind reader, do not censure too severely the action of those two companies of "raw material."

To their inexperienced eyes, unaccustomed to such scenes as were now suddenly thrust before them, the array in their immediate front no doubt had a most formidable appearance, and as self-preservation is said to be the first law of our nature, who blames them for getting out of that and trying to "save their bacon"?

Now, supposing this to be the gap in the line referred to by Comrade Shellenberger, I must differ both with him and Comrade Davis as to how and by whom it was closed. From my perfect knowledge of the character of Comrade Davis, I am aware that he would not knowingly misrepresent a single item concerning Franklin or any other battle, so I think either he was misinformed at the time, or was so excited on reading Shellenberger's version of the affair that his mind was confused or at fault in some way; for this gap which was immediately at the left of the 23d Mich. was not closed immediately, as Davis has it, by the 111th Ohio, for it was not closed at all until after the second or third charge of the enemy had been repulsed and darkness had settled down upon the scene.

We at the left of the 23d Mich., had discovered that a portion of the enemy's force, instead of falling back with the rest to reform their lines, had stealthily taken position in the trench outside our breastwork in front of the gap, and watching opportunities, would climb to the top of the breastwork and give us a raking fire right and left, and were at that time doing us more harm than all the rest of Hood's army. This matter was reported to Col. Moore, I think by Capt. Hamilton, of the 23d, and on his stating that the 80th Ind., on the right of the brigade, had nothing much to do—only a single line of battle to hold—the Colonel directed him to go to the 80th and request the Major to send two companies over to the left to close up the said gap, which was immediately done. And while these companies were moving quietly along in rear of our line, my position, as file-closer, brought me directly in the line of their march, and when the Captain leading them (I think it was the Captain of Co. H of the 80th) came up to me, he asked: "Where is that gap in the line?" I said, "Only a few steps to the left, Cap.; I'll go with you," and walking with him to the vacant space, I said, "Here is the gap, Captain; good-by," and returned to my post. This is how and by whom that gap was closed.

I leave the gallant Captain, if he is living, to inform your readers how he planned to rid us of that nuisance, and how well the noble boys of his command executed his orders, taking, as I understood, a goodly number of prisoners. And I appeal to Col. Moore, if he be living, and Capt. John Hamilton, of the 23d Mich., and any of the officers or soldiers of the 80th Ind. who were participants, as to the correctness of my statement.—A. S. SMITH, Sergeant, Co. C, 23d Mich., Layton Corners, Mich.

Read "Better than a Pension" on page 7.

AT WINCHESTER.

And the 13th Ind. was "Thar."

EDITOR NATIONAL TRIBUNE: I vas been a subscriber to der NATIONAL TRIBUNE for about eight year, und I most always somedimes read der Edidorial bage first, und scan over der "Fighting Dem Over" columns last. Ven I see somedings apout a pattle vat der 13th Ind. vash in I reads 'im. Vell, 'twas funny how some of dem vellers writes! I pelieve dey vant to dell der druth, but der drouble seems to be, dey can't see all ofer a pig pattle-ground at once—if dey do much fighting. Und some vants to gif some barticular regiment and Gurnel all der braise; dot vash nix fair! I dought dot I left der school-room in der Spring of '61, ven I vas yust 19 year old, und enlisted to "go und fight" mit J. C. Sullivan of der 13th Ind. und Co. B. Yah, und I dought we leave Indianapolis und "our girls pehind us" on der night of der 4th of July, 1861, und dot on der 11th of der month—yust seven days after we left home—we "knocked out" der Shonnies at Rich Mountain; maype I vas mistaken; und I dinks all der vile we fights at Sheat Mountain, Greenbrier, und all ofer West Virginia, und dot we sharge at Kernstown in 1862; maype I vash mistaken; maype I vash oust stealing shickens mit "Bill" Sutton and Leopold Pauli!

Yah, I dinks all der vile dot Lieut.-Gurnel Foster leads us, mit our guns at "right shoulder shift," right oop to dot straw-stack, und dot we sharge und drive der Shonnies until dark; I vash dinking all dese long years dot I grab hold of der bridle of der horse—a cream-colored horse—of one of Stonewall's Aids, und Bob Owens grab his bridle on der onner side, und dot we sent him, a brisoner, to der rear; but maype I vash mistaken; maype I vash in der rear—guarding der knapsacks!

I dinks all der vile dot my Captain, J. M. Wilson, say to me a few weeks after dot, ven I had got into some troubles, "Frazier, if it wasn't for your undaunted bravery on der pattlefield of Winchester, und your widowed mother, whom I dink deserves a petter son, I'd have you shot as an example for der regiment; now, d—n you, go to your quarters!"

Now, Mr. Editor, I dinks all dese dings, und maype some more, but Maj. Capehart, in describing dot leedle fight, seems intent only on belittling a good officer—Nathan Kimball, of der 14th Ind., in praising another good officer, of equally as good a regiment—Lieut.-Gurnel Creighton, und making it appear that he—Capehart—was der only one who vas shmart enough to detect, in advance, Sheneral Shackson's indentions. Speaking of Kimball, he says: "His regular profession vas dot of a physician, und, of course, der pisness he vas now following vas comparatively new to him, though he had some practical experience with Lander in West Virginia, under McClellan und Rosecrans." I—s—h dot so? Vell, Dr. Capehart, vill you shust dell us if your "regular profession" vas not dot of a "physician," und blease dell us old soldiers how much "bractical oxberience" you had oop to dot time?

Further on, Dr. Capehart, in shpeaking of Sheperal Kimball, facetiously refers to him as "der doctor in immediate sharge of der case!" Vell, Dr. Capehart, I vill yust remark dot der "doctor in immediate sharge of dot case" got his batient through all riat! Capehart also says: "Hoping to seduce der shy Confederate from his lair, Shields feigned timidity, und moved hurriedly back to Winchester." Vell, dot vash true; und, being true, how is Dr. Capehart going to make it gorrespond mit der remark, further on, dot "Shields und Kimball had been quite unaware of Shackson's proximity?" Vell, dose vash some funny dings! I goes my neighbor's house into, und shake mine fist under his nose, shust like John L. Sullivan, und say, Come mit your house out, und I lick you und your poys so bad as never vash! Coom mit der pack yard oust, und I knock dunder und blixen out mit you! Den I turns around und runs mit der pack yard oust, und nefer dink dot veller und der poys is in close "broximity" to me, eh?

Vell, dot vash so funny! Now der fact is, neither Shields, Kimball, nor anyone else vas surprised; we were looking for und courting the attack. One would dink, from der account of Dr. Capehart, dot der 5th und 7th Ohio were der only regiments not repulsed in der sharge. I vash all der dime dinking dot der 13th Ind. vas not repulsed; but maype I vash mistaken; maype I managed to get suddenly sick, "shust pefore der pattle, mudder," und vash in der hospital. It also occurs to me dot one man don't always somedimes hear all der remarks dot der officers shpeak, ven dere vas some fighting going on. Capehart heard Patrick, of der 5th Ohio, say, "Geep cool," "Hold your ground," "Remember Cincinnati," und "Der bully lager beer," or words to dot effect, as der lawyers say.

Vell, I dinks dot I vash number one in my coompany dot time, und being on der right flank of der regiment, I could hear some dings dot my Gurnel shpeak, und so I vill dell it. After der artillery had been fighting a goot vile, der infantry opened like der duyvel, und Sullivan, who had been chafing all der dime pecause his men had not peen called on, said, as his eyes flashed fire, "Gott! dot ish vat I likes to hear!" Pooty soon, after a leedle vile, der order coom for der 13th, und Sullivan being in command of der brigade, Lieut.-Gurnel R. S. Foster took us to der pattlefield; we coom on der field shust as der Gurnel of der 84th Pa. vash killed, und der poys of dot regiment und der 110th, und der poys of der 14th Ind., vas fighting like der duyvel, but slowly falling pack; ven dey see us dey say, "Hooray! here coom der Sheat Mountain Zouaves!" Dot vash vat ve vash called all dose dimes. Foster see right avay vat der drouble vash. Dem poys all fight like der duyvel; Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, und Virginia, all goot, one shust so goot as anodder, but dey vash in der open field, und der Shonnies vash der stone fence, der straw-stack, und der trees pehint. Foster led us shust like it vash on dress barade, right oop mit dot straw-stack und woods; down about der center, der poys began to get imbatient, und der line vash bulged a leedle out like a rainbow, mit der bow towards der Shonnies; den Foster yell out so lout as never vash, "Vell, d—n it, go in den!" Dot order vash yust as goot, und obeyed yust as bromptly, ash der von ve read apout in der history, who say, "On, Stanly, on! Sharge, Shester, sharge!"

Der comrades of Ohio, Pennsylvania, und Virginia, ven dey see how ve march right avay ofer dot field, ofer der dead und der dying, rally once more, gif some more cheers, und go in mit us, and ve chase "Stonewall Shackson" till dark. Now, Mr. Editor, I vash vaiting so long for somepody who could write petter ash me to dell der part dot der 13th Ind. dake mit dot pattle, und nopody don't do noddings mit it, so I do der best I can. I dink all der poys do vell, und dot der 13th, mit Gurnel R. S. Foster, turned der tide of pattle und saved der day. Vat has become mit all dem old 13th poys? Vy you don't shpeak oust, eh? Dree cheers for der Red, White, and Blue, und der soldier's friend—der NATIONAL TRIBUNE!—"LEE" FRAZIER, Co. B, 13th Ind., Berryville, Ark.

Did Not Capture Quite So Many Rebels.

EDITOR NATIONAL TRIBUNE: In your paper of Sept. 18, appears a communication from Dr. J. R. Thornbury, of Batteries F and A, 1st Ill. L. A., of Princeton, Kans., who makes a statement to the effect that the Fourth Division, Fifteenth Corps, was composed of the following regiments and batteries: The 26th, 40th, 48th, 90th, and 103d Ill., 12th, 97th, 99th and 100th Ind., 46th and 70th Ohio, 6th Iowa, 15th Mich., and Battery F, 1st Ill. L. A., Cheney's and Griffin's 1st Iowa Battery. Now, I want to state that my impression is that the 26th Ill., 12th and 100th Ind. were in the First Division. I was a member of Co. D, 26th Ill., and that regiment was in the First Division, Co. D, after Atlanta was taken, was headquarter guards of the First Division. Again, he says that on the 3d of August, 1864, a detail of 900 men was made to charge the enemy's skirmish-line, etc. This date is wrong. It should be the 4th of August. Again, I am the man whom he calls "Private" John A. Wilson, of Co. D, 26th Ill., and that the rebel pit spoken of did not contain 17 men. There were not over four men in the pit at the time. John S. Wilson might have captured some men, but did not capture any in the pit, and there was no officer in the rebel pit at the time.—CHARLES WILSON, Corporal, Co. D, 26th Ill., First Division, Fifteenth Corps, Chanute, Kans.

Read "Better than a Pension" on page 7.

PICKET SHOTS

From Alert Comrades All Along the Line.

Months of Misery.

John S. Kephart, Lieutenant, Co. F, 5th Ind. Cav., Morgantown, Ind., was a prisoner in Libby, Macon, Charleston, and Columbia 678 days—from May 18, 1863, until March 1, 1865.

J. C. Hayes, Co. A, 104th N. Y., Sandwich Post, 510, Waterman, Ill., writes that, having been captured at Gettysburg July 1, 1863, he was confined on Belle Isle, Andersonville, Savannah, Millen, Blackshear, Thomasville, and exchanged at Vicksburg, March 31, 1865; thus his period of imprisonment was 639 days.

A. H. Booher, First Lieutenant, Co. I, 73d Ind., Burdick, Ind., having seen claims by different comrades that they were confined in rebel prisons longer than any other Union soldier, says he was captured on a raid with 1,400 others, and they were all released but about 90 officers. In the course of time some of these were released by special exchange, some made their escape, and others died, until the number dwindled to but 30. The writer was captured May 3, 1863, near Rome, Ga., and was confined in Libby, Macon, Charleston, Columbia, Charlotte, Greensboro, Raleigh, and Goldsboro, and was paroled near Wilmington March 1, 1865; so he thinks that he can "see" Comrade Ware and "go him 66 days better."

Two Good Suggestions.

Oliver Bliss, M. D., Springfield, Mass., suggests that the G.A.R. build a monument of its own to the perpetuation of the sentiments of the Order, and that it be done while there are yet many comrades on this side of the Great River. He proposes that it be erected in the city of Washington, D. C.; that it be of granite, and that every G.A.R. Post pay for one stone, that stone to be lettered with the name and number of the Post, its Department, and the number of its members at the time the stone is furnished.

John A. Malone, Co. I, 22d Ill., DeSoto, Mo., says, that as Congress did little or nothing at its last session for the ex-prisoners, every one of these men should confer with his Member of Congress who is now canvassing the district he expects to represent, and urge upon him the passage of some measure of relief. These members should be followed up with letters and petitions, so that when Congress meets in December it will be prepared to act immediately upon the question.

Information Asked and Given.

James O. Sullivan, Co. B, 28th Mass., Niantic, Conn., desires to ascertain the names and addresses of two soldiers (one of them believed to be Sergeant McCarthy of New York) who assisted him, after a severe fall, to take the train destined for Andersonville prison. It was about May 14th, 1864, directly after the battle of the Wilderness, when he, with a squad of about 400 prisoners of war, were marched off while waiting for the train. He was in such a weak condition that he fell headlong across the rails of the track, striking his hip with such force as to become entirely helpless. Two of the prisoners assisted him, and if they will kindly send him their names and addresses, it may result in his obtaining a pension.

David G. Woods, Co. F, 19th Ind., who was a prisoner of war at Florence, S. C., would like to hear from James Prentice, who made his escape with the writer from Florence, or from any of the boys who helped to capture the company of rebel militia at Crab Orchard, N. C. He would also like to know if any of them remember the name of the guide who was shot during that expedition.

John S. Phillips, Troop M, 1st N. Y. M't'd Rifles, 64 East Fourth street, N. Y., answering Thomas Ransom, of his regiment, as to the shooting of the Provost-Marshal at Williamsburg, Va., in 1863, says that the Lieutenant was named W. W. Dissoway, of Troop M, and the man who shot him was Private Boyle, of Troop F.

J. A. Wells, Captain, 91st Ill., Erie, Kan., answering John C. Dunn, 19th Ind., who asked what became of the Surgeon who rushed to the aid of President Lincoln when struck down by Booth, writes that George W. McMillin was the Surgeon in question, and he died about five years ago, in Neosho County, Kans.

Lost and Found.

Martin V. B. Russell, 8 Prince street, Salem Mass., has the discharge of James H. Hanson, Co. I, 5th R. I. H. A.

M. E. Renner, La Gro, Ind., has a Henry repeating rifle inscribed with the name of L. P. Tallman, Co. A, Western Sharpshooters.

J. A. Long, Glencoe, Ore., left his discharge in the office of A. B. Wade, South Bend, Ind., and would like to know what became of it.

A. W. Darnell, Clendenen, W. Va., lost in November, 1864, at a station on the B. & O. R. R. near Baltimore, a large-size Smith and Wesson revolver attached to a sword-belt.

Look Out for Him.

John J. M., Marion, Ind., referring to recent item about one Stevens, a fraud, who was published in THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE, says that shortly after Stevens's arrival at the National Home at Marion, there came another tall, soldierly fellow named William Boyd, of Co. F, 1st Iowa Cav., who appeared well acquainted with Stevens. But no one was more willing to corroborate the statements about Stevens made in this paper when the item reached the comrades at the Home. Right then Boyd commenced some confidence work on his own part and managed to swindle the comrades in various ways, one of his schemes being to raise a club for THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE; several comrades gave him $5 bills because they had not the change, on his promising to return $4. He borrowed all the money he could, and about the time they began to suspect him skipped. Boyd is evidently a man to keep clear of, for he has not been caught yet.

Good Homes Writing.

H. L. Albright, 2d Ind. battery, Reyno, Ark., wants to correspond with some soldier's widow or daughter with a view to matrimony. He is a widower with one small child.

Henry E. Cross, Talmage, Mo., wishes to correspond with a soldier's widow between the age of 40 and 50, with a view to matrimony.

W. C. Fay, Co. C, 55th Ohio, Delwood, Mich., is in good circumstances, and would like to adopt an intelligent boy not more than 10 years old, a soldier's orphan preferred. He would do well by him and be as a father to him.

Personal.

E. C. Bacon, Harvey's Hollow, Vt., says that M. M. Wheeler, East Peacham, Vt., was one of the jurors who tried and sentenced the Raiders in Andersonville to death.

J. E. Stannard, Co. G, 14th Conn., Welaka, Fla., having seen the mention of genuine Chinamen in the army, says he knew Joe Pierce as a true soldier. There was another Chinaman in the 27th Conn., named Antonio Dardell, who was brought from China by a Capt. White when quite young. Dardell served his time with credit, and now lives in New Haven. The genuine South Sea Islanders mentioned in THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE were in the writer's company, and if any good ever came of their being there it was not discovered at the time. He believes one of them was of the 12 tried in Andersonville for murder, and was of the six who were pardoned. He would like to know if anyone has knowledge of a genuine Greek serving in our army.

Alexander Gourley, Co. D, 39th Ill., National Military Home, Kan., is a very old comrade. He was born near Edinburgh, Scotland, in May, 1793. He served four years and six months in our army, had a good record, and was permanently injured by the falling of a log at Turkey Bend, Va., while assisting to construct fortifications.

Thomas Bryson, 27th Ind., Gettysburg, S. D., says a great many of the comrades have written him, urging him to reply to some of the criticisms upon him. He will do so briefly at an early date.

At Chickamauga.

Ferdinand Zimmerer, Co. D, 9th Ohio, Tuckerville, Neb., claims that he and Christian Strademeyer, of his company, were the last two men to leave Snodgrass Hill, or Horseshoe Ridge, under orders. After the terrible fighting on Sept. 20, which lasted from 11 a. m. until 1:30, on our left flank and rear, it became quiet, but the writer's regiment could not see or hear anything of the right wing of our army. Soon after, they found some of our troops formed on Snodgrass Hill, and these they joined just as the enemy were making their first attack on these troops. The writer's regiment, 2d Minn., 35th Ohio, and 87th Ind., composing the Third Brigade, Third Division, Fourteenth Corps, were the first to come to the assistance of the troops at that point, which was held until after dark, and the writer and Strademeyer remained on the hill until 9 o'clock. Longstreet's troops made at least four charges between 2 p. m. and dark. The 9th Ohio was the last to leave the field, and Lieut. Schneider asked for two men to stand guard until all had withdrawn. Strademeyer and the writer were the two men to volunteer. They remained there at least an hour, when they followed the regiment. The woods had taken fire, the ground was strew