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If you draw under Act of June 27, 1890, and will soon reach age of 65, 68, or 70, write for a blank to The National Tribune, Washington, D. C.

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If you will soon reach the age of 65, or 68, or 70, and do not draw pension, write for a blank to The National Tribune, Washington, D. C.

ONE DOLLAR A YEAR.

WASHINGTON, D. C., THURSDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1905.

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# War of the Rebellion

## OPENING OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

By JOHN McELROY.

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### CHAPTER XXVII.

#### ON THE MISSISSIPPI HIGHLANDS.

Grant's Advance Strategy—Pemberton Utters Bewilderingly "No" to the "No" and Sharp, Quick Blows Increase His Confusion—Battle of Port Gibson, Capture of Grand Gulf, Battle of Haines Bluff, and the Opening of the River—Joe Johnston Arrives "Too Late."

Gen. Grant was rushing everything forward across the Mississippi River. He had, according to his returns for the month of April, an effective strength of 50,000. These were all available for the river, and the reason that the line of communications had to be carefully looked after and there were also detachments to remote to be brought up in order to their duty on the various enterprises which had been prosecuted. McClellan's Division of McPherson's Corps was still up the river, and one of his brigades remained at Providence during the entire campaign.

To Blair's Division of Sherman's Corps was assigned the duty of guarding the roads leading to the river. Sherman was promptly recalled from his feinting maneuver upon Haines Bluff, and presently Grant had 41,000 effective across the river, and these without wagons, horses for the officers or other necessary equipments. Grant himself was without a horse for a day or two after he got over the river, and then one was picked up for him which he mounted with a ruder saddle than had been found somewhere, and rode this outfit for nearly a week.

May 1 Gen. Grant had with him the Thirtieth Corps under Gen. McClellan, and two brigades of Logan's Division, about 20,000 in all. They were soon reinforced by Logan's remaining brigade and Logan's Division of the Seventeenth Corps. Sherman arrived May 7 with two brigades of his division, making a total force on that day of 33,000. Grant pushed forward with the greatest energy—celerity was everything. Pemberton, who had taken up his headquarters at Jackson, 50 miles east of Vicksburg, was not prepared to meet 60,000 effective between Haines Bluff and Port Hudson. Grierson's raid had strongly disturbed the arrangement of Pemberton's forces. Detachments sent out along the railroad and elsewhere to protect important points against the daring little band of cavalry.

It was absolutely necessary for Gen. Grant to interpose between these outlying forces and prevent their junction. He had the most fear of what Gen. Johnston might do. Johnston had the ability of all the Confederate commanders, and he had command of all the troops west of the Allegheny Mountains. With Rosecrans lying idle at Stone River, Johnston was not likely to detach a large portion of Bragg's force and hurry it down the Mississippi. There were 55,000 available in the region, and Johnston had been urging to have sent across the river. Since the Union fleet now had control of the entire length of the Mississippi these men were isolated, and no further thought need be given them.

The first step was to take immediate advantage of Pemberton's confusion of mind and increase it. While Pemberton had been awakened to the fact that something unusual was going on by the passage of the gunboats and the arrival of Grant's head of column on the eastern side of the river, he had not appreciated the entire significance of the movement. Sherman's very showy demonstration on the Yazoo River had produced the best of results in the minds of Pemberton and his subordinates. Though Sherman had re-embarked his men after a number of threatening maneuvers and considerable shelling of the river, the gunboats, it still looked as if Grant's crossing at Bruinsburg might be a feint to distract attention from Sherman's reversal in strong force to the northward upon the high land in the neighborhood of Haines Bluff.

A Splendid Army. The army which Gen. Grant had about him was exceedingly fit for the enterprise in hand. The men, after their months of disorganizing struggles with the swamps and floods, were in the highest spirits, at last being on solid ground where they could plant their feet firmly. Having this they were ready and willing to do their duty, and had no doubt of their ultimate success. Colonels, Brigades, Division and Corps Commanders were all tried men who proved able to act by long association to acting promptly in concert, and full of confidence in themselves, in each other and their commander.

cluded the reinforcements which reached him after the action was over. In his detailed report, made June 4, 1863, Gen. Bowen says that as early as April 20 he began to believe that Gen. Grant intended to pass below Vicksburg and make a lodgment at or near Grand Gulf. The members of his staff concurred in this view, and it was decided that it would take from 15,000 to 20,000 men to give battle to the forces that were likely to be thrown across. He discovered April 30 that Grant was landing at Bruinsburg, and he sent out Brig. Gen. Green to occupy the roads leading from Bruinsburg to Port Gibson. He sent out other portions of his garrison to hold other roads and fords by which the Union troops could advance and threaten his flanks. The news of the crossing reached Pemberton at Jackson, and though he was still feeling apprehensive of Sherman's maneuvers he telegraphed to Stevenson, in command of Vicksburg, to send 5,000 men at once to Bowen's assistance, and Stevenson started Tracy's and Baldwin's Brigades late on the afternoon of April 29. Pemberton

also ordered Tilghman to gather up all the men around Jackson and start toward Vicksburg. Tracy's Brigade reached Grand Gulf on the afternoon of April 29, and Baldwin's Brigade came in later, with both bodies badly jaded on account of the rapid march.

The Opening of the Battle. Carr had been pushed out into his division on the road leading to Port Gibson immediately after the bluffs had been gained, and at midnight about 10 miles from Bruinsburg and four from Port Gibson, his advance ran up against the pickets of Grierson's Brigade. There was a brief scattering fire and then Carr, not wishing to attack in the dark over ground of which he was entirely ignorant, withdrew a short distance, and his men lay on their arms in the road until daylight. Osterhaus's and Hovey's Divisions came up to Carr's position during the night and A. J. Smith's was well closed up to them.

As soon as it was daylight the enemy's position was clearly revealed, and it was found it was on two roads which describe an angle and a semi-circle and unite at Port Gibson. Grierson's Brigade was posted across the southern road, and Tracy's Brigade astride the northern. Between the two was a deep valley, thickly overgrown, which prevented any concert between the two forces. The woods by the southern road were rough and difficult for the movement of troops, being generally short, steep, detached hillsides, between the two roads were thickly overgrown with impenetrable thickets of cane and underbrush. The battle was brought on at 5:30 by McClellan's pushing forward the left division on the left along the northern road with Garrard's Brigade in advance. It struck Tracy's Confederate Brigade, which met it with a sharp fire and checked the advance. The Union Brigade came to Garrard's assistance and forced the Confederates back a short distance, but was unable to advance farther for several hours. With Benton's Brigade in advance on the right of the southern road and Stone's Brigade on the left of the road, Carr advanced at 6:15, but made slow progress, and the Union Brigade still reached a point at the foot of the ridge, and about 150 yards from the Confederate line, which had in the center a battery of artillery. Without waiting for more than a brief study of the position, the line rushed forward resolutely, gained the ridge, captured two pieces of artillery and 400 prisoners. Green fell back with his brigade, and his brigade toward Port Gibson. Bowen sent out other troops to reinforce his first advance, and finally went himself, reaching the battle field at 9 o'clock. He halted the retreating troops, brought up the others to their assistance, and established a new line about one mile in the rear of the battlefield. Reinforcements were also sent. Tracy, who was still holding his own against Osterhaus on the northern road. Here a very stubborn fight took place, lasting an hour and a half, during which Bowen took two regiments and tried to turn McClellan's right flank. Burbridge met this with his brigade and drove it back, and the Confederates still clung to the position which they had assumed.

Gen. Grant, arriving on the field about 10 o'clock, reconnoitered the enemy's lines and took the direction of the battle in his own hands. McClellan had been sending back requests for reinforcements, although he had three divisions fighting less than two brilliant hours, and could not use effectively. Gen. Grant ordered a brigade sent to support Osterhaus and make a flank movement on the Confederates, and McClellan accompanied this in person. So tangled and difficult was the country that this took hours to accomplish, and it was not until 5 o'clock that J. E. Smith's Brigade struck the enemy's right flank at the same time that Oster-

haus renewed his front attack. It was a short, deadly fight for a few minutes, in which Tracy, the brigade commander, was killed and Green led the command off the road to the eastward, burning the bridge over Bayou Pierre and taking up a strong position on the hills beyond. Baldwin retreated through Port Gibson and burned the bridge behind him. The retreat was conducted in good order, and it was dark before Grant's troops could reach Port Gibson.

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Though the statements of Bowen's superiors were to the effect that he had about 8,500 men in the battle, he officially stated his strength at 5,500. Of these he reports to have lost 60 killed, 340 wounded and 287 missing. The Union commander reports, however, having taken over 600 prisoners.

Gen. Grant officially reported that he had lost 129 killed, 710 wounded and 19 missing.

Reports of the fighting were sent to Pemberton, who had gone to Vicksburg, and he began working the wires energetically to collect his scattered forces and make headway against Grant. Gen. Loring, who was at Meridian, was ordered to come by rail to Edwards's Station, with all the troops he could gather up, but, making all haste, Loring was still unable to get within 20 miles of the battlefield that day and Pemberton sent out from Vicksburg three brigades under Stevenson. Gen. Grant pressed forward the next morning as soon as it was light enough to see the road, and at once began the construction of bridges to take the army across the southern fork of Bayou Pierre. What is called a raft bridge was soon laid from timber obtained by tearing down buildings, stables, fences, etc. Everyone, officers and privates, en-

gaged in the work, for it was of the utmost importance that the army be gotten across and secure Grand Gulf before the enemy could strongly reinforce the place from Vicksburg.

Wonderful Looking Trains. The men were also sent out into the country to gather up transportation for the army, and soon had most astonishing trains, made up of family carriages, farm wagons, carts, and all other manner of vehicles that would carry cartridges and provisions. The draft animals were similarly various—horses, mules and oxen being found intermixed in some of the trains.

At Port Gibson Gen. Grant learned through a Southern paper of the complete success of Col. Grierson's raid, and realized that the raid would be of the greatest help to him if he should properly take advantage of the confusion induced in the rebel army. Crocker's and Logan's Divisions took the lead in crossing the river, and Bayou Pierre and reached the North Fork, eight miles distant, where they found the bridge still burning. The fire was put out and the bridge repaired during the night.

Gen. Loring had now come up, and he made every effort to resist the passage of the North Fork of Bayou Pierre, placing troops to guard the narrow Ford, Hankinson's Ferry and Willow Springs. He soon saw, however, that these efforts would be futile

the following congratulatory order to his men:

"General Orders, No. 32. Headquarters Department of the Tennessee. "In the Field, Hankinson's Ferry, Miss., May 7, 1863. "Soldiers of the Army of the Tennessee: Once more I thank you for adding another victory to the long list of those previously won by your valor and endurance in the recent campaign over the enemy near Port Gibson on the 1st inst. is one of the most important of the war. The capture of five cannon and more than 1,000 prisoners, the possession of Grand Gulf, and a firm foothold upon the highlands between the Big Black and Bayou Pierre, from whence we threaten the whole line of the enemy, are among the fruits of this brilliant achievement. The march from Milliken's Bend to the point opposite Grand Gulf was made in stormy weather, over the worst roads, bridges and ferries had to be constructed; moving by night as well as by day, with labors incessant and extraordinary, privations have been endured by men and officers as have rarely been paralleled in any campaign. Not a murmur nor a complaint has been uttered. A few days' continuance of the same zeal and constancy will secure to this army the crowning victory over the rebellion. More difficulties and privations are before us. Let us endure them manfully. Other battles are to be fought. Let us fight them bravely. A grateful country will rejoice at our success, and history will record it with immortal honor. "U. S. Grant, Major-General, Commanding."

Information for the Secretary of War. Mr. C. A. Dana sent from Hankin-

son's Ferry the following letter to Secretary Stanton: "Hankinson's Ferry, May 5, 1863; 10 p. m. "Via Memphis, Tenn., May 18, 11 a. m. "Enemy had built a bridge of flatboats across the Big Black at this point. Logan pressed up on them so hard in the pursuit that they were not able to destroy it. It is reported by our pickets that they have two brigades in our front on the other shore, and McPherson is going over this morning with a competent force to strike them up. But for the exceeding incompetency of Gen. McClellan, and the delay thence arising, the movement from Bruinsburg in this direction must have resulted in the capture of 5,000 instead of about 700 rebels. A tug with barges ran the Vicksburg batteries on Sunday night, the 3d inst. The hay which was the loading of the barges was covered with set on fire, and the hard bread beneath was considerably damaged by water in putting it out, but the action of Capt. Caswell and his rations arrived from Milliken's Bend at Perkins's Plantation. As soon as these supplies reach here and Sherman's troops arrive, the general advance up the river will be made. Sherman himself was at Grand Gulf yesterday, and two of his divisions will depart there today. The army here is distributed across the river in various positions, and the troops are being every point. Gen. McClellan is on the right center; McPherson here on the left. A reconnoissance pushed as far as Rocky Springs and in the vicinity of the North Fork of the Mississippi discovers no enemy. Please notice that in my dispatch of yesterday I was misinformed as to Logan's movement of the evening previous, and that he was at Warrenton and not the Vicksburg road. The army is thoroughly overpowered from the fatigue of the late operations."

"C. A. Dana, Secretary of War."

Four Precious Days. Gen. Pemberton lost four precious days in endeavoring to understand Grant's movements and intentions. Naturally he could only measure Gen. Grant by such a commonplace standard as himself, and he made his dispositions, and made any intelligent dispositions, to counteract what a man of his caliber in Grant's position would do. Gen. Grant had thrust forward McClellan across the Big Black and Hankinson's Ferry to within five miles of Warrenton. This led Gen. Pemberton to believe that Grant intended to do nothing but make a feint, and to attempt to besiege him in Vicksburg, beginning his lines at the river below the city. But soon Gen. Pemberton learned that Gen. Grant was moving on up the Big Black, and then he became certain that his opponent was going to do the next obvious thing. That is, cut the railroad from Jackson at some point beyond the Big Black and advance to the siege from the eastward. Consequently Pemberton at once began a concentration of his troops at Edwards's Station, where he anticipated that the battle would be delivered. He telegraphed what he was doing to Joseph E. Johnston and Jefferson Davis, and Johnston answered at once: "If Grant crosses up the river, you must beat him. Success will give back what was abandoned to win it." This meant that Pemberton should withdraw all his troops from around Vicksburg and unite them with the troops at Grant's heads of columns and crush them. The thought of abandoning Vicksburg or leaving it open with an insufficient defense against a rapid movement from Grant's army was intolerable to Pemberton, and he would not obey Johnston's order. Jefferson Davis expressed the opinion that Grant's army was not making any headway more than a few days away from the river, and it might be expected to soon return to Warrenton, where it could get supplies brought across to Young's Point. Therefore, the three divisions which had been out toward Grand Gulf were brought back to the crossing between Grand and Vicksburg, with Loring's Division placed to

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During their campaign the troop was mounted and equipped at its own cost.

## EARLY DAYS OF CAVALRY.

### Persistent and Unaccountable Opposition to Mounted Men by the War Department—Many Splendid Bodies Rejected—Others Become the Nuclei of Superb Regiments—Strong Need of Horsesmen From the First.

By WALTER KEMPSTER, M. D., First Lieutenant, 10th N. Y. Cav.

There are but few persons acquainted with the difficulties attending the efforts made to create a corps of cavalry for the Army of the Potomac. In a general way it is understood that the Government did not favor the organization of regiments of mounted troops, but the extent of direct opposition to the enlistment of men and officers has rarely been paralleled in any campaign. Not a murmur nor a complaint has been uttered. A few days' continuance of the same zeal and constancy will secure to this army the crowning victory over the rebellion. More difficulties and privations are before us. Let us endure them manfully. Other battles are to be fought. Let us fight them bravely. A grateful country will rejoice at our success, and history will record it with immortal honor. "U. S. Grant, Major-General, Commanding."

The active opposition of Regular Army officers to the enrollment of cavalrymen appears strange, in view of the fact that after the fall of Fort Sumter the enlistment of men and officers was not so well known. The Philadelphia Troop offered their services on the 15th day of April, but were not accepted until nearly one month had elapsed. In the meantime Gen. Scott concluded that he had need for cavalry, and on the 27th of April sent an order to Maj. George H. Thomas, directing him to send the four companies of cavalry then at Carlisle with all possible dispatch to Washington, enjoining that the route which would insure their arrival at the Capital at the earliest moment practicable should be taken, the order concluding with these words: "The men must be prepared to encounter opposition and to overcome it." Following this, another dispatch was sent to Maj. Thomas, directing him to send the men from Carlisle to Washington via Gettysburg, avoiding, as far as possible, the larger towns, such as Frederick City, and commanding him to make all needful arrangements to render the movement prompt and successful.

The circumstances are mentioned because they contrast so remarkably with subsequent orders from the War Office. When the Nation's Capital was in such great peril during the early days of April, 1861, volunteers were enrolled from among Department clerks and from loyal citizens in the District of Columbia. Among those volunteers was a company of men who did noble service, but about whose organization there has been great difficulty in obtaining more than the most meager outlines. They were content to serve their country in its hour of greatest danger to serve it well, and then retire. Many of its members, however, enlisted elsewhere. I refer to a company of cavalry commanded by Capt. Samuel W. Owen, which was organized at Washington the 25th day of April, 1861, to serve for three months. From the date of their muster-in until they were finally discharged they performed almost incessant scouting and outpost duty, and to their energy and watchfulness the acts of many traitors were made known to headquarters, and their treachery promptly thwarted.

On the 23d of April, 1861, L. Thomas, Adjutant-General, U. S. A., directed Maj. G. H. Thomas, U. S. A., then in command at Carlisle Barracks, to recruit to the maximum number immediately the four companies of the 2d U. S. Cavalry, then at Carlisle, and the next day orders were issued to purchase the necessary number of horses. A requisition was made for equipments to head-quarters, and the troops might be ready at the earliest practicable moment.



On the 24th of May, 1861, Capt. Owen's company of cavalry crossed the Potomac with Gen. Heintzelman's command. He speaks of this troop as follows: "Capt. S. W. Owen, who commanded some of the District Cavalry, accompanied me, and had with him men well acquainted with the country. I gave directions to Capt. Owen to lead Col. Burchfield's regiment as far as Four Mile Run, and there take post on the right of the road; then conduct Col. Wilcox with the 1st Mich. to Alexandria, to unite with the New York Zouaves, under Col. Ellsworth, and occupy Alexandria. This was done without opposition, although they captured 35 cavalrymen with their horses and equipments, belonging to the famous Black Horse Cavalry, commanded by Capt. Ball."

On the 29th of May, being ordered to report to Col. George H. Thomas, and under his command took part in the movements about Falling Waters, Va., where on the 17th of June they had a skirmish with the enemy. Thence they went to Martinsburg, Va., where they had a sharp engagement. It is somewhat amusing to those who participated in the movements of cavalry throughout the war to read Gen. Patterson's report of this affair, where he says: "The cavalry could not be employed in pursuit, on account of the numerous fences and walls crossing the country." At the expiration of their term of service, Aug. 17, 1861, Col. Thomas said of the Philadelphia Troop, that they were deserving "the highest encomiums for military capacity, strict attention to duty, promptness and bravery."

## TO UNION SOLDIER:

Young Newhall and others, thinking there was better opportunity in the West, went to St. Louis, where Gen. Fremont made these young men the nucleus of a cavalry organization; but the majority of his men were from Kentucky. Young Newhall was appointed First Lieutenant under Maj. Zaslony.

The sequel is generally known how at Springfield, Mo., the company of young, impetuous cavalrymen charged a body of rebels numbering more than 2,000, completely routing them and capturing many prisoners.

In this company of Philadelphia boys there was another young man who there began a glorious career, Col. Chas. Trench. That cavalry charge was as brilliant as any in the annals of war, conducted with the utmost bravery, and resulting far better than the commanders could have anticipated. When the heroes of that gallant action, "The Guard," as their story was called, were promptly mustered out of the service as if they had brought disgrace upon their country. It is significant that the officer who was sent to disband them, Gen. Sweeney, a veteran of the Mexican war, upon seeing these men and observing their soldierly conduct, is reported to have said: "I will be damned if I muster such troops out of the service." Gen. Sturgis was next asked to perform this disagreeable duty, and he refused to do so. Springfield were drawn up for inspection he said: "If the Government of the United States wants to lose such troops, it must send some one else to muster them out. I will not do it if I have been given, and it was eventually obeyed.

No Volunteer Cavalry. The day after President Lincoln's first call for 75,000 men an effort was made in New York City to enroll volunteers for a troop of cavalry, and a hindrance was placed in the way of the Government. There was an enthusiastic response from men who had served in other wars, sufficient in number to form several companies.

A gentleman named Bayard Clark, who had once been an officer in the United States Cavalry, and who had been in the Lincoln Cavalry, was sent to Washington, hoping to have the matter entered into service at once. He was promptly told that cavalry was not wanted, and would not be accepted.

When the Nation's Capital was in such great peril during the early days of April, 1861, volunteers were enrolled from among Department clerks and from loyal citizens in the District of Columbia. Among those volunteers was a company of men who did noble service, but about whose organization there has been great difficulty in obtaining more than the most meager outlines. They were content to serve their country in its hour of greatest danger to serve it well, and then retire. Many of its members, however, enlisted elsewhere. I refer to a company of cavalry commanded by Capt. Samuel W. Owen, which was organized at Washington the 25th day of April, 1861, to serve for three months. From the date of their muster-in until they were finally discharged they performed almost incessant scouting and outpost duty, and to their energy and watchfulness the acts of many traitors were made known to headquarters, and their treachery promptly thwarted.

The Lincoln Cavalry. By mere chance President Lincoln saw a gentleman named E. H. Bailey, who had been unsuccessful in his efforts with the 1st N. Y. Cavalry to secure recognition for this regiment, now called "Lincoln Cavalry," and who was about to return to New York discouraged. Mr. Bailey received from the President authority to organize a volunteer organization. Even after securing the written authority of the President, Mr. Cameron and Gen. Scott took every opportunity to raise objections to the organization and acceptance of the regiment, at last giving their "approval" to the President's order, upon conditions which appeared almost impossible to fulfill. They had called for the character of the men interested. Every condition was promptly fulfilled, but still the regiment was kept back. It was not until the 12th of August that it was ordered to Washington, and the Colonel, Andrew T. McReynolds, did not receive his commission until January, 1862. This document, coming from the President—the only Colonel of a volunteer regiment so commissioned. Capt. Wm. H. Boyd left Philadelphia with his company on July 18, 1861, and immediately thereafter began his active duty in the field, at once becoming conspicuous for his activity and soldierly conduct.

Had it not been for the persistence of the officers of the Lincoln Cavalry, and the determination of the President to have his orders obeyed, it is doubtful whether the Lincoln Cavalry (afterwards called the 1st N. Y. Cavalry) would not have shared the fate of the independent companies which had been offered to the Government and persistently declined.

It was not in the East alone that earnest effort was made to organize troops of cavalry. Immediately after the fall of Sumter Governor Richard Yates, of Illinois, called a session of the Legislature, and the necessary laws were passed authorizing the raising of recruits, one regiment to be cavalry. This law became operative on May 3, 1861. Anticipating the action of the Legislature, Gen. Yates had previously reported for duty at Camp Yates. These were the "Chicago Dragoons," commanded by Capt. Chas. W. Barker, and the "Washington Light Cavalry," commanded by Capt. Frederick Schambach. The Dragoons numbered 110 officers and men, and were mustered into State service on the 19th day of April, 1861. They were sent to Camp Yates, but soon thereafter were transferred, at the request of Gen. McClellan, to West Virginia, where they took active part in the pending campaign, receiving from time to time warm commendations from their commanding officer for the work done in that Department. They were mustered out of the service as an organization in September, 1861, although Gen. McClellan personally interceded in their behalf with the War Department, requesting that they might be permitted to continue in the service with him.

This company was reorganized, after its muster-out, under Capt. Shearer. For a time they were associated with another company known as the "McClellan Dragoons," and were attached to a troop of Regulars, but were afterwards reorganized as a separate company, after being refused muster-in, reorganized under the name of "Hoffman's Dragoons," later being assigned to the 1st Cavalry, where they were mustered out. From the first the authorities of Illinois repeatedly urged the General Government to accept one regiment of cavalry, but the Government refused to do so. That such tenders were made is a matter of record. On May 3, 1861, (Continued on page six.)