With the WESTERN ARMY

CAPTURE OF GEORGIA'S CAPITAL.

By GEN. GREEN B. RAUM.

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FIRST STAGE OF THE GREAT MARCH.

The Battle of Griswoldville—Entrance Into Milledgeville—Flight of the State Government—Mock Session of the Legislature—Repeal of the Ordinance of Secession.

Milledgeville, the Capital of Georgia, was now, on the afternoon of Nov. 20, completely cut off from railroad and telegraphic communication with Augusta and Macon.

On the morning of the 21st it being reported that there was a considerable force of the enemy at and near Griswoldville, Gen. Osterhaus deemed it advisable to move against the railroad east of that station with Gens. Woods's and Hazen's Divisions, unencumbered with their wagon trains, except ammunition wagons; so their trains were turned over to Gen. Smith and our division moved on an interior line toward the railroad at Gordon, some distance east of Griswoldville, thus placing us with the trains between the Seventeenth Corps to the east and Woods's Hazen's and Kilpatrick's Divisions to the south and west.

Early on the morning of this day Gen. Osterhaus pushed the 29th Mo. Mounted Inf., commanded by Col. Joseph S. Gage, to the railroad east of Griswoldville. Col. Gage struck and broke the road about 10 o'clock a. m., thus preventing its use by the enemy.

On this day the brigade of Col. Theodore Jones, of Hazen's Division, was left at Clinton to hold that place until Corse should arrive. During the day and night Col. Jones was constantly annoyed by rebel cavalry.

Gen. Woods having the advance of Gen. Hazen, pushed his division to the railroad 14 miles east of Macon on the night of the 21st, while Gen. Hazen went into camp within an easy march of the railroad.

As has been shown, Gen. Smith was moving our division on an interior line; we were able to make more distance eastward, and went into camp but a short march from Gordon. The Seventeenth Corps, in front of us, also went into camp near the railroad. The discomforts of this day's march will never be forgotten by the men who made it.

It would seem that even the mules and horses should retain a doleful recollection of the rain, the cold, the mud and mire through which they passed. Heavy, cold, drenching rains fell all night of the 20th, and all day the 21st. There was no way to avoid the storm; both men and animals suffered from the exposure. The soldiers marched on, not with that buoyant spirit and elastic step that characterized them with sunny skies, but with that determination and stoicism which inspired these seasoned veterans to meet calmly every hardship and every danger. The night was cold and cheerless, but by morning the storm had ceased.

MOVING ON MILLEDGEVILLE.

The Left Wing of the Army was now approaching Milledgeville.

The First and Third Divisions of the Twentieth Corps, commanded by Gen. Williams, under the direction of Gen. Slocum, was moving on the road from Madison, while the Twentieth Corps, led by Gen. Davis, under the personal direction of Gen. Sherman, was marching on the State Capital on an interior line on the direct road from Covington. Thus in seven days the entire Right Wing of Sherman's army, with the Cavalry Division, about 40,000 strong, had been successfully placed between Macon and Milledgeville, with the great railroad system of Georgia completely at its mercy, while the Left Wing of the army had been thrown between Augusta and Milledgeville, the railroad and the Oconee River Bridge destroyed, and the State Capital absolutely subject to its grasp.

The orders of Gen. Howard to the Right Wing for Nov. 22, were for a general movement upon and destruction of the railroad, the pushing on toward Gordon with all possible dispatch the wagon trains, and a strong demonstration upon Griswoldville by Gen. Osterhaus.

The Seventeenth Corps struck the railroad at Griswoldville and worked east. We struck the road at the same town and worked west from the point broken by the Seventeenth Corps.

GEN. RAUM SUPERINTENDS DESTRUCTION OF CENTRAL RAILROAD.

Gens. Hazen and Woods were each west of us. They made heavy details for destroying the road. The Central Railroad of Georgia was well built and in fine condition; the iron rails, instead of being spiked to the cross ties as was the system of construction in the North, were spiked to heavy sawed stringers, which were let into and securely pinned to the ties.

In destroying this road I made no attempt to remove the iron rails from the stringers; this was too tedious a job; the plan adopted was to string out two or three regiments on one side of the track, and by word of command have every man seize hold of a cross tie or the stringer, and when all were ready the word was given: "Now, lift together!" and in a few seconds the track rose from its bed; the stringers were knocked loose from the ties, and the work of piling the ties across the stringers and building fires was soon accomplished, the heat expanded the rails while spiked fast to the stringers, so that they bent and kinked so they could not be used again.

I superintended this work in person with my brigade. We destroyed four miles of track, burning every cross tie and stringer and ruining every rail.

BATTLE OF GRISWOLDVILLE.

The brigade of Gen. C. C. Walcutt, of Gen. Woods's Division, was designated to make the demonstration against Griswoldville. The movement began early on the morning of Nov. 22 with the following-named regiments:

103d Ill., Maj. A. Willison; 46th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. I. N. Alexander; 97th Ind., Col. Robert F. Catterson; 100th Ind., Maj. Ruel M. Johnson; 6th Iowa, Maj. William H. Clune; 40th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Hiram W. Hall.

The march was westward, on the south side of the railroad. Gen. Osterhaus, commanding the Fifteenth Corps, accompanied the brigade, leaving Gen. Woods and Gen. Hazen to take a defensive position to meet any emergency that might arise.

When Gen. Walcutt moved some distance forward, he found Gen. Kilpatrick's Cavalry in his front, engaging the enemy. Gen. G. W. Smith, commanding the Georgia Militia, had moved out from Macon with four brigades of infantry and a battery of four pieces of artillery, to support Gen. Wheeler in an attack upon the Union forces. No movement had been made against Macon since the 20th, and this probably encouraged the belief that the Union force in the neighborhood was small; at all events, this combined Confederate force came out for a fight.

By direction of Gen. Osterhaus, Walcutt relieved the cavalry, who took position on his flanks. A strong skirmish line was thrown forward, which was supported by two regiments of infantry, and cavalry on the flanks. This force met and drove the Confederate cavalry advance, which hastily withdrew across a swampy bottom and through a belt of timber and rallied in an open field beyond.

Gen. Walcutt pushed his men forward without delay, passed the swamp, and marched in line through the belt of timber to the open field, where he found the enemy.

Gen. Walcutt halted his command, hastily corrected the line, and giving the order to advance, his brigade charged impetuously, driving the enemy from their position.

The enemy retired by two roads, passed Griswoldville, and were pursued with vigor; Gen. Walcutt capturing many horses, equipment, etc.

Gen. Osterhaus now directed Gen. Woods (who had joined the brigade) to have Gen. Walcutt rally his command and take a defensive position on the edge of the timber near the open field. The position selected was along a slight rise in the ground, at the base of which in front and on the flanks was low, marshy ground, forming a natural obstruction to the approach. Here light breastworks of rails and logs were hastily constructed, and a section of Capt. Arndt's 1st Mich. Battery was brought forward.

These defenses were regarded as sufficient to enable Gen. Walcutt's Brigade to resist any attack that might be made by Gen. Wheeler's Cavalry, but soon after these arrangements were completed Gen. Smith brought forward his division of Georgia Militia with a battery of artillery, strongly supported by cavalry. Walcutt stood on the defensive.

Gen. Smith attacked with great enthusiasm and courage.

He was largely superior in numbers, but he was attacking a veteran brigade that had never met defeat. The Confederate artillery was served with skill and accuracy, and delivered a terrific fire into the frail works of Gen. Walcutt, while the columns of infantry with great heroism marched up within 50 yards of the Union works, and when forced to retire by the destructive fire with which they were met, they renewed the assault again and again with great impetuosity.

In the midst of the battle Gen. Walcutt was seriously wounded in the leg by a piece of shell, and was compelled to relinquish the command to Col. Robert F. Catterson, who was fully equal to the task that was before him—the command of the 97th Ind. falling to Capt. George Elliott.

Col. Catterson soon found that the Confederate line considerably overlapped his flanks and that they were struggling to turn his position. He at once called upon Gen. Woods for a reinforcement of two regiments. The 12th Ind., commanded by Maj. Elbert D. Baldwin, was promptly sent forward and posted on the right of Catterson's line.

Col. Eli H. Murray, commanding the First Brigade of Kilpatrick's cavalry, hearing the roar of battle, and realizing that Walcutt's Brigade was hard-pressed, moved forward with two regiments and posted one on each flank of the Union line.

The assaults of the Confederate forces were in vain; the Union line did not falter, did not retire an inch. They coolly met and resisted every effort of the enemy to drive them from their line. It was fortunate for the Union army this day that a portion of the brigade was armed with the Spencer repeating rifle. With these guns the soldiers did tremendous execution; the rapidity and deadliness of the fire was too much for human nature to withstand.

When night came on the enemy retired, leaving over 300 dead upon the field. Col. Catterson sent forward skirmishers, who captured 42 prisoners besides many wounded, who were promptly and considerately cared for.

Too much praise cannot be given to the officers and men engaged in this battle for their skill, coolness and courage.

A movement originally designed as a demonstration ended in a battle, in which the Confederate forces were far superior in numbers, but the temporary works covering the Union line was an advantage which the conspicuous bravery of the enemy could not overcome.

CAPTURE OF MILLDGEVILLE.

While the Right Wing of the army on Nov. 22 was engaged in the destruction of the Macon & Savannah Railroad and the Milledgeville Branch at Gordon, and were fighting the battle of Grisswoldville, the Left Wing was moving down upon Milledgeville.

Gen. Williams, under the direction of Gen. Slocum, with the First and Third Divisions of the Twentieth Corps, having passed through Eatonton on the 21st, threw a pontoon bridge over Little River on the 22d and marched to the suburbs of the city. Col. William Hawley, 3d Wis., was appointed commander of the post, and two regiments occupied the city.

The Second Division, led by Gen. Geary, returning from his four days' raid, came up with the rear of Gen. Williams's column at Little River. Here he received orders to advance at once to Milledgeville. He pushed his troops past the train and reached the city at dark.

Gen. Geary marched his division through the town, crossed the Oconee on the large bridge, and went into camp on the left of the First Division with his left resting near the river, having marched 29 miles during the day. The Third Division camped on the west side of the river, near the bridge.

The Capital of the great State of Georgia was now in the undisputed possession of the Union forces, not a gun having been fired in its immediate defense.

On Nov. 20, the Fourteenth Corps, led by Gen. Davis and accompanied by Gen. Sherman and staff, marched for and went into camp near Eatonton Factories. The next day, amid rain and storm, the march was directed to Milledgeville by way of Farrar's Mill on Murder Creek, the main road from Eatonton to Milledgeville being given to the Twentieth Corps. The progress of the trains was slow, and the night of the 21st was spent in mud, water and falling rain, crossing Murder Creek. On the 22d, the weather partially clearing, the corps pushed forward and went into camp near Cedar Creek.

On Nov. 23, in the afternoon, Gen. Davis marched with his corps to Milledgeville, reaching there in the afternoon. Gen. Sherman, for his headquarters, took possession of the Governor's Mansion, which had been hurriedly vacated by Governor Joseph S. Brown, who, however, stripped the building of its furniture, carpets, curtains, etc., and carried them away on a railroad train. The great majority of citizens remained at their homes, but the entire State Government fled for safety.

Governor Brown and the Legislature made every effort possible to secure troops for the defense of the Capital, but without avail. They then concluded that it would not be wise to take the chances of being captured as prisoners of war.

As was natural and usual in such cases, there were many applications for protection of both person and property. But little damage was done to private property, but the Arsenal and some other public buildings were destroyed, besides some 2,300 muskets, 5,000 lances, 1,500 cutlasses and a small quantity of powder and ammunition. The mills and some 1,800 bales of cotton were not disturbed.

REPEALING ORDINANCE OF SECESSION.

The State House, with all the public records, was entirely deserted. It was visited by many officers and soldiers. A number gathered in the Hall of the House of Representatives. The assembled body was called to order, a presiding officer was elected and they assumed the role of legislators. A motion was made to repeal the Ordinance of Secession.

"EVERY MAN SEIZED HOLD OF A CROSS-TIE."

The question was ably debated, and finally was put to vote and carried, and the State of Georgia restored to the Union by these merry legislators.

It was in this same hall that Hon. Alexander H. Stephens, on Nov. 14, 1860, delivered a great speech before the Legislature, against secession, and in favor of preserving the Union. Mr. Stephens was answered by Hon. Robert Toombs, and his opinions were overborne by the Legislature and later by a State Convention, which forced the State of Georgia into secession by a vote of 208 yeas and 89 nays, the people at large not having been given an opportunity to vote upon the question.

If Mr. Stephens's opponents could have lifted the veil that hid the future from their view, and had beheld a great army surrounding their capital and had witnessed the scene of mimic legislation, they would no doubt have stood appalled.

The capture of Milledgeville was the first step in the great march.

IN THE HEART OF GEORGIA.

The whole army had been thrown, without serious opposition, into the very heart of Georgia between Macon and Augusta, the enemy had given battle and was beaten by a small force, and the most important railroad systems of the State had been reached and were being destroyed.

The Left Wing of the army was concentrated at the State Capital, while the Right Wing occupied, and was destroying the railroad east of Macon, and was in communication with the Commander-in-Chief. Gen. Howard, by courier, gave Gen. Sherman full information as to his march, the seizure of the railroad, and the battle of Griswoldville.

The wings of the army were now lying within easy supporting distance of each other.

The movement of Sherman's army from Atlanta was promptly heralded all over the South. Gen. Wheeler, with his division of cavalry, was at once ordered to operate against the moving columns and to aid in rallying a force to meet and destroy this now isolated army, which was moving without a base and without hope of reinforcements. It was Gen. Wheeler's cavalry which from day to day skirmished with Kilpatrick's advance as the movement was made through Jonesboro, Lovejoy and on toward Forsyth and the Ocmulgee River.

When Wheeler learned that the Union forces were crossing the Ocmulgee he hastened to Macon and reached there about 11 o'clock on the night of Nov. 19. He had already sent forward Anderson's and Crews's Brigades to report to Gen. Cobb at Macon, and now directed the balance of his command to follow, except the brigades of Ferguson and Breckinridge.

Gen. Wheeler met Gen. Hardee that night at Macon, and learned that he had assumed command of the Department. Gen. Hardee directed Gen. Wheeler to cross the river and move out at daylight with all his available force, except Crews's Brigade, on the road to Clinton, and ascertain the location and strength of the Union force. It will be perceived that Wheeler and Kilpatrick, old antagonists in northern Georgia, were now face to face again between Macon and Clinton.

It was the cavalry of these two enterprising and courageous men who had a series of skirmishes on Nov. 20. The day was foggy, and at times it was difficult to see any distance ahead. A portion of Wheeler's forces actually penetrated Clinton for a few moments, and captured a servant of Gen. Osterhaus, but the Confederate forces which had been brought together at Macon were wholly inadequate to seriously interfere with the progress of Gen. Sherman's great army.

The plan of campaign for Gen. Hood's army had been publicly proclaimed to be an offensive move to the rear of the Union army at Atlanta, with the view of forcing it to abandon the State of Georgia. Gen. Hood was at Florence, Ala., when Gen. Sherman began his march. It was out of the question in a military sense for Gen. Hood to pursue and overtake Gen. Sherman's army. Had he made the attempt Gen. Thomas would have at once been on his track, and he would have been in danger of falling between the forces of Sherman and Thomas.

The die was cast. Hood must continue his offensive campaign to the end and Georgia must rely for her defense upon such troops as could be brought to her relief, and to the uprising of the people.

The Confederate authorities were amazed at the audacity of Gen. Sherman's movement. The whole thing was contrary to well-established military rules and to them seemed impossible of success. The daily newspapers teemed with articles prophesying the utter ruin of the Union army. An appeal was made for an uprising of the people en masse to destroy the invaders, as will be seen from the following:

GEN. BEAUREGARD AND OTHERS APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE OF GEORGIA TO RISE.

"Corinth, Miss., Nov. 18, 1864.

"To the People of Georgia:

"Arise for the defense of your native soil! Rally around your patriotic Governor and gallant soldiers! Obstruct and destroy all the roads in Sherman's front, flank, and rear, and his army will soon starve in your midst. Be confident. Be resolute. Trust in an overruling Providence, and success will soon crown your efforts.

"I hasten to join you in the defense of your homes and firesides.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

"Richmond, Nov. 18, 1864.

"To the People of Georgia:

"You have now the best opportunity ever yet presented to destroy the enemy. Put everything at the disposal of your Generals; remove all provisions from the path of the invader, and put all obstructions in his path. Every citizen with his gun, and every negro with his spade and ax can do the work of a soldier. You can destroy the enemy by retarding his march. Georgians, be firm! Act promptly, and fear not!

"B. H. HILL, Senator."

"I most cordially approve the above.

"JAMES A. SEDDON,
"Secretary of War."

"Richmond, Nov. 19, 1864.

"To the People of Georgia:

"We have had a special conference with President Davis and the Secretary of War, and are able to assure you that they have done and are still doing all that can be done to meet this emergency that presses upon you. Let every man fly to arms! Remove your negroes, horses, cattle, and provisions from Sherman's army, and burn what you cannot carry. Burn all bridges, and block up the roads in his route. Assail the invader in front, flank and rear, by night and day. Let him have no rest.

"JULIAN HARTRIDGE, J. H. REYNOLDS, JOHN T. SHOEMAKER, MARK BLANFORD, GEN. N. LESTER, JOSEPH M. SMITH, Members of Congress."

These appeals to the people of Georgia made by her most distinguished citizens and representatives, and given sanction by the highest military authority of the Confederacy, were designed, of course, to compass the destruction of the Union army. The plans suggested were very like those adopted by Alexander of Russia against Napoleon's army at Moscow, when in Midwinter every vestige of food and forage for many miles around the city was destroyed, and the city itself was set on fire and became a raging flame, thus forcing Napoleon, for the safety of his army and for want of supplies, to abandon Moscow, and, while unrelentingly pursued and beset by his enemies, retreat with his army into the snow storms of an almost arctic Winter, from which a mere remnant of that imperial army emerged.

Such radical military methods were not practical in an American State, and were not possible in the mild climate of central Georgia, more than 1,500 miles south of Moscow.

When it was made known to Gen. Sherman that certain Confederate forces were destroying corn and forage on his front, he informed prominent citizens that such acts must stop or he would unrelentingly lay waste to the country. This no doubt put an end to such proceedings.

But the fact remained that the State of Georgia was the theater of great military operations, and that both the Union and Confederate armies would be subsisted—both men and animals—off of the country. The farmers and planters of the State had been overtaken with evil times; they, indeed, were the victims of the great hardships of war.

Gen. Sherman started out with the well-considered plan of inflicting all the damage possible on the military resources of the State. Not only were the railroads—the means of transportation—to be destroyed, but all the factories, machine shops and mills that could contribute supplies to the Confederate army were to be destroyed, so that Georgia would practically cease to be an important factor in continuing the war. This was war in its sternest form, and brought the war sadly home to the people of the whole State.

These earnest appeals were made in vain. The great body of the people of Georgia who were not in the Confederate army did not take up arms to "assail the invader." They were apprised of the fact that Gen. Johnston and Gen. Hood at the head of a large, well-organized and valiant army had been powerless to drive back the forces under Gen. Sherman; they therefore wisely concluded that it would be useless for an unorganized body of citizens, however numerous and brave, to attempt to stand before such an army as Gen. Sherman was then advancing with.

While this was so, the daily papers of Georgia, which constantly fell into our hands, declared in the most confident and vehement manner that the Union army would be destroyed; that the forces were gathering to overwhelm it, and that such an army could not subsist on the march, and would become an easy prey, because of starvation.

SPIRIT OF UNIVERSAL CONFIDENCE.

The experience of these nine days—Nov. 15 to 23, inclusive—had not been such as to lead the most timid soldier in our army to conclude that disaster lurked near our path. There was a spirit of universal confidence pervading the whole rank and file of our army. Every officer and soldier felt that we could take care of ourselves—not only in battle, but in the way of food and forage. During these nine days even this veteran army, many of whom were on their fourth year of service, had learned something.

Marching the troops habitually on the side, while the wagons occupied the road, afforded more complete protection to the trains, while at the same time shortening the length of the column.

The standing order was for the columns to move at 7 o'clock a. m. The condition of the roads in front was always ascertained the evening before; if repairs were required the Pioneer Corps, under the protection of troops, pushed forward at an early hour and repaired or made bridges, and corduroyed the road when found necessary.

The foraging parties moved out at daylight, taking empty wagons along to contain the food and forage produced. These foraging parties covered the country from three to five miles on each side of the marching columns. We were moving through a rich country that contained an abundance of everything necessary for the support of our men and animals. Horses, mules, cattle, hogs, turkeys, chickens, bacon, sugar, molasses, honey, sweet potatoes and other vegetables were daily brought in in large quantities. Cattle were brought to camp on the hoof, but hogs were slaughtered at the pen.

The foraging party of my brigade was always under command of a discreet officer, and accompanied by the Quartermaster. The general orders and personal instruction to these officers was to treat the people civilly and always leave plenty for the support of the family. Poor people were not disturbed; the aim was to live off of the country, but not to actually devour it.

It often occurred that considerable quantities of supplies were piled up on the roadside, with a solitary soldier to guard it until the wagon train of his command arrived, when empty wagons would be turned out and promptly loaded without stopping the train.

As the soldiers marched by these piles of good things many a joke would be passed with the guard, but he and his stores were always safe from intrusion. These supplies were duly issued by the Quartermasters.

These parties of foragers, numbering from 25 to 30 each day, and each party having from 50 to 75 well-armed men, were the equivalent of so many scouting parties; they advanced in front and on the flanks of the marching columns and were the first to encounter the enemy, if one appeared.

It often occurred that these men had skirmishes of considerable importance. They soon arranged to support each other in case of need. They knew, of course, that the army was not far distant, and that support would soon come up if needed. They kept the officers in charge of the heads of columns fully advised as to what was going on in front.

The foraging parties brought in horses and mules in great numbers. These were at once put to use; each company had its pack horses, so that the men were relieved from carrying much of their baggage.

A few men would club together and have a pack horse, to be managed by one of their number or a negro; their blankets, haversacks, and cooking utensils would be securely placed on this animal, and he would bear the burden instead of the men. This was a great relief to the soldier.

These pack animals would be kept together and move along with the regiment.

It will be observed that Gen. Sherman's order of march provided that the wagons should be given the roads and the men should march on one side. This plan was habitually practiced, and was found to work well. For the most part the march lay through an open country, where the troops could march through the woods without material obstruction; where heavy thickets and marshes occurred the roads might be used.

My rule in marching my brigade was to rest my men every hour. By marching through the woods by the side of the road I could make these halts without interrupting the movement of the wagon train.

I many times stopped my command for the noon-day meal while the wagon train continued its advance on the road. We often marched with troops on both sides of the road, with the wagons in the middle, thus forming the best possible protection to our trains.

On the long march of the Fifteenth Corps from Memphis to Chattanooga we pursued the old plan of distributing the wagon train amongst the troops and all marching on the road, but the Georgia plan was a great improvement; it shortened the length of the column and brought the fighting men closer together.

Gen. Sherman's aim was to have at least four heads of column advancing to the front. Where an entire corps marched on one road the column was very long. We, however, were usually able to find two or more roads running nearly parallel with each other. It happened, therefore, that a single corps would often have two or three columns marching forward in easy supporting distance of each other, so that in case of a fight a heavy force could be brought into action at short notice.

GEORGIA NEGROES.

A most interesting feature of this march was the universal exhibition of friendship for and confidence in the Union soldiers by the negro population. The slaves of Georgia evidently had a clear conception of the import of the great struggle as far as they were concerned. These people had no education, they could not read the newspapers, they did not travel, they were confined to the plantations, but they had learned from conversation, amongst the white people, which they had overheard, the essential facts in regard to the issues of the war to enable them to conclude that the question of their freedom was involved in the struggle. This knowledge was not confined to a few intelligent house servants, but permeated the entire mass of slave population. Many of the old people were imbued with a deep religious sentiment, and gave expression to the opinion that the hands of the Lord was in this work. This was not new to me. I had observed the same thing in Mississippi in 1863 during the campaign against Vicksburg.

The most remarkable thing in connection with the slave population was that they did not exhibit the slightest hatred or ill-will toward their masters; and when an opportunity came that they could attain freedom by marching away with the Union army they did not commit depredations of any kind before leaving. While they remained at the old home they were absolutely faithful to their masters. I have never heard of a slave betraying a Union soldier who had escaped from prison, and was seeking safety in flight.

I recall an interesting incident of this march which illustrates the feelings of the negroes. While marching along a lane, through a plantation, quite a number of negroes, mostly women and children and old men, gathered in the road to see us pass. One woman had an armful of tobacco nicely cured and tied into bands of four or five leaves. This she handed to the soldiers a band at a time as they passed along; the soldiers accepted the tobacco with thanks and the whole crowd of negroes seemed delighted that they could do something to gratify the soldiers. Finally a young fellow, 18 or 20 years old called out: "May I go with you?" A soldier near him replied: "Come right along," and the negro, without further preparation, waved his hand in a goodbye to his people and marched away with the soldiers. As an evidence of his faith in the young man, the soldier immediately removed his knapsack from his back and placed it safely on the shoulders of the negro, who seemed delighted with the idea that he was at once given something to do.

No other race of mankind, similarly situated, in any age of the world, acted towards their masters with such loyalty and devotion as did the negro slaves of the South during the civil war. These slaves remained upon the plantations peacefully and quietly, laboring for the support and protection of their masters' families, while they, their sons and retainers, were away in the Confederate army fighting to maintain and extend the institution of slavery.

These slaves did not form a conspiracy to aid the Union forces, or in any manner to embarrass the plans of the Confederate leaders. It was not until the Union armies had penetrated the South that any portion of them sought freedom by joining the Union forces. While loyal to their masters, they were also true to every Union soldier who escaped from a rebel prison and called upon them for protection and food.

(To be continued.)

The Death of Gen. McPherson.

EDITOR NATIONAL TRIBUNE: I was a member of the Signal Corps, Army of the Tennessee, serving under Lieut. Wier. On the evening before Gen. McPherson was killed I was at his quarters when he and many of his officers were admiringly viewing a chestnut sorrel stallion, a present to the General from the members of his old regiment. Complying with the General's request, I mounted the animal and rode him around to exhibit his movements and style. As the horse had just arrived from Illinois I do not think the General was ever astride of him.

On the next morning, while I was temporarily on duty at the signal station, the General came up, looked through his glass and asked me a few questions. Being then relieved, the General and I descended the ladder and joined the small cavalcade, consisting of members of the staff, Lieut. Wier and Serg't Thompson. We rode across an open space and entered a woodland in which the undergrowth was very thick. Suddenly the rebels, whose presence was not suspected, fired a volley, which was immediately followed by another. My horse became unmanageable and bolted, passing the General and his Orderly, carrying me through the Johnnies, who fired another volley. I emerged into an open space, where I was joined by Serg't Thompson. After a brief consultation we wheeled and rode back as fast as the dense undergrowth would permit. We found the General lying on the ground, his head resting on his faithful Orderly's arm. I think the General was killed by the first volley.—R. H. CHEADLE, U. S. Signal Corps, Army of the Tennessee.

This Will Interest Many.

F. W. Parkhurst, the Boston publisher, says that if any one afflicted with rheumatism in any form, or neuralgia, will send their address to him, at 804-19 Winthrop Bldg., Boston, Mass., he will direct them to a perfect cure. He has nothing to sell or give; only tells you how he was cured after years of search for relief. Hundreds have tested it with success.

PENSION POINTERS.

Inquiries Answered and Suggestions Made.

Geauga, Ohio—If your claim is for increase of pension on pensioned disability and you were examined in January last, it is high time you were hearing from the Pension Bureau. Consult your attorney.

C. W. A., Salifon, N. J.—The new act of March 2, 1903, applies only to those general law pensioners drawing on account of loss or total disability of a limb.

Subscriber, Knox, Pa.—There is no U. S. law protecting pension money after it is drawn by the pensioner, nor property purchased with pension money.

J. C. H., Walnut Grove, Ky.—A soldier that was sent home on sick furlough before April 2, 1865, and failed to return to his regiment before its muster-out, would have to show very clearly that during the entire period he was physically unable to return or to report to the nearest military authorities.

J. W., Enfield, Ill.—There is no specified rating either for hemorrhage or for catarrh of the head proven of service origin. Nor is there a specified rating for a discharge from the ear. The rate for total deafness of one ear is $10 per month.

E. F. W., Macon, Mo.—See reply to C. W. A., above. The pensioner you refer to evidently receives the $30 rate for total inability to perform any manual labor.

H. M. H., Elk Fork, Ky.—See reply to C. W. A., above. If you are so disabled in consequence of disability of proven service origin as to require aid and attendance in dressing and undressing, etc., but not constant care of any other person, you will probably be allowed the rating of $50 provided by act of July 14, 1892, for such cases. Your case should be heard from within a month or so after the medical examination.

W. A. R., Wellston, Mo.—The general law rate of pension for total deafness of one ear and partial of the other is $20, $25 or $27, according to the degree of deafness of the ear not totally deaf. If you are pensioned under the act of June 27, 1890, these rates will not apply to your case, as the highest rate under that law for any degree or character of disability is $12 per month.

O. G., Silverton, Ore.—The increases allowed by the new act of March 2, 1903, will in general be granted without any application from the pensioner. If you wish to do so, write the Commissioner of Pensions.

J. H. T., Lansing, Minn.—See reply to Subscriber, Knox, Pa., above.

J. W. T., Camden, Ohio—What you refer to is the additional bounty law of July 28, 1866. It expired by limitation on July 1, 1880. Claims for additional bounty under the law must have been filed before that date to be valid.

J. W. P., Manchester, Ohio—The new act of March 2, 1903, provides a rate of $60 per month for loss of both a hand and a foot or total disability of same. A pensioner could not lawfully receive $55 for amputation of a leg at or near hip joint and the same amount for amputation of an arm at or near shoulder joint. Unless there is an amputation of a limb, the highest rate on same is $46 per month.

A. D. C., Tallmanville, Pa.—The act of March 2, 1903, provides a rating of $46 per month for loss or total disability of arm. If there is an amputation it must be at or above the elbow; otherwise the rate would be $40.

F. H., Ventura, Cal.—If the mother of the soldier is practically dependent upon her own exertions or the contributions of others not legally bound to aid her for her support, she would be entitled to mother's pension if it is shown that the son died from causes originating in the service and line of duty. It would need to be shown that the stepfather is unable to, or if able, does not, support the mother.

G. W. Y., Stamford, Conn.—You can amend your original claim to explain and show the true cause of disability alleged, but cannot add what is properly something new by way of disability and obtain rating thereon from date of filing said original applicaton.

DEPARTMENT NEWS.

DIVISION OF PENSION—ACT OF MARCH 3, 1899.

The application of Fannie Smith for half of the pension of her husband on the ground of his alleged desertion of her, was rejected by the Pension Bureau on the ground that the pensioner was not justly chargeable with desertion. The decision on her appeal states (Ass't Secretary Campbell, Feb. 6, 1903):

"Claimant and her two children, a son and daughter, both of age, desiring to better the condition of the family, decided to remove from their own home in Maroa, where they had resided many years, to Decatur, Ill. This was in opposition to the wishes of her husband, who strongly objected to living in Decatur, and as the wife insisted in carrying out her plans, pensioner left and went to his sister at Springfield, Ill., and has never since resided, except temporarily, with claimant or his family. * * *

"In April, 1901, claimant instituted proceedings in the Circuit Court of Macon County, Ill., for separate maintenance and temporary alimony and solicitor's fee.

"Pensioner made answer, and upon the denial of alimony by the court claimant's complaint was dismissed with costs.

"It is contended that pensioner testified before the Special Examiner that he would not support claimant, and that he never intended to return to her, and that this indicated his intent to desert claimant, and that his intent is shown to have existed for more than six months prior to her application. * * *

"Pensioner's testimony before the Special Examiner does not bear the construction put upon it by claimant's attorney.

"He testified that:

"'When my wife and children—Barbara and Bert—took all control of our family affairs out of my hands and moved to Decatur in Fall of 1897, I considered that our family was broke up, but thought that my wife and I would become reconciled to each other after a while, and I made some efforts myself and through my daughter, Mrs. Kibble, to get her to come to her house and make her home there with me, but she refused to do that.'

"The Department is of the opinion that the evidence in this case fails to show desertion on the part of pensioner, under the act of March 3, 1899, the separation of the parties being the result of claimant's desire to change their place of residence in opposition to the wishes of the pensioner, and make her home with her children instead of with her husband.

"The action appealed from is accordingly affirmed."

ACCRUED PENSION—SPECIAL ACT OF CONGRESS.

The soldier, Wesley W. Taylor, was granted pension by special act of Congress approved May 24, 1890, but having disappeared in February, 1889, no payment was ever made under said act, which pensioned him "subject to the provisions and limitations of the pension laws" and named no rate. His wife, claiming as widow on the presumption of his death, was allowed widow's pension under the act of June 27, 1890, but her claim for soldier's "accrued pension" under the special act of Congress was denied by the Pension Bureau on the ground that no pension had accrued under said special act. The decision on the appeal from this holding states (Ass't Secretary Campbell, Feb. 7, 1903):

"The issue in this case is a peculiar one, and might be discussed from various standpoints; but, from any point of view, it may be stated that when a special act directs the name of a soldier to be placed upon the pension roll, no rating being fixed by said act, but, instead, the claim is 'subject to the provisions and limitations of the pension laws,' such a name cannot be placed upon the roll unless the individual can be found or is known to be in existence, the circumstances surrounding the case being such that a rating under such an act can be determined.

"This soldier, if alive, has a right under the special act. If he died before the special act was approved he never had any, as a matter of course; for dead men have no rights under the law. This claimant has no right under the act in question for the reason that there is now no accrued pension and, moreover, there never has been.

"Action affirmed."

SERVICE PENSION.

Views of Comrades Interested in the Proposed Legislation.

Joel Horner, Purvis, Miss., thinks that service pension should be given in addition to disability pension, as otherwise the sum granted would not be sufficient to provide the necessaries of life. Comrade Horner says: "I have been trying to get my pension increased for the past seven or eight years, and have had to spend considerable time and money. I had to go 25 miles across Sand Mountain to Scottsboro, Ala., to be examined for increase. The trip cost me $7. That was four years ago. I thought that I would hear from it in a short time, but instead received blanks and instructions to give the history of my disability and also my residence or several residences, since muster-out. That was a year ago. When the Act of June 27, 1890, was passed, I had secured $12 under that law. In 1894, I was reduced to $8, which sum I have since been drawing, and, as stated above, I have been unable to secure any increase. My service was in Co. I, 31st Wis., from December, 1862, until close of war. I was with Sherman's army through the siege of Atlanta, and on the march to the sea, and also in the Grand Review at Washington."

Jesse Sherer, Co. E, 5th Ohio Cav., Upshur, Ohio, wants service pension given in addition to disability pension.

Comrades at Middleport, Ohio, are enthusiastic for the $12 service pension bill, and the signatures of 60 have been attached to a petition gotten up by Middleport Post, 125. The officers of this Post are Richard Harden, Commander; M. L. Jones, Quartermaster, and S. I. Bowman, Adjutant.

Geo. W. Turner, Co. A, 23d Mo., Day, Okla., writes: "I think the $12 service pension all right, but I would have this added to invalid pension when the soldier reaches the age of 60 years. I think the widows of all soldiers should be pensioned at $12 per month."

John Gilman, Prosper, Vt., writes: "I note in The National Tribune of April 6 the diversity of opinions on the service pension question. This means that there will be no service pension law so long as there is so much selfishness exhibited. Now, why not follow the leadership of our 'Great General'—The National Tribune—and all stand by the $12 per month bill?" Comrade Gilman was mustered into the service first May 2, 1861, for three months, and in July, 1863, into Co. G, 6th Vt., in which he served until the close of the war.

George W. Miller, Co. I, 31st Ohio, Fair Play, Mo., writes: "Give us a $12 service pension."

Ira S. Owens, Corporal, Co. C, 74th Ohio, favors a service pension bill of $12 in addition to disability pension.

James H. Brundage, West Newton, Pa., thinks that were the present pension laws liberally construed there would be no need of additional legislation, but as the soldiers have been grievously disappointed in this matter during recent years, he favors a service pension of not less than $12 to all honorably discharged soldiers who served 90 days, and would place upon the rolls at $12 all widows of such. Comrade Brundage saw three years' hard service in the Army of the Potomac, and is a member of J. C. Markle Post, 623.

Geo. Sauer, Co. F, 8th Ohio, Cosmopolis, Wash., enlisted June 8, 1861; veteranized after three years' service, and was finally mustered out in March, 1865. Comrade Sauer is now 72 years of age, and is receiving a pension of $12. He would have Congress give a service pension of $12 in addition to disability pension.

W. D. Bash, Co. B, 10th W. Va., 1030 Washington St., Indiana, Pa., believes in a graded service pension, and would also grade the pension of widows according to the length of the service of their husbands.

Will B. Spring, Co. A, 1st Conn. H. A., Noroton Hights, Conn., writes: "I think I voice the sentiments of a large number of the old soldiers here in the Home when I say 'Give the soldiers $12 per month service pension.' I was a prisoner in Libby and on Belle Isle and receive only $8 pension."

E. M. Winslow, Co. D, 105th Ill., Fitzgerald, Ga., writes: "Give $12 service pension in addition to disability pension; provided, however, that disability pension does not exceed $24."

John Bartges Post 561, North Georgetown, O., at a recent meeting unanimously indorsed the service pension bill advocated by The National Tribune to place upon the rolls at $12 all honorably discharged soldiers who saw service of 90 days or more, and the widows of such. A. G. Marietta, Commander; G. Stark, Adjutant, North Georgetown, O.

B. F. Harford, Co. H, 20th Ill., Moran, Kan., who is now drawing a pension of $10 per month, thinks that Congress should grant a service pension of $12, in addition to disability pension. Comrade Harford first enlisted for three months, then re-enlisted for three years, and after the fall of Vicksbur