National Tribune.

"To care for him who has borne the battle, and for his widow and orphans."

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ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

Masterly Monographs From a Trenchant Pen.

HISTORIAN'S ART.

Sherman's Excellent System of Communication.

JOHNSTON'S TRIUMPH.

Two Generals Fall, with a Terrible Aggregate Loss.

By

O. O. Howard

Major-General.

XIII—KENESAW COMPLETED.

HOW TO PRESENT a battle without wearying the reader by too much extension—too much repetition of similar method—has often tried my inventive powers. One way is to give all accounts from my own stations or positions during the engagement. Another, to conceive and relate them as well as may be from the places where the commanders most directly engaged are watching and operating; and still another, which soldiers most enjoy, to endeavor to put myself in touch with the brave men who carried the rifle, managed the cannon, or from their chargers in swift motion twirled their sabers above their heads or discharged their carbines. Either presentation of the pictures of the Kenesaw battle, if well done, would suit a veteran. But what, pray, will be best for our children and grandchildren, who never saw an army corps or heard the exciting and thrilling voices of the skirmish-line? For we depend upon them to perpetuate the memory of our work. To do so, I realize more and more, as I write, that they must have a reasonably fair sketch for their study and comprehension. For "Kenesaw" it has occurred to me as best in the outset to find the location of our commander on the one side, and attempt to describe some battle phases as they appeared from time to time to him and his officers; and, vice versa, to locate the Confederate commander on the other side, where he was generally found during the same battle, and note the results of his doings and observations.

I. SIGNAL HILL.

Gen. Sherman's field orders, issued three days before the battle, placed him and his staff "near Kenesaw Mountain," and the 27th of June he was to be there. The first paragraph of those orders read as follows:

"The Commanding General (Sherman) will be on Signal Hill and will have telegraphic communication with all the army commanders"; to wit, with McPherson near Kenesaw Mountain, north end; Thomas near Kenesaw, south end, and Schofield near Olley's Creek. While I recall in general the character of the country near to Kenesaw, mostly wild, hilly and rugged and thickly covered with virgin trees, oak and chestnut, with here and there a clearing made for a small farm, or a bald opening that seemed to have come of itself; yet I but dimly remember Sherman's temporary headquarters, which were fixed on that Signal Hill for a few days only, including that memorable 27th of June. In his "Memoirs" Sherman is a trifle more specific than in his orders. He writes: "The 27th of June was fixed as the day for the attempt, and in order to oversee the whole and to be in close communication with all parts of the army, I had a place cleared on the top of a hill to the rear of Thomas's center, and had the telegraph wires laid to it."

Mr. J. C. Van Duzer (a Superintendent of Telegraph Lines) telegraphed to the Assistant Secretary of War at 9:30 p. m. the 24th of June: "Sherman moved to a point in field three miles west of Marietta and Thomas to a new headquarters camp half a mile further to our right, about the same distance from Marietta."

Van Duzer thus by the wires keeping up his connection with Washington, united our commands. He used for us what was called the "field line" of telegraph wire, and, as we notice, connected his railroad line with Sherman, and Sherman with Thomas half a mile distant, and with Schofield at least two miles in the same direction; also northward from Sherman two miles with McPherson.

Here, then, like the arrangements of Von Moltke in the Franco-Prussian war, we have our commander in a central position on high ground about one mile in our rear, connecting his spreading rays in fan-shaped order with his army commanders; and they by signal stations and swift messengers with their corps commanders, the latter with division leaders, and so on to include brigades, regiments and companies.

The lines of works, conforming pretty well to the Confederate lines, distant from ours from 200 to 400 yards, as it will be remembered, were, altogether, at least eight miles in extent.

II. CREST OF KENESAW.

The Confederate lines were shorter, estimated between five and six miles, and well drawn back at each end, enabling easy reinforcement. Gen. Johnston had his Headquarters on the Burnt Hickory road, about half-way between Marietta and Loring's left, or Hardee's right. His corps commanders, but three in number, were habitually close at hand. The place where they could best see the Yankee troops was Loring's center, on the top of Kenesaw. Johnston during the anxious hours of severe fighting was usually found there. He could from that point trace our camps throughout nearly their whole extent. Gen. Sherman afterwards gave a brief description of this point: "Reaching Kenesaw Mountain * * * (a beautiful day) I had a superb view of the vast panorama to the north and west." He saw campfires at Dallas, traced the railway for 15 miles, and marked the smoke and flames of burning ties.

Here Johnston did well to mount Kenesaw crest. Here he had in the battle similar but better advantages over Sherman than Meade had over Lee from the famous Cemetery Hill.

III. ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE BATTLE.

We cannot do better than present in form that compendium of instructions embraced in Special Field Orders, No. 28, and dated at Sherman's signal station, above described, June 24, 1864:

The army commanders will make full reconnoissances and preparations to attack the enemy in force on the 27th instant, at 8 a. m. precisely. * * *

I. Maj.-Gen. Thomas will assault the enemy at any point near his center, to be selected by himself, and will make any changes in his troops necessary by night, so as not to attract the attention of the enemy.

II. Maj.-Gen. McPherson will feign by a movement of his cavalry and one division of infantry on his extreme left, approaching Marietta from the north, and using artillery freely, but will make his real attack at a point south and west of Kenesaw.

III. Maj.-Gen. Schofield will feel well to his extreme right and threaten that flank of the enemy with artillery and display, but attack some one point of the enemy's line as near the Marietta and Powder Springs road as he can, with a prospect of success.

IV. All commanders will maintain reserve and secrecy, even from their staff officers, but make all the proper preparations and reconnoissances. When troops are to be shifted to accomplish this attack the movements will be made at night. At the time of the general attack the skirmishers at the base of Kenesaw will take advantage of it to gain, if possible, the summit and hold it.

V. Each attacking column will endeavor to break a single point of the enemy's line and make a secure lodgment beyond, and be prepared for following it up toward Marietta and the railroad in case of success.

The full reconnoissance and preparations were faithfully made, and each commander issued practical orders based on those of Sherman. The corps, division, and brigade chief each did the same to carry out the part that fell to him and his organization. Gen. Thomas's instructions in form came to me the 26th; to wit:

I. The corps of Maj.-Gen. Howard will assault the enemy's intrenchments at some point near the left of Stanley's and Davis's Divisions, which will be selected by Gen. Howard after a careful reconnoissance. He will support his attack by such disposition of his artillery as, in his judgment, is best calculated to insure success.

II. Maj.-Gen. Palmer will, with his column on the right of Gen. Howard's, co-operate with the latter by carrying the enemy's works immediately in his front. The batteries of Gens. Baird's and Davis's Divisions will remain as at present posted until the contemplated movement is made. Gen. King's Division will occupy its present position, but hold itself in readiness to follow up any advantage gained by the other troops.

III. Maj.-Gen. Hooker will support Gen. Palmer on the latter's right with as much of his force as he can draw from his lines, selecting positions for his artillery best calculated to enfilade the enemy's works to his left and on Gen. Palmer's front. In supporting Gen. Palmer's movement Gen. Hooker will watch carefully his own right flank, and be prepared to meet any demonstration of the enemy upon it.

IV. The troops must get into position as early as possible and commence the movement at 8 a. m. to-morrow, precisely. All the troops will be ready to follow up with promptness any success which may be gained.

I will risk wearying the reader by quoting here my own brief orders for the same battle:

I. In pursuance of instructions from Headquarters, Army of the Cumberland, an attack will be made upon the enemy to-morrow at 8 a. m. by this corps (the Fourth) in conjunction with the Fourteenth Corps. The points of attack are selected near the present position of Col. Grose's Brigade.

II. Gen. Newton will lead the assault, being prepared to cover his own left.

III. Maj.-Gen. Stanley will retain one of his brigades in position extending from Gen. Palmer's left to the ravine, and will be prepared, with his other two brigades well in hand, to follow closely Gen. Newton's movements.

IV. Gen. Wood will occupy his present front and extend to the ravine on his right with one brigade, while he will hold his other two brigades in readiness to follow up the movement of the attacking column.

V. The points for massing the troops of Gen. Stanley's and Wood's Divisions will be pointed out in the morning.

Gen. Newton will commence his movement for the attack at sunrise, keeping his troops as well concealed from the enemy's view as possible.

Ah, my comrades, even these brief and formal orders were not given with the boasted Wellington coolness! Thomas and his two corps commanders most concerned, Palmer and I, were for hours closeted together. I went with my division commander, Newton, and we examined the ground which our juniors had selected that seemed least objectionable. Newton used the column of regimental divisions, doubled on the center. That formation seemed best for the situation; first, to keep the men concealed as well as possible beforehand and during the first third of the distance, the ground being favorable for this; second, to make as narrow a front as he could with many men, so as to make a sudden rush with numbers over their works. But for the slashings, abatis, and other entanglements, all proving to be greater obstacles than they appeared to our glasses, the little column would have lost but a few men before arriving at the barricades. Had they done so, and broken through the Confederate works, as our men did in the night fight at Wauhatchee, and as Harker's men did at Muddy Creek, deployed lines were ready to follow up the forlorn hope and gain a success as brilliant as there, and like that of Hazen afterward at Fort McAllister; but let us not anticipate.



THE LINES ABOUT KENESAW.

IV. THE DEMONSTRATION.

(*a.*) *Blair's Corps.*

Begin on our (Sherman's) extreme left. McPherson was to make a feint with Blair's Corps, Garrard's cavalry clearing the way and supporting his flank. Blair at daylight had made an early start; he had put Gen. Gresham's Division in place so as to hold all the intrenchments, including a part of Logan's; Leggett's Division then marched off eastward, swinging toward Marietta. He displayed Garrard's cavalry, put out strong skirmish-lines, ran his artillery upon favorable knolls, and pressed back the Confederates until he struck their solid lines. There Leggett stopped, as all mere feints are apt to do. Yet, surely, the troops had not been detained by any mere skirmish defense, or by cavalry. The wires at last brought word from McPherson to Sherman, who had been not a little solicitous concerning Blair and Leggett: "Have not received report from Blair yet, but Maj. Willard, one of my staff officers, who was with Leggett's Division all day, and left him at sunset, says he was returning to his original position, and that his loss will not exceed 60 men." Such was Blair's demonstration. His actual loss proved to be more; viz, 175.

(*b.*) *Dodge's Corps.*

Dodge, commanding the Sixteenth Corps, part of which was present, came next in line. At the appointed hour (8 a. m.) he deployed as skirmishers three regiments in front of two of his brigades, and sent them "up the mountain." They, with Blair's men, were only to attract attention and help the "feint." A cross-fire from above them at last checked their advance. Dodge's loss from this skirmish was probably about 40 killed and wounded. He found the rifle-pits full, and did not believe that men could "readily ascend" the Kenesaw at that place. Dodge had no doubt that there was a strong hostile line-of-battle opposed to him throughout his entire front.

V. LOGAN'S ATTACK.

The main attack for the Army of the Tennessee, it will be noticed, by Sherman's orders, was by Logan's command, the Fifteenth Corps His line struck a little south of the middle of the great mountain. As did the rest of us, he made his preparations during the night of the 26th. He put Harrow's Division on his left, Osterhause's on the right, and Morgan L. Smith's behind the two, in reserve. Early the morning of the battle Logan re-formed the division of Morgan L. Smith and added some other troops, placing all under his division commander's direction. The brigades were Lightburn's, Giles A. Smith's, and Walcutt's. These constituted the assaulting column. Gen. Logan's report of this action is brief and graphic. It is, in part, as follows:

"They moved forward gallantly, engaging the enemy almost immediately after leaving our line of works. The advance was continued steadily in the face of a destructive fire from three batteries of about 12 pieces, throwing canister and shell, and from a musketry-fire of sharpshooters of the enemy situated below the enemy's first line of rifle-pits, and (continuous) rifle-pits also. After a most stubborn and destructive resistance they succeeded in taking and holding two lines of the enemy's rifle-pits, and advanced toward the succeeding works of the enemy, which were found to be impossible to be carried by assault, on account of a steep declivity of rock 20 or 25 feet high, and the nature of the ground, which was of the most rugged and craggy character. Commanding officers state most positively that the position could not be gained in two hours without any opposing force. After vainly attempting to carry the works for some time, and finding that so many gallant men were being uselessly slain, they were ordered to retire to the last line of works captured and hold them; which was done. The pioneer corps of the different divisions were ordered up at once and used in strengthening the positions already held. Seven commanding officers were killed and wounded in this assault. * * * Near nightfall the enemy on the right of my line advanced from their works and attacked Gen. Lightburn's column, and after a short but decisive fight were gallantly thrown back, losing very many killed and wounded, whom they were unable to remove. After this affair the enemy remained quiet and little firing was heard during the night. We captured 87 prisoners, three of them being commissioned officers."

Logan's killed, wounded and lost were 629.

VI. THOMAS'S ATTACK.

(*a.*) *Howard's Corps.*

This news came in to Sherman, who was very anxious, not, of course, as a whole report, but by driblets. Thomas was nearest to Sherman, and the telegrams from him were constant. I cannot give the account of the doings of my Fourth Corps, that was chosen to make the assault, a main attack, better than I did just after the sad event in 1864. Newton's Division of three brigades made the bold attempt. Here it is:

"I was required to assault the enemy's works at some point near the left of Gen. Stanley's Division. Gen. Palmer, with his column on my right, was directed to carry the enemy's works in his front. The whole movement was to take place at 8 a. m. After a careful examination of the ground, I found only two points where the troops could have a reasonable cover in Stanley's front, and decided to make two columns of attack. Gen. Harker led one column and Gen. Wagner another, while Gen. Kimball moved in support in echelon with Wagner's Brigade. These columns had each a regimental division front, and were separated by 100 yards' interval. The whole front was covered by a strong line of skirmishers, Such troops of Stanley's and Wood's as were free to move were massed in support. The artillery of the corps was so placed as to bring a heavy fire on the points of attack. Gen. Palmer's arrangements were made simultaneous with mine. The artillery opened from all points and continued firing for about 15 minutes.

(*b.*) *Newton's Division.*

"At a preconcerted signal the columns pushed rapidly forward, driving in the enemy's skirmishers, and were not checked until they reached the entanglements in front of the enemy's works. At this place the artillery and infantry fire became so galling that the advance was stopped. Gen. Harker is reported to have made a second advance, when he received the wound which caused his death. Some of his men succeeded in reaching the enemy's works, but failed to secure a lodgment. As soon as it became evident that the enemy's intrenchments could not be carried by assault the command was directed to resume its former position. Our losses were very heavy, particularly in valuable officers. * * * My experience is that a line of works thoroughly constructed, with the front well covered with abatis and other entanglements, well manned with infantry, whether with our own or that of the enemy, cannot be carried by direct assault. The exceptions are where some one of the above conditions is wanting or where the defenders are taken by surprise. The strength of such a line is, of course, increased by well-arranged batteries. Notwithstanding the probabilities against success it is sometimes necessary to assault strong works, as has occurred in several instances during the present campaign."

Gen. John Newton has a few words that ought to be introduced. He remarks:

"Gen. Harker's Brigade advanced through dense undergrowth, through the slashing and abatis made by the enemy, in the face of their fire, to the foot of the works, but (the men) were unable to get in, and fell back a short distance. Gen. Wagner's Brigade passed through similar obstacles, and (his men) were compelled to stop their advance a short distance from the enemy's works. * * Apart from the strength of the enemy's lines, and the numerous obstacles which they had accumulated in front of their works, our want of success is in a great degree to be attributed to the thickets and undergrowth, which effectually broke up the formation of our columns and deprived that formation of the momentum which was expected of it. Beside the enemy's musketry, our troops were exposed to a heavy fire of case-shot. * * * The loss of the division in the assault was 654 killed and wounded."

Col. Opdycke, with the 125th Ohio, led in brave Harker's charge. Harker went into the action mounted, and so was a conspicuous mark. At the bugle-call the column was started. The mass paid no attention to the enemy's scattered out-watchers, but rushed at once for the hostile skirmish-line, protected by deep detached rifle-pits. The skirmish-fire made but little impression. But here came the "tug of battle"—musketry before them, hot in their faces, direct and cross-firing! On they go up the slope, but not many yards, when a Confederate battery, well located for the purpose, poured grape and shells into their flank, cutting in halves their column and confusing the regiments in rear. Still many men kept on, pulled the abatis apart, sprang over or kept under the felled trees, and tried to mount the high parapet. Some were killed, some were seized and pulled over to become prisoners. This terrible trial lasted a little more than an hour, when Harker's Brigade gave up the assault and fell back for better shelter, bringing their dead chief, Gen. Harker, with them.

Wagner's assault was equally brave. Six regiments in column; Col. Blake, with the 40th Ind., on the lead. A writer present used these words:

"Thirty consecutive lines of blue leaped forward with impetuous strides, making their way through the scattered trees and undergrowth in splendid order. Before them on the crest of the ridge was the silent, and, to the sight, untenanted convex salient of the enemy's works, which they were aiming for. On they go, with increasing enthusiasm. But in a few minutes the storm broke in their faces. A close, concentrated, withering blast of musketry swept over the front lines, leaving them indented but unwavering; with the momentum of a mighty river the brigade flows on, till but 200 paces—a mere stone's cast it looked—divided the assailants and the assailed." They gained another advance, perhaps a hundred yards, while the Confederates were reloading. "Then squarely in the teeth of the inspired brigade opened a battery of six guns, * * * every shot plowing through the devoted ranks. Masses of men moved to the right and left of the battery range, still bent upon but one object. Many struggled up to within 20 yards of the enemy's works; some penetrated the lines of the palisades and abatis at their base, and a devoted few planted the foot of a Winkelreid on the slope of the parapet, but the assault had failed!"

The Confederates at one time eagerly pursuing sprang over their works and undertook to charge Wagner's repulsed brigade: "They soon swarmed back, and faster than they emerged, when our reserves, under Gen. Kimball, opened on them with a withering fire with small-arms and artillery."

VII. PALMER'S ATTACK.

(*a.*) *Davis's Division.*

Gen. Palmer, commanding the Fourteenth Corps, selected Jeff C. Davis's Division. Davis, a man always clear-sighted in field work, selected what seemed to be the most vulnerable point in the enemy's breastworks. He designated McCook's and Mitchell's Brigades, placing McCook on his right and Mitchell on his left, in the rear of my right division (Stanley's). Morgan's Brigade he held in reserve. His front line was about 600 yards from the point of attack. There the ground was uneven and rocky, covered with the usual trees and undergrowth. Davis's words give a vivid picture of the scene:

"The signal was given a little before 9 o'clock, and the troops, following the example of their admired leaders, bounded over our own works, in the face of the enemy's fire, and rushed gallantly for the enemy, meeting and disregarding with great coolness the heavy fire, both of artillery and infantry, to which they were exposed, until the enemy's works were reached. Here, owing to exhaustion produced by too rapid execution of the movement, the exceedingly rough ground and the excessive heat, the troops failed to leap and carry the works to which their noble daring and impetuous valor had carried them. McCook had fallen, dangerously wounded, and Harmon, next in rank, had assumed command, but fell immediately. Dilworth, the next senior in rank, promptly took command of the brigade, and with great personal gallantry held his command to the fierce contest now being fought so near the works that a number of both officers and men were killed and wounded at the trenches. Mitchell's Brigade, moving in column parallel with McCook's, received and returned the fire with the same impetuosity and invincible determination, but failed, from the same cause, to carry the works. The position of the troops at this juncture was one of extreme solicitude, and presented a problem of some difficulty of solution. To retire and thus receive the full effect of the enemy's unrestrained fire, now considerably diminished in severity by the effect of our own, was sure to incur additional loss. A renewal of the assault in the present exhausted condition of the troops was exceedingly hazardous. Under the circumstances, after a thorough examination of the ground and the enemy's works, I reported to Maj.-Gen. Thomas, and recommended that the position be held and the troops intrenched where they were. This he ordered to be done, and intrenching implements were immediately furnished the troops, and both brigades threw up works a few yards from and nearly parallel to those of the enemy. This was done under a fire so severe that at times it might almost be termed a general engagement. * * * Col. Daniel McCook, long the admired and gallant commander of his brigade, fell with a severe wound, of which he subsequently died at his home in Ohio. Col. Harmon, of the 125th Ill., succeeded him in command, but fell immediately afterward. He was a brave and skillful officer. The loss of these two noble leaders was at the time a great misfortune to the troops, and will ever be to the army and country a great loss."

Gen. Davis stated in a later paper his loss as 770, and he gave a long list of officers who fell that day.

VIII. THE DISAPPOINTMENT OF SHERMAN.

All the facts herein given were, as we have said, speedily known at the "Signal Hill." Sherman still hoped almost against hope that Schofield, followed by Hooker, might have made a lodgment or a breach upon Johnston's weakened flank. Schofield's dispatch at 10 a. m. was encouraging: "Col. Reily has carried the enemy's position on the Sandtown road and driven the enemy back." (This was an outpost.) "Cox will push

(Continued on second page.)

MIRACULOUS ESCAPE.

One of a Long Series of Adventures.

A DISCOVERY.

Playing Upon the Weakness of the Southron.

A MAD MAJOR.

Successful, Only to Find Prison Again at Florence.

BY H. E. SAINT-PIERRE, MONTREAL, CANADA.

[Continued from last week.]

ON THE REAR OF the shed, at a distance of no more than three feet from it, there was a sliding track which was no longer used, and upon which an old, dilapidated box-car had been abandoned and left exactly opposite the middle of the shed. This box-car had an opening on each side which was provided with a sliding door. It was occupied by an old negro and his wife, who used it as their cabin. They kept the sliding door shut on the side of the shed and used the other side for their entrance door. To get into their improvised cabin four planks had been propped side by side against the car, as a sort of stairway leading to their door.

Wild weeds and high grass had grown profusely and in thick clusters all around the shed, as well as under and around the old box-car.

So much for the description of the shed and the topography of the place. Now for the habits of our friends the rebs when they came in contact with us.

The Southerners were brave men and good fighters. This not one of us ever denined, but they were as ignorant as they were brave, (I am speaking, of course, of the country people,) and as talkative as they were ignorant. They never missed an opportunity of engaging in a discussion with us about the war, and this generally began with the question:

"Why do you 'uns come to fight we 'uns here for?"

The reply was never slow to come, and then the wrangling began. Being aware of their disposition to talk, it always was the easiest thing in the world for us to entice them into a lively discussion whenever we felt so inclined.

With these explanations the reader will now easily follow the sequel of my story.

We had not been in our improvised prison above 10 minutes before a complete survey had been made of the place. The first thing which met our gaze and attracted our attention was a big lot of

THE GUARDS PACING THEIR BEAT.

old scraps and pieces of iron of all shapes and sizes which had been piled at the northeast corner. This was, no doubt, a remnant of the materials which had been used for gunboat building. A complete set of burglar's tools would not have been more handy for us, nor more thankfully received at this moment, than was this pile of old scraps of iron.

The shed was of an oblong form, its greater length stretching along the track. The flooring was composed of thick planks laid lengthwise and reaching to the middle of the building, where they were nailed to a cross-beam. We discovered that, in addition to the door opposite the main track, there were two others; first, a large sliding door on the rear similar to the one in front, which was closed by means of an iron bar thrown across on the outside, and a small door hanging upon hinges at the northern end quite near to the rear of the shed. This latter door opened from the inside and was closed by means of a big lock fastened with screws.

Through the slits between the boards which inclosed the building we could see the guards outside. We observed that the two sentries in the rear were walking their beat with a regular, steady stride, facing one another as they came toward the middle of the building opposite the old box-car, and then, after turning on their heels, receding, back to back, each as far as the corner he had come from.

Now, anyone who has been a military