



By JOHN McLEROY.

CHAPTER XIX.

GEN. JOHN POPE IN COMMAND. Decision to Remove the Army From the Peninsula. Gen. Pope's Advance. Jackson Hurried Off to Meet Him. Jackson Recognizes a Formidable Opponent and Calls for Reinforcements. The Bloody Little Battle of Cedar Mountain.

The Army in Narrow Confines. The position which Gen. McClellan had selected at Harrison's Bar had, it is true, many advantages, but it had still more striking disadvantages. The first of these was that it cooped up a great

ly immediately connected with his army to engross his attention to the utter exclusion of anything else. Apparently, however, he was less concerned about the things which would have intensely concerned him than about those with which he had no business. He found time to write the following amazing letter to the President, the length of which shows that it must have occupied his mind for many days. Instead of devoting himself to his obvious duty of caring for his army and using it for the purpose for which it had been organized at such vast expense, he was trying to dictate a political policy to the Government, a matter with which he had not the slightest relation.


The Government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized. This principle should be extended upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves of the particular State; thus working manumission in such State; and in Missouri, perhaps in West Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time. A system of policy thus conceived, and carried out by the influences of Christianity and freedom, which would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty. Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. The policy of the Government must be supported by concentrations of military power. The army should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation and numerous armies, but should be mainly collected into masses and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. These armies, thoroughly defeated the political structure which they support should soon cease to exist.

President came away with a very sad heart, for the hopelessness of McClellan doing anything with his army was even more apparent than when he had been tried to get him to move upon Manassas. Wherever McClellan had been he always wanted something more before he could do anything, and that something supplied created another want which paralyzed his initiative. As the weeks passed with the mortality increasing, McClellan's Generals began to murmur. They did not want to see their men wasted in idleness and dying from sheer inaction in those malarious surroundings. Unless the army would do something it was far better that it should be sent away to some healthier location. This talk was so loud and constant that it must have reached McClellan's ears, but he gave no sign of receiving it.

The Appointment of Gen. Pope. What gave deepest offense to Gen. McClellan was the appointment of Gen. Henry W. Halleck to be Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Potomac. The selection of his able lieutenant, John Pope, to command the armies in front of Washington. This could not help being exceedingly distasteful to McClellan and his friends. The armies of the West had achieved some signal victories, while the Army of the Potomac had done nothing. The bringing East of Halleck and Pope, and the open declaration that the Western men were superior to those of the East, and aroused sectional animosity. Inasmuch as Halleck was a native of the West, the Commander-in-Chief, and had gathered immediately about him those whom he presumed to be the flower of the army, it was necessary to have another officer superimposed upon them. It would be expecting too much of human nature, and especially of the high-minded men of the Army of the Potomac, to imagine for a moment that they would not bitterly resent this change. Personal hard feeling and jealousy made John Pope particularly unacceptable to the army. He was immediately around him. Both men were in the Engineer Corps, and hated each other as only good Christians and brothers can hate.

Secretary Stanton's brilliant scheme to bag Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley, failing because of his inability to make Banks, Fremont and McClellan cooperate, had convinced him that the management of the campaign from his office in Washington was beyond his powers, and he had therefore called to his assistance Gen. Halleck, who was then wearing the laurels won for him by Grant at Donelson and Pope at New Madrid and Island No. 10. Jackson's narrow escape from the hands of McClellan and Fremont completed the Secretary's dissatisfaction with those officers, and Gen. John Pope was assigned to the command of the three armies. Fremont, who had good reason for disliking Pope, dating from the Missouri days, refused to serve under him, and a detachment from the West was sent to him from the West, but as he made no show of moving, the force he had Halleck visited him, July 26, at Harrison's Landing, and told him that the journey was made for the express purpose of ascertaining his views and wishes with regard to future operations. McClellan said that he proposed to cross the James River at that point and seize Petersburg. This was an excellent idea, and he was convinced that McClellan would act with any more energy on a strategic point of view, but he was not convinced that McClellan would act with any more energy on a tactical point of view.

Gen. Pope named his force the Army of Virginia, and divided it into three corps. The First Corps was given to Gen. Sigel, with the First Division, consisting of McClellan's and Stahl's Brigades, commanded by Robert C. Schenck. The Second Division was commanded by Adolph von Steinwehr, and had only Bohlen's Brigade. The Third Division was commanded by Carl Schuler, and consisted of Krzyzowski's, Schimmelmann's and Milroy's Brigades. Banks's force was denominated the Second Corps. His First Division was commanded by S. Williams, and made up of Crawford's, Gordon's and Gorman's Brigades. His Second Division was commanded by C. C. Augur, consisted of Prince's, Geary's and Greene's Brigades. The Third Corps was McDowell's force. His First Division was commanded by Ricketts, and made up of Tower's, Hartsuff's, Carroll's and Duryea's Brigades. His Second Division was commanded by Rufus King, and made up of Gibbon's and Hatch's Brigades. His Third Division was commanded by Sturgis, and consisted of Platt's and another brigade. The Roanoke force were presently brought up, and added to Pope's command under the designation of the Ninth Corps, with a division commanded by Reno, Stevens and Parke.



A PART OF THE FORTIFIED CAMP OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC AT HARRISON'S LANDING.

Army on an exceedingly narrow space, scarcely more than two miles wide or long in any direction. This would have been very insupportable even in a healthful climate, and was vastly more so on that low-lying flat in the torrid month of August. The army was like one shut up in the narrow confines of a fortress, where the water and the ground soon became vile and poisonous from the very presence of so many men and animals. It would have been much better to have remained on the field of battle at Malvern Hill, which was on high ground, above the surrounding morasses, and besides had a far greater



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Area. Worst of all, there was nothing for the troops to do, and this affected their health and spirits calamitously. Medical Director Letterman reports that about 6,000 were sent away from Harrison's Landing soon after the army reached there, but 12,000 still remained in camp. The Sanitary Commission was appointed to care for the sick, and other agreeable variations to the army rations, besides tents, medicines and a large corps of trained nurses. This mitigated, as far as human skill and sympathy could mitigate, the evils of the unfortunate situation of the army. McClellan would not, however, give the medication that the men most need-

quire a Commander-in-Chief of the Army—one who possesses your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders by directing the military forces of the Nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and I will do so faithfully and never subordinate to any superior.

"I may be on the brink of eternity, and as I hope forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity toward you and from love for my country.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant, B. McClellan, Major-General. His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, President."

The result of this letter and of the President's visit to Harrison's Bar was a decision that McClellan was to be removed, and a successor must be found. Secretaries Stanton, Seward and Chase urged Mr. Lincoln to put Pope in command of the Army of the Potomac, and Gen. M. Mitchell in command of the Army of the Shenandoah. McClellan's retreat to the James were intensely anxious ones for the President and Secretary of War. Mr. Lincoln spent most of the night of the 26th in Secretary Stanton's office, part of the time reclining on a sofa in a lounge, but without going to bed. In all this he spoke no unkind word of any one, seeking only to ascertain the situation and safe others. There was unutterable sadness on his face when he received the announcement of McClellan's retreat to the James. Gen. Pope absolutely refused to take command of the army if McClellan were left free to use his own discretion as to whether he would go, and he therefore urged that a common superior be appointed to both himself and McClellan, who would make his operations contingent upon the consent of the others in urging him to accept the appointment, and July 11 that General was made Commander-in-Chief.

Comments. The future historian will find few things more damaging to McClellan's reputation than this letter. If he had come to the National Capital with the laurels of victory he might have had some justification for assuming such a moral superiority, such an air of high birth, and such a position of official honor. This attitude, however, came with the worst possible grace from a man whose campaign, begun with so much expectation, had ended in a series of failures and defeats. The closing lines, where he spoke of "being on the brink of eternity," brought forth a rebuke from the Secretary of War, no doubt McClellan was a brave man, he had not, since his entrance into the service, shown any such rashness upon the subject of his own life, and the least anxiety for his untimely cutting off.

President Lincoln's Visit. Gen. McClellan continued to implore the Government almost hourly for reinforcements, but the experience had been that the more men he had the less likely he was to be successful, and the Administration did not know where to look for reinforcements. The first great uprising of the people, which filled the country with enthusiasm, had spent itself. The long inaction of the Army of the Potomac and the absolute lack of something decisive had depressed the spirits of the people and stopped enlistments. No one wanted to go into the army and lie around camp for months. July 7 President Lincoln, accompanied by Secretary Stanton, arrived at Harrison's Landing to survey himself by personal inspection as to the strength and condition of the army. Lincoln was accompanied by the members of his day, and no one surprised him in the examination of a witness. His first question to McClellan was as to the number of men in his army, to which McClellan replied that he numbered 84,472; absent, 18,514; McClellan thereupon made a written statement, in which he said that he had present for duty 85,665; absent by reason of illness, 18,514; making a total of 144,534. Of those absent by authority one-half were probably not for duty, but having been sent on sick leave and otherwise, had not returned. Even these figures fell below the Adjutant-General's report for July 7, which showed the army counting Gen. Wool's or Gen. Burdette's forces, that there were present for duty, 101,691; on special duty, sick or in arrest, 17,878; absent, 25,795; total, 145,364.

McClellan as usual asked for reinforcements "rather much over than less than 100,000 men." The worst of the President's remark was that McClellan implied that the number of those already on the march there were less than 75,000 men altogether east of the Alleghenies. The

same system, and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to do so, and that speedily. I am sure you long for an opportunity to witness the distinction you are capable of achieving. That opportunity I shall endeavor to give you. I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases, which I am sorry to find much in vogue among you. I desire constantly of taking strong positions and holding them on lines of retreat and of bases of supplies. Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should take is to occupy a line from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look before and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance. Disaster is in the retreat. There has been very much of this in our recent operations. Let us act on this understanding, and let it be safe to predict that your ban-

ners shall be inscribed with many names upon the banner of your names will be dear to your countrymen forever. John Pope, Major-General Commanding. Pope's Plan. When Gen. Pope was consulting with the President and Secretary of War with regard to his plans he insisted that if McClellan was in the situation that he represented himself to be his better plan would be to move to the right, sacrificing his material on the Peninsula, and join him, Pope, at Fredericksburg. This plan was founded on sound military principles. Instead of doing this, however, and while his consultation was going on, McClellan moved off toward the James, thus rendering any co-operation between his army and that of Pope difficult if not entirely impossible, especially as it could never be told when nor how McClellan would obey an order even if he chose to obey it at all.

The Army of Virginia. Gen. Pope named his force the Army of Virginia, and divided it into three corps. The First Corps was given to Gen. Sigel, with the First Division, consisting of McClellan's and Stahl's Brigades, commanded by Robert C. Schenck. The Second Division was commanded by Adolph von Steinwehr, and had only Bohlen's Brigade. The Third Division was commanded by Carl Schuler, and consisted of Krzyzowski's, Schimmelmann's and Milroy's Brigades. Banks's force was denominated the Second Corps. His First Division was commanded by S. Williams, and made up of Crawford's, Gordon's and Gorman's Brigades. His Second Division was commanded by C. C. Augur, consisted of Prince's, Geary's and Greene's Brigades. The Third Corps was McDowell's force. His First Division was commanded by Ricketts, and made up of Tower's, Hartsuff's, Carroll's and Duryea's Brigades. His Second Division was commanded by Rufus King, and made up of Gibbon's and Hatch's Brigades. His Third Division was commanded by Sturgis, and consisted of Platt's and another brigade. The Roanoke force were presently brought up, and added to Pope's command under the designation of the Ninth Corps, with a division commanded by Reno, Stevens and Parke.

The official reports for July 31 give a total strength of the First Corps at 13,928; the Second Corps, 18,571; Third Corps, 21,478. Gen. Pope said that these figures were much exaggerated, particularly as to Banks's Corps, which had no more than 8,000 effectives. McClellan's strength at Harrison's Landing was badly scattered in attempting to hold too many places in the Valley. Pope had concentrated Sigel's Corps at Sperryville, Banks at Little Washington and Ricketts's Division at Waterloo Bridge when he assumed command in the morning of July 23. McClellan's inactivity. All this time McClellan was calling for reinforcements, altho he was making no use of the 90,000 men already given him to extend his lines beyond the narrow limits of the fortified camp at Harrison's Landing. He continued his appeal for more troops, and asked that 20,000 men be sent him from the West, but as he made no show of moving, the force he had Halleck visited him, July 26, at Harrison's Landing, and told him that the journey was made for the express purpose of ascertaining his views and wishes with regard to future operations. McClellan said that he proposed to cross the James River at that point and seize Petersburg. This was an excellent idea, and he was convinced that McClellan would act with any more energy on a strategic point of view, but he was not convinced that McClellan would act with any more energy on a tactical point of view.

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The dangers of Pope's position were greatly augmented by the difficulties of supply. His only line was the rickety Orange & Alexandria Railroad, never a first-class line, and now suffering from repeated destruction of track and derangement of equipments. It was at this time that Brig-Gen. Haupt rendered signal service to his country by his extraordinary activity and ability in reorganizing the supply system and improving facilities to meet emergencies, infusing his own wonderful energy into his subordinates. Pope's unfortunate temper brought him into collision with Gen. Haupt, and the latter was suspended from his position. After eight or 10 days, however, Pope found he could not get along without Haupt and reinstated him.

Preliminaries to Cedar Mountain. As soon as Pope learned that Jackson had crossed the Rapidan he ordered his commanders to concentrate in front of Culpeper, with Sigel on the right at Sperryville, Banks at the center at the Hazel River Bridge, and Ricketts's Division and some other troops at Culpeper. The morning of July 9 Pope advanced to meet Jackson, with Sigel, as usual, mistaking the road, only coming up hours after the appointed time. Sigel's division, followed by Ricketts at a distance of three miles, Jackson, on the left, thrust out toward Banks. Cedar Mountain is about eight miles beyond Culpeper, and Banks reached there about noon with less than 8,000 men in the divisions of Augur and Williams. Jackson's plan was to strike Banks before the rest of Pope's army could reach him, and Ewell's advance was followed by Winder's Division, and these in turn by A. P. Hill's, so that together there was with striking distance of Banks's 8,000 men at least 20,000 Confederates. About 3 o'clock Early and Talford opened the battle, moving with great caution. Gen. Pope, who was handling his men skillfully and warily, had no intention of fighting a battle at Cedar Mountain. He merely intended that Banks should present a firm countenance toward Jackson and check his advance until the tardy Sigel could be brought up, and a line formed for the protection of Pope's communications from Culpeper to Washington. Banks and his men were doubtless overzealous for a fight. They were burning with shame over the retreat down the Valley, and longed for an opportunity to retrieve themselves in the eyes of the country. Banks formed his line in the Valley of Cedar Run, where he overlapped the Confederate left. Geary and Prince advanced with their brigades, met Early and Talford on a broad, slightly-rolling wheat field south of the Culpeper road, and drove them back, while Crawford turned the enemy's left, and the first advantage was gained by Banks, who had shown a prompt retreat to close quarters with the enemy. Jackson hurried up Garnett to strike Crawford's flank, and he sent besides him the men who were retiring under pressure upon Geary and Prince. Banks also brought up Gordon's Brigade, which charged in to the support of Crawford, while Greene's Brigade moved in to help Prince and Geary. Jackson succeeded in getting up the most guns first, and drove Banks's artillery back after a stubborn resistance. Under the cover of the success Early pushed his division forward, and all of Hill's Division came into line, crushing Banks's front by sheer weight of numbers before the rest of Pope's army could reach him, and Ewell's advance was followed by Winder's Division, and these in turn by A. P. 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