Civilian & Telegraph.

CUMBERLAND, MD.

Thursday, Sept. 8, 1864.

NATIONAL UNION NOMINATIONS

FOR PRESIDENT,

ABRAHAM LINCOLN,

OF ILLINOIS.

FOR VICE PRESIDENT,

ANDREW JOHNSON,

OF TENNESSEE.

FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.

For the State at Large,

WILLIAM J. ALBERT,
H. H. GOLDSBOROUGH.

For Districts,

1st. W. H. W. FARROW,
2nd. WM. S. REESE,
3rd. R. STOCKETT MATHEWS,
4th. ISAAC NESBITT,
5th. GEO. W. SANDS.

On our first page to-day will be found a very able letter from Hon. Wm. Price, under the head of "A Patriot's Counsel," and which we invite all to read.

THE PRESIDENCY.

Our prophecy in regard to the Chicago nominee has been fulfilled in the nomination of General George B. McClellan, as the candidate of the Copperhead party for the Presidency. We felt no doubt in regard to that matter, because McClellan had a show of popular favor with him which no other man they could get to stand with them had. There can be no doubt, and there was none in the minds of the leaders of that convention, that there were many men who had been under the command of McClellan who felt a strong friendship and attachment to him. It is a matter of great moment to them to be able to proclaim and parade a number of the names of the heroes of the Peninsula and Antietam, as the supporters of McClellan and opposed to Lincoln. This is a long practiced dodge of the old political parties, and used to have weight; these demagogues, in their emergency, hope and believe that it will be a good card to play in their hands now. We however indulge the hope that the great mass of the people who so manfully, twelve months since, pitched overboard their old political leaders and took into their own hands the management of their political affairs, will teach these trickstering politicians that they still intend to do their own thinking and their own voting, and are not again to be gulled by these old stale tricks. That General McClellan made himself many friends in the Army of the Potomac, and will get many of their votes, we have no doubt, but most of these would have voted for him because he has the *name* of being the Democratic nominee. That he *has not* made friends of many thinking men who acted heretofore with the Democratic party and who had opportunities of knowing him during his military career, we also know. So that so far as capital is to be made out of the army vote it may turn out a profitless speculation.

The acceptance of this nomination places McClellan before the world in no enviable position. Had he been content to enjoy the *pay and emoluments* of a Major-General in the quiet and security of private life, awaiting patiently the opportunity to be afforded, on the restoration of peace, to vindicate his honor, if it has been tarnished by others now holding official position, or to clear up his shortcomings, he would have been entitled to the sympathy of those who supposed him to have been harshly dealt with, and to the respectful forbearance of all who are willing to accord justice to every man. But by the acceptance of *this* nomination he has thrown *name and fame* into the political arena, subjecting himself to the shafts of all who may oppose, and has endeavored to evade the calm judgment of peaceful times, or the awards of an impartial and finished history. His honor and future fame must now stand by the hasty and passionate judgment of the ballot box, which will not, nevertheless, clear him from the judgment of impartial history. He stands before his countrymen as the Copperhead or Peace party candidate for the highest office in the gift of the people, and the great and only merit that can be pleaded in his favor for this high office is that for a time he was the *Major-General* of the United States army, that after the multitudinous grand reviews, and *balloon reconnoisances*, having let his enemy slip away from Manassas he at last marched a grand army across the Peninsula, to Harrison's landing on the James River and sailed back to Washington shorn of half of his splendid army, its equipments, its munitions, and stores, and shorn of half his glory. The only laurel that he brought back from that campaign was, that he did not lose his whole army, and might have seen the spires of Richmond if he had ventured as near it as many of his gallant soldiers did. Nay, more, he lost not more than half the confidence of an honest, single-minded and confiding President, who, after a short time again placed him in command of the Army of the Potomac, and again at the battle of Antietam he made *nothing*, but let the enemy recross the Potomac with all his plunder, deliberately march back to, and formidably fortify, Fredericksburg.

These are the splendid military achivements of Gen'l McClellan in the field, which entitle him to the Presidency. He has the credit of organizing the army of the Potomac and making an army of it, though he could not do more. He has also the credit of inaugurating military arrests and sending the Rebel Legislature of Maryland to Fort Warren. For this we owe him thanks and gratitude. He has also the credit of having urged on President Lincoln the use of all the war powers implied in the Constitution, negro soldiers, emancipation proclamations, &c., as effective means of crushing the rebellion, for these, too, we thank him. He has also the credit of military interference in the political elections of Maryland which elected our present Governor, for which, too, we thank him (we are disposed to be thankful even for small favors). All these things did he do in the short space of two years, and now he stands before the world as the candidate of the Peace party, the secession, recognition, State sovereignty, Constitution as it was, Southern rights candidate, under whose administration peace must surely take place, the rebels coaxed back if you can, taxes reduced, public debt be repudiated, and everything let go as smooth as a jack plane, if it will with only one proclamation that is, that the war is at an end, the South are cordially invited to come back to all their old places, to have all their "niggers" or be paid for those who have been killed and can't be found, the Federal debt to be repudiated, and the Confederate debt to be paid, and every Southern man is to have all his constitutional rights, except one; he shall not be hung for having been a traitor. Such is the platform on which Gen'l McClellan is now placed, compare it with what he wrote and urged two years ago and then talk to us about "consistency thou art a jewel."

General McClellan also wrote a book, and published it, forgetful of the exclamation of one of olden time, who exclaimed, "Oh! that mine enemy would write a book." We shall take occasion to refer to that book. In the meantime, we have a few words to say to Father Abraham. Write no books save what you write with the sword. You have put your foot down for 500,000 more men; keep it there, and if need be set your teeth firmly, take a long breath, and when you let go of it let the sound thereof be, "By the Eternal" I'll have them too.

The Military Field.—In our paper to-day we publish an article with this title, copied from the New York *Times* It is written by one of its correspondents who has been over the whole military field for the last two years, and has had the very best opportunities to understand the subject. He is one of the very best writers on the war, his statements are always reliable, and the information he gives always proves true, and his judgment in regard to coming events rarely proves incorrect. He can be relied on. Let all our readers and all who feel interested in the future give this article a careful and calm reading, they will rise from its perusal gratified, and with better heart and will be able to form better conclusions as to their duty to their country, themselves and their neighbors. Do not fail to read it.

GLORIOUS NEWS.

ATLANTA IN OUR POSSESSION.

DEFEAT OF HOOD'S ARMY.

Official Bulletin.

War Department, Washington, September 2, 1864.

Maj. Gen. Dix, New York:

This Department has received intelligence this evening that Gen. Sherman's advance entered Atlanta about noon to-day.

The particulars have not yet been received, but telegraphic communication during the night with Atlanta direct is expected.

SECOND OFFICIAL BULLETIN.

THE GLORIOUS NEWS CONFIRMED

GEN. HARDEE REPORTED KILLED.

War Department, Washington, September 2, 10.45 P. M.

Major Gen. Dix, New York:

The following telegram from Major Gen. Slocum, dated this day in Atlanta, and just received, confirms the capture of that city.

"Gen. Sherman has taken Atlanta.—The Twentieth Corps occupies the city The main army is on the Macon road, near East Point.

"A battle was fought near that point in which General Sherman was successful. Particulars not known."

(Signed) H. W. Slocum, Major General.

An unofficial report states that in the battle fought near East Point, by General Sherman, with Hood, the Rebel army was cut in two with very heavy loss to the enemy, and that General Hardee was killed. Our loss not known.

(Signed) Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

SURRENDER OF FORT MORGAN.

REPORT OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT

DISHONORABLE CONDUCT OF THE REBEL OFFICERS

DESTRUCTION OF FORT PROPERTY.

Washington, Sept. 2.—The Navy Department to-day received the following from Admiral Farragut:

Flagship Hartford, West Gulf Blockading Squadron, Mobile Bay, Aug. 25, 1864.

Hon. Gideon Welles, Sec. of Navy:

Sir:—I had the honor in my despatch No. 81, to state to the Department, that Fort Morgan had surrendered on the 23d inst., to the army and navy, though at the time that despatch was written and mailed, the ceremony of surrender had not actually taken place.

The correspondence preliminary to that event is herewith forwarded, marked No's 1, 2, 3, and 4, and the Department will perceive that the terms of capitulation were the same as in the case of Fort Gaines. General Paige endeavored to obtain more favorable terms but without success.

I regret to state that after the assembling of the Rebel officers at the appointed hour, 2 o'clock, P. M., for the surrender outside the fort, it was discovered, on an examination of the interior, that most of the guns were spiked and many of the gun-carriages materially injured, and arms and ammunition and provisions, &c., destroyed; and there was every reason to believe that this had been done after the white flag had been raised. It was also discovered that General Paige and several of his officers had no swords to deliver up; and, further, that some of, those which were surrendered had been broken. The whole conduct of the officers of Fort Gaines and Fort Morgan presents such a striking contrast in moral principal that I cannot fail to remark upon it. Colonel Anderson, who commanded the former, finding himself in a position perfectly untenable, and incumbered with a superflous number of conscripts, many of whom were mere boys, determined to surrender a fort which he could not defend, and in this determination was supported by all his officers save one. But, from the moment he hoisted the white flag, he scrupulously kept everything intact, and in that condition delivered it over, whilst General Paige and his officers, with a childish shiftlessness, destroyed the guns which they had said they would defend to the last, but which they never defended at all! and threw away or broke the weapons which they had not the manliness to use against their enemies, for Fort Morgan never fired a gun after the commencement of the bombardment, and the advanced pickets of our army were actually on its glacis!

As before stated, the ceremony of surrender took place at 2 o'clock P. M., and that same afternoon all the garrison were sent to New Orleans in the United States steamers Tennessee and Bienville, where they arrived safely.

Respectfully your ob't servant,
D. G. Farragut,
Rear Admiral Commanding
West Gulf Blockading Squadron.

LATER.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF SHERMAN.

GREAT STRATAGETIC MOVEMENT.

REBEL ARMY CUT IN TWO.

Washington, Sept. 4. A, M.

To Major Gen. Dix:

The following telegram from General Grant has just been received;

City Point, Sept. 3.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

"I have Richmond papers to-day. They contain rumors of a battle at Atlanta, but say that the War Department having no official information, it declines to form an opinion from the rumors. I have no doubt, however, but that General Sherman has gained a great success there.

"Before the dispatch of last night was received, announcing the occupation of Atlanta by our troops, the fact was known to our pickets. The Rebels hollered over to our men that Sherman had whipped Hood, that the latter had lost 40,000 men, and that our troops were in Atlanta.

"All quiet here.

"U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General."

"Our Southwestern line continues down, and this, with the heavy storm that commenced in the afternoon, and is still prevailing beyond Louisville, may damage the lines so as to hinder the arrival of details from Atlanta for a day or two.

"E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War."

THIRD OFFICIAL BULLETIN.

War Department, Washington, Sept. 4, 1864, 8 P. M.

Major Gen. Dix, New York:

General Sherman's official report of the capture of Atlanta has just been received by this Department. It is dated 26 miles south of Atlanta at 6 o'clock yesterday morning, but was detained by the breaking of the telegraph wires mentioned in my dispatch of last night.

As already reported, the army drew from about Atlanta, and on the 30th had made a break of the West Point road, and reached a good position, from which it struck the main road. The right, under the command of Howard, being near Jonesboro', the left under Schofield, near Rough and Ready, and the center, under Thomas at Brouch's. Howard found the enemy in force at Jonesboro', and entrenched his troops at a salient point within half a mile of the railroad. The enemy attacked him at 3 P. M., and was easily repulsed, leaving his dead and wounded.

Finding strong oppositions on the road, I advanced the left and center rapidly to the railroad, and made a good lodgment, and broke it all the way from Rough and Ready down to Howard's left, near Jonesboro' and by the same movement I interposed my whole army between Atlanta and the part of the enemy's force entrenched in and around Jonesboro'. We make a general attack on the enemy at Jonesboro' on the 1st of September, the Forteenth Corps, General Jeff. C. Davis, carrying the works hansomely with ten guns and about a thousand prisoners. In the night the enemy retreated South and we have followed him to another of his hastily constructed lines, near Lovejoy's Station. Hood at Atlanta finding me on this road, the only one that could supply him, and between him and a considerable part of his army blew up his magazines in Atlanta and left in the night time, when the Twentieth Corps. under Gen. Slocum, took possession of the place; so Atlanta is ours, and fairly won! Since the 5th of May we have been in one constant battle or skirmish, and need rest. Our losses will not exceed twelve hundred, and we have possession of three hundred Rebel dead, two hundred and fifty wounded and fifteen hundred well.

(Signed) W. T. Sherman, Major General.

A later dispatch from General Slocum dated at Atlanta last night, 3rd, 9 P. M., states that the enemy, in evacuating Atlanta, destroyed seven locomotives and eighty-one cars, loaded with ammunition, and small arms and stores, and left fourteen pieces of artillery, most of them uninjured, and a large number of small arms. Deserters are constantly coming into our lines.

E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

THE MILITARY FIELD.

A CHEERFUL, HOPEFUL, AND TRUTHFUL SURVEY OF IT.

POPULAR ERRORS CORRECTED.

The Immense Work Accomplished by the Union Armies.

THE ONE THING NEEDFUL.

[From the N. Y. Times' Special Correspondent]

I.

POPULAR ERRORS REGARDING THE LENGTH OF THE WAR.

The course of public opinion regarding the war has been marked by two errors so wide-spread and tenacious, that the philosophic historian whose task it will be to trace the connection between the inward thoughts of men and the outward events of this great revolution, will probably be compelled to class them under the category of popular delusions. The one of these prevailed during the early stages of the rebellion; the other obtains at the present time. The first was an ill-founded anticipation of the shortness of the war; the second is an equally ill-grounded fear of its indefinite prolongation. If the first was a great bar to the efficient execution of the duty of putting down the rebellion—and there is no doubt that our illusions as to the speediness with which the work would be accomplished was a serious hindrance to the very preparations needed to *make* it short, the other is an error equally fatal; *for the paralysis of the effort produced by the sentiment of the probable longness of the war is sure to make it much longer than it would otherwise be.* There is no higher duty, therefore, than for patriotic men to fortify themselves and others by the consideration of all the elements of hope which a survey of the situation really inspires. Such a survey justifies the conclusion that the end of the war—the crushing of the main armed force of the rebellion—*is not only not far off, but that it is near at hand, and that it is in our power to bring it about almost at a blow.*

There is a singular fact which may well be taken into account in the attempt to estimate the actual prospect of the war, and that is that the present despondency arising from its seemingly interminable outlook is no more than a repetition of a phenomenon which has often before manifested itself in the experience of other nations. It has often happened that men, on the very eve of the conclusion of a war have looked upon it as promising the longest duration; and it will be in the memory of many that just previous to the termination of the Crimean war even as sagacious an observer of the signs of the times as Mr. Cobden had in a pamphlet made it out as certain to be prolonged for many years. It thus often happens that war, which in its practical execution deals so largely in deception, is itself the greatest of deceptions. When after years perhaps of strife, great armies still confront each other, it is hard to penetrate its outlet or its issue; but some sudden turn of affairs produces the climax, and in the flames of a Waterloo, a Cannæ or a Pultowa, fabrics and systems seemingly firm-rooted go out in ashes and nothingness.

II.

REAL HOLLOWNESS OF THE REBELLION.

The present front of the rebellion, menacing though it be, is really nothing more than a mask, concealing the hollowness and rottenness within. The South is literally exhausted—exhausted of that without which it is impossible to carry on war—exhausted of men. The field, in the impressive expression of Napoleon regarding France after the three conscriptions, is reaped down to the stubble. Out of an available fighting population of upwards of three-quarters of a million with which the war was inaugurated, they have saved an effective force of one hundred and fifty, perhaps two hundred thousand men. The rest are in their graves, in the hospitals, disabled, or prisoners in our hands. These are the forlorn hope of the rebellion. By a matchless sagacity in the conduct of affairs, executing its purpose with despotic power, this force is still kept on foot, and even made to present a formidable aspect. And without doubt the rebel chiefs will still for some time be able to oppose a vigorous resistance to our efforts to quell armed opposition, and to the real desires of the majority of the Southern people for peace. They will certainly do so while they have at the main points of contact a force so nearly proportioned to our own. But it is not hard to show how, by an exertion of the power we have in our hands, the armies that stand between the Confederacy and their utter ruin can be destroyed

THE SITUATION BEFORE ATLANTA.

The main forces of the rebellion are collected in two armies—the one defending Richmond, the political capital of the Confederacy; the other defending Atlanta, the natural capital of the Confederacy

In front of Atlanta is planted the superb army commanded by Gen. Sherman, a man of unsurpassed military ability. He has placed his army in that position after an advance from Chattanooga of nearly a hundred miles, marked by a series of brilliant manœuvers and actions, in which the enemy's force has been driven from a succession of strongholds, looked upon as impregnable. Arriving in front of Atlanta he has been thrice assailed by an enemy willing to lavish everything in the desperate effort to drive him back. The enemy has thrice met a bloody repulse. Sherman is now working slowly but surely round on the rebel communications, two lines of which he holds He is completing this by extending his force around on their only remaining line—a task which necessarily demands some time for its accomplishment. *But there is no dead-lock at Atlanta,* and those who represent the situation in this light utterly fail to grasp the true military significance of what Sherman is doing. General Sherman can take Atlanta any day; but he aims at more than that—*he means the destruction of the Western army of the Confederacy.* And, indeed, either that result or its early flight is a matter of speedy certainty.

At the same time that he is thus pressing with fatal weight on the enemy, Sherman's own communications are safe, which is much to be able to say of a line two-thirds as long as that of Napoleon's from the Nieman to Moscow. The rebels who have been counting on dislodging him from before Atlanta, by operations on his lines, have been taught by the failure of their last attempt, made with their whole available cavalry, the emptiness of these expectations; while those among ourselves who, looking at the enormous depth of his line, have been solicitous for his safety, may dismiss their fears The substantial grounds of this security are not proper to make public; but it is not unseemly to say this much—that Sherman, (who has a genius for supplying his army unequaled by any Commander in the field,) *is practically independent of his line of communication for any time during which the enemy can possibly interrupt it.* This, therefore, leaves him free to work out the great task before him; and private advices from himself to the Government give the assured hope of its early accomplishment.

Of the effect of the capture of Atlanta it is is not too much to say that secondary in its political importance to that of Richmond, yet in a material and military point of view—in its pressure on the issue of the war—its effect must be ten-fold that of the capture of the rebel capital. It once more cuts the Confederacy in twain, and compels the rebel army, if it be allowed to retreat at all, to make toward Montgomery, in which case it is thrown off eccentrically and away from its connections with the rebel force in Virginia, or else to move into the Carolinas, in which case the area of the Confederacy is cabined, cribbed and confined within the restricted limits of the parallelogram of the Atlantic seaboard States.

IV.

THE SITUATION IN VIRGINIA.

In Virginia the military situation presents even on the surface an aspect much more encouraging than it has yet worn since the army crossed the James. If Gen. Grant is not seen assuming the offensive on a scale commensurate with the public expectations, he is quietly working out the solution of the great problem intrusted to his hands—working out by a policy necessarily somewhat cautious, what he will gladly carry through by bolder and more brilliant measures when he obtains the means which the people will shortly give him.

The firm foothold the left wing has obtained on the Weldon Road severs that important line, and what is even of more moment, gives a position from which to menace the main rebel line of communications with the South, namely, the Danville Road. So vital is this to the existence of Lee's army, that it is accepted by all military men as a fixed fact, that *could we plant a force on that road, or even seriously threaten it, it would compel the abandonmennt of Richmond and Virginia, and oblige Lee to fall back to the line of the Roanoke, in which case, given the successful execution of Gen. Sherman's programme, and the entire remaining rebel force would be shut up in the Carolinas.*

Without pushing speculation so far as this, however, or going beyond the actual elements of the situation, there is nothing in them to discourage, and much to encourage One great cause of fear in all previous combinations on the military chess-board of Virginia, has been the facility which the rebels have had to throw us back on our base whenever the Army of the Potomac has been pushed forward so as to threaten Richmond. *In the present state of facts such a counter movement is for the first time not to be feared.* It could only be undertaken by the rebels in a fit of desperation, and would be certain to work out their destruction.

For the first time in the history of the war the Shenandoah Valley—the gate through which the rebels in each of their three invasions have entered loyal States—is thoroughly garded. We have there a fine army, under thoroughly able leadership, in a position which perfectly covers Maryland, Pennsylvania and Washington. It is true, and it is no secret, that this army is largely composed of troops that have been withdrawn from the army south of the James; but so far from this having the effect to put so much available force out of the way, and so far from its being any source of humiliation or regret, the corps under Gen. Sheridan are really doing more for the general cause, and even for the special problem before Petersburg, than they could if back in the Army of the Potomac. For while the Army of the Shenandoah acts as a defence of Washington, thus relieving Grant from all solicitude on that score, it plays something more than a merely defensive part. The time is not now fitting to reveal the motives of the late forward and backward movements in the Valley, far less to indicate the programme assigned Gen. Sheridan in that field of operations; but the time is not far distant when the wisdom of the present distribution of force will be recognized. In the meanwhile, it is no small matter that the column in the Valley, while covering Washington, *neutralizes and keeps away from Petersburg, a force of full forty thousand men*—a force which had it been in front of Gen. Grant, would probably have rendered it impossible for him to have seized the important point he now holds on the Weldon road.

V.

A REBEL INVASION—IS IT PROBABLE AND WOULD IT PAY?

But should the rebel force in the Valley once more attempt an invasive movement?

Nothing would suit General Sheridan better than that it should do so. *I think he would even be quite willing to build a bridge across the Potomac for it.* Indeed, if I do not mistake the purport of some late manœuvres, he is even now trying to tempt Early to this very enterprise, and if he should be unable to do so, and Early should retreat, as it is certain he must do if he does not go forward, seeing that the valley is eaten out, and it is out of the question for him to keep up so long a line as he would have over which to bring up supplies, Sheridan will even in this eventuality follow him up, press on his rear, and by threatening Lynchburg, compel Lee to keep the force detached from Petersburg. It may be said that the danger might be more serious should the rebels, by secretly reinforcing their column in the Valley from the army defending Richmond, gain a preponderance of force which would enable them to defeat Sheridan before he could be reinforced by General Grant. Such a contingency is very remote; for, to begin with, the rebels have but barely men enough to hold their own in front of Gen. Grant. Lee has now under his own immediate command but two corps, the strenght of which, by official estimate, is put at between twenty-five and thirty thousand men. A movement of the kind indicated could, therefore, only be made effective by a total withdrawal of Lee, determined to hazard everything on a last desperate initiation. In doing this, however, he would necessarily abandon Richmond, and in his advance northward would march attended by the powerful force of Grant on his rear, and holding his only line of communication. This would certainly be a very different kind of enterprise from either of those he has before adventured, in his two invasions in both of which cases he had but to make a flanking movement to relieve Richmond of all menace, and allow him to pursue his course with the rear safe and his communications open. It is thus seen how, by the admirable combinations in Virginia, Lee is bound over either to a purely defensive policy or to enterprises of a rashness that must insure his ruin.

WHAT GRANT ASKS TO END THE WAR.

These considerations all unite in the illustration of the fact that the military *status* is very far from being of that discouraging aspect which it wears, not only in the jaundiced eyes of those whose desires prompt them to invest it in sombre hues, but which it assumes even to the apprehension of many who would fain hope better things. I am persuaded that if our armies did no more than hold their own in their present positions, with the grip they have on the rebel armies, the rebellion must wear itself away and die out from sheer lack of breath. But the duty is laid upon us, not less in consideration for the South itself than for the honor and integrity of the nation, and the material interests of the world at large to use swifter means for its suppression. We all want peace, North and South; but the shortest cut to peace is through vigorous blows at that alone which prevents peace—the armed forces still under control of the chiefs of the rebellion. Even in point of time no ambassadors could arrange terms of peace so quickly as the mission of a fresh hundred thousand muskets. It is no mere poor judgment of mine, but the authoritative utterance of the head of all our armies, that it is in the hands of the people to end the rebellion at a blow. *Lieut.-Gen. Grant has declared, that "if he had now but a hundred thousand fresh men he could, in fifty days, do up all the fighting that needs to be done during the war."* This is no shallow hearsay; it is the authentic declaration of the high name given; and the sentiment is affirmed by every military man I have lately met. Half that force added to Gen. Grant's own immediate army, would enable him to stretch his line across to the Danville road and positively *compel* the abandonment of Virginia; the other half would put Hood's army into the hands of General Sherman. Is there living patriotism enough left in the country to evoke the means for so glorious a consummation? If there were not, it might well raise the question whether such a people *deserved* to be saved?

The time is fast drawing nigh when this patriotism will be put to the test.—The draft is designed to give Gen. Grant the hundred thousand and three times the hundred thousand men he needs to conclude the war withal. That measure rings the death-knell of the rebellion.—The leaders of the rebellion in the South know it, and hence their efforts to thwart it. The draft will be made in spite of both. But it can be made tranquilly and efficaciously, or with lame and impotent results, as the people shall elect. It is a momentous issue which hangs on that election!

VI.

CONFIDENCE AND GROUNDS OF COURAGE.

There is to a people battling in any cause a force, purely metaphysical in its character, which is yet stronger than the sinews of war—stronger than the sinews of men's arms. It is *courage.* Never has it been more needed than of late, when a fatal paralysis has benumbed the public sense, and in the eclipse of faith, "the whole noise of timorous and flocking birds, with those that love the twilight, flutter about, and in their envious gabble would prognosticate a year of sects and schisms."

I believe we have already touched the nadir of our fears and our despondency, and that a breath of patriotism and hope is now vivifying the nation's pulse. But each man can swell the rising tide. To diffuse the inspiration of courage is the duty of every patriot. And happily we need draw this inspiration from no illusive fountains; for the more earnestly and honestly we look at the situation, the more grounds of hope we find. Some of these grounds can be briefly set down:

1 The body of the rebellion is moribund. Gen. T. Seymour, whose critical habit of thought and conservative temper, well known to me, add a prodigious weight to any declarations he makes on this head, states as the result of his three months' observations in the interior of the South, that "the rebel cause is fast failing from exhaustion" This is profoundly true, whether it has regard to the material resources of the South, from three-fourths of which it is now cut off by the lines held by our armies, or to its still more vital resources in men, of which the field is now reaped and bare. Every man and every boy is now in the field; there is nothing behind The whole South is therefore in the armies confronting Sherman and Grant. Of the army opposing Gen. Sherman, forty thousand men have been subtracted by the losses of the great summer campaign. Of the other army, commanded by Lee, one-half its force has been put out of the fight since Gen. Grant crossed the Rapidan.

2. It is true, inflicting this damage, we also have lost quite as severely—perhaps even more so; but (if it is lawful to speak thus of so grave a matter) we can afford it. We can stand to lose man for man, till every man in the armies of the rebellion is put *hors du combat*, and leave behind untouched a force equal to all we have lost in the war.

3. But I do not believe it will be needful to wade through such an ocean of blood as this. All that is needed is a blow that will disrupt the two main rebel armies. It is worthy of note, that the merciless conscriptions that have swept over the South have even simplified the problem for us. The war has no longer those thousand-fold embarrassments that attend a national war, or war on populations. There is no population. Our task is confined to beating the armies at Richmond and Atlanta. For the rest, the Southern people are tired of the war, and are sighing for peace.

4 In a military point of view, such is the situation held by Gen. Grant and General Sherman, toward the insurgent forces opposed to them, that the reinforcements they will receive by the draft will certainly enable them to complete their work. In addition to the testimony of Gen. Grant's already given, take the impressive asseverations of Gen. Seymour on this head:

> "If Sherman had but 50,000 or 75,000 more men near, the South would be lost, because Hood would be annihilated. If Meade had moved in the Spring, with reserves of 75,000 to 100,000 men, Lee would have been hopelessly crushed. Even at this moment a third column of 40,000 to 50,000, rightly moved, would give unopposed blows to the Confederacy, from which she could never rise. * * *
>
> There is but one course consistent with safety or honor. Let the people awake to a sense of their dignity and strength, and a few months of comparatively trifling exertion—of such effort as alone is worthy of the great work—and the rebellion will crumble before us. Fill this draft promptly and willingly, with good and true men; send a few spare thousands over rather than under the call, and the Summer sun of 1865 will shine upon a regenerated land."

5 *This will be the last draft.* There will be no more calls, for there will need no more. The reinforcements it will give our armies will end the war. This reflection should evoke the heartiest efforts to make it productive of the *best fruits* which will be realized when our people, coming to view it not as an arbitrary imposition of force, but a solemn call of duty, and its elections not as a misfortune to those on whom they may fall, but as a sacred laying on of hands, respond promptly and personally to its demands.

If all the considerations, both of the actual presentment and future prospects of the war for the Union are such as to encourage those who have at heart the triumphant consummation of the one end that adds to this war all its halo of glory and freedom, it must not be lost sight of that these inspiring hopes may be baulked and brought to naught by our own weakness, pusilanimity and folly. Is it not a solemn monition that while it is in our power to terminate the rebellion almost at a blow, it is also in our power to indefinitely protract it, or, worse still, to see it end in a hollow peace, which can be no peace at all, but endless war—the nation, like the mystical body of Osiris, torn limb by limb, and the one humiliating reflection left us that there was a time when a little practical patriotism would have saved us?

William Swinton.

SPEECH OF GENERAL BURNSIDE

Major General Burnside who is now on a thirty day furlough, stopped at Centre Harbor, N. Y., and was serenaded on the night of the 29th ultimo, in response to which he said:

"My friends, I am sure you will excuse me from making any extended remarks on this occasion, because in the first place it is not my habit to address public assemblies, and just now I am returning from a brief pleasure trip through your beautiful country, during which I purposely enjoyed recreation and thought as little as possible of official or public business, it will not be amiss, however, for me to say that I have the fullest confidence in the ability of the government to crush out this wicked rebellion.

"I feel that the day is not far distant when the despondency which now prevails will totally disappear, and the people of the North will see, as we in the field see, that the end is at hand. Only united effort is needed to enable the government to move still more quickly. I refer to this because I have lately witnessed this despondency, and been surprised at it.

"Why, I have heard more grumbling at the North in three days than I heard in our whole campaign from the Rapidan to Petersburg! People seem to think that our armies are wearing out without corresponding exhaustation of the enemy. This is a mistake. Our resources in the field is greater than his. We have three times his home resources untouched, and can lose far more than the South and still break down the rebellion. I repeat, there is no cause for despondency.

"Let every citizen do all in his power, and the result is sure. It is not possible that any cause so founded in iniquity as this rebellion should succeed. But in independent of the right and wrong I am sure from observation that we have the strength and will to conquer."

The General's remarks made a strong impression on the audience.

WHAT GEN. GRANT ASKS FOR.

100,000 MORE MEN TO GIVE THE FINISHING BLOW.

It is ascertained with reasonable certainty that the naval and other credits required by the act of Congress, will amount to two hundred thousand including New York, which has not yet been reported to the Department, so that the President's call of July 18th, is practically reduced to three hundred thousand men to meet and take the place of—First the new enlistments in the navy; Second the casualities of battle, sickness, prisoners and desertion; and third, the hundred days troops, and all others going out by expiration of service this fall. One hundred thousand new troops, promptly furnished, is all that General Grant asks for the capture of Richmond and to give a finishing blow to the Rebels armies yet in the field. The residue of the call would be adequate for garrison in forts and cities and to guard all the lines of communication and supply, free the country from guerillas, give security to trade, protect commerce and travel and establish peace, order and tranquility in every State.

(Signed) Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

THE ARMISTICE QUESTION.

[From the Richmond Examiner, Aug. 27.]

It seems to be nearly certain that a proposal will soon be made to us from some quarter—either from Lincoln or from the Chicago Democratic Convention, to assent to an armistice, or simple cessation of hostilities, to allow of negotiations "for peace and re-union," and for that alone. A New York paper most urgently advises Lincoln himself to take the initiative in this, in order "to disarm and silence the demoralizing peace faction at the North," because it shrewdly guesses that such armistice and negotiations would be refused. This is merely a move to take the wind out of the Democratic sail. Whether Lincoln is to make such a proposal now, or whether the Democrats are to carry in their candidate expressly that he may make it—from whencesoever it may occur, it is wholly inadmissible. If the North desires to have negotiations for re-union entered at all, let all troops and blockading fleets be withdrawn and the right of secession formally acknowledged, and then negotiation would be at least possible. If they invite us to negotiate on any other footing our only rational answer will be another blow at the heart of Pennsylvania. We are not likely to consider the question of re-union with a sword hanging by a hair over our heads; and if such a proposal be made we shall only conclude that it means war, and endless war, until one nation or the other shall be subjugated or extirpated.

This is evidently the proposal on which the British Government is still gloating with satisfaction. The Queen is proroguing Parliament, deigns to mention our war, and reaffirms the policy of strict "neutrality," namely, such neutrality, all on one side, as we have experienced uniformly for some years past. Mr. Seward could ask no more. No matter; we have long been conscious that this Confederacy will have to sustain itself, not only against Yankee fire and sword but against the most malignant machinations of British neutrality.

Four years ago, and up to the outbreak of the war, McClellan, as well as Pendleton, was a resident of Cincinnati, and that city is still his legal residence, according to the axiom of our State Constitution that no one gains or loses a residence by reason of serving the country in her armies. We do not know whether McClellan is now billeted on New York, New Jersey or some other State, nor is it at all material. The President and Vice President must not be residents of the same State; but there is no rule which forbids a dozen defeated candidates being in the same house if they choose.—*N. Y. Tribune.*

McCLELLAN FIRST PROPOSED ARBITRARY ARRESTS.

The principal thunder which the supporters of McClellan hurl against the Administration is that arbitrary arrests have been made. But worse than the draft, even in the sight of these patriotic "Democrats" are those arbitrary arrests that have done so much to weaken the Administration. How they have thundered against them night and day as breaches of the Constitution, infringements of the sacred liberties of person, and a reckless overthrow of all the safeguards against despotism which our forefathers erected as the right of the States. Nevertheless, the most high-handed, arbitrary and exorbitant of all acts of this kind—the seizure and imprisonment of the entire Legislature of the State—of the sovereign State of Maryland, was ordered and, to a certain extent, executed by Gen. McClellan. Banks was at the time in command at Baltimore, and, as it was suspected that the members of the Legislature might take measures to carry the State out of the Union into the Confederacy, McClellan wrote to him in this wise:

[Confidential.]

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, Washington, Sept. 12, 1864.

Major General N. P. Banks, U. S. A.:

"*General*—After a full consultation with the President, Secretaries of State, War, &c., it has been decided to effect the operation proposed for the 17th. Arrangements have been made to have a Government steamer at Annapolis to receive the prisoners and carry them to their destination.

"Some four or five of the chief men of the affair are to be arrested to-day. When they meet on the 17th you will please have everything prepared to arrest the whole party, and be sure that none escape.

"It is understood that you arrange with General Dix and Governor Seward the *modus operandi.* It has been intimated to me that the meeting might take place on the 14th inst., please be prepared. I would be glad to have you advise me frequently of your arrangements in regard to this very important matter.

"*If it is successfully carried out, it will go far toward breaking the the back bone of the rebellion.* It will probably be well to have a special train quietly prepared to take the the prisoners to Annapolis.

"I leave this exceedingly important affair to your tact and direction—and have but one thing to impress upon you—the absolute necessity of secrecy and success.

"With the highest regard, I am, my General, your sincere friend.

"George B. McClellan,
Major General U. S. A."

This was, it must be confessed, a pretty summary and effective way of dealing with State rights, and McClellan went into the the work with gusto. It cannot be said that he was merely carrying out the orders of his superiors, for he appears to have suggested the plan himself, merely "consulting" the President about it, and tending it his warm and earnest approval. His anxiety to get it done with complete success, and the importance he ascribes to that success, shows that his co-operation was more than willing; it was zealous. He seizes those suspected legislators—those representatives of a free, independent and sovereign State—which was not at war with the nation, with as much avidity as a dog catches at a bone. He jugged them all at a swoop, and there was an end of the matter. Mr. Lincoln's seizure of a poor offending editor here and there, or of a speculating contractor now and then, is a pitiful proceeding beside this nabbing of a whole legislative body. Cromwell's dispersion of the Long Parliament has become historical; it has been both painted and sung; but it was a lame affair compared with McClellan's method of getting rid of the Maryland Parliament. His "Democratic" admirers, especially those who are champions of State rights, would do well to put the scene upon their transparencies and banners. It would make an extremely picturesque and effective emblem of political consistency.

MARRIED.

On Tuesday morning, 6th inst., by Rev. A. J. Weddell, Mr. H. F. Cross, of Clarksburg, W. Va., to Miss Mary V. Wickard, daughter of Jacob Wickard, Esq., of this city.

DIED.

On Saturday, the 3d instant, Robert Bruce, infant son of Lieut. Col. G. Ellis, and Allie E. Porter—aged six months.

List of Letters

"LETTERS REMAINING UNCLAIMED in the Postoffice at Cumberland, State of Maryland, 8st day of Sept. 1864.

"To obtain any of these letters, the applicant must call for '*advertised letters*,' give the date of this list, and pay one cent for advertising.

"FREE DELIVERY of letters by *carriers*, at the residence of owners, may be SECURED by observing the following RULES:

"1. DIRECT letters plainly to the street and number, as well as the postoffice and State.

"If not called for within *one month*, they will be sent to the Dead Letter Office.

"4. *Place* the Postage *stamp* on the *upper right-hand* corner, and *leave space* between the stamp and direction for *post-marking* without interfering with the writing.

"N. B.—A REQUEST for the RETURN of a letter to the writer, if unclaimed within 30 days or less, written or printed with the writer's *name, postoffice* and *State*, across the left-hand end of the envelope, on the face side, will be complied with at the usual prepaid rate of postage, payable when the letter is delivered to the writer.—Sec. 28, Law of 1863."

Bissett, Joseph	Hughes, S E Miss 2
Barnes, Joseph 2	Hissett, Mike
Bird Ruberry 2	Kerres, F A
Bell, Sarah E Miss	King, Dr
Ball, M A Mrs	Lochheart Allen
Clark, Lue	Logson, Samuel
Clasgrove, Beall Miss	Lewis, Wm H
Cummings, Finely O	Lidinger, Mary Miss
Christopher, Geo Wm	Mannel, John J
Coahl, Henry	McLeinbaugh Wm
Caun, J Kin	Rittenour, Adam
Cougleton, Joseph	Regge, Catharine
Caudit, Samuel B	Biffle, D W
Calahan, Sade Miss	Ruhl, George
Dear, Gust	Rogues, W
Elliott, Jane Mrs	Rolland, William
Folston, M	Reahl, Margaret Miss
Foulk, Sylus	Ridgeway, A
Fisher, Dell	Smidth, Lewis
Fraultenberry Geo	Scott, Levi
Furr, Hannah Mrs	Silger, Margaret
Fay, James	Simons, Thomas
Gaskill, Drusie Miss	Stevens, Thomas A
Hanner E B	Sawtell, G G
Honicka, Christopher	Sprigg, Harriet Miss
Henry, Chulton	Sonders, James H 2
Hudson, Betty Miss 2	Smith, James
Howard, John W	Slicer, J Edward
Hoblitzell Jacob	Sidner, J B
Hatten, John	Smith, J A Miss
Hard, Thomas C	Wood, J D
Hitbelus, Thornton	Weeks, J W
Holdrige, Tom	Young, Henry

GEORGE A. HOFFMAN, P. M.
Cumberland, Sept 8

Estate of Catherine Dunham

This is to give notice that the subscriber has obtained from the Orphans' Court for Allegany County in Maryland, Letters Testamentary on the personal estate of

CATHERINE DUNHAM,

late of said county deceased. All persons having claims against the said deceased are hereby warned to exhibit the same, with the vouchers thereof legally authenticated, to the subscriber on or before the 8th of March next; they may otherwise be excluded by law from all benefit of said estate. All persons knowing themselves indebted to said estate are requested to call and make immediate payment. Given under my hand this 9th day of Sept. 1864.

J. M. STRONG, Executor.

Sept8—3w