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ONE DOLLAR A YEAR. WASHINGTON, D. C., THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1903. VOL. XL—NO. 50.—WHOLE NO. 1153.

The AMERICAN SPANISH WAR

Its History Written by the Men Who Participated in It.

Edited by JOHN McELROY.

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CONQUEST OF PUERTO RICO.

Gen. Miles's Brilliant Campaign on the Island.

BY CAPT. HENRY H. WHITNEY, U. S. A., *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

"During a campaign, whatever is not profoundly considered in all its detail is without result. Every enterprise should be conducted according to a system; chance alone can never bring success."—NAPOLEON.

CAPT. HENRY H. WHITNEY, U. S. A.

PUERTO RICO was a strong base of supplies for the Spaniards in Cuba, and as it was known that the rainy season did not begin until late in August, it seems to have been the plan of the Major-General Commanding to strike the first real blow there, making it a secondary base of operations against Cuba later in the Fall. But the presence of Cervera's fleet changed the plan, when the Navy asked for the army's assistance at Santiago. When this bugaboo of the seas had been so brilliantly disposed of, and Gen. Miles had taken reinforcements to Shafter's army and with them the prestige of a "Master of Victory," he hurried to Guantanamo to assemble his Puerto Rican expedition.

Every contingency that might arise had been foreseen, and on the 15th of July requisition by cable was made for a train of 800 pack mules complete, 400 freight travois with saddles, an abundant supply of medical stores, hospital supplies, ambulances and tentage, dock construction corps with laborers, steam tugs and lighters, and $100,000 for hire of native transportation and purchase of horses. All infantry was to be supplied with smokeless-powder arms, and there was to be sent a full allowance of transportation for all commands.

Several days were spent waiting for the necessary naval convoy; finally, on the 21st of July, the fleet set sail, composed of the following vessels: Transports Lampasas, Nueces, City of Macon, Comanche, Unionist, Specialist, Rita and Stillwater, together with the cruiser Columbia and converted cruiser Yale, with a grand total of 3,554 fighting men. The convoying squadron was composed of the U. S. battleship Massachusetts, the U. S. converted yacht Gloucester, and the U. S. converted yacht Dixie. The cruiser Columbia, and auxiliary cruiser Yale, having troops aboard, are not properly considered part of the convoy.

When the

INVASION OF PUERTO RICO

was definitely decided upon, a temporary landing on Vieques, or Crab Island, about 13 miles east of the main island, was considered. This could be effected without opposition, hospitals established, the troops from Cuba recuperated and a landing made, when the proper time came, at any desired point on the main island. But after the fever had broken out, it was not deemed safe to take any of the Cuban troops. Besides, Santiago had fallen, and it was important to seize Puerto Rico and make secure some of the substantial fruits of victory, before the enemy, seeing the hopelessness of the struggle, sued for peace. So, on the representation of naval officers who had cruised along the eastern coast, Point Fajado, on the northeast coast, was selected, and on the 16th of July Gen. Miles cabled that reinforcements on transports coming from the United States be directed to proceed to that point.

When, on leaving the Windward Passage, the bows of the ships turned eastward on their hazardous mission, the General Commanding had with him very little more means for disembarking on a strange and hostile shore than did Columbus when he sailed westward on adjoining seas some four centuries before. The fleet moved slowly, expecting to be overtaken by or fall in with transports bringing reinforcements and appliances for landing quickly. Finally the northern end of Mona Passage was reached, but no looked-for ships appeared. The problem now became a serious one for the General Commanding, who had but 3,554 unskilled troops with which to land in the face of between 8,000 and 9,000 Spanish regulars and more than that many armed volunteers, the majority of whom could concentrate at any point on the coast in from four to five days. The waters about Point Fajado, the selected landing place, might be used as a rendezvous for the naval vessels in fair weather, but is nothing of a harbor at which to land troops and munitions of war without the means at hand for disembarking, and with no prospect of securing any on arrival. As the landing place had been well advertised in our own press, the Spanish commander evidently knew of our intention and would bring artillery from the Capital, some 35 to 40 miles away, over passable roads, and intrench on the hills commanding the beach. This, it was learned afterward, had in a measure been done, when a naval vessel touching at this point brought away some Puerto Rican refugees. So common prudence as well as one of the first principles of strategy demanded that the landing be made elsewhere in an unexpected quarter.

FINDING A NEW LANDING PLACE.

An officer on the staff of the Major-General Commanding had made, in May, a hasty reconnoissance of the southern portion of the island, and had gathered important information about the harbors on that coast and noted the number and location of the native lighters, means for defense, etc. It was known that on the south coast Guanica was the best harbor of which there was a chart, and it was reported to be unmined and undefended. It opened into the most disaffected district of the island. Four miles from its head, at Yauco, is the terminus of a railroad, 15 miles long, leading to Ponce. The town of Ponce could be taken easily, being practically undefended, because the troops had been withdrawn to oppose our projected advance from the east. Ponce once occupied, we would have the largest town on the island, the end of a cable, and the terminus of the fine military road leading to the Capital.

The General's mind was soon made up, and he signalled to the Admiral of the fleet (Capt. Higginson) his desire to change the objective. As fast as the signal flag could spell out the words, came back the message of the naval commander, with hearty co-operation, "All right; Guanica it is," and the ships were promptly headed south by southwest into the Mona Passage, a vessel being dispatched to Cape San Juan to redirect any transports that should arrive there.

With all lights out and absolute quiet aboard, the fleet crept through the passage, close to the shore, and arrived off Guanica harbor on the morning of July 25. The Gloucester (Commander Wainwright) was sent forward to reconnoiter. She made her way slowly at first, zigzagging her course back and forth across the mouth of the harbor, feeling for possible mines or torpedoes, more mindful, apparently, of the safety of the transports to follow than of her own. When sure that the way was unobstructed, she struck straight in, followed closely by the transports. Spanish troops to the number of about 250 were occupying the village, but retreated when a few shells from the Gloucester were thrown about them. The marines, two companies of the provisional engineer battalion and several companies of infantry were put ashore in ship's boats, a skirmish line was formed and shortly afterward outposts established. Brig.-Gen. Gilmore, who was the first general officer to land, superintended the disembarkation. Upon opening fire the inhabitants, terror-stricken, fled from the town to the hills. During the day word was sent to them

ON THE SAN JUAN ROAD, PUERTO RICA.

This is a characteristic country scene on the highway between Ponce and San Juan, the road over which Gen. Miles's troops moved. The mounted man is a mail carrier, and his donkey is rigged up in semi-Spanish style, with bells and slashed leather ornamentation.

TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES,

which, before night, they did, and were very demonstrative in their expressions of joy at the arrival of the Americans. It was the policy of the General Commanding to make the best impression upon the natives on the initial landing, knowing how rapidly the news of arrival would travel over the island and the effect his every act would have upon future operations in the interior. The Spaniards had caused reports to be circulated freely among the ignorant, mainly through the priesthood, that the American soldiers were giant ravishers who, though impotent against Spanish arms, would despoil their homes and destroy their property. At the date of invasion, therefore, a large proportion of the illiterate native element were in doubt whether to support the ills they already had or to fly to others that might be worse. The best protection to life and property was what they wanted and what they would fight for. Gen. Miles showed by his treatment of the inhabitants that the complete success of the expedition depended as much on the conciliation of them as upon the force of his arms.

Our arrival was a complete surprise, as was afterward learned, the enemy having no intimation of our proximity.

THE FIRST BATTLE.

On the morning of July 26 Gen. Garretson, with parts of the 6th Mass. and the 6th Ill. regiments of his brigade, undertook a reconnoissance, in force, to about three miles beyond Guanica along the road toward Yauco. He found the Spanish troops in position on a hill along a solid angle formed by the intersection of the north and east slopes. The enemy opened fire on the advance guard of his force from a position on a hill to the west. The suddenness and volume of the fire caused a momentary confusion among our troops, but they were quickly steadied, and in a spirited engagement drove the Spaniards from their position into the valley beyond. The force of the enemy engaged consisted of battalion 25 ("Patria") of the Spanish regulars and some volunteers—in all about 600 to 700 men. The casualties on the American side were two officers and two enlisted men slightly wounded. The casualties of the enemy were reported to be one Lieutenant and one Cornet killed, 18 seriously and 32 slightly wounded. On the following day, July 27, a further reconnoissance established the fact that the enemy had retreated beyond Yauco, which a part of Gen. Henry's command promptly occupied.

Several stanch lighters were found in the harbor, and these, towed by two navy steam launches, were of great assistance in disembarking the light batteries, ammunition and supplies. The Chief Engineer, Lieut.-Col. Black, built a pontoon bridge 260 feet long, employing the battalion of provisional engineers under Maj. Sackett. On this bridge most of the animals and stores were unloaded.

As Ponce was our real objective, Guanica being what might be called an accidental one, on account of its harbor, the Dixie, followed by Capt. Higginson with the rest of the naval convoy, moved into the port of Ponce on the evening of July 27, and its commander, through one of his officers, Ensign Curtin, took possession of the Playa without opposition. Seventy lighters and several schooners that were in the harbor were seized by the navy and declared prizes of war. On suspension of hostilities the lighters were turned over to the army for proper disposition, when it was found that they were the property of private citizens.

GEN. MILES LANDS.

On the morning of July 28, Gen. Miles, accompanied by his staff, landed, formally took possession and raised the National colors and the headquarters flag over the Custom House. Maj.-Gen. Jas. H. Wilson, who had arrived at Guanica with his command on the 27th, was sent forward to occupy the city of Ponce, two miles inland from the port. The Spanish troops, numbering about 500, retreated on our approach, leaving arms and ammunition in store-houses and barracks. Before retiring they endeavored to destroy the railroad property at the station, planting mines along the route to Yauco, setting fire to the rolling stock, breaking down the telegraph lines and destroying the cable instruments. The railroad, under the energetic supervision of Brig.-Gen. Roy Stone, was soon put in running order, and the telegraph lines were promptly repaired by the Signal Corps, under the immediate supervision of Lieut.-Col. Sam Reber. New cable instruments were procured by Col. James Allen, at St. Thomas, Danish West Indies. On the day of landing the Major-General Commanding published, in Spanish and English, a proclamation to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico, for which they were anxiously looking. This manifesto had a very salutary effect upon the people. The dignity of its language and the wisdom of its assurances as to the future policy of the Government will give it the highest rank among state papers.

Gen. Wilson proceeded energetically to get his command into shape for a forward movement and to organize the civil administration of the city and district. Owing to the lack of lanches, which had been foreseen before leaving the United States, but which had not been remedied, the work of landing troops and supplies was seriously hampered and the difficulties would have been almost insurmountable had it not been for the assistance rendered by the navy in towing lighters back and forth from the shore to the transports. As it was, the preparations for an advance into the interior were delayed at least a week longer than would have been otherwise necessary. This movement was further delayed by the grounding of two loaded transports, the Massachusetts and Manitoba.

A FORWARD MOVEMENT.

Gen. Schwan having joined at Ponce with his command, July 31, and Gen. Brooke with his on Aug. 1, gave a total strength of about 14,000 men. The General Commanding was now ready to make his contemplated forward movements. The friendly attitude of most of the inhabitants, the abundant supply of provisions in some sections of the country, the apparent healthfulness of the climate and the ability to hire native transportation convinced him that columns starting from Ponce as a base of operations, moving first on diverging lines and then converging finally toward a principal objective, would meet with success. The columns were to capture or drive the enemy out of the small towns, receive and disarm such volunteers as desired to surrender, and so conduct their march that the inhabitants might be made to understand that our chief object was to overthrow the armed authority of Spain; that it was not a war of devastation, but one bringing protection and security to all within the control of our military and naval forces. The campaign was to be conducted along four lines of operations separated into two groups, Brooke's and Wilson's commands forming one, and Henry's and Schwan's the other—the former converging toward Aibonito and the latter toward Arecibo.

HAINS'S BRIGADE.

On the 2d and 3d of August the forces under Maj.-Gen. Brooke landed at Arroyo, about 40 miles east of Ponce. They consisted of Gen. Peter Hains's Brigade, made up of the following elements: 3d Ill. (Col. Bennitt); 4th Ohio (Col. Coit); 4th Pa. (Col. Cass); 27th Ind. Light Battery; 5th Mo. Light Battery A; Pa. Light Battery B, (with three dynamite guns); Philadelphia City Troop; Troop H, 6th U. S. Cav.; Co. H, 8th U. S.; Detachment Hospital Corps; Detachment Signal Corps. Total, 4,790.

The task selected for this force was the movement on Aibonito with the view of co-operating with Gen. Wilson in the defeat and capture of the Spanish, particularly those in the vicinity of Cayey, it being especially important that the column should reach this point in time to intercept the enemy should he abandon his position at Aibonito and retreat along the military road to San Juan.

CAPTURING GUAYAMA.

On the morning of Aug. 5, at 8 a. m., Gen. Hains, with the 4th Ohio in advance and the 3d Ill. in reserve, moved on the town of Guayama, occupied by about 300 of the enemy, who offered but slight resistance and were driven out of the town and pursued beyond it with a loss on our side of four enlisted men wounded. One of the enemy was killed and two wounded, as far as known. A few shots fired from the Sims-Dudley dynamite guns are reported to have had a very demoralizing effect upon the enemy. By the night of Aug. 5, the 3d Ill. and the 4th Ohio occupied a strong position on the outskirts of the town. No active movement again occurred until the 8th of August, when a reconnoissance along the Cayey main road, "for the purpose of developing the enemy's position and to clear the way for the engineers to map the country correctly," was attempted by two companies of the 4th Ohio. They were met with a sharp fire from the enemy on the hills. Some members of Co. C, 4th Ohio, fell back to the town, bringing reports of a repulse. In consequence of this, the remaining companies of the regiment were sent forward to the support of the reconnoitering party, when the enemy retired to stronger positions and the regiment returned to the camp with five men wounded and two overcome by heat. No further aggressive movemnt was made until August 13, Gen. Brooke being seriously delayed by the grounding of two transports on which were his artillery, cavalry and most of his rations. For this day a general attack upon the Spanish position was planned. The enemy, variously estimated at from 600 to 1,500 infantry, had been busily engaged, during the eight days he was left unmolested, in intrenching himself along the crests and in the passes of the hills north of Guayama, where Nature had provided a stronghold that lent itself most admirably to the genuis of the Spanish engineer. The trenches were cleverly hidden among banana trees and palms, and disposed along not less than five miles of the divides of the Sierra de Jajome, the Corro de las Palmas and the Atlas de Guamani, in the form of an arc convex toward the front, with advanced works on the sharp spurs jutting out from the main divide. The Spanish center occupied the Guamani Pass, 2,100 feet above the sea level, through which the military road to Cayey leads. Their right rested on a spur of the Sierra de Jajome range, 2,400 feet high. The left, on the Atlas de Guamani, was 400 feet higher. The trenches and barricades covered about four miles of the main road south of the pass and every important trail along which the position might be flanked. Brooke's general plan of action was an artillery assault upon the Spanish center, which was to begin when Gen. Hains, with the 4th Ohio, had executed a flank movement against the enemy's right on the crest of the Sierra de Jajome. At the moment when the order suspending hostilities was received the artillery was unmasked before the Spanish trenches at a bend in the road about three miles above Guayama, and was about to open fire. The flanking column had proceeded about eight and a half miles on the old Cayey trail, which passes through the village of Carmen, four miles south of the Jajome range. The greater part of this march, although over a rough mountain trail, was accomplished in a remarkably short time, considering the heat, yet without a single straggler. In the light of what is now known of the strength of the Spanish position it would seem that our troops had a very warm day's work before them. Gen. Brooke was "satisfied, however, that but for the receipt of telegram from Headquarters of the Army the entire Spanish force would have been captured."

GEN. WILSON'S COMMAND.

As rapidly as Gen. Wilson's command was disembarked at Ponce it was pushed forward along the military road leading to San Juan, the troops finally comprising the force being as follows:

Gen. Oswald Ernst, commanding Brigade; 2d Wis. (Col. Born), 3d Wis. (Col. Moore), 16th Pa. (Col. Hulings), Battalion of Light Artillery (Maj. Lancaster), consisting of Light Battery F, 3d Art. (Potts), Light Battery B, 3d Art. (Anderson), 4th Art., detachment with two dynamite guns and one Gatling gun (Buckeye); also Troop C, N. Y. Cav. (Clayton), 5th Co. U. S. Vol. Signal Corps, Hospital Detachment. Total, 3,417.

On the evening of the 7th of August, Wilson's outposts occupied a line across a narrow valley about seven and a half miles beyond the village of Juana Diaz, controlling the valley of the Descalabrado River. Energetic reconnoissance and reports of spies and deserters disclosed the fact that the enemy had gathered a force of about 2,000 regulars and volunteers at Aibonito, 35 miles from Ponce, a village situated in a pocket near the summit of the main divide, in a position of great natural strength overlooking and commanding at every turn the winding military road leading to it. Coamo, an advanced position held by not less than 250 of the enemy, was in the way of a movement against Aibonito and, as it could not be taken by direct attack without great loss, Wilson decided to turn it by the enemy's right. On the evening of the 8th, he sent the 16th Pa. by exceedingly difficult mountain cross trails over the divide into the valley of the Coamo River, so as to reach the main road from a half-mile to a mile in the rear of the town. Meanwhile, at 6 a. m. on the morning of the 9th, Gen. Ernst, with the main body of his brigade, moved forward and began the direct attack against the town, four guns of Capt. Anderson's battery having shelled and destroyed the block-house commanding the forks of the road about a mile and a half southwest of Coamo. The entire movement was executed substantially as planned. The 16th Pa., under the guidance of a staff officer who had discovered the mountain route, reached the road beyond the town and engaged the enemy, who began retreating at the opening of the direct attack. The affair lasted about an hour and was terminated by

THE SURRENDER OF THE SPANISH FORCES.

The brunt of the action fell upon the 16th Pa., which lost seven men wounded. The Spanish lost two officers and 14 men killed and wounded, while seven officers and 163 men surrendered. The enemy was taken completely aback by the brilliant turning movement of the Pennsylvania men, most of whom, brought up among the mountains of their own State, took as naturally to hill climbing as did Lord Robert's regiment of Goorkas in India during his advance upon Cabul. Those of the enemy who were not cut off were pursued by the cavalry about five and a half miles beyond Coamo, where the advance was stopped by fire from the enemy's batteries on the summit of Asomante Hill and El Penyon, situated two and a half miles northwest of the town of Aibonito. On the slopes below the batteries were the infantry intrenchments, which completely swept with a plunging fire the main road for several miles. The position was practically impregnable against a direct assault and Wilson decided after a careful reconnoissance of all approaches, to turn it by a movement around the right as at Coamo, moving the main body of the brigade to Barranquitas, and thence to Aibonito, via Honduras, or to Cayey, via Comerio and Cidra, leaving a battalion as a containing force in front of the position. To divert the enemy's attention from the movement, which was ordered for the 13th, and to develop his fire, an artillery reconnoissance was made by Light Battery F, 3d Art. (Potts), which on the 12th advanced from camp at Coamo and opened fire, at 1 p. m., with five guns, from a position on the reverse side of a low ridge

(Continued on second page.)

With the WESTERN ARMY

BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.

By GEN. GREEN B. RAUM.

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THE BATTLE'S HARVEST.

Reaping the Field After the Rout of Hood's Army—Relentless Pursuit Through Mud, Rain and Over Swollen Rivers.

Extract from report of Brevet Maj.-Gen. J. H. Wilson, commanding Cavalry Corps:

"By noon the skirmishers of Hatch and Hammond had formed a continuous line, stretching from the right of Schofield's Corps across the Granny White pike. This line was parallel to that of the enemy, and facing in the direction of Nashville. The men of the Fifth and Seventh Divisions, urged forward by their gallant officers, steadily pressed the enemy back at every point, skirmishing heavily.

"Having informed Gens. Thomas and Schofield of the position occupied by my command and what it was doing, the infantry was ordered forward on the right, and, as they charged the front of the rebel works, Coon's Brigade, of Hatch's Division, attacked them in the rear. Pressed in front, flank, and rear about 4 p. m. the enemy broke and fled in confusion from the field."

GEN. THOMAS'S REPORT.

Extract from report of Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas:

"Immediately following the effort of the Fourth Corps, Gens. Smith's and Schofield's commands moved against the enemy's works in their respective fronts, carrying all before them, irreparably breaking his line in a dozen places and capturing all his artillery and thousands of prisoners, among the latter four general officers. Our loss was remarkably small, scarcely mentionable. All of the enemy that did escape were pursued over the tops of the Brentwood and Harpeth hills. Gen. Wilson's cavalry, dismounted, attacked the enemy simultaneously with Schofield and Smith, striking him in reverse, and gaining firm possession of the Granny White pike, cut off his retreat by that route.

"Wood's and Steedman's troops, hearing the shouts of victory coming from the right, rushed impetuously forward, renewing the assault on Overton Hill, and although meeting a very heavy fire, the onset was irresistible, artillery and innumerable prisoners falling into our hands. The enemy, hopelessly broken, fled in confusion through the Brentwood Pass, the Fourth Corps in close pursuit, which was continued for several miles, when darkness closed the scene and the troops rested from their labors."

MCMILLEN'S REPORT.

Extract from report of Col. W. L. McMillen, commanding First Brigade, First Division, Sixteenth Corps:

"In front of Couch's Division, Twenty-third Corps, there was a very steep hill, over the crown of which the enemy's main line extended, and which formed the key-point of his works in front of our division.

"This hill once carried and securely held, these works, as far as we could see to our left, became untenable, and would necessarily have to be abandoned.

"Being a position of so much importance it was of course guarded by a strong body of troops, besides, being so steep, it was supposed no assaulting party could live to reach the summit. We waited long hours for the division of the Twenty-third Corps in front of this hill to carry it, intending to advance at the same time and carry the works at its base and our left.

"At length Gen. McArthur, tired with the long delay and fearful the day would pass without making any serious impression upon the enemy's line, directed me to withdraw my brigade and 'take that hill.' This was about 2 o'clock in the afternoon. I immediately withdrew my skirmishers, retired the regiments, and moved them by the right flank to a point opposite the hill to be carried; forming in two lines outside of the works occupied by and in front of Couch's Division; supplied empty cartridge boxes, and posted my battery so as to command the enemy's position."



THE FIGHT AT NASHVILLE.

GEN. MCARTHUR'S REPORT.

Extract from report of Brig.-Gen. John McArthur, commanding First Division, Sixteenth Corps:

"On the morning of the 16th, at 8 a. m., I moved the division forward by wheeling to the right of the Twenty-third Corps, forming at right angles to the position held the night previous, with the Granny White road running through between the Second and Third Brigades, and moved up at 9 a. m. to within charging distance of the enemy's main line of works, but finding no dispositions made by the corps on my right to co-operate with me, I ordered the command to construct rifle pits to protect them from the infantry fire of the enemy's main line, my batteries in the meantime being used with good effect on their works. Continuing in this position until 3 p. m., when, again consulting with Maj.-Gen. Couch, commanding division on my right, and being informed that he had no orders to advance, and fearing that if delayed until next day the night would be employed by the enemy to our disadvantage, I determined to attack. Sending word to this effect to the Major-General commanding corps, and no contrary orders being received, I prepared for the assault.

"In order to do so successfully, it was necessary that the hill on the enemy's extreme left and immediately in front of the Twenty-third Corps should be taken. I ordered the First Brigade, Col. W. L. McMillen commanding, to move by the right flank and take position in front of and to take the hill, Maj.-Gen. Couch sending forward a brigade to occupy and hold the intrenchments vacated by Col. W. L. McMillen, in case of an emergency, the Second and Third Brigade having orders to charge as soon as the First had advanced half way up the hill, which was the salient point of the position. The First Brigade, with fixed bayonets, without a cheer or firing a shot, but with firm resolve and without doubting their success, commenced the difficult ascent, and without a halt, although exposed to a murderous fire, which none but the bravest troops could withstand, planted their colors on the very apex of the hill.

"At the appointed time the Second and Third Brigades—the Third, commanded by Col. W. R. Marshall, 7th Minn.—moved forward on the enemy's works. Their path lay across a cornfield, traversed by stone walls and ditches, which together with the softness of the ground, exposed as they were to a direct fire in front and enfiladed by batteries on the flanks, for a time held with intense interest the most experienced officers who beheld it; but onward was the motto, and their banners were planted on the works defended by the choicest troops of the rebel army, calling forth the remark of the rebel officers that powder and lead were inadequate to resist such a charge."

REPORT OF GEN. A. J. SMITH.

Extract from report of Maj.-Gen. A. J. Smith:

"About 3 p. m. Gen. McArthur sent word that he could carry the hill on his right by assault. Maj.-Gen. Thomas being present, the matter was referred to him, and I was requested to delay the movement until he could hear from Gen. Schofield, to whom he had sent. Gen. McArthur, not receiving any reply, and fearing that if the attack should be longer delayed the enemy would use the night to strengthen his works, directed the First Brigade, Col. W. L. McMillen, 95th Ohio, commanding, to storm the hill, on which was the left of the enemy's line, and the Second and Third Brigades of the division to attack in front when the First should be half-way up the hill. Accordingly, Col. McMillen formed his brigade in two lines, with the 114th Ill., 93d Ind. and 10th Minn. in the first, and the 72d Ohio and 95th Ohio in the second line, and gave his men orders not to cheer or fire a shot until the works should be gained."

CONFEDERATE GENERAL BATE'S DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE.

A most graphic and thrilling account of the battle of Dec. 16 has been given by Maj.-Gen. William B. Bate, Division Commander in Cheatham's Corps. His troops occupied the hill attacked and carried by Col. McMillen's Brigade. From his high position he could see the preparations made by Gen. McArthur for the assault. He witnessed the struggle of other soldiers of the corps in trying to resist the attacks of Wilson's Cavalry in the rear. He witnessed the tragic ending of the great struggle, the defeat of Gen. Hood's army, and its retreat. Following is an extract from this report:

"The enemy was in two lines in my front, and in the afternoon moved by his right flank from the direction of the Granny White turnpike, and massed by advancing a skirmish line at a time under the brow of the hill near the angle. I made this known to Gen. Cheatham by a staff officer (Lieut. Rogan), and asked for reinforcements. The General informed me that he had nothing that could possibly be spared, and desired me to extend still farther to the left, as he had to withdraw strength from his front to protect his left, which had been turned. About this time the brigade on the extreme left of our infantry line of battle was driven back down the hill into the field in my rear, and the balls of the enemy were fired into the backs of (killing and wounding) my men. The lines on the left (as you go into Nashville) of the Granny White pike at this juncture were the three sides of a square, the enemy shooting across the two parallel lines. My men were falling fast. I saw and fully appreciated the emergency, and passed in person along the trenches in the angle built by Ector's Brigade, where I had placed troops who I knew to be unsurpassed for gallantry and endurance, and encouraged them to maintain their places.

"The men saw the brigade on the left of our line give way and the enemy take its place on the hills in my rear, yet they stood firm and received the fire from three directions with coolness and courage.

"Anticipating a disaster, I ordered Capt. Beauregard, who commanded my artillery, to move his battalion back to the Franklin turnpike, as the enemy already had the Granny White pike in our rear, which was my channel for escape, as per order in the forenoon. About 4 p. m. the enemy with heavy force assaulted the line near the angle, and carried it at that point where Ector's Brigade had built the light works, which were back from the brow of the hill and without obstructions; not, however, until the gallant and obstinate Col. Shy and nearly half of his brave men had fallen, together with the larger part of the three right companies of the 37th Ga., which regiment constituted my extreme left. When the breach was made, this command—the consolidated fragments of the 2d, 10th, 15th, 20th, 30th and 37th Tenn.—still contested the ground, under Maj. Lucas, and, finally, when overwhelming numbers pressed them back, only 65 of the command escaped, and they not as a command, but individuals. The command was nearly annihilated, as the official reports of casualties show. Whether the yielding of gallant and well-tried troops to such pressure is reprehensible or not, is for a brave and generous country to decide.

"The breach once made, the lines lifted from either side, as far as I could see, almost instantly, and fled in confusion.

"Two regiments—the 29th and 30th Ga.—then my extreme right, commanded by Col. Mitchell (Jackson's Brigade), and adjoining Walthall's Division, did not break, but remained fighting until surrounded. The section of artillery under Lieut. Alston was turned on the enemy and fired after being completely flanked and our lines vanishing. I mention it in compliment to this gallant Lieutenant. I first sought to rally the men and form line in the wooded bottom in rear of Strahl's Brigade, Lowry's right, but found it yielding to the example on its right (there being no pressure of consequence either on its front or that of my extreme left), and hence it was impossible to do so.

"I was then directed by Gen. Cheatham to form a line at Lea's house, on opposite side of Granny White turnpike, but found on getting there that our lines on that flank had also given way, and the enemy already commanding it with his small-arms. The men then, one by one, climbed over the rugged hills in our rear and passed down a short valley which debouched into the Franklin turnpike. The whole army on this thoroughfare seemed to be one heterogeneous mass, and moved back without organization or government.

"Strenuous efforts were made by officers of all grades to rally and form line of battle, but in vain. The disorganized masses swept in confusion down the Franklin turnpike, amid the approaching darkness and drenching rain, until beyond Brentwood, when the fragments of commands were, in some measure, united and bivouacked in groups for the night."

REPORT OF CONFEDERATE COMMANDER.

Following is what Gen. John B. Hood, commander of the Confederate army, says in his report of the action on the second day of the great battle:

"Early on the 16th of December the enemy made a general attack on our lines, accompanied by a heavy fire of artillery. All his assaults were repulsed with heavy loss till 3:30 p. m., when a portion of our line to the left of the center, occupied by Bate's Division, suddenly gave way.

"Up to this time no battle ever progressed more favorably; the troops in excellent spirits, waving their colors and bidding defiance to the enemy.

"The position gained by the enemy being such as to enfilade our line, caused in a few moments our entire line to give way and our troops to retreat rapidly down the pike in the direction of Franklin, most of them, I regret to say, in great confusion, all efforts to reform them being fruitless. Our loss in artillery was heavy—54 guns. Thinking it impossible for the enemy to break our line, the horses were sent to the rear for safety, and the giving way of the line was so sudden that it was not possible to bring forward the horses to move the guns which had been placed in position. Our loss in killed and wounded was small."

On leaving the field Gen. Hood sent a staff officer to inform Gen. Forrest of his defeat, and to direct him to rejoin the army with as little delay as possible, to protect its rear. The heavy rain had so swollen the creeks that Gen. Forrest was unable to join Gen. Hood until his retreating army reached Columbia, leaving Gen. Chalmers with the only cavalry force to meet Gen. Wilson's advancing columns.

What Gen. Chalmers lacked in numbers he tried to make up in activity. He held his command well together amidst the excitement and shock of defeat.

The news of Gen. Thomas's splendid success was telegraphed North promptly, and was at once given out to the public. It was received with universal rejoicing by loyal people, and drew out expressions of unbounded praise and gratitude to Gen. Thomas and his army. The battle of Dec. 16 was a great victory for the Union army. The campaign had demonstrated the fact that these veteran troops were invincible. Every officer and soldier engaged in the battle of Nashville performed his duty in such a manner as to warrant the appellation of hero.

To Brig.-Gen. John McArthur, commander of the First Division, Sixteenth Corps, unstinted praise is due for his skilful and courageous action in the battle of Dec. 16. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon of that day the train of forces were all set, ready to move to bring about the great event. To Gen. McArthur must be accorded the act which set that train of forces in motion. The keypoint of the Confederate left was the hill in front of the Twenty-third Corps. Gen. McArthur conceived the idea of capturing that hill by assault, and proposed to do it. He moved McMillen's Brigade to the right, in front of the works of the Twenty-third Corps, and giving the necessary orders to his division, assaulted the enemy's works and carried the hill.

This success instantly set the troops of Cox, Wilson, Wood and Steedman in motion. Attacked in front, on the flank and in the rear, the Confederate army was overwhelmed and beaten. The stoutest hearts of officers and men of that veteran and heroic army quailed before the impending danger, gave up the fight, and found safety in surrender or flight.

Honor and praise is due to every officer and soldier who fought in that great battle. They are heroes all. But special praise is due to the men who conceived the movement and to the troops who led the assault on that great day. The names of McArthur and McMillen should be inscribed on a monument of imperishable granite erected on that battlefield in honor of their splendid leadership.

PURSUIT OF HOOD'S ARMY.

Gen. Hood's army, broken and defeated along its whole line, and cut off from the Granny White pike by Wilson's Cavalry, retreated in great disorder along the Franklin turnpike; many soldiers on the left of the line, when the break occurred, took to the woods, and escaped by climbing the Brentwood Range. The attack of the Fourth Corps became a pursuit along and on both sides of the Franklin pike;

(Continued on third page.)