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The AMERICAN SPANISH WAR

Its History Written by the Men Who Participated in It.

Edited by JOHN McELROY.

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HON. JOHN D. LONG, Secretary of the Navy. (From a photograph by Purdy, Boston. Copyright 1897.)

OUR New Navy, which has come out of the war with Spain with so much credit and renown, dates from the Administration of President Arthur, when Mr. Chandler was Secretary of the Navy. The first ships were the Chicago, Atlanta, Boston, and Dolphin. John Roach builded, not better than he knew, but apparently better than anybody else knew. He and Secretary Chandler not only laid the foundation of our present magnificent Navy, but gave an impulse to iron naval building in this country which has resulted in the creation of American ship yards capable of turning out as good work as any in the world. An infelicitous attempt was made to discredit the little Dolphin as "structurally weak," but she has circumnavigated the globe and has come out of the recent war equal to every demand and sound as a nut.

Secretary Whitney, with continuing ability and foresight, enlarged the work which was begun under Mr. Chandler, and was followed in the same lines by Secretaries Tracy and Herbert, each adding to the number of our war ships and developing in every way our naval power.

When I entered upon my duties in March, 1897, the Navy, though not large compared with the navies of one or two foreign powers, was well equipped and well prepared. A high professional spirit animated its officers; the Bureaus and leading naval stations were officered by chiefs alive to their responsibilities, zealous and progressive. It is fair to say that after the last above named date no new life or force was infused into the administration of the Navy. These were already there. The fleets went on, as during the year before, in the gunnery and target practice and manuvers at sea. They were supplied at home and abroad with ammunition, coal, medical and other supplies, so that they were ready for any emergency, and the credit of their substantial preparedness when war came belongs to no one man nor to any one year.

And yet it was the preparation of a small Navy, almost pathetically small as compared, for instance, with that of Great Britain. It had seen no war service; its battleships, gunboats and torpedo boats were untried. To appreciate the situation we must forget the glory and confidence felt in it everywhere to-day and remember that a few years ago it had very little popular hold. At the first muttering of the storm with Spain, it was an open question whether her naval power was not equal to our own. She had ships of the finest and most recent naval construction; she had gallant and educated officers and brave seamen; she had ready access to every resource which the skill of Europe could supply in the way of naval construction, armament and ammunition. It was with a consciousness of these facts on our part that, when the possibility of war became apparent, the work of providing for its exigencies which had been begun and carried on so well already under the ordinary conditions of past years, was continued strenuously and earnestly by the same agencies to meet the extraordinary demands which war would bring.

THE LOWERING OF THE WAR CLOUDS.

As early as January, 1898, the increasing tension of our relation with Spain put the Navy Department on its guard. The fleet in Atlantic waters had been largely engaged during the previous years in enforcing the neutrality laws, and great vigilance had been exercised in preventing the fitting out and departure of filibustering expeditions from our coast. Recognizing the importance of retaining experienced enlisted men in the service, the Commander-in-Chief of the European station was directed, on the 11th day of January, 1898, not to discharge men whose enlistments were about to expire. This was probably the first important order given in contemplation of war. On Jan. 17, the Commander-in-Chief of the South Atlantic station was informed of the critical condition of our relations with Spain and directed to proceed with the Cincinnati and Castine from Montevideo to Para, Brazil. On the same day, the Helena, then on her way to the Asiatic station, was ordered to await instructions at Lisbon; and the Wilmington, on her way to the South Atlantic station, was ordered to await instructions in the West Indies. On Jan. 26, the Commander-in-Chief of the European station was ordered to assemble his squadron at Lisbon, and on the next day the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic station was ordered to retain the men whose enlistments were about to expire.

For several years prior to the incoming of the McKinley Administration, it had been the policy of our Government to refrain from sending naval vessels to Cuban waters. This policy was now reversed, and in the Fall of 1897, the North Atlantic squadron, following the formerly established custom, and so without just cause of offense to Spain, was ordered south for the purpose of Winter evolutions and practice. The next step was for our naval vessels to resume friendly visits to Cuban ports; and after conference between our Secretary of State and the Spanish Minister, in which the subject was "discussed and accepted," the authorities at Madrid and Havana were informed that the U. S. S. Maine would be forthwith instructed to call at the port of Havana.

The order dispatching the Maine was sent Jan. 24, the ship being at that time off Dry Tortugas, Florida. The telegram directing this movement was as follows:

"Washington, Jan. 24, 1898.

"Sicard, Key West:

"Order the Maine to Havana, Cuba, and make friendly call, pay his respects to the authorities, particular attention must be paid to usual exchange of civilities. Torpedo boat must not accompany Maine. The squadron must not return to Key West on this account."

The Maine was received in Havana with every mark of official courtesy. Reports from her commanding officer, however, and other sources, indicated from the first that this visit was received with disfavor.

A little after 1 o'clock, on the night of Feb. 15, my daughter came into my apartment at the Hotel Portland, woke me from a sound sleep, and gave me a dispatch which she had just received from a Western Union messenger boy in the hallway, with the information that it was of great importance. It was the famous dispatch from Capt. Sigsbee announcing the destruction of the Maine, and was as follows:

"Havana, Feb. 15, 1898.

"Secretary of the Navy,

"Washington, D. C.:

"Maine blown up in Havana Harbor at 9:40 to-night, and destroyed. Many wounded and doubtless more killed or drowned. Wounded and others on board Spanish man-of-war and Ward Line steamer. Send light-house tenders from Key West for crew and the few pieces of equipment above. No one has clothing other than that upon him. Public opinion should be suspended until further report. All officials believed to be saved. Jenkins and Merritt not yet accounted for. Many Spanish officers, including representatives of Gen. Blanco, now with me to express sympathy.

"SIGSBEE."

It was almost impossible to believe it could be true, or that it was not a wild and vivid dream. As my eyes went over and over the letters, I seemed to see between the lines the harbor at Havana, lying under the shadow of night, suddenly rift with a column of fire and startled with the thunder of the explosion of the noble battleship. Commander Dickins was at that time, in the absence of Capt. Crowninshield, Acting Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and I sent the dispatch to him with a short note written in lead pencil as follows:

"Dear Dickins:

"I have just received this terrible telegram. Please have request attended to at once by telegram in ordinary language, not using cipher."

Commander Dickins reported a little later at my hotel. I was sitting in a small room adjoining the hotel office with two or three newspaper correspondents, who had already heard the news and had come to me for confirmation of it. Dickins was ordered to send to the naval station at Key West instructions to dispatch a vessel to Havana with medical assistance. He then went to the White House to inform the President of the catastrophe. The following telegram was sent to Captain Sigsbee:

"Sigsbee, Havana:

"The President directs me to express for himself and the people of the United States his profound sympathy with the officers and crew of the Maine, and desires that no expense be spared in providing for the survivors and caring for the dead.

"LONG."

The telegram of Capt. Sigsbee did much to hold public opinion in check and to assist the Department in securing in the public mind as dispassionate a view as possible of the disaster, and a suspension of of judgment until the facts could be investigated.

INVESTIGATING THE DISASTER

A Board of Inquiry was appointed on Feb. 19 to investigate and report to the Department the cause of the explosion. It consisted of Capt. W. T. Sampson, Capt. F. E. Chadwick, Lieut.-Com. Wm. P. Potter as members, and Lieut.-Com. Adolph Marix as recorder. They proceeded to Havana and began their investigations on the 21st day of February. A most thorough and exhaustive examination of the wreck was made, and the Board reported on the 21st day of March that the Maine had been destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, but that the responsibility could not be fixed upon any person or persons. The most cursory examination, even by a non-technical eye, of the drawings which accompany the report is convincing that the cause of the disaster must have been from the outside. The impression has prevailed that the Department was cognizant of the nature of the findings of the Court long before they were received in Washington. This, however, was not the case. At one time the advisability of having the report telegraphed in cipher was considered, but the proceedings were so protracted and the preparations for any emergency had reached such a stage that this step was not deemed necessary.

On Feb. 25, the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic station, Commodore Dewey, was ordered to assemble the squadron under his command at Hong Kong and to retain the Olympia, which was under orders to proceed to San Francisco. Instructions were given, outlining his conduct and duty in the event of hostilities. The Baltimore, then at Honolulu, was directed to join the Asiatic squadron and a large supply of ammunition was sent to Honolulu by the Mohican and transferred to that vessel.

The Department, as early as March 3, issued instructions to the Office of Naval Intelligence to make special inquiries of our naval attaches in Europe as to what men-of-war and torpedo boats could be purchased abroad. They were directed to submit estimates of cost and to report upon the condition of purchasable ships. It was considered important to secure any war vessels which might be in the market, not only to strengthen our own navy, but to prevent them from coming into the possession of Spain, and it was necessary that any purchases made abroad should be concluded before the outbreak of hostilities, which, under the neutrality laws, would then make their purchase impracticable.





THE SUPERIOR MARKSMANSHIP OF OUR TARS.

NOTE.—The sub-caliber practice is the foundation of the accuracy of the men behind the guns. Illustrations show the sighting drill and how a rifle is fixed in the breach of a 10-inch gun for sub-caliber practice.

PREPARING FOR WAR.

With a view to these and other proper expenditures, Congress passed, on March 9, the Emergency Bill, appropriating $50,000,000 for National defense. A Board was at once appointed for the purpose of examining such vessels of our own merchant marine as were deemed suitable for naval purposes. With the ample means thus provided, the purchase of vessels, ammunition, guns and all classes of naval war material went rapidly on. The inquiries set on foot in Europe showed the impossibility of obtaining war ships in any number in foreign markets. On the day of the passage of the Emergency Appropriation, the Naval Attache at London was authorized to negotiate for the purchase of two cruisers then building in England for the Brazilian Government, the Amazonas and the Almirante Abreu. This purchase was successfully concluded and the United States flag was hoisted March 18 on board the Amazonas, renamed the New Orleans, which soon afterwards became an efficient part of our naval war fleet. The Almirante Abreu, since then named the Albany, was far from completion, but one vessel could not be bought without the purchase of both. An officer was sent to Europe with instructions to negotiate for other vessels, but made no purchases. The Naval Attache at Berlin purchased at Elbing, Germany, a torpedo boat which was renamed the Somers. Unfavorable weather and other causes prevented her prompt departure for the United States, and when war was declared she was in an English port, where she remained. The cruiser Diogenes was purchased from the Thames Iron Works on April 2, 1898, and there placed in commission as the Topeka. The Nictheroy, afterwards renamed the Buffalo, was purchased at Rio Janeiro and the Manly, a very small torpedo boat, was purchased in Europe.

The statement of the armed vessels actually bought affords but a meager idea of the number of vessels the purchase of which was under consideration from time to time, and for some of which extensive negotiations were carried on. Of those really desirable, few could be obtained, and great care was necessary to avoid burdening our navy list with a number of obsolete craft for many of which exorbitant prices were asked. A number of colliers were purchased abroad, as it was not practicable to obtain enough suitable vessels for this purpose in the United States, and they proved of great value during the war.

THE STRAGETIC BOARD

A Naval War Board was established early in March, and continued in session at the Department throughout the war. Its services were of great value, although there was at first an inclination in the public mind to carp at such a board and to make it the easy target of criticism; but no institution was ever more thoroughly vindicated. The time of the Secretary of the Navy, like that of every other Cabinet officer, is so much taken up with interviews and routine work, that it was a great relief to me to refer questions relating to naval movements to this board, which, in the quiet of its room, aided by maps and charts, and constant telegraphic communication, was able to give professional and undivided consideration to every problem that arose. Its duty was to consider and outline the strategical policy of the Department. Under it were prepared, for the consideration and signature of the Secretary, orders bearing upon this policy, and to it were referred all information received of the movements of the Spanish naval forces and everything bearing upon the operations of the war. Its permanent members were Rear-Admiral Montgomery Sicard, U. S. N.; Capt. A. T. Mahan, U. S. N. (retired), and Capt. A. S. Crowninshield, U. S. N.—Admiral Sicard, a man of long and copious naval experience, and of the most painstaking deliberation; Capt. Mahan, the famous naval author quick, earnest and competent; and Capt. Crowninshield, through whom all orders to ships in commission are issued and who was in direct touch with the personnel of the Navy as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.

In the meantime, the Columbia and Minneapolis, in reserve, had been ordered to prepare for service. The Brooklyn had been ordered to proceed from La Guayra to Hampton Roads, in contemplation of the Flying Squadron. The Commanders-in-Chief of Stations had been ordered to husband ammunition and to keep their vessels filled with the best coal obtainable.

The Helena and Bancroft had been ordered to the United States, and the Commander-in-Chief of the European station had been ordered to attach the New Orleans to his command and proceed home. The Oregon had been ordered from Bremerton, Washington, to San Francisco, with a view to bringing her around to augment the Atlantic fleet, and the Cincinnati, Castine and Wilmington had been ordered to proceed from Para, Brazil, to Port Antonio, Jamaica.

The report of the Maine Court of Inquiry was received at the Department on March 24. Lieutenant-Commander Marix brought it into my office about 10 o'clock in the morning, and after reading the findings of the Court I went with him to the White House, where they were read by him to the President, and I recall that both the President and myself were much struck with their brevity. This report was forwarded to Congress on March 28 with a special message.

Congress having passed an act authorizing the appointment of officers in the Navy and Marine Corps in such numbers as might be required, to serve for the period of the emergency created by war with Spain, the Department appointed boards to conduct the examination of applicants. As a result 856 officers were commissioned for temporary service.

On March 3, the Navy Yards at Brooklyn, Boston and League Island were instructed to enlist seamen, firemen and petty officers for general service, and the enlisted force was steadily increased as vessels became available for service, until, on Aug. 15, the date on which it reached its maximum, there were 24,123 enlisted men in the service.

The purchase of auxiliary ships, under the efficient direction first of Assistant-Secretary Roosevelt and then of his successor, Mr. Allen, went on as rapidly as possible. As fast as purchased, they were sent to the Navy Yards and to certain private establishments for such changes as were necessary for their use by the Navy. The old monitors, which had been laid up in reserve, were placed in commission and were provided with crews from the Naval Militia of the States and stationed at important ports along the coast. A system of coast defense and coast signal service was devised and was ready to be put in operation upon the outbreak of hostilities.

The total ships added to the Navy numbered 128. The maximum fighting force separated into classes was as follows:

Battleships (first class)	4
Battleship (second class)	1
Armored cruisers	2
Coast-defense monitors	6
Armored ram	1
Protected cruisers	12
Unprotected cruisers	3
Gunboats	18
Dynamite cruiser	1
Torpedo boats	11
Vessels of old Navy, including monitors	14
Auxiliary navy:	
Auxiliary cruisers	11
Converted yachts	28
Revenue cutters	15
Light-house tenders	4
Converted tugs	27
Converted colliers	19
Miscellaneous	19

On April 20, Congress passed the resolution directing the President to intervene in Cuba. In order to understand the situation of the Navy on this date, let us recall that the North Atlantic Squadron, under command of Capt. W. T. Sampson, U. S. N., was in the vicinity of Key West. The Oregon had reached Atlantic waters on her way to join the North Atlantic Squadron; the North Patrol Squadron, for the protection of the Atlantic coast between the capes of the Delaware and Bar Harbor, had been organized under command of Commodore J. A. Howell, U. S. N.; the Flying Squadron, under command of Commodore W. S. Schley, U. S. N., had been assembled at Hampton Roads; the Asiatic Squadron, under command of Commodore George Dewey, was at Hong Kong, China; and the Pacific Squadron, under Admiral Miller, was at different points on the Pacific coast.

ORDERS TO DEWEY.

Commodore Dewey, having carried out his orders to retain the men whose enlistments were about to expire, to proceed to Hong Kong, China, with the squadron under his command and keep his fleet full of the best coal obtainable, to retain the Olympia, to purchase two supply vessels, and to arm and man them, and having been reinforced by the Baltimore, and received full instructions outlining his duties, was ready for the outbreak of hostilities. The following dispatch was sent to him:

"Washington, April 24, 1898.

"Dewey, Hong Kong:

"War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to the Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors.

"LONG."

Upon the request of the Governor of Hong Kong, Commodore Dewey left that place on April 25 and proceeded to Mirs Bay, China, where the arrival of the United States Consul from Manila was awaited. The squadron sailed on April 27, and arrived at Manila on the morning of May 1. The brilliant action of the squadron in passing the mines and forts at the entrance of the harbor, and in engaging and destroying the Spanish fleet under Admiral Montojo, is without parallel in naval history.

News of this great victory was first received through the public press, via Madrid. The official dispatch, sent by the McCulloch to Hong Kong and transmitted from that place, was not received at the Department until May 7. It was dated Manila, May 1, and being of some length was received in piece-meal. The fact of its arrival at once became known, and many correspondents and others had gathered in the big reception room of the Department eagerly awaiting its translation.

The news was received with the greatest enthusiasm. It announced the complete destruction of the Spanish fleet, without injury to our squadron and without the loss of a single man. Another dispatch, received from Commodore Dewey on the same day, dated Cavite, May 4, announced that he had taken possession of the naval station at Cavite and destroyed its fortifications, that he controlled the bay completely, and that he could take the city at any time. The gratification of the Department at the receipt of this news it is difficult to state. Aside from the moral effect of the victory, coming almost immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities, and the inspiriting influence it had on the personnel of the entire naval service, it relieved the Pacific coast from all danger of attack and all shipping in the Pacific ocean from fear of capture. An immense saving to the country was effected by the decrease in marine insurance rates which followed in consequence.

The force under Commodore Dewey consisted of the Olympia, flagship; Baltimore, Raleigh, Petrel, Con-

(Continued on second page.)

With the WESTERN ARMY

TRYING TO OVERWHELM THOMAS.

By GEN. GREEN B. RAUM.

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HOOD'S MARCH TO NASHVILLE.

He Hoped to Catch Thomas at a Disadvantage and Crush Him Before He Could Get Reinforcements.

On Nov. 12, 1864, when the railroad and telegraph lines were broken between Maj.-Gen. W. T. Sherman at Cartersville, Ga., and Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas at Nashville, Tenn., the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi devolved upon Gen. Thomas. He was now commander of all the troops in the three great Departments—the "Tennessee," the "Cumberland" and the "Ohio," together with all the National troops stationed therein.

There were numerous garrisons in Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama and Mississippi, holding important cities and towns, and guarding lines of railroads and rivers. These aggregated a large force, but no considerable number of these troops were available for an active campaign in the field without surrendering the territory they occupied. The military situation on the date named was as follows:

MILITARY SITUATION IN NOVEMBER, 1864.

Gen. Sherman, with Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth and Twentieth Corps and Kilpatrick's Division of cavalry, numbering in all 65,000 men, was assembling his troops at Atlanta, from which place on the 15th, the start was made on his great expedition to Savannah.

Gen. Hood, commanding a large Confederate army, was at Florence, Ala. He had three corps, commanded respectively by Gens. Stephen D. Lee, Alexander P. Stewart and Benjamin F. Cheatham, and a cavalry corps when assembled, of 10,000 men, commanded by Gen. N. B. Forrest.

Gen. Lee, with his corps, was encamped on the north side of the Tennessee River, in front of Florence, while Gens. Stewart and Cheatham, with their corps, were encamped on the south side of the river near Tuscumbia.

For active duty present in the field Gen. Thomas had the Fourth Corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. David Starley; the Twenty-third Corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. John M. Schofield, and a portion of Wilson's Cavalry Corps, one division commanded by Brig.-Gen. Edward Hatch, one brigade commanded by Brig.-Gen. John T. Croxton, and one brigade commanded by Col. Horace Capron, numbering 18,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, being about one-half the force Gen. Hood had present for duty.

But Gen. Hood felt, as did Gen. Thomas, that it was necessary for him to play a waiting game; neither felt himself prepared and ready for the great struggle which was impending.

Early in November Gen. Hood with his three corps in hand at Tuscumbia and Florence knew that he was superior in numbers to Gen. Thomas, and that it would be to his advantage to make a prompt attack, but he was short of rations and clothing, and was soon to be reinforced by the arrival of the balance of Gen. Forrest's cavalry. Gen. Hood was impatient to move, but felt himself forced to wait.

On the other hand, Gen. Thomas knew that he was inferior in numbers to Gen. Hood, and was consequently apprehensive that his antagonist would avail himself of this advantage before he could concentrate his forces. His plan was to keep a close watch upon the movements of the Confederate army, and if Gen. Hood started north to delay his movements as much as possible.

GEN. SCHOFIELD ASSUMES COMMAND AT PULASKI.

Gen. Schofield reached Pulaski Nov. 13 and assumed command of all the forces in the neighborhood the next day. He found the Fourth Corps at Pulaski thoroughly intrenched and prepared to stand a siege.

Gen. Schofield stationed the Third Division of his corps, Brig.-Gen. Jacob D. Cox commanding, three miles north of Pulaski, and stationed Col. Silas A. Strickland with his brigade at Columbia, 30 miles north of Pulaski.

Gen. Hatch and Gen. Croxton with their cavalry were stationed in front of Pulaski, while Col. Capron with his brigade was stationed first at Waynesboro, and later near Mount Pleasant, some 20 miles southwest of Columbia.

Col. Capron while at Waynesboro scouted the country daily in his front toward Florence, Eastport and West Point, while Gen. Croxton, some distance to the left, scouted toward Florence and guarded some 15 or 20 miles of the Tennessee River.

ACTIVITY OF THE UNION CAVALRY.

When Gen. Hatch arrived he assumed command of the cavalry, and entered upon an active conflict with the Confederate cavalry in his front. He had almost daily skirmishes with the enemy. By his activity and constant presence he forced the rebel cavalry west of Shoal Creek, and this stream practically became the line dividing the contending forces. The pickets stationed along the creek were usually in speaking distance of each other.

Gen. Croxton, on the left of Hatch's line, still guarded a long stretch of the river.

Col. Capron was now stationed in front of Mount Pleasant. This cavalry force kept a close watch upon every movement of the Confederate forces; nothing escaped them. Gen. Hatch was in constant communication with Gen. Schofield by courier, and the dispatches to this General were usually duplicated, one copy being sent to Gen. Thomas at Nashville by telegraph.

Heavy, cold rains set in early in November, making the roads almost impassable.

In transferring his division to this field of operations, Gen. Hatch had left his wagon train behind. He had no wagons whatever for the transportation of supplies. He had a pack train for his ammunition. There were no tents in his command; officers and men alike were constantly exposed to the inclemencies of the weather. For rations they depended on the country and an insufficient supply sent out from the railroad. For forage Gen. Hatch's force, and the Confederate cavalry as well, were forced to rely upon the country.

The unfortunate farmers of this region were between the upper and lower mill stone, and were sorely afflicted with the hardships of war.

Gen. Schofield, with his entire force of infantry and cavalry, maintained a defensive attitude, leaving Gen. Hood to take the initiative. The Union forces were, however, constantly kept in a state of readiness to march upon the shortest notice, to meet any movement that might be made by the enemy.

Gen. Schofield did not have long to wait upon the movements of Gen. Hood. By Nov. 15 Cheatham's Corps had crossed the Tennessee River, and after marching through Florence to the inspiring strains of martial music, went into camp some distance in front of that town. Nothing now remained to be done for the opening of the campaign but the arrival of Gen. Forrest and the crossing of the Tennessee River by Stewart's Corps.

GEN. HOOD OPENS HIS CAMPAIGN.

On Nov. 19, 1864, Gen. Hood began crossing the Tennessee River at Florence with Stewart's Corps.

On the 21st Gen. Forrest, with additional cavalry, arrived and assumed command of the entire cavalry force, now consisting of three divisions.

The great offensive campaign now opened. The Confederate army moved out in three columns. Gen. Cheatham with his corps on the left, marched on the road to Waynesboro; Gens. Lee and Stewart with their corps marched on parallel roads farther to the east.

Gen. Forrest, leading Chalmers's Division, was in the advance, directing his march through West Point, Kelly's Forge, Henryville, and Mount Pleasant; while Gens. Buford and Jackson with their divisions of cavalry moved up the old military road toward Lawrenceburg, covering the right of Hood's army.

Winter had actually set in. This movement was begun in the midst of a snow storm which continued for two days; but disregarding the wintry blast and the bad roads, the various columns moved steadily forward.

HOOD'S ARMY OF VETERANS.

This was an army of veterans. It can be safely said that the Confederate authorities never brought a more effective force of the same number of men into the field.

It was commanded by Gen. John B. Hood, recognized as one of the most intrepid leaders in the Confederate army. His corps commanders were Lieut.-Gen. Stephen D. Lee, Lieut.-Gen. Alexander H. Stewart, Maj.-Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham, and Maj.-Gen. Nathan B. Forrest.

Gen. Lee had as his division commanders Maj.-Gen. Carter L. Stevenson, Maj.-Gen. Edward Johnson, and Maj.-Gen. Henry D. Clayton, and as brigade commanders Col. Elihu P. Watson, Brig.-Gen. Edmund W. Petty, Col. Jos. B. Palmer, Brig.-Gen. Zach C. Dear, Brig.-Gen. Arthur M. Manigault, Brig.-Gen. Jacob H. Sharp, Brig.-Gen. Marcellus A. Stovall, Brig.-Gen. Randall L. Gibson and Brig.-Gen. James T. Holtzclaw.

Gen. Stewart had as his division commanders Maj.-Gen. William W. Loring, Maj.-Gen. Samuel G. French, and Maj.-Gen. Edward C. Walthall, and as brigade commanders Brig.-Gen. Winfield S. Featherston, Brig.-Gen. John Adams, Brig.-Gen. Thomas M. Scott, Brig.-Gen. Francis M. Cockrell, Col. William W. Witherspoon, Col. Julius A. Andrews, Brig.-Gen. George D. Johnson, Brig.-Gen. Charles M. Shelley and Brig.-Gen. Daniel H. Reynolds.

Gen. Cheatham had as division commanders Maj.-Gen. Patrick R. Clebourne, Maj.-Gen. William B. Bate, and Maj.-Gen. John C. Brown, and as brigade commanders Brig.-Gen. James A. Smith, Brig.-Gen. Mark P. Lowry, Brig.-Gen. Daniel C. Govan, Brig.-Gen. Hiram B. Granbury, Brig.-Gen. Thomas B. Smith, Col. Robert Bullock, Brig.-Gen. Henry R. Jackson, Brig.-Gen. States R. Gist, Brig.-Gen. John C. Carter, Brig.-Gen. Otto F. Strahl, and Brig.-Gen. George W. Gordon.

Gen. Forrest had as division commanders Brig.-Gen. Abraham Buford, Brig.-Gen. William H. Jackson, and Brig.-Gen. James R. Chalmers, and as brigade commanders Col. Tyree H. Bell, Brig.-Gen. Hylan B. Lyon, Col. Edmund W. Rucker, and Col. Robert McCulloch.

Included in Gen. Hood's force were 3,000 artillerymen, with 124 guns.

To cover the movement of assembling his army on the north side of the Tennessee River, on Nov. 19, Gen. Hood caused Jackson's Division of cavalry to make a demonstration along the west bank of Shoal Creek, and to march up that stream.

COL. COON'S RECONNOISSANCE DEVELOPS THE ENEMY'S MOVEMENTS.

Gen. Hatch followed on the east bank and sent Col. Coon across with the Second Brigade to engage the enemy. A spirited fight ensued. Col. Coon captured some prisoners and wagons, and discovering the movement of Confederate infantry in his front withdrew to the east side of the creek.

Gen. Hatch now became satisfied that Gen. Hood had commenced to move his army north. Gen. Hatch sent the following message to Pulaski, which was forwarded by telegraph, and a copy delivered to Gen. Schofield:

"Headquarters, Fifth Cavalry Division,
"Lexington Road, near Military Road,
"At Watkin's House,
Nov. 19, 1864; 8 p. m.

"Maj.-Gen. Thomas, Nashville: My brigade on the right struck Forrest's column about 12 o'clock to-day moving on the Butler Creek road toward Lawrenceburg. (The Butler Creek road is parallel with the Waynesboro and Florence road on the west side of Shoal Creek.) The brigade first struck Buford's Division and whipped him. About 3 o'clock Forrest came up with more of his command, and our men were obliged to fall back to the east side of Shoal Creek.

"Buford had four regiments of mounted infantry in his division. Two prisoners from Buford's escort say the whole of Forrest's command is moving, its divisions on different roads. As they have not come out on my left, the command, I believe, is moving by the way of Waynesboro, and is going to strike the railroad about Duck River. The infantry of the enemy did not move to-day, and can not; the roads are in the very worst condition. Forrest has in his command Jackson's, Buford's, Chalmers's and Roddey's Divisions—2,500 to a division is not a large estimate; probably has three batteries with him, perhaps, all four-gun batteries. Of this, however, I am not sure.

"Very truly your obedient servant,
"EDWARD HATCH, Brigadier-General."

On the morning of the 20th Gen. Hatch continued his movement north, having decided to concentrate his forces at Lexington, a small town three miles south of the Tennessee line. Before reaching Lexington he sent the following dispatch to Gen. Thomas and Gen. Schofield:

"Five Miles West of Lexington,
"Nov. 20, 1864.

"Maj.-Gen. Thomas: The enemy's infantry was advanced this morning on the Butler Creek road, 14 miles from Florence, moving by the right flank toward the military road, which will oblige me to concentrate at Lexington. I have ordered Gen. Croxton to concentrate at Lexington, leaving a small force to watch the crossings of the Huntsville road and Lexington and Florence roads. I am undecided as to the line of march, but believe the enemy's infantry will move to Lawrenceburg, and his cavalry on his left flank, meaning to cut the road between Pulaski and Nashville.

"EDWARD HATCH, Brigadier-General."

These movements of the Confederate cavalry seemed to indicate quite clearly that the main column of Hood's army would not strike at Pulaski, but would probably undertake to reach the railroad north of that place.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GEN. SCHOFIELD AND GEN. THOMAS.

This was the conclusion of Gen. Schofield on Nov. 20, as will be seen from this dispatch:

"Pulaski, Tenn., Nov. 20, 1864; 2 p. m.

"Maj.-Gen. Thomas, Nashville, Tenn.:

"After full consideration, I am of the opinion that this is not the best position for the main body of our troops, at least, so long as we are inferior in strength to the enemy. If Hood advances, whether his design be to strike this place or Columbia, he must move via Lawrenceburg, on account of the difficulty of crossing Shoal Creek. Under cover of his cavalry he can probably reach Lawrenceburg without our knowledge, and move his forces a day's march from that point toward Columbia before we could learn his designs, and thus reach that point ahead of us; or he might move upon this place, and, while demonstrating against it throw his force out the pike north of us and thus cut us off from Columbia and from our reinforcements. Lynnville would be free from these objections as a point of concentration for our forces. On the other hand a force at this point covers the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad to the best advantage; but a brigade in the inclosed works at this place could hold out against any force until relieved, while the main force at Lynnville would be sure of concentrating with the troops still in rear. I respectfully submit these views for your consideration.

"J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major-General."

To this dispatch Gen. Thomas sent the following reply:

"Nashville, Nov. 20, 1864; 10 p. m.

"Maj.-Gen. Schofield, Pulaski:

"Your dispatch of 2 p. m. this day just received; two other dispatches of to-day were received previous to this one.

"Do you mean that one brigade in the intrenchments at Pulaski could hold out a week? The reason I ask is, Gen. Smith cannot get here before next Friday. If one brigade can hold the fortifications for a week or 10 days, you are authorized to leave a brigade or division there and concentrate the rest of your force at Lynnville, preparatory to support Hatch, or fall back on Columbia, whichever may be necessary. Part of Ruger's troops will start for Columbia to-night, the remainder at 2 o'clock to-morrow, and the Railroad Superintendent says he will have them at Columbia by to-morrow night. The very moment Smith's troops arrive I will start them to Columbia. In any event all surplus transportation should be sent to Columbia. I have just received Gen. Hatch's of this p. m., and it seems from it that Hood is advancing. His movements will indicate to you what disposition you should make—whether to concentrate at Columbia or remain at Lynnville. If Hood's entire army should advance, you must use your own discretion as to holding the fortifications at Pulaski or withdrawing the troops.

"GEORGE H. THOMAS,
"Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding."

Gen. Schofield sent the following reply to the above dispatch:

"Pulaski, Nov. 20, 1864; 11 p. m.

"Maj.-Gen. Thomas, Nashville:

"Your dispatch is received. If Hood ad-



DOTTED LINES SHOW HOW HOOD ADVANCED ON COLUMBIA.