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ESTABLISHED 1877—NEW SERIES.



MEMOIRS of General William T. Sherman. WRITTEN BY HIMSELF

JOHNSTON ESCAPES FROM THE TRAP LAID FOR HIM.

FIGHTING TO GAIN HIS LINE OF RETREAT

Why He Did Not Give Battle at Cassville.

ONE HUNDRED MILES OF DIFFICULT COUNTRY GAINED IN MAY.


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URING THE 15th, without attempting to assault the fortified works, we pressed at all points, and the sound of cannon and musketry rose all day to the dignity of a battle. Toward evening McPherson moved his whole line of battle forward, till he had gained a ridge overlooking the town, from which his field artillery could reach the railroad bridge across the Oostenaula.

Hooker's Corps had also some heavy and handsome fighting that afternoon and night on the left, where the Dalton road entered the intrenchments, capturing a four-gun entrenched battery, with its men and guns; and generally all our men showed the finest fighting qualities.

Howard's Corps had followed Johnston down from Dalton, and was in line; Stoneman's Division of Cavalry had also got up, and was on the extreme left, beyond the Oostenaula.




On the night of May 15 Johnston got his army across the bridges, set them on fire, and we entered Resaca at daylight. Our loss up to that time was about 600 dead and 3,375 wounded, mostly light wounds that did not necessitate sending the men to the rear for treatment. That Johnston had deliberately designed in advance to give up such strong positions as Dalton and Resaca, for the purpose of drawing us farther south, is simply absurd. Had he remained in Dalton another hour, it would have been his total defeat, and he only evacuated Resaca because his safety demanded it. The movement by us through Snake Creek Gap was a total surprise to him. My army about doubled his in size, but he had all the advantages of natural positions, of artificial forts and roads, and of concentrated action. We were compelled to grope our way through forests, across mountains, with a large army, necessarily more or less dispersed. Of course, I was disappointed not to have crippled his army more at that particular stage of the game; but, as it resulted, these rapid successes gave us the initiative, and the usual impulse of a conquering army.

Johnston having retreated in the night of May 15, IMMEDIATE PURSUIT WAS BEGUN. A division of infantry (Jeff. C. Davis's) was at once dispatched down the valley toward Rome, to support Garrard's cavalry.

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roads by which Gens. Hooker and Schofield were approaching would lead them to

A SEMINARY NEAR CASSVILLE, and that it was all-important to secure the point of junction of the roads with the main road along which we were marching. Therefore I ordered Gen. Thomas to push forward his deployed lines as rapidly as possible; and, as night was approaching, I ordered two field-batteries to close up at a gallop on some woods which lay between us and the town of Cassville. We could not see the town by reason of these woods, but



a high range of hills just back of the town was visible over the tree-tops. On these hills could be seen fresh-made parapets, and the movements of men, against whom I directed the artillery to fire at long range. The stout resistance made by the enemy along our whole front of a couple of miles indicated a purpose to fight at Cassville; and, as the night was closing in, Gen. Thomas and I were together, along with our skirmish-lines near the seminary, on the edge of the town, where musket-bullets from the enemy were cutting the leaves of the trees pretty thickly about us. Either Thomas or I remarked that that was not the place for the two senior officers of a great army, and we personally went back to the battery, where we passed the night on the ground. During the night I had reports from McPherson, Hooker, and Schofield. The former was about five miles to my right rear, near the "niter-caves"; Schofield was about six miles north, and Hooker between us, within two miles. All were ordered to close down on Cassville at daylight, and to attack the enemy wherever found. Skirmishing was kept up all night, but when day broke the next morning, May 20, the enemy was gone, and our cavalry was sent in pursuit. These reports led me to believe that we depended for supplies; so I determined to pause a few days to repair the railroad, which had been damaged but little, except at the bridge at Resaca, and then to go on.

Nearly all the people of the country seemed to have fled with Johnston's army; yet some few families remained, and from one of them I procured the copy of an order which Johnston had made at Adairsville, in which he recited that he had retreated as far as strategy required, and that his army must be prepared for battle at Cassville. The newspapers of the South, many of which we found, were also loud in denunciation of Johnston's falling back before us without a serious battle, simply resisting by his skirmish-lines and by his rear-guard. But his friends proclaimed that it was all strategic; that he was deliberately drawing us farther and farther into the meshes, farther and farther away from our base of supplies, and that in due season he would not only halt for battle, but assume the bold offensive. Of course it was to my interest to bring him to battle as soon as possible, when our numerical superiority was at the greatest; for he was picking up his detachments as he fell back, whereas I was compelled to make similar and stronger detachments to repair the railroads as we advanced, and to guard them. I found at Cassville many evidences of preparation for a grand battle, among them a long line of fresh intrenchments on the hill beyond the town, extending nearly three miles to the south, embracing the railroad-crossing. I was also convinced that the whole of Polk's Corps had joined Johnston from Mississippi, and that he had in hand three full corps, viz, Hood's, Polk's, and Hardee's, numbering about 60,000 men, and could not then imagine

WHY HE HAD DECLINED BATTLE, and did not learn the real reason till after the war was over, and then from Gen. Johnston himself. In the Autumn of 1865, when in command of the Military Division of the Missouri, I went from St. Louis to Little Rock, Ark., and afterward to Memphis. Taking a steamer for Cairo,

I found as fellow-passengers Gens. Johnston and Frank Blair. We were, of course, on the most friendly terms, and on our way up we talked over our battles again, played cards, and questioned each other as to particular parts of our mutual conduct in the game of war. I told Johnston that I had seen his order of preparation, in the nature of an address to his army, announcing his purpose to retreat no more, but to accept battle at Cassville. He answered that such was his purpose; that he had left Hardee's Corps in the open fields to check Thomas, and gain time for his

sequently, in the Spring of 1870, when I was at New Orleans, en route for Texas, Gen. Hood called to see me at the St. Charles Hotel, explained that he had seen my speech reprinted in the newspapers, and gave me his version of the same event, describing the halt at Cassville, the general orders for battle on that ground, and the meeting at supper with Gens. Johnston and Polk, when the chances of the battle to be the next day were freely and fully discussed; and he stated that he had argued against fighting the battle purely on the defensive, but had asked Gen. Johnston to permit him with his own corps and part of Polk's to quit their lines, and to march rapidly to attack and overwhelm Schofield, who was known to be separated from Thomas by an interval of nearly five miles, claiming that he could have defeated Schofield, and got back to his position in time to meet Gen. Thomas's attack in front. He also stated that he had then contended with Johnston for the "offensive-defensive" game, instead of the "pure defensive," as proposed by Gen. Johnston; and he said that it was at this time that Gen. Johnston had taken offense, and that it was for this reason he had ordered the retreat that night. As subsequent events estranged these two officers, it is very natural they should now differ on this point; but it was sufficient for us that the rebel army did retreat that night, leaving us masters of all the country above the Etowah River.

FOR THE PURPOSES OF REST, to give time for the repair of the railroads, and to replenish supplies, we lay by some few days in that quarter—Schofield with Stoneman's cavalry holding the ground at Cassville Depot, Cartersville, and the Etowah Bridge; Thomas holding his ground near Cassville, and McPherson that near Kingston. The officer intrusted with the repair of the railroads was Col. W. W. Wright, a railroad engineer, who, with about 2,000 men, was so industrious and skillful that the bridge at Resaca was rebuilt in three days, and cars loaded with stores came forward to Kingston on the 24th. The telegraph also brought us the news of the bloody and desperate battles of the Wilderness, in Virginia, and that Gen. Grant was pushing his operations against Lee with terrific energy. I was therefore resolved to give my enemy no rest.

In early days (1844), when a Lieutenant of the Third Artillery, I had been sent from Charleston, S. C., to Marietta, Ga., to assist Ins.-Gen. Churchill to take testimony concerning certain losses of horses and accoutrements by the Georgia Volunteers during the Florida War; and after completing the work at Marietta we transferred our party over to Bellefonte, Ala. I had ridden the distance on horseback, and had noted well the topography of the country, especially that about Kennesaw, Allatoona, and the Etowah River. On that occasion I had stopped some days with a Col. Tulin, to see some remarkable Indian mounds on the Etowah River, usually called the "Hightower." I therefore knew that the Allatoona Pass was very strong, would be hard to force, and resolved not even to attempt it, but to turn the position, by moving from Kingston to Marietta via Dallas; accordingly I made orders on the 20th to get ready for the march to begin on the 23d. The Army of the Cumberland was ordered to march for Dallas, by Euharlee and Stilesboro; Davis's Division, then in Rome, by Van Wert; the Army of the Ohio to keep on the left of Thomas, by a place called Burnt Hickory; and the Army of the Tennessee to march for a position a little to the south, so as to be on the right of the general army, when grouped about Dallas.

THE MOVEMENT CONTEMPLATED leaving our railroad, and to depend for 20 days on the contents of our wagons; and as the country was very obscure, mostly in a state of nature, densely-wooded, and with few roads, our movements were necessarily slow. We crossed the Etowah by several bridges and fords, and took as many roads as possible, keeping up communication by cross-roads, or by couriers through the woods. I personally joined Gen. Thomas, who had the center, and was consequently the main column, or "column of direction." The several columns followed generally the valley of the Euharlee, a tributary coming into the Etowah from the south, and gradually crossed over a ridge of mountains, parts of which had once been worked over for gold, and were, consequently, full of paths and unused wagon-roads or tracks. A cavalry picket of the enemy at Burnt Hickory was captured, and had on his person an order from Gen. Johnston, dated at Allatoona, which showed that



HE HAD DETECTED MY PURPOSE of turning his position, and it accordingly became necessary to use great caution, lest some of the minor columns should fall into ambush, but, luckily, the enemy was not much more familiar with that part of the country than we were. On the other side of the Allatoona range, the Pumpkin Vine Creek, also a tributary of the Etowah, flowed north and west; Dallas, the point aimed at, was a small town on the other or east side of this creek, and was the point of concentration of a great many roads that led in every direction, and it got into print. Sub-

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KANAWHA DIVISION: ITS CAMPAIGNS.

Maj. William McKinley Shared Its Fortunes and Its Trials.

SPLENDID ADVANCE.

President Lincoln Encourages by His Coming.

SPECIAL TRAINING.

Gen. Crook Returns With 36th Ohio and Takes Command.

BY R. B. WILSON, 842 LINCOLN AVENUE, TOLEDO, O.

(continued.)

THE ANTIETAM the Union army had to attack Lee's in its chosen position behind the Antietam, passable for artillery only at the four bridges, and by infantry, aside from these bridges, only by deep fording, while its flanks were well protected by the Antietam and Potomac Rivers.

At Gettysburg Lee's was the attacking army and Meade was acting strictly on the defensive in a strong and well-chosen position. At Antietam Lee's army, as strong as it was at Gettysburg, was driven from its chosen position and pushed back at all points of his line on an average more than a mile.

Lee's army retired from Antietam in a condition of far greater demoralization than from Gettysburg, many lives being lost in the panic at the fords of the Potomac. And yet Antietam is generally looked upon as a drawn battle, while Gettysburg is considered a great victory for the Union army. Lee's Antietam campaign was, in its inception, his first great blunder; Gettysburg, after that lesson, was stupendous folly.

Driven back at last, his entire left retired to its third position, from which it slipped away across the Potomac during the following night and day, while keeping up a show of front to mask the movement.

All of the 18th the Union lines were in readiness for and expecting the order to advance that never came; and therein was a great and irretrievable blunder on the part of the commander of the Army of the Potomac, which deprived it of the



GEN. CROOK.

full fruits of a victory which it had fairly won.

III.

A little later came a day which all soldiers of the Army of the Potomac remember with gratitude that they lived to see it. President Lincoln, with uncovered head, rode down the long lines in review and looked with the kindly eyes of a father into theirs, and asked the name of each division, brigade, and regiment as he passed.

Did he have any premonition then as he passed a certain regiment in the Kanawha Division that its kindly-faced Colonel, with his arm in a sling, from a wound at South Mountain, was in a few years to be his successor, and that a certain thoughtful-looking young Lieutenant that saluted him from its ranks would rise up in later years to be, like himself, in the minds and hearts of the people, and be called by them to administer the same high trusts and duties?

We may not know what was passing in his great mind and heart as he looked in the faces of the soldiers who had so recently passed through the fiery ordeal of a great battle, but certain it is that



LINCOLN REVIEWING THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

The part taken by the Kanawha Division at Antietam, while not so distinct from that of other divisions and commands as at South Mountain, was yet in keeping with the high

STANDARD OF EXCELLENCE

it had always maintained. Its position in the morning, as before stated, was on the left, opposite the Burnside Bridge. This bridge, flanked as it was by long lines of rifle-pits and with batteries planted to sweep the bridge and its approaches, was well nigh impregnable to direct attack. Nevertheless, the attempt was several times made to storm it by one brigade of the division in connection with parts of Wilcox's and Sturgess's Divisions, of the Ninth Corps, but without success and with heavy loss.

The other brigade of the division was then sent to ford the Antietam below the bridge and make a flank attack on the force holding the bridge. This was successfully accomplished, though meeting with some sharp resistance at the ford, and resulted in the bridge being carried and Lee's right retiring a half mile to a second position.

When the corps had all crossed over, and its lines were formed for the second attack, the division was on the extreme left of the Union lines. The advance of this line was a grand sight never to be forgotten by those who beheld it. Lee, however, in anticipation of it, had massed a heavy force in a cornfield on his extreme right, and as the Union line advanced it fell upon the left flank of the advancing line with great force.

The brigade on the extreme left, consisting of the 12th, 23d and 30th Ohio, had to change front under fire to meet this attack. Upon it was concentrated the fire of several batteries, which, being answered by our own batteries at short range from its rear, the brigade stood for a time the center of a storm of shell and bullets that threatened to annihilate it. But it firmly held its ground. This was Lee's last despairing effort to check the advance of the Union lines and retrieve some of the ground he had lost.

every soldier there felt that he knew and appreciated the

HARDSHIP AND DANGERS

they had endured, and each felt that he had received his special commendation and blessing for the service he had performed.

Who can tell what faithful service and patient devotion to duty and what heroism was prompted and inspired by the wonderful sympathy and kindly commendation which each soldier felt he had received.

It was said of a Scottish chieftain in a crisis of battle that "One blast from his bugle were worth a thousand men." How infinitely more potent for good, for



GAULEY BRIDGE.

strength of purpose, for patient endurance, for high resolve and gallant deeds was one glance of the kindly eyes of the man who bore on his great heart the burdens and sorrows of all the people.

What wonder is it that thereafter the mighty fervor with which they sang "We're coming, Father Abraham, 300,000 strong," was both the promise and assurance of final victory.

After Antietam there came another season of "All quiet on the Potomac" for that army, but not, as events proved, for the Kanawha Division. It had no sooner left West Virginia for the East than its old enemy became active. A number of newly-organized regiments had been hastily sent in to take its place, and upon these the enemy fell and

(Continued on second page)