The Peninsular Campaign

By JOHN McELROY.

CHAPTER X.

THE SIEGE OF YORKTOWN.

The Army Worn Out by a Long Month of Hard but Futile Siege Operations. McClellan Allows Magruder's Small Force to Hold Him at Bay—Ravages of Disease—Joe Johnston Carries Off Everything but His Heavy Guns—Sad Experience of the Gallant Vermonters at Lee's Mills.

McClellan's Disappointments.

While McClellan was adjusting himself to his new locale he received two severe disappointments. The first of these was the detachment of McDowell's Corps, upon which he had relied to attack Gloucester and assist in the siege of Yorktown, the other being the engrossment of the Navy with the Merrimac, which prevented it from giving him the assistance he expected. It is difficult to comprehend the importance that McClellan gives to the part he had assigned to McDowell. Certainly nothing like 40,000 men were necessary to operate against Gloucester and that side of the York River. A brigade, or at least a division, would have been all sufficient, since Magruder had not to exceed 11,000 in the works at Yorktown, and Joe Johnston had none to spare from the army with which to bar McClellan's 100,000 in its advance upon Richmond. The lack of naval co-operation was a serious matter, and on this subject comes a strong divergence of statement between Gen. McClellan and the naval authorities. While Gen. McClellan says that the navy failed utterly to give him adequate co-operation and to reduce the water batteries, Assistant Secretary Fox testified that no one had ever thought the vessels could reduce the batteries, since they were on too high ground for the naval guns to reach, and that McClellan never made any such a request to a responsible officer. Admiral Goldsborough, who was in command, gives explicit testimony as to this:

"With regard to that campaign, no naval authority whatever, to my knowledge, was ever consulted till after a considerable part of the army got down there. The whole matter was arranged here in Washington by officers in the army, as I understood. I believe they never said a word even to the Secretary of the Navy. Certainly nothing was ever said to me until the eleventh hour. Then it was that I heard that they expected the navy to co-operate with them. The Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. Watson, came down to see me in behalf, as he said, of the Secretary of War and the President of the United States. He told me of the great anxiety felt in Washington in regard to the Merrimac; that they were apprehensive she might get up the York River and entirely disconcert all the movements of the army. I told Mr. Watson that the President might make his mind perfectly easy about the Merrimac going up York River; that she never could get there, for I had ample means to prevent that. This was in the latter part of March, 1862. The army at that time was about assembling at Old Point Comfort. Gen. McClellan had not then arrived."

The Admiral goes on further to declare that he did everything that the General requested of him, detailing seven gunboats for his purposes, being all the former wanted, and adds that upon the day of his arrival off Fortress Monroe and before going ashore the General came on board of his ship to consult with him "as to the best mode of attacking Yorktown." This mode contemplated a flank attack by way of the Severn River upon the Gloucester works, on the fall of which the gunboats could run by Yorktown and render that position untenable.

The Investment of Yorktown.

Heintzelman and Keyes plodded over muddy roads under the beating showers April 5 and 6, and while the rain was falling in torrents brought their men up squarely against heavy fortifications. Heintzelman was to move to a point two and three-fourths miles from Yorktown, while Keyes was to go on with his corps to the left of the "Half Way House" to prevent the escape of the garrison at Yorktown and reinforcements being thrown in. Keyes was stopped, as before mentioned, by the battery at Lee's Mill, which swept the road so completely that the only thing he could think of to do was to cut another road thru the woods to avoid this fire. During April 5 Keyes had only made five miles of progress, while Porter had made four. There was reason for Porter's stopping, however, since he had come under the fire of the artillery at Yorktown, and was deploying Morell's Division to support Weeden's and Griffin's Batteries, which had gone into acton at about 1,000 yards from the enemy's parapets. Thus at once McClellan's plan of campaign wholly miscarried. He admits this himself, and lays the blame upon the map which had been furnished him by Lieut.-Col. T. J. Cram, Engineer and Aid-de-Camp to Gen. Wool at Fortress Monroe. This, McClellan complains, did not show the course of the Warwick River, nor its close proximity to the defenses of Yorktown. It indicated the Warwick River as running nearly parallel with the road up the Peninsula, instead of directly across it. Admitting this error in Cram's map, the question naturally arises, What reason had McClellan from the first to imagine that he could move up the Peninsula with no more opposition than he encountered in building a railroad over the Illinois prairies?

GEN. FITZ-JOHN PORTER.



UNION BATTERY NO. 4 AT YORKTOWN.

Tho the Peninsula was only 12 miles wide, a line had been established from Yorktown to the south side of the James, connecting Magruder with Huger, who was defending Norfolk, so that either could support the other if attacked. Ordinary military sagacity would have known that the communication between these two points must be strongly guarded. The lack of accurate maps and information was no greater obstacle than those encountered by all the other Generals in their advance into the Southern Confederacy. Yet McClellan was paralyzed for six precious days by Keyes being brought to a halt, and his rapidly swelling army floundered about over the muddy roads and swamps to little purpose. Everything depended upon the vigorous advance which McClellan had promised, but this he did not make, nor did he make reconnoissances across the river to discover how weakly the line was held. According to Magruder's own story, which must be always taken with allowance, for Magruder was not likely to permit the slavery of exact figures to embarrass him, he had but 5,000 men holding the 12 miles between Yorktown and the James and but 6,000 men to hold Yorktown and Gloucester Point opposite.

McCLELLAN'S OCCUPATION OF THE LOWER PENINSULA.

Very singularly, the Confederate authorities at Richmond were as badly informed as McClellan suffered himself to be. Johnston, after retiring from Manassas, had taken up his position on the Rapidan, where he expected to encounter McClellan's army, and he, Lee and Jefferson Davis continued to look for McClellan there, even after some 50,000 men had disembarked at Fort Monroe. Then Johnston was summoned to Richmond, and sent out on the peninsular front to examine the situation. He saw the case with which Magruder's position at Yorktown could be turned and he caught in a trap, and Johnston recommended that Magruder be withdrawn further up the Peninsula, possibly behind the Chickahominy, and the army concentrated there to meet the United States forces. In this plan Lee and Davis concurred, but still hardly believed that a movement up the Peninsula was the main aggression, and kept looking for a column from Washington to march against Richmond by the overland route. The line of the Rapidan continued to be strongly held. A formal order was even sent to Magruder to evacuate Yorktown, and at a council of war held to consider the order all but one of Magruder's subordinates voted to obey it. The one exception announced that it was his wish to make the place a Themorpylae, and Magruder sided with him.

GEN. ERASMUS D. KEYES.

Magruder's Defense.

Magruder, who had an exuberant fancy, told a great many stories afterward of the ruses and devices which he adopted to deceive McClellan as to his real strength. The important thing, however, is that he did so. McClellan became at once full of the belief that Johnston had shifted his whole army to his front, massing it behind the wide swamps of the Warwick. He therefore began elaborate engineering operations in cutting roads thru the heavy white oaks that densely covered those lowlands, in corduroying these highways, and in bringing up artillery to crush the fire of the enemy. At the same time the long siege of Yorktown was begun, with all the formalities of the engineering art which McClellan so dearly loved. He was now about to make an application on a grand scale of the lessons he had learned at Sebastopol, and exhibit to the engineers of the world the capabilities of American officers. Gen. Fitz-John Porter, McClellan's chief favorite, was appointed Director-General of the siege, and with Gen. Barnard began tracing the first line of works about a mile from those of Magruder at Yorktown. Requisitions were sent to Washington for all the siege pieces that could be gathered up, and as these went forward the Arsenal at Washington ran overtime to provide projectiles and powder. A base was established on the York River at Shipping Point, and the whole army was set to work to dig trenches, cut roads, construct bridges, clear off places d'armes, make gabions and fascines, erect batteries and land and drag to their places the immense Columbiads and ponderous 13-inch mortars. The attention of the country was drawn to this portentous siege, and the illustrated papers were full of pictures of routes, redans, lunets, ponderous siege guns, the transportation of the great 8-inch, 11-inch and 13-inch shells, and of the thrilling performances of Berdan's "Sharpshooters," with their deadly telescope rifles. There were wonderful stories, accompanied by his portrait and lifelike pictures of his marvelous doings, of "California Joe," whose deadly rifle shots sought the very heart of the Confederate position.

GEN. JOHN B. MAGRUDER, C. S. A.

GEN. BENJAMIN HUGER, C. S. A.

The Vermonters' Fight at Lee's Mills.

How absolutely unnecessary all this was was demonstrated by the unfortunate experience of the Vermont Brigade at the dam above Lee's Mills. Gen. Keyes had brought his full corps of 30,000 men up nearly to the Warwick, but it was not until April 16 that Gen. McClellan finally decided to make a reconnoissance across the creek to develop what was on the other side. He chose one of the dams which had been thrown across the creek about 100 yards above Lee's Mills. This looked to be, what it was, the weakest part of the Confederate line. Instead, however, of making a prompt push across the river, a general cannonading was opened from Yorktown to Lee's Mills to silence the artillery and keep Magruder in doubt as to the point to be assailed. Rather than accomplishing this object, it notified Magruder that at some point between Yorktown and Lee's Mills, a distance of only five miles, there was to be an attack made, and he promptly moved up his force to meet it. At last, towards 4 o'clock, after this cannonading had gone on for six hours, the fire of 24 guns was concentrated upon the ground beyond the creek, and four companies of the 3d Vt., under Capt. Harrington, rushed boldly into Warwick Creek, which came above their waists, and reached the other side in the face of the 15th N. C. and 16th Ga., which fell back before them with considerable precipitation. They carried the first line of works and gained a destined foothold on the other side of the creek, and the Confederate line was really broken if our Generals had then taken proper advantage of the great opportunity. There were 40,000 men within easy distance of this point, but those in command seemed to be paralyzed by the success of the Vermonters, and made no effort to do the obvious thing of rushing forward all available men to their support. The Vermonters found before them a strong redoubt at first only manned by a few hundred Confederates. These they gallantly attacked, but without success, and for an hour a stubborn fight was carried on, with no other assistance sent the assailants than some 500 or 600 men from the 4th and 6th Vt. While Keyes and his subordinate commanders stood thus idle and confused, Magruder was putting in the time to good advantage in concentrating a heavy force in front of the Vermonters, who were finally broken and driven back across the creek, with a loss of more than 200 in killed and wounded. Thus the opportunity which was more than golden was wantonly flung away. If the Vermonters had been properly supported Magruder's line would have tumbled that afternoon like the bricks in a rotten wall, and he would have been fortunate indeed had he got away with any considerable portion of his men. The effect of this upon the army was very discouraging, as it seemed to be a repetition of the Ball's Bluff mismanagement.

A Letter From Lincoln.

About this time Gen. McClellan received from the long-suffering President the following letter, which shows how severely he was trying Mr. Lincoln's patience:

"Washington, April 9, 1862.

"My Dear Sir: Your dispatches complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much.

"Blenker's Division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acquiesced in it—certainly not without reluctance.

"After you left I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction, and parts of this even was to go to Gen. Hooker's old position. Gen. Banks's Corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the upper Potomac and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. This presented, or would present when McDowell and Sumner should be gone, a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My implicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.

"I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course, I was constrained to substitute something for it myself. And allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond, via Manassas Junction, to this city, to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade.

"There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over 100,000 with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement, taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 108,000 then with you and en route to you. You now say you will have but 85,000 when all en route to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of 23,000 be accounted for?

"As to Gen. Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that command was away.

"I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you is with you by this time; and if so, I think this is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon you; that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reinforcements than you can by reinforcements alone. And once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy and the same or equal intrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note, is now noting, that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.

"I beg to assure you that I have never written you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, as far as, in my most anxious judgment, I consistently can. But you must act.

"Yours, very truly,

"Abraham Lincoln."

The President's Pleading.

It will be noticed how earnestly the President, in this letter, pleads for McClellan to strike a blow, to do something to justify the hopes that had been entertained of him. There is something extremely pathetic in the President's urgent pleadings of the painful anxiety of the country. He does not hesitate to say that McClellan's failure to do so makes the country fear a repetition of the old delay of months before Manassas. Two months before this Grant, with a little army of 15,000 men, had marched directly upon Fort Donelson, where he was reinforced by other troops, and three days after firing the first shot had captured the entire garrison of about 15,000, or several thousand more than Magruder was then able to oppose to McClellan's 100,000. McClellan continued to importune the President to send him McDowell's Corps to turn the Yorktown line by the capture of Gloucester, and Lincoln at last ordered Franklin's Division and some other troops to him, which McClellan kept on board vessels for two weeks before he decided where to land them.

Progress of the Siege.

Under Gens. Fitz-John Porter, W. F. Barry, Chief of Artillery, and J. G. Barnard, Chief of Engineers, the siege of Yorktown was prosecuted with a skill equal to anything mentioned in the European books of which these gentlemen were such students. Nearly 100 heavy guns, mortars and howitzers were put in position at ranges of from 1,500 to 2,000 yards from the enemy's works, and opened "with great effect," to use the words of the reports. The intention was to batter down the enemy's works until they would be practical for an assault. There was a furious cannonade on our side, responded to with more deliberation and economy of ammunition by the enemy, occasioning a surprisingly small loss of life on both sides. By far the greatest mortality was due to the exhausting and unremitting labor imposed upon the troops. For 20 of the 30 days of the siege it rained heavily, but thru it all the men worked with an industry and zeal to be expected from the magnificent material of which the army was composed. The mournful result of this intense labor, performed in the miasmatic atmosphere of those low-lying lands, was the physical breakdown of a large portion of each command. Men, worn out by their exhausting toil, flung themselves down on the damp ground to rest, and, lying unsheltered, were beaten upon by the deluges of rain, and became a ready prey to the swamp fevers.

Gen. John G. Barnard, who seems to have been the only man frank enough to tell the truth about the situation, says in his report to his commander at the close of the campaign:

"At the time the Army of the Potomac landed on the Peninsula the rebel cause was at its lowest ebb. Its armies were demoralized by the defeats of Port Royal, Mill Spring, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Roanoke Island and Pea Ridge, and reduced by sickness, loss in battle, expiration of period of service, etc., while the conscription law was not yet even passed. It seemed as if it needed but one vigorous grip to end forever this rebellion, so nearly throttled. How, then, happened it that the day of the initiation of the campaign of this magnificent Army of the Potomac was the day of the resuscitation of the rebel cause, which seemed to grow pari passu with the slow progress of its operations?

"However I may be committed to any expression of professional opinion to the contrary (I certainly did suggest it), my opinion now is that the lines of Yorktown should have been assaulted. There is reason to believe that they were not held in strong force when our army appeared before them, and we know that they were far from complete. The prestige of power, the morale, were on our side. It was due to ourselves to confirm and sustain it. We should probably have succeeded. But if we had failed it may well be doubted whether the shock of an unsuccessful assault would be more demoralizing than the labors of a siege.

"Our troops toiled a month in the trenches, or lay in the swamps of Warwick. We lost few men by the siege, but disease took a fearful hold of the army, and toil and hardship, unredeemed by the excitement of combat, impaired their morale. We did not carry with us from Yorktown so good an army as we took there. Of the bitter fruits of that month gained by the enemy we have tasted to our heart's content."

The Evacuation.

Apparently McClellan was looking forward to May 5 as the date upon which he was to do something decisive towards the reduction of Yorktown, and he kept up a constantly increasing fire upon the enemy's works, adding to it some 100 or 200-pounders which he had brought up, and succeeded with infinite labor in placing in battery. The trial shots showed that these guns would land their projectiles in the middle of Yorktown, and this helped start the evacuation which had been determined upon April 30, at a council of war held in Yorktown by Jefferson Davis, Robert E. Lee, Joseph E. Johnston and J. B. Magruder.

Gen. Johnston managed this movement with the brilliant thoroness which characterized his retreat from Manassas. He kept up a strong and vigorous fire upon the besiegers, increasing it very markedly on May 3, so as to deceive his enemy very completely. In the meantime he had been sending out everything portable and establishing magazines on the line of retreat, so that the troops would find supplies at convenient points upon their march. All that he left behind were 71 pieces of heavy artillery mounted in the works. As to the value of these there is the usual discrepancy of statement among the Confederate leaders. Jefferson Davis, who never loses an opportunity to land on Johnston, says that they were guns of superior value which the Confederacy could ill afford to lose, while Gen. Johnston claims that they were mostly guns of obsolete pattern which the Confederates had little use for, and Gen. D. H. Hill, whose rancor against the Yankees was unfailing, agrees with Gen. Johnston's statement that the fruits of the Yorktown victory were unimportant. He says: "The heavy guns abandoned were all of the old navy pattern, taken at Norfolk, and of little more use than so much cast iron."

The discovery on the morning of May 4 that every man in Yorktown had been quietly withdrawn out of reach of the powerful guns placed to wreak destruction was as bitter a revelation to the army as the discovery of the Quaker guns at Manassas had been two months before.

(To be continued.)

Veterans Can Earn from $5 to $10 a Day Selling the New Album of

Rare Civil War Photographs

Comparatively few veterans of the civil war realize that actual photographs were taken on the battlefields. It is true, nevertheless. Mr. Edward B. Eaton, Hartford, Conn., owns 7,000 original negatives of scenes covering the important engagements of the armies of the East, West and South. The only other like set in the world is owned by the United States Government, and there is a standing order in the War Department at Washington which positively forbids their being used by anyone for commercial purposes.

Mr. Eaton has selected about 250 representative scenes, and has arranged to present reproductions of them in album form. They will be chronologically arranged, and each will have its authentic history. They will be printed on fine white enameled paper, and the pages of the album will be 11 inches wide by 15 inches long. The volume opens from the end, and when extended measures over 30 inches from left to right. It will be durably bound in heavy board covers.

The first part vividly depicts the horrors of the war by words and pictures, and ends with a plea for universal peace. The album is now on the presses, and will be ready for delivery about Sept. 1. Up to that time Mr. Eaton is offering it to veterans at the special low price of $2. After Sept. 1 the price will be $3 to everybody. If any readers of this paper want copies it is advisable that they send their orders at once to Edward B. Eaton, Box 1035, Hartford, Conn., and thus save a dollar. A postal card is enough. No money need be sent until notification is received that the album is ready for delivery. The $2 price includes free delivery to your door.

Mr. Eaton will have his album and several enlarged war scenes on exhibition at the National Encampment at Saratoga Springs in September. The scenes and their descriptions are intensely interesting, and the album should be in the home of every survivor of the war.

It promises to be one of the greatest sellers of the age. Mr. Eaton intends to give worthy and energetic veterans a chance to make some money out of it. He wants an old soldier in each Grand Army Post in the country to take orders for it. A liberal cash commission will be paid and full instructions given as to how to solicit orders successfully. From $5 to $10 per day should easily be made by following the instructions. Territory being rapidly taken. For particulars address

EDWARD B. EATON : : : : Box 1035, Hartford, Conn.

END OF VACATIONS.

The Summer Absentees Are Beginning to Troop Back—Government Business Will Soon Resume Its Wonted Activity.

The wheels of Government will soon be moving a little faster. The time of vacationists begins to come in this week, and it will reach a high point by Sept. 1. The linen covers will be lifted from desks next week, and something like the normal activity will be resumed.

A large portion of the Government's workers have been gradually educated to appreciate the pleasures of absence from Washington in September, but the Department chiefs frown upon that. Generally the vacation period must be confined to July and August, the hottest months of the year. In September the nights are cool, altho the days are hot, and those who have stood the heat of the two hot months, by departing in September, can return to an ideal climate.

For very many years the objectionable climate of Washington was used as a strong argument for moving the Capital to some other spot where the sun did not concentrate its heat so strongly. It is hardly 10 years ago that the last of these spasmodic efforts in Congress to change the site of the Federal Capital were earnestly urged. If the Government were to begin all over again now, however, with its present population and widely diversified area, Washington, in the District of Columbia, would have about as much chance of becoming the Capital of the Nation as a flea would have of crawling all the way from the District of Columbia to California.

One can imagine what a terrific fight there would be for the honor of having the Capital. The aggressive delegations from Chicago can be seen in the mind's eye booming the central location and the delightful weather of that Western metropolis. New York would not care enough about it to put in a serious bid for the location, but some of the enterprising cities on the Atlantic Coast, that are not so puffed up with their commercial importance as to care nothing about being the political and Governmental center, would be after the plum with a vengeance.

St. Louis was one of the last cities that made anything like a fight to have the National Capital located there on the banks of the Mississippi. Some Reuben Congressman from Missouri, whose name is now lost to fame, introduced a bill to move the Capital there.

If the Capital were to be located anew it would probably go to the upper Mississippi Valley, near some large body of water. The great and dominant interests of the Mississippi Valley would have the influence and the votes to put it there. Wisconsin or Minnesota would likely cede a Federal strip for the purpose.

But all prospect of ever moving the Capital vanished years ago. Hundreds upon hundreds of millions of money have been invested by the Government in its plant at Washington. Future officials and employes will have to swelter thru the same hot Summer weather as at present. With the exception of oppressive weather, it is probably well that the seat of Government is where it is. The center of population is not a long distance from Washington. The last census showed that it is somewhere in Indiana, and it will probably be many years before it moves as far westward as the Mississippi River. It is only about a 15 hours' journey from Washington to Indiana. But the commercial center of the country is still at New York, and will be probably for ages. The center of art and culture is in Boston. The tide of travel eastward is much larger than it will be westward for 200 years, perhaps for 500 years. The National Capital is very accessible to the many thousands of Europeans who come to America as well as to Canada, most of whose population is in the eastern provinces. Those are important considerations which tend to show that the Capital is pretty well located after all.

Some time there may be a Summer Capital of the United States. It may come in the course of a few generations, altho it will hardly be feasible ever to transport the entire army of clerks and officials from Washington to a cooler place for three or four Summer months. People sometimes say that the Summer Capital is at Oyster Bay, or wherever the President happens to be, but that is true only in a limited sense.

If a custom should arise by which all the high officials who leave Washington for the Summer would go to some one watering place or resort, including the President and members of his Cabinet, it would be to the great convenience of a large number of citizens who have Government business of importance to transact. That custom is followed in a way, by some Governments. There is a vast amount of delay and annoyance nowadays, because of official absenteeism in the Summer. Sometimes purely routine matters are delayed because the men with authority cannot be reached till they return from their vacations.

Everyone who has business with the Government is gratified when September rolls around, because then with every day it becomes easier to get one's work done. The sun-burned clerks begin to troop back to their offices, the accumulated tasks receive attention and things assume a more businesslike air.

GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGN.

(Continued from first page.)

$2,000, elects for four years. Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont and Wisconsin are the States of two-year Gubernatorial terms. Every State on the Pacific Coast and also Nevada elect Governors for four years.

Some of the four-year States have arranged to have their Gubernatorial elections on Presidential years and others at the middle of a Presidential term. The latter arrangement is largely to avoid mixing State and Presidential politics. Others of the four-year States arranged their Gubernatorial elections on Presidential years, so as to be able to get the voters out easier. This has been the case in Illinois, because it is a strong Republican State in Presidential politics, and when the Republican vote all gets out it is difficult to elect a Democratic Governor. In fact, the State has never elected but one Democratic Governor in the course of many years.

The tendency in recent years has been toward fewer elections and toward uniformity in the time of holding elections. All but four or five of the States now hold their elections in November, but Oregon always leads off with an election in June, Maine and Vermont following with elections in September. The day for the inaugural of Governors varies considerably, altho most of the Governors take the oath of office in January. The Governor of Georgia, however, is sworn in in October; of Kentucky and South Carolina, in December; of Louisiana, in May; of Virginia, in February; of West Virginia, in March. Vermont also inaugurated her Governor in October.

Ordinarily Ohio would have had a State campaign this year, but her last Governor was elected for a term of three years, so that Gubernatorial elections hereafter in that State would come at the same time as elections for members of Congress.

While there are comparatively few Governors to be elected this year, North and South, it is noteworthy that in practically every State the election promises to be close. Maryland and Kentucky are normally Democratic States, but in each the Republicans are making the liveliest kind of a fight this year, and it is not improbable that they will capture both States. Maryland has had but one Republican Governor, the late Lloyd Lowndes. Kentucky has had but one Republican Governor, Mr. Bradley, who is still an influential figure in Republican politics, and who is now a candidate for the United States Senate.

Rhode Island is one of the few Northern States that has a Democratic Governor. James H. Higgins, a young man hardly yet in his 30s, will make a big fight there this year for re-election. Massachusetts is a normally Republican State, but it is rapidly growing Democratic, and there is some chance that the Democrats will carry it this year, defeating Gov. Curtis Guild, Jr., for re-election.

In the matter of Governors, however, the Republicans have only a shade the best of it over the Democrats. Nineteen States now have Democratic Governors and 26 have Republican Governors. As a matter of fact, Ohio elected a Democratic Governor the last time, but he died, and the Republican Lieutenant-Governor took his place. In New York the Democrats came within an ace of electing their man, but did win with all the rest of the ticket. California almost elected a Democratic Governor last year. So did Kansas. The Northern States that now have Democratic Governors are Minnesota, whose Governor is John A. Johnson; Montana, Joseph K. Toole; Nevada, John Sparks; North Dakota, John Burke; Oregon, George E. Chamberlain, and Rhode Island, James H. Higgins.

While the Gubernatorial elections this year may not be especially significant, they will show whether the trend is Democratic or Republican. The Democrats would be elated should they carry either New Jersey or Massachusetts, and the Republicans would be equally despondent.

THE STANDARD OIL FINE.

It Is Being Attacked by Lawyers and Friends of Reform.

The general criticism of the big fine imposed upon the Standard Oil Company has been forceful. The President has not openly approved the fine, but indirectly he has allowed it to be known that he is highly pleased at it. Some of the most level-headed men of both parties have deprecated it, notwithstanding the popular view that the Standard received no more punishment than it deserved. There is a feeling that the courts may not sustain the verdict in Judge Landis's court. He is known as a jurist who likes to play to the grand stand, and it is claimed, how truthfully is not known, that he did not give the trust what President Roosevelt calls "a square deal" at the trial in excluding evidence which would have proven that the company did not know it was receiving a favored railroad rate in the instances on which the indictments were framed.

The independent critics of the trial and of the fine are not speaking their minds out of any sympathy for the octopus, but out of fear that such legal actions, whether or not they be upheld, will cause something of a popular revulsion, and thus work an ultimate injury to reform.

It is noticeable that prominent men, known alike for their honesty and independence, are taking the same view in both parties. Ex-Representative John R. Thayer, a Democrat, of Worcester, Mass., who maintained himself several years politically in an overwhelmingly Republican district, recently criticized the fine in a public speech.

Lennox College Students.

E. S. Tuthill, 3332 Moncriff Place, Denver, Colo., says that the President of Lennox College and all the students enlisted in a company, with Capt. McKean in command. Comrade McKean died at Memphis a short time after arriving there, and his body was embalmed and sent home. Comrade Tuthill was Second Sergeant in Co. C, 44th Iowa.

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