New Orleans Republican.

OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES

OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF NEW ORLEANS

THE DAILY REPUBLICAN

May be had of the following dealers:

George Ellis, opposite the Postoffice.

A. Simon, No. 94 Exchange Alley.

C. C. Haley, No. 19 Commercial Place.

C. G. D. Holle, No. 61 Exchange Place.

James Ennis, Pontchartrain Railroad Depot, Third District; also, at Depot foot of Lafayette Street, First District.

J. W. Long, corner of Love and Enghien Streets, Third District.

Variety news-stand, corner Dauphine and Canal streets.

AUCTION SALES THIS DAY.

BY H. W. FARROW, Constable Fifth Justice Court, at 12 o'clock, in front of courthouse, on Villere street, Algiers, half of a lot of ground and house on Seguin street—A. Ramos, transferee vs. William F. Dunham.

BY SHERIFF SAUVINET, at 12 o'clock, at Merchants and Auctioneers' Exchange, lot of ground on Liberty street.

Local Intelligence.

SALE OF BONDS BY AUDITOR GRAHAM.—Mr. Graham yesterday closed his auction sale of bonds, and the results prove that our State is solvent—another answer to the stereotyped inquiry of "M."

The bonds offered yesterday were city consolidated, and the figures speak for themselves. These bonds were put up in lots of twenty, usually, when it could be done.

Five brought 120¼; 3, 120; 8, 116¼; 5, 115⅝; 4, 115¼; 5, 115⅝; 2, 114⅝; 13, 114; 13, 110¼, 110⅛; 3, 108⅝; 20, 108⅝; 2, 108¼; 1, 109¼; 1, 109⅛; 8, 110⅛; 10, 110; 20, 110⅛; 7, 110⅞; 10, 110½; 20, 109⅜; 9, 111⅛.

City railroad, the coupons of which will be payable in a few months: 20 brought 100⅝; 20, 101⅛; 20, 101⅛; 20, 91¼; 13, 95.

The bidding was spirited, and seemingly as fair as possible. Representatives of large capital were quite good-natured, and occasionally the gentlemen joked each other in a figuratively way. Messrs. Graham, Estlin, and the clerks, were well up in their new role, accommodating to all, readily answering every question.

A TALENTED DRINKER.—The young man who keeps a bar at the corner of St. Charles and Julia streets, yesterday called at police headquarters to request that one of his most talented frequenters be arrested. His complaint was that the customer had absorbed drinks, within two months, which scored up $264, and was now about to leave the city. The drinkest is a minor, and obtained credit on his father's wealth. The parent refuses to liquidate the bill, and the young toper is unable to pay. One bar will probably dry up on credit business, so far as youngsters are concerned. We have the name, but as the matter is a purely civil transaction, we can not give it just yet.

NEW PUBLIC HALL.—When the new frame building was erected at the corner of St. Charles and Clio streets, Mr. Purves could have converted the second floor into a splendid lecture hall, such a one as is and has long been needed in this city, and rented it for price far below that charged by those termed first class. The location is good, and there would be many applications for the hall by private parties who are unwilling or unable to pay fancy prices. It is not too late.

Wade Hampton, cart driver, was badly bruised last evening by his vehicle breaking down at the corner of Dryades and Julia streets. It is thought his skull is fractured. He was sent to his home up town.

A jolly party of gentlemen yesterday purchased a small schooner at the end of the new shell road, and intend to indulge in sailing and fishing during the heated term. This is better than passing odd hours in billiard or barrooms, or worse places. Out door exercise like airing on the lake will prove healthful, if not profitable.

REMOVING WARTS.—Lewis Smith, a stranger in our midst, while standing in the cigar store corner of St. Charles and Common streets, was accosted by a good looking young man, whose name proves to be A. Salvadore, who gratuitously informed Mr. Smith that he had recently gained knowledge of a medicine that would incontinently remove warts. Warts is a strange subject and one on which much can be said, medicinally and financially. The two started off for the precious cure, but on the way to an apothecary Salvadore suddenly remembered that he had drawn a prize in a lottery in a room on St. Charles street. Smith was willing, and accompanied the good looking young man to see him gather in his winnings of $70. Smith was requested to tempt fortune, and was asked the extent of his wealth. He foolishly showed a small bundle of lucre, and instantly it vanished, he asserts. His story is that Salvadore snatched the money and said he had lost it on the play. Then a little rumpus arose, and in stepped Sergeant Gaster who arrested the man who could cure warts. Warts is emphatic in saying that Smith risked the money and lost it. The sergeant has made an affidavit against warts.

During the storm last evening the steamboats Wild Wagoner and Governor Allen and a barge of the transportation company were driven from their moorings, and blown across the river. The police boat Two Brothers, Captain Schreiber, assisted the vessels out of the trouble.

COMMITTED.—Joseph Johnson goes to the Criminal Court for only assaulting and cutting one of his neighbors. William Brooks travels the same route for maiming Paul Despinas. Thomas Richards Brown and J. H. Cain go down for battering P. Zorn, M. Geiss for using an ax on a woman.

CRIMINAL COURT.—The case of James H. Langwell, charged with manslaughter in killing Michael Finch on the levee, at the head of Lafayette street, on the twenty-seventh of April last, was continued until the twenty-sixth instant, at ten o'clock, owing to the absence of the District Attorney, who is sick.

William Brady, jointly charged with William Watney with murdering one Gottfried Bass on the seventh of October, 1871, at the corner of Congress and Levee streets, while the latter came out of the coffeehouse of H. Bedeman, when the two accused had a quarrel with another party, surrendered himself this morning.

On the preliminary examination of the case, Brady had been discharged by Recorder Leclere, but the grand jury (Frank Wheaton, foreman), on the fourth of November, found a true bill against both the accused. When the capias was issued, Brady could not be found. Yesterday, bail was fixed at $3000, Watney having been released some time ago on $5000 bail.

Frank Flasesch was acquitted of an assault and battery on Cora Nicholas.

John Glover pleaded guilty to two cases of obtaining money under false pretenses, and was remanded for sentence.

IMPORTANT DECISION

By Justice Bradley, of the United States Supreme Court—The Slidell and Other Confiscation Cases.

United States vs. 844 lots and ten squares of ground, the property of John Slidell, on appeals and writ of error.—Under the act of July 17, 1862, entitled "An act to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels and for other purposes," the marshal of the United States for the district of Louisiana, on the fifteenth of August, 1863, seized the property in question in this case as the property of John Slidell, and on the fifteenth of September, 1863, the district attorney of the United States for the same district filed a libel or information for the confiscation of said property. The libel charges that Slidell, subsequently to the passage of the act, did act as an officer of the army or navy of the rebels in arms against the government of the United States, or as a member of Congress, or as a judge, or as a Cabinet officer, or as a foreign minister, or as a commissioner, of the so-called confederate States of America, or that, while owning property in a loyal State or Territory, etc., he did give aid and comfort to the rebellion.

Other charges were made against him of the same general character, and it was claimed that, by reason of the premises, the property described in the libel was forfeited to the United States, and ought to be condemned to their use; and prayed process against the property and the owner thereof, and all persons interested or claiming an interest therein, to warn them to appear and answer the information. Process was accordingly issued and duly published.

Several persons appeared and filed petitions of intervention, setting up title to certain portions of the land seized, or liens by way of mortgage or otherwise upon portions thereof.

John Arrowsmith claimed title to several squares in New Orleans, as having been purchased by him many years before.

The Citizens' Bank of Louisiana claimed a mortgage upon a portion of the property to secure a stock note for $4104, due the first of June, 1863; and also a mortgage on another portion to secure them for advances upon a letter of credit given to Slidell on the third of September, 1861, upon Messrs. F. Ad. Marcuard & Co., of Paris, upon which he had drawn $25,000, prior to the thirteenth of May, 1862. The latter mortgage was registered May 2, 1862.

F. A. Marcuard, a citizen of France, claimed a mortgage lien upon certain portions of the property to secure certain loans of money made by him to Slidell in Paris, namely, 250,000 francs on the fourth of June, 1862, payable in one year, which mortgage was received at New Orleans by Eugene Rousseau, agent of Marcuard, July 14, 1862, and recorded on the same day, before the appointment of a register by General Butler, and afterward, again recorded on the twenty-ninth July, 1862, by a recorder appointed by him, and deposited with a notary August 4, 1862; and again recorded, with the act of deposit, on the ninth of August, 1862. On the eleventh of August, 1862, General Butler issued an order for the confiscation of Slidell's property, and the rents were afterward received by the military authorities on the property mortgaged.

Nicolson & Co. claimed a lien on certain property for laying the Nicolson pavement.

The State of Louisiana claimed a lien for certain taxes due.

Mrs. Gaines claimed to be the owner of certain lots specified in her petition.

The Merchants' Bank of New Orleans claimed a certain brick building in which their banking business had been carried on, and an equitable interest in which, etc., by virtue of a certain agreement.

Oritz Huppenbauer, a tenant of two lots, claimed to have largely increased their value by making permanent improvements, and desired an equitable allowance therefor.

In the principal cause of confiscation a default was taken on the eighteenth of April, 1864, and and decree of condemnation rendered on the eighteenth of March, 1865.

Various proceedings were had, and considerable evidence was taken upon the several interventions, and decrees were made by the District Court in each, favorable or unfavorable to the claim presented. Among others, a decree was made on the seventh of July, 1865, dismissing the claim of the Citizens' Bank to a mortgage lien for 100,000 francs, or $25,000, advanced upon their letter of credit given to Slidell in September, 1861. Another decree was rendered on the same day dismissing the claim of Marcuard to a mortgage lien of 250,000 francs lent to Slidell in Paris. On the fifth of May, 1866, the court dismissed the claim of the Merchants' Bank of New Orleans. From all these decrees appeals were regularly taken by the intervenors; and one of the questions before this court is whether an appeal lies in such cases. A motion has been made to dismiss the appeals on the ground that the proper remedy for revising the judgment or decree of the District Court is a writ of error, and not an appeal.

It has undoubtedly been decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Armstrong's foundry (6 Wall 776) and other cases, that the proceedings for confiscation are proceedings at common law, and not in admiralty or equity, and therefore require a jury for the trial of issues of fact, and a writ of error to revise the judgment. This view is corroborated by the recent cases of Garnett vs. the United States, McVeigh vs. the United States, and Miller vs. the United States, reported in 11 Wallace. But interventions of third parties, made during the course of the proceedings, setting up claim to, or lien upon, the property, are often in the nature of a bill of equity, and require an equitable proceeding to ascertain and establish the rights of the parties. They are especially so when they seek to establish a lien upon the property or any portion thereof, and to subject it, or the proceeds of it, to the payment of a debt or other claim, having priority over the claim of the government, or constituting a legal charge upon the property when the cause of confiscation occurred. I conceive the claims of the intervenors in this case who have appealed, as before stated, to be of this kind.

Hence, in my judgment, no trial by jury was requisite in reference to those claims, and the decrees rendered in reference thereto are subject to appeal rather than to writ of error. Whether they would come up as outbranches of the record, and be subject to review upon a writ of error, brought to the principal judgment in the case, it is perhaps unnecessary to decide. I hold, therefore, that the appeals taken in this case by the intervenors above named were properly taken, and should not be dismissed.

The next question is whether they were well taken. As the district judge has not assigned his reasons for dismissing the claims, I am somewhat at a loss to know the precise reasons on which his decision was founded. In the case of the Citizens' Bank (No. 3647), I presume the ground must have been that the letter of credit was manifestly given to Slidell, to enable him to accomplish his mission to France in the service of the confederate cause. It has been repeatedly decided at the Circuit, and in the case of Hanauer vs. Doane, 12 Wall, 342, by the Supreme Court, that a contract made in furtherance of the rebellion, or in aid of the confederate cause, is void and can not receive the aid of the courts. The furnishing of Slidell with a letter of credit when he went to Paris as the emissary of the confederacy was so manifestly intended to subserve this end that I can not disturb the decree dismissing the claim.

The case of Marcuard, however, is different from any which has yet been decided. The precedents have all been in cases in which the transaction has been between citizens of the United States, owing allegiance to the government thereof. But Marcuard was a citizen of France, and the loan made by him to Slidell was made in Paris. It was a loan of money made by a neutral on neutral territory, to an enemy, or, at most, to a citizen of the United States engaged in hostile operations against the United States. An innocent loan made to such a person, unless made for the purpose of enabling him to carry on hostilities, is a valid transaction everywhere. And the neutral is not bound to presume that such hostile use is to be made of the money loaned. One witness states that there was general notoriety that Slidell was purchasing gunboats in Paris for the use of the confederacy; but there is no direct evidence on the subject; and there is no evidence, except the amount of the loan, that the money was borrowed for other than private purposes. And the amount is hardly sufficient to throw the burden of proof on the lender. It seems to me that the case does not show sufficient evidence of notice to Marcuard that any unlawful use was to be made of the money loaned by him to defeat his claim.

Supposing the debt to be a valid one, was it a lien or charge upon the property in question when the cause of confiscation occurred? This cause can not be said to have occurred before the passage of the act of Congress, July 17, 1862; but from that moment it existed, and the general rule is, that a judgment of confiscation relates back to the act which causes it. The question, then, is reduced to this: Whether Marcuard's lien on the property in question had become complete on the seventeenth day of July, 1862? New Orleans was then in the possession of the United States forces. Military rule prevailed. All civil authority emanated from the power or existed at the suffrance of the United States military authorities from the occupation of the city, early in May, 1862. Could Slidell, a declared rebel and enemy, in Paris, during this period transfer or encumber property located in New Orleans, within the military lines of the United States? If he could do it as to third persons, could he do it as to the United States? Had he been in the confederacy he could not have done it at all. For in that case every attempt to deal with property within the Union lines would have been abortive and void. It was forbidden by public proclamation of the President, and by the usages of belligerents. Did his residence in France give any greater validity to his acts as against the government of the United States? In my judgment it did not. And Marcuard, in taking a mortgage from Slidell on property within the Union lines, took the risk of the exercise by the government of the United States, of its right as a sovereign power engaged in war, to confiscate the property of its enemies.

I am, therefore, of opinion that the decree upon the intervention of Marcuard must be affirmed.

The next case is that of the Merchants' Bank of New Orleans (No. 4057). This company held a lease granted by Slidell in 1850 to John Robb & Co., for ten years, at a certain rent. The lessees covenanted to put up on the lots leased buildings to cost at least $15,000. At the end of the term Slidell was to pay them the value of the buildings, at an appraisement. The bank claimed a lien, by virtue of this contract, for the value of the buildings. The district court rejected the claim. It is difficult to see on what ground a lien for this sum can be maintained. The matter existed simply in covenant. The lease does not contain a word which looks like the creation or expectation of a lien on the property itself.

The bank complains that Fish, the purchaser of the property, was permitted to except to the intervention; whereas he had no right to appear in the suit at all, because the sale had been suspended, and the marshal had not been ordered to proceed. But it matters not that Fish had no interest. The question is, had the bank any interest? Fish, as *amicus curiæ*, might call the court's attention to the want of interest which the bank had. Unless the bank had a lien, the court can not reverse the decree. In my judgment, the bank had no lien, and, therefore, the decree is affirmed.

I have not adverted to certain general questions, applicable to the entire proceedings for confiscation, because they have been settled by adjudications of the Supreme Court made since the argument of these cases. That court has disposed of the constitutionality of the act, the power of Congress to pass it, and the character of that part of it under which the proceedings are taken. In the case of Miller vs. the United States (11 Wall., 268) it has decided that the act has two distinct parts, each part having a separate object. The first four sections provide for the punishment of treason and rebellion as criminal offenses, and are permanent in their character. The remaining sections provide for the confiscation of the property of certain designated parties, as enemies' property, and are temporary in their character, being intended for the purpose of insuring the speedy termination of the rebellion.

The proceedings under these sections are proceedings *in rem*., conforming as near as practicable to proceedings in admiralty, in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and to revenue cases, where the seizures are made on land. In the latter case, after seizure, an information is filed by the law officer of the government, setting forth the facts upon which the confiscation is claimed. Whether the information is called a libel of information or simply an information, is of no consequence. The same court has cognizance of the case, whether it is in admiralty or a different revenue proceeding. The nature of the case determines its character. If a claimant of the property appears and contests the material facts alleged—as, for example, the guilt of the owner, or his ownership of the property, the issue is to be tried by a jury.

If no person appears to answer the merits, a judgment is taken by default, and the court proceeds to examine witnesses or other evidence ex parte, by way of inquest, to ascertain the principal facts in the case. This examination does not require the intervention of a jury, being only intended to inform the conscience of the court. If a third power intervenes for the purpose of setting up some charge or lien upon the property, and not of resisting the confiscation, collateral proceedings are had, suitable to the nature of the case, as before stated. [See the cases of Garnett, McVeigh and Miller, in 11 Wallace, and of the Union Insurance Company, Armstrong's Foundry, and Hart, in 6 Wallace.]

This general view of the nature of the proceedings will serve to answer at once many of the objections which were so elaborately argued when these cases were heard. A belligerent has a right to take such course and impose such conditions with regard to the confiscation of enemy's property as it sees fit. The rules which it prescribes are not to be questioned by any code except the law of nations and its own constitution. The rights of a government against its own citizens in insurrection are not less, but are rather greater, than those it may exercise toward a foreign enemy. But in either case the enemy's property may be confiscated simply as such, if the government so determine. Congress, by the act of July 17, 1862, directs property to be seized and confiscated as enemy's property, but only the property of certain classes of persons.

This discrimination renders necessary, when issue is taken upon the information, an inquiry into the guilt or innocence of the owner, not for the purpose of a criminal conviction and sentence, but for the purpose of determining the status of the property seized. Hence many rules, constitutional and otherwise, which require to be observed in criminal prosecutions, have no application to these proceedings.

The case is altogether unlike that of an attainder. There the criminal prosecution and conviction are the principal thing. The attainder, like disqualification to be a witness, after conviction of perjury, follows as an incident of the conviction. Here the confiscation is the principal thing, and an inquiry into the acts or the conduct of the owner of the property may, or may not, be required by the law.

If it is required, it is only as a subsidiary thing, and involves no personal sentence or condemnation. Hence all those objections which are founded upon the necessity of a regular indictment, of the personal presence of the accused, of a trial by jury, etc., are out of place. Where the information is traversed, a trial by jury is necessary, it is true; but for another reason, and not because the proceeding is a criminal one; for the reason, namely, that the seventh amendment to the constitution requires a trial by jury in all suits at common law where the value in controversy exceeds $20.

These considerations render it unnecessary to examine more in detail the various points that were raised on the argument.

Having held the appeals taken by the Citizens' Bank, by Marcuard, and by the Merchants' Bank, to be properly taken, the several writs of error sued out by those parties will be dismissed.

The next case to be considered is the writ of error of John Slidell, No 6158. The final judgment of condemnation was rendered on the eighteenth of March, 1865, and the writ of error was sued out on the seventeenth of March, 1870. It was sued out, therefore, just in time to save the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court in the case of McVeigh vs. United States, 11 Wall., 259, decided that the owner of the property, though a rebel and within the confederate lines, was entitled to appear and contest the proceedings, or bring a writ of error upon the judgment. The writ, therefore, is regularly brought, and we are obliged to examine the record.

Many of the questions raised have been already disposed of, and need not be again adverted to. There is one objection, however, that has given me some trouble; namely, the insufficiency of the information. It is one of the most remarkable specimens of loose pleading and uncertain statement that I remember ever to have seen. After having duly alleged the seizure of the property, and fully described it, it states that John Slidell was, at the time of filing the information and on the seventeenth of July, 1862, and previously, the owner thereof. Then, having stated the existence of the rebellion, and the passage of the confiscation act, it proceeds to allege:

V. That the said John Slidell, subsequently to the said seventeenth of July, 1862, did act as an officer of the army or navy of the rebels in arms against the government of the United States, or as a member of Congress, or as a judge of a court, or as a cabinet officer, or as a foreign minister, or as a commissioner, or as a consul of the so-called Confederate States of America; or that, while owning property in a loyal State or Territory of the United States, or of the District of Columbia, he did give aid and comfort to the rebellion against the United States, and did assist such rebellion.

Now, from this allegation, can any mortal man tell what John Slidell did?

The next article is of the same ambiguous and inconsequential character.

The extreme ambiguity of these charges is something more than a matter of form; it amounts to a substantial defect. There is, in truth, no charge at all. There is no charge that Slidell acted as a foreign minister of the confederacy. The allegation is that he either did that or something else; but we are not informed what. If the defect were one of form, it might be amended; but being substantial, it seems to me it is fatal.

The other articles of the information do not save it. The seventh article alleges that John Slidell, subsequently to the seventeenth of June, 1862, within a State or Territory of the United States, was engaged in armed rebellion against the government, and did not, within sixty days after the proclamation of the President, made on the twenty-fifth of July, 1862, cease to aid and abet such rebellion, etc. And the eighth article is of similar character to the seventh.

Now, not only is this same ambiguity kept up in these articles, as in the previous ones, but they do not set forth any of the offenses which, in the statute, are made the basis or cause of confiscation. They are evidently meant to be assigned under the sixth section of the act. But that section refers to persons who, in any State or Territory of the United States, other than those named as aforesaid, were engaged in the rebellion. Now, the States named as aforesaid were the loyal States, which had just been named in the last clause of the fifth section. Therefore, the States and Territories other than those were the disloyal or rebellious States. So that the sixth section of the act only refers to persons who, within any disloyal or rebellious State or Territory, were engaged in the rebellion. Yet the seventh article of the information merely alleges that John Slidell, within a State and Territory of the United States, was engaged in rebellion. It does not make a charge within the statute.

The whole information, therefore, is substantially defective, and the judgment must be reversed.

The same defect is fatal to the judgments in the cases of Charles M. Conrad vs. the United States, No. 6039; and in Francis H. Hatch vs. the United States, No. 6079; and the judgments in those cases must also be reversed.

In the cases of Duncan F. Kenner vs. the United States, No. 6038; Abel Ward Bosworth vs. the United States, No. 6080, and Jefferson Davis vs. the United States, No. 6082, the substantial defect appears in the informations, each taken as a whole, and I have been unable to perceive any other ground on which the judgments in those cases should be reversed. They are therefore affirmed.

It is perhaps not necessary at this time to decide what will be the effect of reversing those judgments which have been reversed. But as the subsequent proceedings may depend on a solution of the question, and as the parties in interest will be desirous of knowing the position in which they stand, it is proper that I should give my opinion on the point.

It is a general rule that a judicial sale, under a judgment which the court had jurisdiction to render, will stand, although the judgment itself be subsequently reversed for error. I see no reason why that rule should not apply in these cases. It is true that a judgment of reversal usually contains a direction that the plaintiff in error be restored in all things, to that which he hath lost by reason of the erroneous judgment.

But the mode of making this restoration, where a sale of property has taken place under the reversed judgment, is by awarding to the plaintiff in error the proceeds of sale. This will be the proper mode in these cases.

One question to which considerable attention was given upon the argument, was whether anything more than an estate for the life of the owner was transferred by the confiscation proceedings. Indeed, it was alleged as a ground of error that all right, title and estate of the owner was condemned and sold.

I do not regard this form of judgment as material; although on looking at the judgments, it will be found that the form of judgment pursued was, "that the said sixteen lots of ground, the property of A. B., be and the same are hereby condemned as forfeited to the United States," without any definition or limitation of the estate forfeited. I regard the judgments as to be construed by the law which authorizes the confiscation to be made; and am of opinion that the several sales by the marshal had the effect of transferring only such estate as it was lawful to sell. What that estate is, is the question. The joint resolution approved at the same time with the confiscation act, provides that no punishment or proceedings under the act shall be so construed as to work a forfeiture of the real estate of the offender beyond his natural life.

It seems to me that this provision extends to the whole act and to "the proceedings" for confiscation as well as to the prosecution for the crimes of treason and rebellion. It may be very true, and I am inclined to think it is true, that the constitutional provision which declares that no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted, does not apply to the confiscation of enemies' property, even though those enemies be rebels against the government, and, therefore, guilty of treason.

But whether it applies or not, Congress, from respect to the scruples of the President, or for other reasons which seemed to it sufficient, did enact, as it had a right to do, that no proceedings under the confiscation act should be so construed as to work a forfeiture of real estate beyond the natural life of the offender. And I can see no way in which this limitation can be confined to criminal proceedings under the act. It seems to me that by a fair interpretation it extends to all proceedings by which a forfeiture is effected or adjudged.

The District Attorney has filed an application for a writ of error in the Supreme Court, which will have the effect of a supersedias.

Camp Meeting at Biloxi.

The Methodist camp meeting at Biloxi will commence to-day, and continue until the twenty-eighth instant. Large numbers of persons will go from New Orleans to the camp meeting grounds, to remain till the close of this religious campaign, while there will be numerous daily visitors to the scene of Christian strife against the spirits of evil.

The Temperature.

The thermometer at Louis Frigerio's, No. 50 Chartres street, yesterday stood as follows: At 8 A. M., 78°; at 2 P. M., 85°; at 6 P. M., 75°. Lowest point during the night of June 19, 71°. Rain, June 20, one-fifth of an inch.

SPECIAL NOTICES.

First Regiment Louisiana Field Artillery.—You are hereby notified to attend the regular meeting FRIDAY EVENING, June 21, 1872, at Armory Battery C, at seven o'clock. Punctual attendance requested. By order

W. J. BEHAN, Colonel commanding.

W. H. BRANHAM, Secretary. je31 1t

Notice.—Office of the Louisiana State Lottery Company, New Orleans, June 20, 1872.—In conformity with the by-laws, the stockholders of this institution are hereby notified that the stock books of this company will be closed on the thirtieth instant, and remain closed until after the dividend is declared.

je20 3t H. PERALTA, Secretary.

Special Notice.—Louisiana Cotton Manufactory, New Orleans, June 12, 1872.—A general meeting of the stockholders of this company will be held on MONDAY, the fifteenth day of July, 1872, at 1 P. M., at No. 57 Carondelet street, to take into consideration the propriety of liquidating its affairs and dissolving the company. Punctual attendance is requested.

By order of the Board of Directors.

je16 tjy15 GEORGE PERRILLIAT, Secretary.

Batchelor's Hair Dye.—This superb hair dye is the best in the world—perfectly harmless, reliable and instantaneous; no disappointment; no ridiculous tints or disagreeable odor. The genuine William A. Batchelor's hair dye produces immediately a splendid black or natural brown; leaves the hair clean, soft, beautiful; does not contain a particle of lead or any injurious compound. Sold by all druggists. Factory, No. 16 Bond street, New York. 1y12 ly

POLITICAL NOTICES.

Headquarters Liberal Party, State of Louisiana. Office No. 15 Carondelet street, New Orleans, June 20, 1872.—The following named gentlemen are hereby appointed members of the Executive State Central Committee of the Liberal party of Louisiana:

Harry T. Hays, J. M. Dirthammer,
James D. Blair, James Graham,
E. P. Rareshide, P. Dumas,
Louis Stein, Jack Wharton,
Walter Pugh.

FINANCE COMMITTEE.

James Graham, A. H. Peale, Jr.,
Joseph Magner.

D. B. PENN, President.

Circular.—Headquarters of the Liberal Party street, or the State of Louisiana, No. 15 Carondelet New Orleans, Louisiana, June 20, 1872.—The citizens of the different parishes of the State and wards of the city of New Orleans who favor the object set forth in the address to the people of Louisiana of June 10, 1872, are hereby requested to organize without delay, and without further instructions from these headquarters, by forming Greeley and Brown clubs, and calling parish conventions to assemble on the twentieth of July, for the purpose of electing delegates to the State Convention, to meet in the city of New Orleans on the first Monday in August.

Presidents and secretaries of clubs and conventions are earnestly requested to report action in person or in writing at these headquarters.

D. B. PENN, President.

ANDREW HERO, Secretary. je21

Provisional Liberal Parish Executive Committee of the Parish of Orleans—Headquarters Provisional Liberal Republican State Central Committee, New Orleans, June 17, 1872.—By virtue of the authority in me vested, I hereby announce the following gentlemen as composing the Provisional Parish Executive Committee for the parish of Orleans, which will sit on SATURDAY EVENING, June 22, 1872, at half-past seven o'clock, at Riley's Hotel, corner Common and Dryades streets, for organization, viz:

First Ward—J. Oplatek, M. Sharkey and G. Bouligny.

Second Ward—Fred. Wang, P. H. Boyle and John Cochrane.

Third Ward—W. L. Stamford, Thomas O'Connor and J. D. Houston.

Fourth Ward—Louis Schwartz, E. J. Lawless and Henry Weber.

Fifth Ward—Judge J. P. Montamat, John H. Bevans and A. H. M'Arthur.

Sixth Ward—L. E. Lemaire, L. B. Wakeman and R. Brewster.

Seventh Ward—Judge J. A. Letton, J. B. Jourdain and W. J. Moore.

Eighth Ward—Charles Morell, T. J. Moroney and George Delamore.

Ninth Ward—Judge A. B. Sloanaker, William Stevenson and W. C. Kinsella.

Tenth Ward—John Kaiser, Dr. Henry Smith and J. C. Weaver.

Eleventh Ward—Dr. W. S. Mitchell, T. M. Heathton and N. H. McLemore.

Twelfth Ward—W. G. McConnell, E. Reviere and W. M. Surls.

Thirteenth Ward—John Lockwood, Dr. J. Welfesburg and Charles Roper.

Fourteenth Ward—G. B. Fish, P. R. Smith and W. R. Fish.

Fifteenth Ward—Colonel Jack Wharton, Dr. J. A. Riley and W. P. Willeon.

By order of the Provisional State Central Committee of the Liberal Republican Party.

G. H. BRAUGHN, President.

Attested:

P. W. WOODLEAF, Assistant Secretary.

je19 7t

Thirteenth Ward. Attention.—The signers to the call for the organization of a Greeley and Brown Club for the Thirteenth Ward will meet THIS (Friday) EVENING, at half-past seven o'clock, in the carpenter shop on St. Charles street, between Napoleon avenue and Jena street, in accordance with said call.

By order of the Committee. je21 1t*

First District Greeley and Brown Campaign Club.—There will be a meeting of this Club at Geddes' Hall, on Erato street, between Carondelet and Baronne, on FRIDAY EVENING, twenty-first instant, at half-past seven o'clock. Residents of the District favorable to the election of Greeley and Brown, and desiring reform in our State administration, are earnestly invited to attend. Business of importance will be brought before the meeting.

By order. J. D. HOUSTON, President.

THOMAS LYNCH, Secretary. je20 2t

LOTTERIES.

DRAWING OF THE LOUISIANA STATE LOTTERY FOR JUNE 20, 1872.

CLASS 147.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
10	11	46	23	75	65	60	15	61	62	42	67	—	—

The above drawings are published in all the principal papers, and are drawn in public daily at the rooms of the company.

Information furnished and prizes cashed by HOWARD, SIMMONS & CO., Contractors. St. Charles street, corner Union, New Orleans.

Witness our hands at New Orleans, Louisiana, this twentieth day of June, 1872.

H. PERALTA, ADAM GIFFEN, Commissioners.

BEWARE OF BOGUS LOTTERIES. ap28

LOUISIANA STATE LOTTERY COMPANY.

Incorporated August 17, 1868.

CHARLES T. HOWARD.....PRESIDENT.

SINGLE NUMBER LOTTERY.

SPLENDID SCHEME—ONLY 20,000 NUMBERS.

Capital Prize.....$50,000.

CLASS I.

TO BE DRAWN AT NEW ORLEANS ON Saturday, June 29, 1872.

HOWARD, SIMMONS & CO., Contractors.

SCHEME:

20,000 Numbers—Tickets Only $20.

1 prize of	$50,000 is	$50,000
1 prize of	20,000 is	20,000
1 prize of	10,000 is	10,000
1 prize of	10,000 is	10,000
1 prize of	9,000 is	9,000
1 prize of	8,000 is	8,000
1 prize of	7,000 is	7,000
1 prize of	6,000 is	6,000
1 prize of	5,000 is	5,000
1 prize of	4,000 is	4,000
1 prize of	3,000 is	3,000
1 prize of	2,000 is	2,000
1 prize of	1,000	
1 prize of	1,000	
1 prize of	1,000