



"TO CARE FOR HIM WHO HAS BORNE THE BATTLE AND FOR HIS WIDOW AND ORPHANS."

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## SECRETARY SEWARD.

His Eminent Services to the Country Reviewed.

A DECLINE OF INFLUENCE.

Policy, More than Principle, Guided His Actions.

ENGLISH ARROGANCE.

The Effect Considered in Case of War.

BY GEN. JOHN POPE, U. S. A.

**T**HE two most prominent and well-known men in Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet were Mr. Seward and Mr. Chase. Perhaps Mr. Seward was better known to the country than Mr. Chase, and it is certain that in the early part of 1861 he was by far the most influential politician in the Republican party, not even excepting President Lincoln. He had an immense following of his own, and even among those who had not been his supporters there was a widely prevalent belief that he would dominate the new Administration and dictate its policy; in short, that whilst Mr. Lincoln was no doubt the "de jure" President, Mr. Seward would be President "de facto." The New York men were no doubt largely responsible for starting this idea and encouraging belief in it. They themselves had endowed Mr. Seward with such supreme intellectual force and power to govern that it seemed to them impossible and absurd that such a man as Mr. Lincoln, with only fair natural abilities, and with absolutely no experience in the higher grades of official life, would undertake to oppose himself in any respect to a man who held the foremost

**PLACE IN HIS CABINET.** and was, besides, such a master of political management and so shining a light in his party. As Mr. Lincoln soon showed himself the superior in intellectual power and force of will it resulted that Mr. Seward was heavily handicapped in the very beginning by being invested in the public belief, with power he did not possess, and looked to for influence which he never wielded. As he thus, of necessity, failed to fulfill, in any large degree, the expectations of his followers, and as time made it more and more manifest that the incumbent of the White House was one of those supremely great men who but rarely appear, and would be the controlling power of the Government, it happened, in the nature of things ("that is, of political things"), that Mr. Seward began rapidly to decline in influence with his party and in their reliance upon his supremacy in the Administration. His extraordinary fancy for compromises on all subjects, and his peculiar diplomatic methods to bring them about, made it pretty plain that policy even more than principle would be his guide in public affairs. His negotiations and conferences, direct and vicarious, with Southern Commissioners and

**CONGRESSIONAL OFFICIALS** will never be completely known, but sufficient has been brought to light to make it quite certain that if the business of the Government in 1861 had been confided to Mr. Seward instead of Mr. Lincoln, we should today probably have been clearing away the debris of a wrecked Union. The opinion of Mr. Seward held in 1860 by perhaps the majority of his countrymen, seems marvelous in view of the history which followed. It is, perhaps, due to Mr. Seward's mental characteristics as well as to his political training that he hardly seemed to be in earnest or to have any strong convictions concerning public questions. He appeared to treat the whole subject of politics in this country as a mere game, to be decided by political skill and party management, and to act as if expediency, not conviction, should be consulted in adopting and urging public policies. He did not seem to understand the earnestness and at times intense passion which seized upon most public men in the discussion of the great issues which so nearly brought the Government to destruction. He could not, therefore, realize that the

**SOUTHERN SENATORS** were so deeply in earnest and so profoundly moved by the questions at issue, and treated their speeches (as no doubt he considered his own) as mere oratorical efforts for general effect. When the grossest affronts, both in words and demeanor, were publicly put upon him in the Senate, he accepted them without anger or resentment, much as the lawyers on opposite sides of a case in court are in the habit of regarding themselves and encouraging their clients by the use of bad language or insulting references to each other, with a perfect understanding on both sides that their words were to be accepted in a "Pickwickian" sense. Unfortunately Southern men do not so understand it in the discussions of great public questions of such vast and far-reaching results, which assailed, as they insisted, the very foundations of the social structure of the South. They were furiously in earnest and meant every word they said, especially such words as were charged with insult.

**IT WAS THE FAILURE** of public men like Mr. Seward to understand and to resent insult from the Southern

public men on the spot, which, more than anything else, created that most unfortunate if not fatal idea that Northern men were cowards and would not fight, and that one Southern man was a match for at least five of them. That mistaken belief had much to do with precipitating the rebellion upon us, and brought to the support of, or submission to, secession many thousands of men in the South who would never have consented to any measures which would plunge the country into civil war. The high position in his party and in public estimation which Mr. Seward's great abilities and long experience in public life had given him, made him a target for the denunciations of Southern Senators; and the North, wound up to nearly as high a pitch of dangerous excitement as the South, was treated almost every day to scenes in the Senate of insult, open and gross, to Mr. Seward and to the Northern people whom he represented, which were accepted with naive, unoffended manner, and

**SMILING, FRIENDLY FACE,** as if it were completely understood that it was all in fun. Grim old B. F. Wade was never assailed in this manner, nor was any one in doubt as to his course if he had been. It was not because Mr. Seward lacked personal or moral courage that he acted thus, but because he did not seem to be able to realize that his public opponents were his personal enemies, that they were dreadfully in earnest, and that they meant all they said because they believed it, and because, too, they knew what would be the effect of such denunciations of the Northern people, and such a reception of them, upon their excitable constituents in the South.

I recall, as in some degree illustrating this trait of Mr. Seward, a story once told me by the late Associate Justice Swayne, of the Supreme Court of the United States. In returning to Washington from his "swing around the circle," President Andrew Johnson, with the Presidential party, spent a night in Columbus, Ohio. Judge Swayne, who lived in Columbus, and was a personal friend of Mr. Seward, hunted him up as well as he could in the immense crowd which had assembled at the depot and filled the streets, and finally found him sick in bed at the hotel. The Judge sat down by his bedside, and after

**A FEW WORDS OF GREETING,** Mr. Seward asked him with eagerness, and apparently having no doubt of a favorable answer, what effect he thought that the President's tour and speeches had produced on the general sentiment in the West. It was so plain that he expected an agreeable answer that the Judge hesitated to reply, but finally said that the effect, in his opinion, had not been good. With that Mr. Seward grew somewhat excited, and said with emphasis, "Judge, I consider Andrew Johnson the finest public speaker I ever heard in all my public life." Observing probably some incredulity on the Judge's face, he struck his hand on the bed and repeated with excited manner, "I tell you, Judge, I consider Andrew Johnson the finest public speaker I ever listened to." Judge Swayne related the story to me as a strange and unaccountable delusion of Mr. Seward; but I told him then, what has always been my impression, that it was not strange but characteristic simply. Mr. Johnson, as the whole country knows, was an uneducated man, without acquirements or accomplishments of any kind. He had little command of the English language, except in the way of denunciatory epithets, and those not of an elevated or choice character, or always expressed

**IN GRAMMATICAL LANGUAGE,** nor had he any of the graces or delicacy of an orator at all. It could not have been any of these things, therefore, which a polished speaker like Mr. Seward could have admired so much. Eliminating these, there was nothing left to make such an impression of fine oratory, except the furious earnestness of the man and the striking evidence that he not only meant what he said, but was ready and anxious to translate every word of it into acts. It was the passionate fervor and deeply-felt convictions of Mr. Johnson which naturally impressed a man of Mr. Seward's characteristics, and not the object of his speech nor the language or the manner in which it was expressed.

The history of his relations to the Southern Commissioners and other officials and of his negotiations and understandings with them will convince anyone, I think, that

**THIS FATAL WEAKNESS** of his nature, want of conviction and of earnestness, disabled him from realizing the situation during the early months of 1861, and led him into schemes and propositions which could only have been based upon the belief that the whole matter was a mere game of political bluff, as perhaps might have been the case in some former disagreements; that the South had no real purpose to secede, and only held the attitude of secession to secure to the very uttermost the most favorable concessions which the fear of disunion and war could wrest from the timidity of the North. He had no belief because he had no personal experience of the savage resolution of the Southern leaders, and thought by little concessions and adroit compromises to abate this fury of passion in the South. The history of these transactions is not pleasant reading even after all these years have gone by, but, unpleasant as they are, it may be truly said that there is not in them all that feeling of humiliation which is provoked by the correspondence in the Trent affair and the almost abject position in which that correspondence and subsequent English insolence and outrage placed us. I know that many of our people maintain that Mr. Seward by such almost pusillanimous conduct of our foreign affairs rendered the country a most valuable service by preserving peace with England, but there also are many other people who hold views quite antagonistic. Of course if the law of nations and our own interpretation of them therefore required the surrender of Mason and Slidell they should have been given up, but surely not upon demands so arrogant made in a manner so insolent. If it be

## HIS IDEA OF "REFORM."



SOLDIER-HATER: All I want is just a chance to reform the villainous pension system.

credible or even politic to preserve such a peace as England accorded to us during the rebellion by obsequious abnegation of our manhood such as may be found in our diplomatic relations with that nation, or if the advantages gained by it were sufficient to compensate for the intolerable humiliation inflicted upon this people, perhaps in the view

**OF EXPEDIENCY MERELY** these transactions of Mr. Seward might have been excused, surely never commended. But was it so? What sort of peace did England grant us for our subject submission? We all know that it was a peace which left Confederate cruisers, encouraged by English sympathy and open assistance, to destroy our commerce on the ocean, to drive all our commercial marine, greater than her own, from the seas, or force them to sail under her flag and become the property of her citizens. Every possible advantage she could have wrested from us by successful war she gained by this peace, which, like the peace we read of in the Scriptures, "passeth all human understanding." An open war would have been opposed by half of her own people, and would have endangered the tranquility of England itself by plunging thousands of the skilled laborers into destitution. She could not have expected, if war was declared, to bring a military force across 3,000 miles of ocean which could have made the least impression upon the great armies marshaled against each other over this broad country.

**THE SLIGHTEST CONSIDERATION** of the mechanical difficulties attending the transport of a considerable body of troops over so vast an expanse of water, even if there were no such things as vessels of war and privateers to molest them, makes it highly unlikely that such a project was ever entertained. That England might, with her large fleet, have undertaken to raise the blockade of the Southern ports is possible. But to what purpose? It was not the lack of arms, ammunition, or food that beat the South, and if England had piled the southern seacoast mountains high with such supplies, would the result of the war have been different or perceptibly prolonged? The bombardment of the Northern cities, or some of them, was within the range of probable attempt; but even at the beginning they were not without formidable defenses, and in 1862 these were supplemented

**BY MORE POWERFUL DEFENSES** on the water. An attack on any of our cities at any time after the Summer of 1862 would have been hazardous to the enemy, and its result very uncertain. At any rate, any damage which could have been done to our seaboard cities would have been less costly and injurious to the country than the total loss of our commercial marine, which has not been replaced to this day. But what should we have been doing in the meantime? The first news of a declaration of war against us by England would have witnessed the muster of an army along our northern frontier for the capture of Canada, which lay open to us as helpless as a baby, an army, too, composed in the main of that portion of our fellow-citizens who were opposed to the war with the South, and were in every lawful way obstructing its successful prosecution, and whose operations for that purpose had required the retention of large forces in the Northern cities and important localities to keep the peace, behind the armies in the field. Who can truly estimate what a burden of anxiety and discouragement would have been lifted from the shoulders of the Government and the country by such employment against

**A COMMON ENEMY** of so large a contingent of our dissatisfied if not hostile population in the North; or who can say how much sooner the end of the war might have come, could the large bodies of troops thus necessarily kept in the rear

have been sent to reinforce the armies at the front. I do not think one need trouble himself to inquire what would have been the action of our disaffected fellow-citizens had England declared war against us. No man who knows the people of this country could have a doubt on this point, especially as regards our Irish fellow-citizens, whether recently arrived or long domiciled among us. A declaration of war by England would therefore have speedily relieved us of a large and troublesome element in our midst, and have forced upon England the necessity of submitting to the humiliation of losing Canada, or engage in fruitless effort to defend a remote colony against a powerful neighbor, who could bring against it any amount of military force along a thousand miles of open frontier.

**THE EFFECT OF WAR WITH ENGLAND** would have been to free us on the land from a large part of the intestine troubles, which were not only discouraging to the successful prosecution of the war, but which were increasing

**IN POWER AND INTENSITY** every day, so as to threaten the general security. On the seas the effect would have been even more favorable. Instead of leaving our commercial vessels to rot at the docks, they could, with little preparation and in the briefest time, have been sent to sea as privateers, and in all probability they would have been as profitable to their owners in that occupation as in the ordinary business of commerce. A few good sailors, easily picked up in every seaport, and two or three guns of no heavy caliber and costing little, would have been sufficient for the arming of such of the numerous sail and steam-vessels which made up our commercial marine, and in a space of time scarce long enough to be considered the seas would have been alive with armed vessels to war on English commerce. There would hardly have been an inlet on any coast of the world which would not have been visited and watched by some of this active and countless fleet. All trade of England with her colonies would either have been cut off altogether or so endangered as to be practically destroyed. Indeed, communication itself would have been made impracticable except by

**HEAVILY-ARMED VESSELS** or ships of war. It would have been England's commercial marine, and not ours, which would have been destroyed during our civil war.

The effect of this great obstruction, if not complete interruption, to her intercourse and trade with her colonies would have been disastrous to a large element of the English people, and extremely embarrassing, if not actually dangerous, to the Government. Without enlarging upon the serious results to England of a declaration of war against the United States, it will be sufficient to say that by her treatment of this country, and our submission to it, she enjoyed all the advantages of successful war without suffering any of the penalties of war. Our commerce was driven from the seas and our ships of war treated almost as enemies, whilst Confederate ships were warmly welcomed, fitted out, and provisioned in every English port on the globe.

It is not difficult to imagine what would have been the effect on the mass of the English people of a declaration of war against us in the interests of slavery, and a war which would have brought ruin and destitution to large classes

**OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE.** The moral effect upon our civil war appears to me to have been vastly overrated. The South had, as it were, the moral effect of the sympathy and encouragement of the English Government. Their recognition of the Confederacy would have done no more. The larger part of the English ships of war would have been required to guard their

own commerce and keep open their communications with their own colonies, and could not, at any rate, have given practical aid to the South in a conflict which, in the nature of things, had to be settled on land. I cannot but believe that the more this subject is examined the stronger will be the conviction that we paid far too much for such a peace as England granted to our timid, not to say abject, submission to her insolence and arrogance. As was well said in the Senate of the United States, "the wrongs done to us by

**THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT** can never be atoned for by the payment of money. Her attitude toward us during our civil war has left upon the great mass of our people a feeling of bitter resentment and dislike which renders our relations to that country critical at all times." Some of our people on the Eastern seaboard may, perhaps, be disposed to qualify that statement, but the number of them, I think, will be small. In the West I have never heard but one opinion on this subject, and that leads directly to the purpose of seizing the first opportunity to reckon up with England for the treatment we received at her hands. An open war would have left far less of bitterness behind it and far better prospect of genuine peace and good feeling.

With the inception and conduct of this diplomatic policy Mr. Seward is, no doubt, to be largely credited, altogether so according to Mr. Charles Francis Adams, our Minister to England, who thinks it most judicious and beneficial

**TO THE UNITED STATES.** Perhaps Mr. Adams's personal connection with these negotiations and his relations with Mr. Seward may make it possible that his opinion of the latter's diplomacy was as open to doubt as Mr. Seward's impression of Andrew Johnson's oratory.

Whoever else may be entitled to a share in it, however, the country has ascribed it all to Mr. Seward, and some, at least, of his friends rest much of his fame upon the fact that he kept the peace with England during our civil war. What sort of a peace it was, and by what means it was kept, is worth considering also.

As Mr. Seward's reputation as a member of Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet rests largely, according to the opinion of his friends, and especially of his special eulogist, the late Charles Francis Adams, upon the conduct of our foreign relations during the civil war, I have thought it not out of place to dwell somewhat upon that part of it which had to do with the country from which we had most to fear, but from which, in spite of past experiences, we seem most unreasonably and unaccountably to have expected something more than ordinary fair treatment. Indeed, in the beginning, many of our people believed it a matter of course that, as our

**PRESENT DIFFICULTIES** and the resulting civil war was directly caused by the opposition of the Northern people, then in possession of the Government, to human slavery, and especially to its further extension in this country, the toleration of which by us had been the subject of the severest reproach by the English from the beginning of our existence as a Nation, we should have on moral grounds alone the active sympathy of the English Government and people in the struggle against it, which the Northern people had at last been forced into.

There is nothing in the past history of England, either in her relations with this country or any other, to justify this belief in the least degree. On the contrary, her record from the beginning has been of bad faith and self-seeking, without moral scruples to restrain her cupidity or hold her hand from the commission of any wrong that became necessary in pursuit of a selfish purpose. The last exhibition of this, and perhaps the

**MOST OUTRAGEOUS** of all, was the bombardment of Alexandria in a time of profound peace, and the destruction of such parts of that ancient city (filled with women and children) as were within reach of her ships of war, for no better reason than the failure of the Egyptian Government and people to pay some indebtedness to English bondholders. Certainly it would be hard to find, in the long list of crimes against humanity committed by the nations of the earth, anything more brutal than this bombardment of a peaceful city, the home of a weak and helpless people, so feeble in all the means of war as to be perfectly at the mercy of the brutes who destroyed their homes over their heads and shot them down with perfect coolness and in entire safety. For such acts as these, always done upon the weak, and for intrigue and bad faith toward the strong, the English Government stands to-day among the civilized Nations of Europe without a friend; and it is within bounds to say that there cannot be found in all the world a people (even a tribe of wandering savages), among whom the English have ever appeared, that does not

**HATE THE ENGLISH NAME.** It was with such a Government as this that Mr. Seward hoped to maintain an honorable peace, if not actual friendly sympathy, in a domestic war which threatened the stability of our Government, but which was directed against the institution of slavery, with the toleration of which both the English Government and the English people had been bitterly reproaching us. Certainly if there had been any real feeling embodied in the moral and highly philanthropic lectures they were constantly bestowing upon us they should have rejoiced in the opportunity to give all proper aid to the Northern people in a war which, if waged successfully by the Government of the United States, must of necessity result in the abolition of slavery in this country. Of all things looked for from the English Government by the majority of our people in such a crusade, encouragement to the South and sympathy with its purposes was about the last.

It may be CONFIDENTLY ASSERTED that England proved true to herself and her

past history in her dealings with us during the civil war. Her most manifest desire was to see this great Republic broken to pieces, and its great commerce, which had grown to be nearly if not quite equal to her own, and which threatened soon to surpass it, destroyed by the hands of its own people. The South, being considered the weaker party, was patted on the back and encouraged to proceed by indirect promises of help, conveyed in private conversations with members of the English Government. Just so far as the South could injure our commerce and drive our merchant vessels from the ocean or force upon them foreign ownership (English mainly)—in other words, so far as our civil war could benefit English trade—the English Government did give aid and encouragement to the rebellion by the extraordinary privileges granted to the Southern privateers, but

**DENIED TO NORTHERN CRUISERS** in English ports all over the world. This open help enabled the Southern privateers, built or bought in England, to destroy, within two years, our foreign commerce, which naturally passed into English hands—a loss impossible to calculate, even financially, and which, notwithstanding the Geneva arbitration, never has been nor can be compensated for. Farther than this direct robbery of all our commercial marine through Southern instruments, a loss to us which benefited England alone, and not at all the Southern Confederacy, England did not go, but contented herself with thus reaping the fruits of a successful war with the United States without any of the injury she would have sustained by actual war. It became early manifest, even to the South, that England had no feeling for or interest in either party to our civil war beyond the ill-considered wish that our Government might be broken to pieces and our country dismembered. Her loudly-proclaimed horror of human slavery on

**HIGH MORAL GROUNDS** resulted in practical aid to the slave-holding party to maintain that so-much-denounced institution, and her sympathy for this great republic of Anglo-Saxons, descendants of English lions, heirs to the English language and literature, inheritors of English liberties, and (as we have been so often told since our civil war) dear to the hearts and to the pride of our English cousins, resolved itself into an open exhibition of anxiety that we should disappear from among the great nations, especially the commercial nations, of the world. The same result followed in this case as in all other dealings of England with foreign Governments. Both Northern and Southern parties to our civil war emerged from it in entire sympathy in their feeling of bitter hostility to England, a sentiment far beyond the reach of money or soft talk to modify. The only friend on earth that England had was alienated by the same methods which have made enemies of all the rest, and nothing is more certain than the fact that when the opportunity presents itself, however far in the future, we shall not fail to commend to her lips

**THE CUP OF BITTERNESS** she forced on us in our time of trouble. Arbitration with a nation which has emerged successful and powerful from a civil war, and which is able to enforce by arms redress for injuries done her in her travel for life, may possibly answer in the mere question of payment in money for the destruction of property, but it can never destroy the bitter feeling of outrage and wrong nor the ever-present memory that in our time of trial the English Government was our most persistent and harmful enemy. To preserve the mere pretense of peace with England during our civil war we submitted to treatment which humiliated us in our own eyes, we lost all we could have lost by open war with her, whilst she reaped all the advantages of successful war and left this people embittered against her to a degree that forbids all possibility of reconciliation forever.

**THE DIPLOMACY OF MR. SEWARD,** upon which his principal eulogist rests his claim to greatness, actually bestowed on England all of our merchant marine and the vast commerce it represented gratuitously, and entailed on this people a feeling of bitter hostility to the English Government. I must again say that the peace Mr. Seward preserved with England during our civil war "passeth all human understanding."

The attack upon Mr. Seward's life about the time the war ended brought him again into affectionate relations and high regard with the great mass of the earnest men, who constituted the earnest and powerful political party to which he had always belonged, but these feelings soon subsided into indifference, if not contempt, when it was found that he adhered to Andrew Johnson and joined heartily in the effort to force upon the country a policy of Southern reconstruction which would have rendered abortive the sacrifices of the war and committed Southern Union men and the whole colored population into the hands of

**THEIR BITTEREST ENEMIES.** It is impossible to reconcile Mr. Seward's relations to Mr. Johnson and his celebrated policy with his utterances on the same subject for 20 years back, and his seeming apostasy was so clearly seen and believed that the moment his term of office expired he sank into utter neglect, and appeared to lose in a moment the high position he had held and the great respect with which he had been regarded for so many years. It is a sad spectacle, the last years of Mr. Seward's life, and the utter indifference of the country when his death was announced. That a man who had held so exalted a place in the admiration and confidence of a large part of his countrymen that his words were hung upon the utterances of an inspired man, and commanded the assent of the great political body to which he belonged, and which he actually led for so many years, should have so soon and so completely lost it all, is one of those phases of the vanity of human life which will always commend itself to the dissertations of the philosopher. Of course Mr. Seward will always occupy a conspicuous place in the history of his country, and his great services to it will always be remembered; but the remembrance of him and of his work will always be clouded by the sad and perplexing episode of the last years of his public life.

## SOME AUTUMN DAYS.

Siege of Joseph's Band of Nez Percé Indians.

BLOODY FIGHTING.

Splendid Marksmanship of the Warriors.

JOSEPH HOLDS A PARLEY.

Intense Suffering of the Wounded Soldiers.

BY CAPT. HENRY ROMERY, U. S. A.

**T**HE campaign of 1876 in the Valley of the Yellowstone had been nearly a fruitless one. The overwhelming disaster of the 7th U. S. Cav. and the massacre of the greater part of its officers and enlisted men had been followed by an abortive attempt of the Commanders of the Departments of the Platte and Dakota to force the Indians to a fight, as it had been preceded by a drawn battle on the headwaters of the Rosebud, and it fell to the lot of the 5th U. S. Inf., under its indefatigable leader, to strike about the only blow of the year which had any lasting effect, when late in October that command met the Sioux north of the Yellowstone, not far below the mouth of Powder River, and forced them into a flight and most of them finally into a surrender and return to the Agencies on the Missouri River; Sitting Bull, with most of his band, including several of the more prominent warriors, escaping across the Canadian line. This had been followed by the

**WINTER CAMPAIGN** against Crazy Horse and his band up the Valley of Tongue River, in which they were driven from their camps, which were destroyed, and this action by the surrender of most of the Northern Cheyennes at Tongue River cantonment.

Then in May the band of Lame Deer had been struck in its camp on a tributary of the Rosebud and scattered over the country, with the loss of some of its best warriors, all its best horses, and its camp and provisions.

A month later a column, consisting of portions of the 2d and 7th Cav., 1st, 5th, and 22d Inf., was sent into the field; the 5th, mounted on Indian horses, captured, as above stated. But no fight took place, though the remnants of Lame Deer's camp were trailed over 400 miles, through eastern Montana, western Dakota, and northern Wyoming, and finally abandoning the field sought shelter at the Agencies in the Department of the Platte.

**BATTLE OF BEAR PAW MOUNTAINS.** Late in the Autumn of 1876 the troops located at the mouth of Tongue River had constructed shelters made of logs placed on end in a trench dug in the soil, and "capped" with a "plate" or log, on which rested a roof of poles and earth; not uncomfortable, as far as warmth was concerned, in the winter, but terribly damp. But material and labor for constructing a new post was on the way, and as soon as possible after the ice was out of the stream boats began to arrive, and at times the banks of the heretofore silent river assumed the appearance of the "levees" of a lower Mississippi town; on one occasion 11 steamers being tied at the landing at once.

**A LARGE PROPORTION OF THE ARMY** was represented at the new camp during the Summer. The 1st, 5th, 6th, 7th, 11th, 17th, and 22d Inf. had each one or more companies there, and what was known as "The Montana Battalion" of the 2d, and most of what remained of the 7th Cav. Scouting was kept up in all directions from the new camp, but with little result.

Meanwhile, far away to the westward, so far that the troops on the Yellowstone had no expectations of sharing in it, another war was in progress. Abandoning their reservation and homes, the Nez Percés went on the warpath; and their leader, leaving the country they had always held, had with his people started on that long march which, if made by a white chieftain, would have justly ranked with some of the most famous ones of ancient times. Boating off some of the forces which sought to impede his movement, and skillfully avoiding others, he at length emerged from the mountains into the Valley of the Yellowstone, and crossing to the left (northern) bank of that stream, turned his course toward the Canadian border. Six days later (on the afternoon of Sept. 17) the news of his crossing reached the camp at the mouth of Tongue River. It did not take long for the commanding officer there to decide upon his

**COURSE OF ACTION.** The courier reached the camp about 3 p. m. By 4 p. m. orders were issued for a movement across the river, and every one was busy. Twenty days' rations were to be taken, and the command was to move the next morning. It consisted of Col. E. B. Bennett, F. (Snyder), G. (Leak)