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ARMY of the CUMBERLAND AND THE Great Central Campaign

The Important Position of Kentucky and Tennessee.

By JOHN McELROY.

CHAPTER XX.

THE ARMY SETTLES DOWN IN MURFREESBORO.

Repairing, Refitting and Fortifying—Works of Immense Strength Thrown Up—Need of More Cavalry—Wheeler Beaten off at Fort Donelson—Coburn Captured at Thompson's Station—Carter's East Tennessee Raid—Morgan Receives a Severe Beating.

Rosecrans in Murfreesboro.

After establishing himself in Murfreesboro and making a preliminary survey of the country, Gen. Rosecrans ordered Gen. Thomas to place his divisions on the Woodbury, Bradyville, Manchester and Shelbyville turnpikes. Gen. McCook was to place his three divisions from the Shelbyville road across the Salem turnpike to Stone River, upon which he was to rest his right. Gen. Crittenden was to take position on Gen. Thomas's left, so as to cover the Liberty and Lebanon turnpikes, and rest his left on Stone River below Murfreesboro.

Naturally the first duty of the Commanding General was to repair, as far as was possible, the losses of the terrible battle. The hundreds of wagons which had been burned by the rebel cavalry were a serious blow, every part of the army's equipments had been damaged, lessened, or otherwise impaired, and the railroad back to Nashville had to be put in running order, a serious task in the severe wintry weather which followed the battle. Until that could be done the army had to depend for food, ammunition and clothing upon what the greatly-diminished wagon trains could haul from Nashville.

The railroad from Nashville to Louisville had been only very imperfectly repaired from the terrible wrecking which Wheeler and Bragg had given it, so that the trains could only run slowly and with many accidents which greatly interrupted traffic. Thus it was for several weeks after the battle rations were very scarce with the Army of the Cumberland, never at any time full, most frequently half or quarter. The country round about was ransacked for supplies and everything within reach only went a short distance in supplying the necessity. Bragg's army had been in the country too long to leave any great amount of provender for man or beast.

Gen. Rosecrans had transferred to his Department Forts Henry and Donelson, which controlled the navigation of the Cumberland and Tennessee, and he began using the Cumberland River as a secondary line of supply, though it was a very roundabout course from Louisville to Nashville by way of that stream.

Another Reorganization.

General Order No. 9, War Department, Jan. 9, 1863, changed somewhat the organization of the Army of the Cumberland by dividing it into three corps, the Right to be the Twentieth Corps, the Left the Twenty-first, and the designation "Fourteenth Corps" to be limited to the Center under Gen. Thomas. The commanders of these divisions remained the same. Gen. Fry was succeeded in the command of one of the divisions of Thomas's Corps by Gen. Steedman, and the division brought in from Gallatin to Antioch Church and Lavergne. There being felt less need for strongly guarding the railroad from Louisville to Nashville, Gen. Reynolds's Division was relieved of that duty and brought forward to join Gen. Thomas at Murfreesboro.

As finally constituted the Fourteenth Corps comprised four divisions, with the first commanded by Maj.-Gen. Lovell H. Rousseau, the Second by Maj.-Gen. Jas. S. Negley, the Third by Brig.-Gen. J. M. Brannan, and the Fourth by Maj.-Gen. J. J. Reynolds.

Need of Cavalry.

More than any of his predecessors, Gen. Rosecrans felt the need of additional cavalry. At the beginning of the war cavalry was held in little esteem by the reigning coterie at the War Department, and all attempts to raise mounted regiments were strongly discouraged. The cavalry regiments which were accepted were, as a rule, those which had been pressed upon the Government by the urgency of Governors of States, and when in the service received but little attention or recognition from the powers in Washington. The arms and equipments supplied were scanty and antiquated. On the other hand, the Confederates had paid much attention to the mounted service, which was popular in the South, and attracted to it the best quality of the young men. They were all natural horsemen, fine shots, and strongly imbued with the chivalric idea. The bold and successful operations of Morgan, Wheeler and Forrest had painfully aroused the Union commanders in the field to the value of cavalry, but they had a long, hard time in impressing this upon Washington. Buell's infantry had worn out the Lord's patience and an infinite amount of Uncle Sam's shoeleather in fruitless and mortifying chases of the fleet-hoofed cavalry of the enemy. The country rang with the exploits of the Southern cavaliers, and this prestige was very useful in attracting the chivalrous youth of the South to the standards of Morgan, Wheeler and Forrest, consequently that arm of the Confederate service was now at its very best in numbers and that aggressive self-confidence which is so powerful a factor in the success of cavalry.

Rosecrans had timed his advance from Nashville with Forrest's absence in West Tennessee, whither he had been sent by Bragg to assist in destroying Grant's communications. As it was, the cavalry force under Wheeler and Wharton still with Bragg was more than a match in numbers for the Union cavalry, which had to be helped all the time by infantry to keep the bold Southern riders off our flanks and communications. Rosecrans began importuning Halleck for more cavalry, but this the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies treated as a complaint by Rosecrans, and then and there began the acrimonious correspondence between the Commander of the Army of the Cumberland and his superior at Washington which forms an unpleasant chapter in our military annals. At that time Bragg had at his disposition probably 10,000 or 12,000 unexcelled horsemen, while Rosecrans could not oppose to him more than half that number of Union cavalry.

Rosecrans Fortifies.

Next to repairing the railroad and refitting his army, Rosecrans devoted himself to the construction of the most astonishing system of fortifications around Murfreesboro. The works erected there were equal in magnitude and strength to those which defend great cities in Europe. On high ground, between Stone River and Murfreesboro, was thrown up a fort—Fort Rosecrans—of the strongest character that an engineer could devise, and which required an immense amount of labor by the soldiers. Smaller works only less in strength were thrown up on the high ground which had been so important during the battle, and there a chain of these was run around the town with works of much strength covering the whole front of the army. In short a gigantic fortress was constructed, sufficient for the accommodation and shelter of Rosecrans's whole force.

It makes a curious study as to why Rosecrans did this, which is in such sharp contrast to the aggressive character of Grant, who forced his way 600 miles into the enemy's territory before he threw the first shovelful of earth in his lines of circumvallation around Vicksburg. The works at Murfreesboro could not be said to be defensive of Nashville, since they did not cover the most vulnerable side of that city; they were too extended and elaborate to be merely defenses of a secondary base, and also too near the real base, since Murfreesboro is but 25 miles from Nashville. They were therefore of little use in holding the country firmly, since if that had been the object of the fortifications, they should have been on the Tullahoma line where Bragg was, or better still about Bridgeport, which is the gateway between Middle and East Tennessee. The greater probability is that Rosecrans was stunned by the terrific battle through which he had gone with its awful loss of life and its alarming nearness to the destruction of his army. He wanted to provide a refuge against a similar disaster before he advanced any further. This is the only creditable explanation that can be given for keeping his thousands of soldiers at work upon these fortifications for long months instead of employing them in inflicting damage upon his enemy. The only use ever made of these enormous works was in defeating Forrest's attempt to take a portion of them and to secure supplies during Hood's siege of Knoxville. Even this furnishes only a partial justification for them, since works costing one-hundredth of the labor would have been equally effective in securing the safety of the stores. Another surprising thought is that so much labor was expended upon these works and so little upon the more natural and vulnerable approaches to Nashville by the way of Columbia and Franklin.

As to the powerful armament of these fortifications the following is the official report of that of Fortress Rosecrans alone:

	Guns
Eight-inch siege howitzers	11
Twenty-four-pounder James rifled, siege	15
Six-pounder smooth-bore, field	16
Twelve-pounder howitzers, field	2
Ten-pounder rifled Parrott, field	1
Six-pounder rifled James, field	4
Three-inch rifled Rodman, field	1
Three-inch rifled bronze, field	1
	51

Trouble with the Cavalry.

After settling down along Duck River, Gen. Bragg put his troops into Winter quarters and began an extensive series of fortifications around Tullahoma to protect his base there. Van Dorn was sent up to him from Mississippi with three brigades of cavalry aggregating 5,000 men, thus greatly increasing Bragg's superiority over the Union cavalry. He stationed Van Dorn on his left with headquarters at Columbia to threaten the right of the Union army and Nashville. Wheeler was stationed on the right to protect that flank, threaten the communications north of Nashville, and also to be somewhat freer in his range than Van Dorn. Under Wheeler were Morgan, Wharton and Martin, each commanding a division. Forrest was assigned to Van Dorn. Finding the Union army settled down to the work of digging, the Confederate cavalry started out on operations to enliven the monotony of the Winter and disturb the quiet of the Union commanders. The first stroke was begun Jan. 26 when Bragg ordered Wheeler to make a dash across the front of the Union army and strike for Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland River, to break up that line of communications. Forrest was to cooperate, and was ordered to move down the river road to the vicinity of Dover, where the Union troops had fortified a position outside the old works of Fort Donelson. Wheeler taking with him Wharton's Brigade of 2,500 men, moved on the road to the left. Rosecrans, who had his spy system in remarkable order, learned of the movement as soon as it began, and ordered Jeff C. Davis, with his division and two brigades of cavalry under Minty, to march by the Versailles road and take Wheeler in the rear. Steedman started after Wheeler by way of Triune. Minty moved with such celerity and energy that he captured a regiment of 350 men at Rover, but Wheeler skillfully eluded the heavy columns of infantry, and Feb. 3 attacked with his entire force the Union troops at Dover. The place was garrisoned by Col. Harding, of the 83d Ill., with some 600 of his men, the commander and men proving to be the right ones in the right place. Wheeler attacked promptly and sharply, but Harding beat him back with heavy losses. A second attack was still more resolute and met a more costly repulse, and Harding followed this up with a counter-charge in which he captured 42 of the enemy, sending the remainder off the field in disorder. Upon the approach of the enemy Harding had sent messengers off for assistance, and one of these reached a fleet of six gunboats 24 miles down the river, which were convoying a fleet of transports carrying reinforcements to Rosecrans. The Lexington, Lieut. Fitch, steamed rapidly, and by her fire aided in repulsing the last assault. The others came up later and fired a number of shots, largely to show their good will, for Wheeler had hastily abandoned the field after the last repulse and the sight of the gunboats. He lost 150 killed, 400 wounded and 150 captured, while Col. Harding's loss was only 16 killed, 60 wounded and 50 captured. Davis essayed to cut off Wheeler's retreat, with the usual ill-success of infantry trying to surround cavalry. Col. Harding was promoted to a Brigadier-General for this service.



CARTER'S RAID INTO EAST TENNESSEE.

The Disaster at Thompson's Station.

The brilliant little affair at Fort Donelson was offset by the disaster at Thompson's Station, for which the ever unlucky C. C. Gilbert was largely responsible. After Perryville, Gen. Gilbert was dropped from his rank of Provisional Major-General, and he next appeared on the scene as a Brigadier-General in command of a brigade of the troops coming up the river to reinforce Rosecrans. The other two brigades were commanded by Gens. George Crook and Absalom Baird. Altogether there were 18 regiments of infantry, with four batteries of artillery, and the division was commanded by Gen. Gordon Granger. After Wheeler retreated from Dover, the fleet steamed up to Nashville, in magnificent pageant, with bands playing and colors flying, impressing strongly the people of that rebellious city with the power and majesty of the United States and the probabilities of what might happen to the army of Gen. Bragg from this accession of strength. From Nashville Gen. Crook was sent with his brigade to Carthage to guard that important passage of the Cumberland River and Gilbert was sent with his brigade to Franklin. Gilbert had apparently no knowledge whatever of Van Dorn's position and strength at Columbia, and seems to have taken no measures to inform himself. At that time Van Dorn was massing his forces under Bragg's orders for a strike at Nashville along that line of approach. March 4 Gilbert sent orders to Col. Coburn, with the 33d and 85th Ind., 22d Wis., 19th Mich., and 124th Ohio, the 18th Ohio Battery, 2d Mich., 9th Pa., and 4th Ky. Cav., in all about 3,000 men, to go south from Franklin with a train of 100 wagons on a foraging expedition, and also a reconnoissance of the enemy's front. The detachments of cavalry were commanded by Col. Jordan. It was expected that 12 miles south of Franklin the force under Sheridan would unite and move forward with it. At that unlucky time Van Dorn with his whole force of 10,000 in hand was advancing to feel the Union lines. Jordan's cavalry struck the enemy only three miles from Franklin, and a smart little fight opened which ended with the retreat of the enemy to Spring Hill, followed by our troops. As he advanced Coburn became aware that he was confronted by a greatly superior force, which was evidently trying to draw him into a trap, and notified Gilbert, who repeated his blunder of Munfordville by ordering him to push on his advance, which Coburn did, although he plainly saw the unwisdom of that course. Along in the morning Coburn encountered the enemy drawn up in line of battle near Thompson's Station. Forrest's command was on the extreme right, with the Texan Brigade in the center and Armstrong's Brigade in reserve. It was 9:30 o'clock when Coburn threw his troops into line and attacked vigorously. He pushed back the troops immediately in front of him, but Armstrong's and Whitfield's Brigades began to turn his flanks. Coburn held his position for half an hour, when he saw the hopelessness of the contest and ordered a retreat. Jordan tried in vain to cover this, but Van Dorn passed around his flanks, broke up attempts to make a stand, and although the attacks were repulsed sufficiently to allow the artillery to escape, the remainder of the command was at last compelled to surrender. Coburn's loss was 40 killed, 150 wounded, and some 2,000 prisoners. The enemy reported 35 killed and 140 wounded. The affair was a piece of bad mismanagement for which Coburn was held in a large measure responsible and the promotion of that worthy officer for a long time retarded in consequence. The final verdict was, however, that Gilbert was most culpable, and he very soon passed entirely from the scene, and the Army of the Cumberland knew him no more.



TOPOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF FORTRESS ROSECRANS AT MURFREESBORO, TENN.

Gen. Carter's East Tennessee Raid.

The bold, enterprising riders of the Southern Confederacy did not secure all the successes, by any means. While much was made in the Northern press and in the reports of the commanders of their alarming exploits, considerable less was heard of quite as daring, dashing achievements on the part of the Union troopers. One of these led into his native country by Gen. S. P. Carter, a naval officer from East Tennessee, was a particularly fine exhibition of what can be done by a brave, energetic, resourceful cavalry leader. Gen. Carter had all of these characteristics in spite of his long training in the Navy, to which he returned after the war, dying some years ago with the well-earned rank of Rear-Admiral.

As has been often stated before, the possession of East Tennessee was almost vital to the Confederacy, since through it ran the Virginia & East Tennessee Railroad, the main highway between Richmond and the Mississippi Valley. This was the strong military reason which added urgency to President Lincoln's desire that an advance be made into East Tennessee to protect the splendid loyalists of that country from the intolerable cruelties of the Richmond Government. None of Mr. Lincoln's commanders in Kentucky, except Gen. Thomas, could, however, be brought to sympathize with this object. They all believed that the vulnerable point at which to strike was Chattanooga.

After Gen. G. W. Morgan's retreat from Cumberland Gap in September, 1862, the Confederates felt entirely secure in the possession of East Tennessee, and stripped the country of troops to swell Bragg's army before Rosecrans. Knowledge of this induced the latter to recommend to and urge upon Gen. H. G. Wright, the commander of the Department of Ohio, to make a stroke at the all-important railroad. Plans for this were begun in November, but it took more than a month for them to mature, and while Rosecrans was getting in readiness to move out of Nashville, Gen. S. P. Carter was designated as commander of the expedition. Great care was to be exercised in selecting a small force of the highest efficiency to send with him. The best horses and men were to be picked out, formed into small detachments at various places and finally concentrated at the mouth of Goose Creek, Clay Co., Ky. They consisted of the best part of two battalions, 2d Mich. Cav., Lieut.-Col. Campbell; 9th Pa. Cav., Maj. Russell, and 1st battalion, 5th Ohio Cav.,

(Continued on page two.)

THE BEER OCTOPUS.

The Sodden Monster Which is the Greatest Curse of the Land.

Years ago Victor Hugo in one of his greatest works thrilled the civilized world with a vivid, intense description of the fight of a sailor with a hitherto little known marine monster, the octopus or devil fish. These monsters have great, bag-like bodies of soft, flabby material, from which extend enormously long arms furnished with suckers. They have large, fearsome, staring eyes to penetrate the dark depths of the waters, and their rope-like tentacles wind around their victims, which are held fast by the suckers until they are devoured by the monster. Many of them squirt out an ink-like liquid which clouds the water and helps to prevent the escape of their victims. The fight described by Victor Hugo had a thrill and a terror not to be found in any other species of combat. With a tiger, lion or other wild animal a battle is sharp, intense, natural, but far less terrible than one with a cold, clammy, slimy, remorseless fiend that does not strike or bite, but simply envelops his victim in his noisome folds and crushes and sucks the life out of him. Of such a nature is the fight today for the morals and health of the country against the terrible beer octopus, which is undermining the manhood of Germany, destroying its physical fiber and its moral character, and unless checked will, in the opinion of the best thinking Germans, utterly destroy the country. A battle with whisky is like a fight with a lion or a tiger. There is something thrilling, exciting, inspiring about it, even though it ends in the death of its victim. Not so a battle with the remorseless, unshakable, overpowering, slimy monster beer. It paralyzes, saps, sucks and overpowers its hapless prey.

Where whisky burns out a man in a year or two beer simply rots him in every fiber and tissue through a long period of physical and mental deterioration.

Where whisky may for a time stimulate a man from some weakness or inspire him to some unusual exertion beer beclouds, deadens, dulls and decays him.

Where whisky may possibly preserve bodily tissue beer putrefies it.

For the truth of this one need only look around among his acquaintances and see men who have survived whisky drinking possibly for 50 years where he cannot find one who has outlived continuous and heavy beer drinking a decade. The whole medical fraternity in Great Britain, France, the United States and even Germany testify that far the most dangerous patient that can come under their care is one who has been in the habit of drinking considerable quantities of beer. Every one of them will bear willing testimony that even under mild attacks of such customary diseases as pneumonia and fever their patients at the moment when any other man would begin to recover slip through their hands with the suddenness and completeness of blowing out a candle. Large-limbed, full-bodied, apparently robust men who have been drinking beer will sink under a light attack of disease that a child should have easily survived.

Effect Upon Animals.

The debilitating effect upon the lower animals is quite as marked. A few years ago a yellow illustrated paper made quite a sensation by giving actual photographs of cows and hogs which were fed upon brewery slops. The cows lost their tails and horns, most of their hair and suffered other diseases and the hogs were similarly affected. The object of the paper was to awaken attention to the dangerous character of the milk furnished by these slop-fed animals, but investigations pushed farther showed that the flesh of animals so fed was so diseased and putrefied as to be absolutely dangerous as human food. These pictures and exposures made a profound sensation at the time, and there was some corrective legislation, but like other sensations in this country it was soon effaced by another and forgotten. Probably the same evils exist to-day and are responsible for a large proportion of the death rate in the cities where the people drink the milk from these cows and eat their flesh. If the medical history of every man, woman and child who is carried to the grave could be written it would be found that instead of dying from pneumonia, heart disease, Bright's disease, diabetes, fever, liver troubles or neurasthenia, the real cause was beer drinking either by the victims themselves or by the fathers and mothers of the victims. The little children died from the vitiated milk or the polluted meats that had been fed them.

The Scientific Reason.

There is a scientific reason why beer is more deadly than whisky. The processes of fermentation is far from being completely understood by scientists. Fermentation is the beginning of a process of decay. In this process there are many noxious alkaloids, acids and other dangerous substances formed which may exist only temporarily and then be again disintegrated. In fermentation there may go on a process akin to that which forms the deadly ptomaines in putrefying meat. When the fermenting, rotting "mash" is distilled these dangerous bodies are left behind, while the less harmful alcohol is distilled off. Consequently the drinker of whisky does not get any of the dangerous products of decomposition, but they remain in full strength and vicious activity when the fermenting "mash" becomes beer and they are taken in great quantities into the stomach of the drinker.

There must necessarily be something of this kind to explain why beer produces so much more degradation of the bodily tissues both of men and animals than does alcohol in the shape of whisky. No one can deny this who studies even casually the general appearance of a beer-drinker and contrasts it with that of a whisky-drinker. Every educated physician will unhesitatingly testify to it. The Germans have the reputation of being the most scientific people in the world, and of studying these abstruse problems with more zeal, industry and thoroughness than any other in the world. Today every scientific man in Germany is engaged in an active crusade against beer-drinking as the sure source of contamination and degradation of the physical stamina of the German people. The great Olympian games at Athens, where the German athletes made such a poor showing, have furnished them a text upon which they are preaching most effective sermons to their people. They are showing that the flabby flesh and muscles of even the moderate beer-drinker and his physical powers even when moved to the highest effort in a world-wide competition cannot approach the achievements of the non-beer-drinkers of other countries. The astonishing superiority shown at that time by the American athletes over even their British cousins was accepted as a demonstration that they had been more abstemious in the consumption of fermented liquors than the British, and, of course, far more than the Germans.

The German railroads have found by actual daily experience, with all their prejudices at first in favor of beer-drinking, that their employees who drank even occasional glasses of beer were not nearly so safe and reliable as those who refrained altogether from the dangerous brew. Therefore, the railroads have found it very profitable to furnish their employees with coffee, tea and similar drinks at the expense of the corporation rather than have these men tipple no matter how lightly in the saloons. This takes the matter clear beyond the realms of theory and morals and puts it in the cold, searching, unanswerable light of business experience.

Growth of Beer-Drinking in This Country.

These pregnant facts give burning point to the fear of the enormous increase of beer-drinking in this country. In the old days before the war our people drank no beer. There was some ale brewed in the country, but it was inconsequential in amount and substantially all the evils of intemperance were due to the drinking of the "old-fashioned, hand-made whisky." These were so enormous, however, that people looked about for a remedy and they were frightfully misguided by the talk of superficial thinkers that there was no drunkenness in France or Germany because the people there drank only beer and light wines. We followed off this ignis fatuus with the wild enthusiasm that we are likely to display toward any new idea, especially in Temperance. Breweries sprang up all over the land like mushrooms, to be as insidiously fatal as the most noxious of those fungus growths. The poison in the beer is terribly like the fatal toxic in the deadly toadstools. We traded an active, virulent but occasional devil for a cold, clammy, sodden one which is everywhere present and everywhere making his stupefying, destroying banefulness felt. We were so blind to this, so deceived by the misguided "beer and light-wine" advocates, that most of the States have on their statute books laws making a strong difference between the sale of liquors and the sale of beer and native wines. In several of the States the sale of beer and light wines was exempted from taxation, while that of whisky was either prohibited or heavily taxed.

The receipts of the Internal Revenue Bureau from fermented liquors tell the story of how the consumption of beer has swept over the country like a prairie fire. To meet the enormous expenditures of the war everything in sight had to be taxed, and while whisky was at first taxed $2 a gallon, beer escaped with the light taxation of $1 a barrel of 31 gallons. Our first returns from this source were in 1863, when the Internal Revenue Bureau collected the modest sum of $1,628,934, each dollar representing a barrel of beer. The following table of the annual receipts from this source will show the marvelous increase in the production and consumption of beer, remembering that as a rule each dollar received represents a barrel of beer of 31 gallons:

1863	$1,628,934
1864	2,290,209
1865	3,734,928
1866	5,220,553
1867	6,057,501
1868	5,855,869
1869	6,099,880
1870	6,319,127
1871	7,389,502
1872	8,258,498
1873	9,324,938
1874	9,304,680
1875	9,144,004
1876	9,571,281
1877	9,480,789
1878	9,937,052
1879	10,729,320
1880	12,829,803
1881	13,700,241
1882	16,153,920
1883	16,900,616
1884	18,084,954
1885	18,230,782
1886	19,676,731
1887	21,918,213
1888	23,324,218
1889	23,723,835
1890	26,008,535
1891	28,565,130
1892	30,037,453
1893	32,527,424
1894	31,414,788
1895	31,640,618
1896	33,784,235
1897	32,172,162
1898	39,515,421
1899	68,644,558
1900	73,550,754
1901	75,669,908
1902	71,988,902
1903	47,547,856
1904	49,082,459
1905	50,360,553

Stupendousness of These Figures.

The overwhelming immensity of these figures can be only grasped by subjecting them to analysis, and bringing them into relation to each individual citizen of the country. Taking in connection with the beer brewed at home that imported from abroad it makes the astounding total of between 1,500,000,000 and 1,600,000,000 gallons consumed by the 82,000,000 people of this country last year. Disregarding all fractions, this is approximately 20 gallons a year for every man, woman and child in the United States. Assuming a glass of beer to be half-a-pint, this gives 360 glasses of beer a year for each of them, or one a day. Now we know, in spite of what the yellow papers may say about the increase in drinking by women in the cities, substantially none of our women drink beer. Those that do are really an inconsiderable fraction of the population. Nor do the children drink beer. Then there are millions upon millions of men in the agricultural districts, business men and mechanics in the cities, railroaders, clerks, professional men, clergymen, physicians, and teachers who are rigid Temperance men, and never touch beer from one year's end to the other. There are thousands of Counties where Local Option prevails, and drinking is prohibited. There are great Prohibition States—like Maine and Kansas—where beer can be only obtained surreptitiously and in small quantities. Nearly all the Southern States have fairly well-enforced Temperance laws, to keep beer and whisky away from the negroes and "po' white trash." Consequently, if we put the real beer drinkers at 10,000,000, or one in eight of our population, we shall make a liberal estimate. Therefore each of these must consume nearly half-a-gallon of beer a day, to the destruction of their working capacity, their health and their morals.

The Rapid Growth of the Evil.

Were the beer drinking confined to this relatively small class of people, we could view it with more equanimity. We could say philosophically that those who are poisoning themselves with beer belong to the set that are going to perdition anyway, and they might as well go by the beer route as any other. Certain men and women are born with self-destructive tendencies, and if they do not drink beer or whisky, they will take to opium or some other suicidal agent. But the rapid growth of the beer business forbids any such self-complacent philosophy. The Internal Revenue statistics are far more alarming than any Temperance sermon. Nothing in the country has grown with the enormous rapidity of the beer business. While the population of the country is only about two and a quarter times what it was at the close of the war, the consumption of beer is 12 times as great. It has gone up every year by leaps and bounds, in spite of the restrictive legislation which Temperance advocates have fondly hoped would curb the demon. In the last 20 years it has actually doubled, though everybody has supposed that the Temperance cause was making great headway. While other business has its vicissitudes, with production and consumption rising and falling in cycles of years, the beer business shows every year millions of barrels more produced and drunk. Like death, all seasons and years are alike to it, except that every succeeding twelvemonth adds millions more to its slaves and victims. Even the ravages of disease cannot check it. Though beer-drinkers die off like rotten flocks, the number swells every

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

THE FIEND THAT IS WORSE THAN PESTILENCE, FLOOD OR FIRE.