HARD MONEY.

f Senator Blaine at Faneuil Hall September 25, 1878.

Chairman and Gentlemen—The n people are at present engaged k that should never have been n them; the settlement, in a politpaign, of their currency; for I to say that if there be any one at the people of the United States stand, if there be any one thing l smite and blight the prosperity eople past recall and past recovery, have a political currency. [Ap- And the tendency of the present n, the tendency of the issue e are met this night to confront, ich is upon the people to settle, is us that worst of all curses, a currency. Bear with me while f review I trace the facts and the that have brought us face to face issue that we now confront. f you here can well remember war broke out. We were called confront a great trial, and we had y treasury; and the first Congress mbled in 1861 upon the call of Lincoln had for its first and duty to provide the means of on the war. Their first measure end was a loan bill, authorizing retary of the Treasury to borrow fired and fifty millions of dollars, y gave him the right to issue, for rposes of circulation, treasury yable, on demand, in coin, to the f fifty millions of dollars. In the 1861, the military situation having out unfavorably, and the country reatened with complications with ritain, and business being embarthe banks suspended, the governllowed suit and suspended also, demand notes went to protest. , when it next assembled, found nfronted with an empty treasury credited currency. The situation y serious, and on the twenty-fifth uary, after considering the matter, took that step which had never ken in this country before, or, I by any country, to issue paper n the faith of the government, dare it to be legal tender. This then an absolute necessity.

was no time to consider whether the constitutional power to issue oney or not. Of course it would n mere squeamishness at that sumoment of peril for the governhave hesitated upon the use of er, however extreme. When a rested on the highway by a robs not going to call for the Revised or the reading of the habeas corbut he takes the first club and est weapon he can get hold of; is what the United States govdid at that time, and issued one and fifty millions of dollars. t out, and in a few months were , and the government was comissue one hundred and fifty milres. When Congress met in De1863, the government was again means derived from the revenue, er to borrow money was being l tested to the utmost, and it cisely in this complicated and sing attitude—that if we issued ney in the shape of greenbacks yed our power for borrowing. he demand for ready cash was so a compromise was effected; and n and there agreed that the Secthe Treasury should be empowforward and borrow as much was necessary on the faith of nment; and that for ready means d have the right to issue another millions of greenbacks, with fifty d millions to take up the tempo- Then comes the great loan y of which I hold in my hand— t connects itself as intimately second independence of this s the declaration of 1776 conself with the original independ country. [Applause.] When bill was under consideration, o account this embarassment, I en the imminent and terrible dy cash and the non-ability of rnment to issue notes without power to borrow, there came the compromise which is enat act; and that compromise he Secretary should go forward w what was needed on the faith of the government; and there d a proviso, standing in your -day, inserted by the unanimous th the Senate and the House of atives, a proviso not voted in by ats over Democrats, but inserted Democrat and every Republican nd Representative—a proviso -day as binding on the honor th and the consciences of the people as the last words of a er upon the filial affection of a pplause.] That proviso was, this government appealed to for its means to carry on the the world stood ready, waiting its money, saying only, "We e guarantee that if we loan shall get money back; if we put don't want to take the risk of in rags" [applause], the gov- stepped forward and said, "If en money to this people, we n this great hour of our na- we pledge you with the unanth of a great people, we pledge he solemn vote of every Senator Representative in Congress, we that this proviso shall be invided'—and every child should g—'provided, that the amount States notes'—that is greenvided that the amount of tates notes, issued and to be all never exceed four hundred dollars." Now, gentlemen may quibble and cavil and dispute to the end of time, but I say, man and man, that the loan nd million dollars, which was e basis of that proviso carried mpaign under Sherman and campaigns that ended with the ts and the surrender at Appothose campaigns were fought usand millions that were born the world, on that pledge as tion on which the loan was d here, speaking to an audierican people, jealous of their indful of their traditions, y it to twelve men here, or in able American audience, and hether they can again launch at sea of paper money. [Ap-

Chairman, I do not desire to od by the remotest possible , that if this pledge could be vaded, or if it had never been it would be to the honor and the American people to launch the sea of paper money, be- said before, you can not do you agree to have a political this country. I ask those who uch a currency, who propose ive hundred millions: How do , if you are going to launch n the sea of paper money, to regulate its issue, or contract its amount, or limit it in any way? The uniform answer has been, by Congress. [Voice in the crowd, "By the Constitution."] Let it be by the Constitution. Congress is the body which carries out the Constitution. [Applause.] Now, I have a very high respect for the American Congress, and for the members of both branches; I speak in no other terms than those of respect, yet I should regard it as a wiser and safer measure for fixing the amount of the currency to leave it to the aldermen of the city of Boston than to leave it to the Congress of the United States [applause], because Congress is necessarily a political body—made up of partisans on both sides, and properly so. It is so in the constitution of a republic, and you have better government when you have two parties watching each other. So it is an imperative necessity that Congress is and always will be made up of two great parties. These parties are controlled in deciding measures by their caucuses in Washington. Therefore, to leave the question to Congress is to leave it to a Republican caucus or the action of some other assembly in Washington to determine what shall be the amount of currency in the country. You might leave it to Congress to say how much cotton cloth shall be used in the country. [Voice—"Or postage stamps."] The idea is simply absurd.

I have watched and waited for the advocates of paper money to give another solution. Mr. Thurman made a recent speech in Ohio in which he took ground in favor of the government's issuing paper money. I read that speech very carefully, and found that when he came to that particular point as to how the amount of currency should be regulated, he skipped it. He had nothing to say. Their answer, gentlemen, is that Congress has exercised that power, and it may be trusted to exercise it again. Ah, my friends, that is a tremendous mistake. Congress never determined the amount by the demands of trade. It was called upon in a terrible war to determine what was needed by the demands of the government in violation of the demands of trade,—a very different matter. There is no merchant who does not remember that all prices were dislocated by the issue of paper money in defiance of the demands of trade, creating an abnormal rise in prices and giving an unusual opportunity for speculation. So that case does not sustain the regulation by Congress, but is of exactly the opposite character. If Congress again have to confront the same question, then for the time being trade must step aside; commerce must halt; manufactures must wait, for the government is in a life and death struggle.

Another way I have heard suggested was that you have a constitutional amendment, to determine how much currency there shall be in the country. That will be a very handy way. It takes two-thirds of the Senate and two-thirds of the House of Representatives to even so much as propose a constitutional amendment, and and then it takes three-fourths of all the State legislatures, or of conventions called in the States, to agree to that amendment. Now, if every time you are going to increase the currency in this country, or decrease it, you are going to have a constitutional amendment submitted to the people to determine, judging by the average time it has taken for the adoption of constitutional amendments, it will take four years and over. That will be a handy way of regulating the currency. And yet I see it solemnly proposed in some of the modern Greenback conventions that the amount of currency should be determined by a constitutional amendment. The whole idea is so absurd that no man at all conversant with the manner in which our government is administered would think of it a moment. The idea of issuing a certain amount of currency per capita is equally absurd. All communities do not require the same amount of currency. What would you say to distributing agricultural implements according to population, and giving State street its quota. [Laughter.] You want currency in all the great centres of trade. The idea of distributing it per capita is absurd and ridiculous.

Now, Mr. Chairman, there may be invented such a currency as will be flexible in its nature and adapted to the wants of trade, which will adjust itself to the varied conditions of the country in the different seasons of the year. The Republican party takes the responsibility for the financial legislation of the country for the last sixteen years, and I have never in its platforms or public utterances seen the claim that it is responsible for the National bank system. But I have always, for myself, having been in Congress and having voted for the system, though I do not know enough on finance to declare positively that it is the wisest system possible, I have always thought and do declare that there has never been in this country, with any other system, a bank which gave such absolute security to the innocent third party,—the bill holder,—as the national banking system. [Applause.] Yet three bills are now pending in the national Congress to-day for liberty to restore the old State banks. [Cries of "No, no." They are very good if the men behind the counters are good, honest men. The Suffolk system of banking was justly regarded as the best system of State banking in the United States. It gave to the people of New England a very substancial currency, with a very small variation, compared with that in other States. With all the safeguard which surrounded the Suffolk system, the banking system which prevailed in Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, and the other New England States was good, if the men who ran the bank were good. If the men happened to be dishonest, the innocent bill holder must suffer the loss. In Maine, twenty-five years ago, a bank in a small town failed. It had issued three hundred and forty-five thousand dollars in bills; two hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars were out when the bank failed. It is out to this day, every dollar of it. [Laughter.] They talk about the national bank system being oppressive. The loss to the American people from the failures and the defaulters of the State bonds, annually, was far larger than you can ever make by the system of national banks, because the government endorses the bills, no matter what becomes of the banks. You can not compare the State banks with the national in benefits. The State banks throughout the country were a parody on the science of finance. If the Republican party had no other claim on the respect of the people than that it has given this great advantage to the people that it has said that the United States is not thirty-eight communities, but one community, and the whole use but one kind of money circulating through them, it has done enough for the general government. [Long applause.]

Then the Republican party has done another thing. Senator Thurman disapproved of the national bank system as a monopoly. I don't know what dictionary he uses. A monopoly is something which is enjoyed by a class to the exclusion of the whole, or by an individual to the exclusion of his fellows. Now the Republican party found that the banks existed largely by special charter; but it perfected a system of national banks, so that banking could be free to A, B, C and D, or to any person desiring it. [Applause.] It is so to-day. If any five gentlemen in this crowd choose to organize a national bank they can do so, with one simple condition. The United States stipulates that you may organize this bank, but before you do you must put ten per cent more United States bonds in the Treasury than the amount of bills you propose to circulate. Then, if you mismanage or destroy your bank, it will take your bonds and pay your bill-holders. [Loud applause. A voice: "Pay them in greenbacks?" [Cries: "Shut up." Give him a chance.] I will answer the gentleman. [Laughter and applause.] A State had no power to make a bank good beyond its own border. You could not find a Boston bill in Philadelphia, nor a Philadelphia bill in Boston. You could not travel to Chicago with Massachusetts money. The advantage of a uniform currency is something of which these people have had twelve or fourteen years' experience, and will not give it up. I would like to say to my greenback friend that whatever currency you have, you will never get rid of banks. Banks have always existed. What sort of banks do you prefer? [Voice: "N. P. Banks." Laughter and applause.] Banks are necessary, for they are the place where the borrower of money meets the lender. You can not carry on the great business of a commercial community without any man or bank to bring the borrower and lender together. You can not spend your time running around to see who has money to lend. You want to go to the bank and get it without delay or trouble. If you break down the national banks under the cry that they are a monopoly, you raise up behind them the ghost of the old State banks. That is the thing we don't want in this country. [Applause.] At the West they had a great variety of State banks. I heard of a gentleman who went to buy timber lands in Michigan in the times when State banks were plenty. He offered the seller three prices, according to the currency he took to pay in. First, and poorest, was "wild cat." That was Michigan bank money. Second was "red dog." That was Ohio bank money, which was still better. Last were good counterfeits on New England banks. [Laughter and applause.] That was the old State bank currency.

But some gentlemen say that the banks make double interest on their money. They have a very good story to tell, it is true. But I would like to have any gentleman who is familiar with the subject tell me if he knows of any species of property in any form that begins to pay the amount the national banks do. Let me illustrate by figures. The total valuation of your great commercial city is 630 million dollars.

Your total tax levy is seventy-eight hundred and odd thousand short of $8,000,000. Your national banks in Boston pay $855,000, one-ninth of all your taxes, eleven per cent; and besides that these banks pay $705,000 taxes to the general government. The national banks of this very city of Boston pay $1,560,000 taxes on a capital of $52,000,000. Will any gentleman tell me of any other $52,000,000 of property in the city of Boston or in the State of Massachusetts that pays that tax. [Applause.] Well; suppose you abolish the national banks? This is the question you have got to vote on.

Suppose you abolish the national banks, you lose the interest on the bonds which are placed in the government to sustain the circulation, and which form the basis of the corporation, which are not taxable themselves, but which are put in as the basis of circulation, and are voluntarily subjected by their owners to the severest and heaviest form of taxation of any property in the United States. [Applause.] Let me generalize. In the United States the entire bank circulation to-night is three hundred and twenty-two millions in round numbers. There are four hundred and thirty millions of bonds deposited to secure that circulation, and every one of that four hundred and thirty millions is worth more than its face in gold coin. [Applause.] And I submit, Mr. Chairman, that the like of that never existed in the world. The boasted Bank of England, the Bank of Amsterdam and the Bank of France, the great continental banks, never presented such security to the bill holder. [Applause.] The three hundred and twenty-two millions of national bank bills that are out to-night in the hands of the people of this country, are sustained by four hundred and thirty millions of gold coin or that which is equivalent to it, to redeem them and make them absolutely good in the hands of the holder. [Applause.] Now the total amount of our taxes paid locally—these figures are not very hard to remember, and I beg some of you to carry them away, if you haven't thought of them before—the amount of taxes paid locally by the national banks in the United States is nine million three hundred thousand dollars; the amount of taxes paid to the general government is seven million two hundred thousand dollars. Put them together and you get sixteen millions and a half of taxation derived from the national banks throughout the country. Now I want to state as fairly as I can the proposition of the modern Greenback party. It is to save something to the people by substituting greenbacks for the national bank note. That is the proposition. Now, I will admit, for the sake of argument, that you can call in that amount of bonds. The only bonds of the United States that sell at par are the four per cents. All that are above that command a corresponding premium.

But suppose you call in, if there are so many out, on the equivalent of three hundred and twenty-two millions of four per cent. bonds, issuing greenbacks in place of the national bank notes and taking these bonds. This is a fair statement, I think, of what the Greenback party proposes—that they will place the greenback in place of the national bank notes, and take in a corresponding amount of United States bonds. I admit for the sake of an argument, they can do it, though they can't [laughter], because the minute you do that the bonds would go "sky-high," as the boys say, in premium. But I will admit that they can call them in at par in greenbacks. Suppose that is done, will somebody who is good at figures tell me how much the government will have saved? It is four per cent. on three hundred and twenty-two millions, that is, between twelve and thirteen millions of dollars, not quite thirteen millions. But the national banks at present are paying sixteen and a half millions of taxes. [Applause.]

Where would be the saving to the people of the United States by destroying the national bank system, with a basis of taxation that pays sixteen and a half million of taxes, in order to cancel a sufficient amount of United States four per cents. to save one million three hundred thousand dollars of interest? I think that it would be a very queer form of economy, and would result in a loss to the people of about three and a half million dollars. [Applause.]

Now I have remarked, Mr. Chairman, that the bonds of the United States, which stand as the bases of the banks, which yield this large taxation, are not themselves taxable, and that if you can remand them to their owners and take from them the franchises of the bank, you would necessarily, in this city and everywhere else, lose that amount of taxation. And that brings me to observe another point of this discussion. For the last fifteen years in this country there has been a large amount of agitation at different times, still going on with more intensity than ever, in regard to the bonds of the United States not being taxed. They say that every species of property should pay its full and fair taxation; that if I pay on my house and you on your farm and another man on his merchandise, that the bondholder ought to pay taxes on his bonds. Well, that is a strong proposition, and I am not disposed to object to it. I think so too. I think United States bonds ought not to escape taxation. [Applause.] But I go a little further. I say they not escape taxation. [Laughter and applause.] I go just a little grain further. I say they pay a fuller and larger share of taxtion than any other form of property in the United States, the national bank stock alone excepted. That is a pretty stiff proposition, probably some of you think. But I repeat that, with the exception of the stock of any national bank, the bonds of the United States pay a fuller and heavier amount of taxation than any other form of property in this country, and they pay it in advance, too. Now, let us argue that a little bit. I see two gentlemen out there who look to me as though they had about ten thousand dollars they wanted to invest. [Laughter.]

One of them is a conservative gentleman, and he thinks that he will put it in United States bonds. And he puts on his glasses to-morrow morning and looks over the price list of the stock market to see which class of the bonds he will take. Well, I will save him some trouble on that, for if he will step into any broker's office on State street they will tell him, I think, that however he may invest in United States bonds, he can not possibly get more than four per cent. on his money. The four per cents he can get at par. If he takes any of the sixes or fives or fours and a half that are out, that are not yet funded with lower bonds, he will pay just enough premium to make his interest four per cent., and it is calculated to the ninety-ninth shade of a hair. [Laughter.] So he can save himself all trouble when he comes to invest, and he had better put his money in straight fours. But my other friend, there, he does not look quite so conservative, and would not be content with four per cent., and looking over the price list he thinks he will take Chicago sevens. Big city, great wealth, large amount of bonds in Boston, most all of them here! [Laughter] He thinks he will take Chicago city sevens. Well, the gentlemen who puts his ten thousand dollars in United States fours gets only four hundred dollars a year, and the other gentleman is quite justified, in the general view, in trying to get seven per cent., and so he takes his ten thousand dollars in Chicago city sevens. Now, of course, in the city of Boston, where everything is done just according to the square, [laughter] where sin has not entered and guile is unknown [laughter],—of course, in this city of Boston, the gentleman who took the ten thousand dollars of Chicago city sevens will go the very next day to the assessors of the city of Boston and tell them he has got them! [Laughter.] You all do that way.! You would not think of buying a city bond, or any security whatever, without immediately advising the assessors that you had got them, and ask them to tax them. [Laughter.] Well, honest as we are down in Maine, we do not always do that. My judgment is, we don't get a great deal of that sort of thing taxed by your assessors even. It is a kind of property that is very hard to get hold of, generally kept in a little tin trunk with a patent lock, and it is so easy to place it in a by-way place. It is in your wife's bureau drawer, and it is the property of your brother that lives in Colorado [laughter]; or your son left it with you when he went to California, or it is the property of your widowed sister in Europe. The truth is, that the vast mass of that kind of property escapes taxation, and I am afraid that the gentleman who buys that ten thousand dollars of Chicago city sevens would not go right away to the city assessors to Boston, but he would quietly tuck it it away and get seven hundred dollars for his ten thousand dollars annually. Now, to place him exactly the same as the government bond man, he should pay three hundred dollars taxes. Which of these two men do you think has really paid his tax, the man who took the ten thousand dollars of government fours, agreeing to take only four per cent., because taxation had been taken out in advance and the rate made low by reason of that fact, or the man who takes the seven per cents, and runs for luck as to whether the assessors will find him out or not. [Applause.]

But suppose you could tax the government bond. Suppose, for example, that government to-morrow by proclamation would say that its bonds were taxable, do you suppose there would be a long procession in Boston with little bank trunks under their arms going to the assessors' office and presenting them for taxation? This whole idea of taxing government bonds proceeds upon the absolutely wrong assumption that if you had the power of taxing them you would do it. Why don't you tax the man with the Chicago city sevens? Why don't you tax all bonds whose interest is paid by coupons? In the State of Maine we have a debt of seven and a half millions. Three millions of these bonds are quite well known to be held in the State, yet there never has a hundred thousand of them turned up for taxes yet. Now, the government of the United States, if it would make its bonds taxable, of course, it would have to pay six per cent on them, and all you would realize would be that the people of the United States would have to raise two per cent more, that is, one-half more than they now have to raise by taxation. It is only yesterday, it is only thirteen years, since 1865, when the annual interest on the bonds of the United States amounted to $144,000,000. To-day it is reduced down to $96,000,000. If the funding process goes forward and we get—as we shall get if the finances of the country are left undisturbed—a solid and established basis for our national finances, the whole of the United States debt, inside of five years, will be in United States four per cents, and then your taxation will have $30,000,000 more taken off of it. If the United States to-day should increase the rate of interest on her bonds and give you the power to tax them you would have to raise to meet the additional interest, you would have to raise fifty per cent more to pay the interest, and then I should like to see you chase the bondholders to get back the taxes. [Applause and laughter.]

There is a good deal said in the greenback discussion of to-day about the government of the United States producing the panic and the hard times by contracting the currency. Well, that is a question simply of fact. It is simply a question of whether it is so or not, and I undertake to say that on the day the panic struck this country, the eighteenth of September, 1873, five years ago, there was a larger paper circulation in the country that day than there has been at any time since the war closed, with the exception of a very few months in 1867; and if there had been any virtue in a paper circulation to save us from any financial troubles, we should never have been placed in that condition. I know that the argument proceeds on this: that the seven-thirty bonds that were circulating in the country, they say were used as money and were made legal tender, and these were retired. The old compound interest notes, which were circulating to the amount of one hundred and eighty millions, were retired and that in this way the government contracted the currency to $400,000,000. Well, now, any gentleman here who ever handled a compound interest note or seven-thirty note knows very well that they never circulated as money. Any man knows that an interest-bearing security can not circulate as money, because as the interest accumulates the holders will not part with them. But I am perfectly willing, for the sake of argument, to grant what these gentlemen say, that these were retired. They were because the government had promised that they should be converted into long bonds, and the promise was kept. And if any gentleman of the greenback persuasion is greatly troubled by the contraction of the currency that resulted from that, let me say, for his consolation that every one of those bonds which has been paid by the government is here to-night. They are all among us. There never has been a time since the war closed when so large a proportion of the United States bonds were among the American people as to night. [Applause.] They have been coming home from abroad in tens of millions and hundreds of millions, and they are here. They are here as four, four and a half or five per cents. and these bonds are just as good for currency and for payment of debts as were the seven-thirties or the compound interest notes. But this whole idea is an absurdity. These notes never circulated as money, never in the world. They are to-day just as much, and if the United States were to take take account of its money to-night, according to the Greenback way of calculating, it would foot up two thousand three hundred and ninety millions of currency.

I hold in my hands the currency of the United States. I hold in one hand money, and in the other currency. That is money [holding up a gold piece]; it has been money a long time. [Laughter.] If any gentleman knows any history of literature that existed very long before that was spoken of, he is better read than I am. Moses didn't manage to get any reference to it in the first chapter of Genesis, but he brought it in to the second. [Laughter.] He said: "The gold of the land of Havilah was good." [Laughter.]

It was not a bit better than the gold of the land of California. It is the same, and silver is its younger brother; belongs to the same family. They are permanent forms of money, have existed for hundreds of years, for thousands of years, and will exist for thousands of years to come. [Applause.] The Toledo platform entirely abolishes this from the list of valuable things in exchange. They say they want one form of legal tender, and only one, and that paper. They had rather have the paper than the gold, according to the Toledo platform. I wish I could see one of the most intense disciples, strongest in the faith of the Toledo platform, offered by his debtor behind the door a thousand dollars in bills or a thousand in coin. He would make your hair stand on end with the rapidity with which he would grab the coin. [Loud laughter and applause.] One of the theories is that this derives its whole value from the stamp.

Why, if you had that gold stamped by the poorest government in the world it is just as good as that stamped by the United States. [Applause.] You trade between Boston and the river La Plata a good deal. You send out cargoes to Rio Janeiro and Buenos Ayres. You will take in exchange the gold of that country? Will you take their greenbacks? [Laughter.] Buenos Ayres ought to be the very paradise of Greenbackers. Their notes are only worth two and a half cents on a dollar. [Loud laughter.] Their gold is just as good as the gold of the United States. [Loud applause.]

When we come to stamps; the United States stamps this paper, and it says on the face that the United States will pay the bearer ten dollars. Now, mark you, it does not say the United States will pay the bearer "on demand." They tried that, as I said at the outset of my remarks, at the beginning of the war, and they found that the government of the United States might not be able to pay on demand. So in issuing this paper they do not say "on demand," but on the faith and honor of a great people the United States will pay the bearer. There is a good deal of force in the way that is said. When you give me a note you say you will "promise" to pay. The United States don't say they promise to pay, but they say they will, [applause], and they reserve to themselves the right to say when. In the month of January, 1875, they said that four years from that time, on the first day of January, 1879, any man who held one of their obligations could go to any sub-treasury of the United States and get his money if he wanted to.]Applause.] Then, of course, the minute you can get it you don't want it. The argument on the other side is that this is a very fair promise. Why, they say that the Republicans boast that they have got two hundred millions in coin; and, they say, there is three hundred and forty-six millions of greenbacks. How in the world are you going to redeem three hundred and forty-six millions in greenbacks with two hundred millions in gold? That wise argument proceeds on the assumption that every man in the United States will be at the Treasury doors on New Year's day next with his little box under his arm. [Laughter.]

A Greenbacker down in Portland, Maine, advanced this same argument to a stiff, hard-headed old Democrat, the other day. The old Democrat said to him: "Well, you are a smart fellow. You have got forty thousand people in Portland, haven't you?" "Yes, sir." "They will all want coffins some time in the order of nature, won't they?" "Yes." "Well, you don't keep forty thousand coffins stuck up here all the time, do you?" [Laughter and applause.] It is kind of a cold-blooded argument, but I will lay it off on the Democrat. [Laughter.]

The modern Greenbacker don't propose to say that he will pay twenty dollars. This modern advanced school, this new light that has dawned on the world in the shape of financial science, does not propose to put on the face of the greenback that the United States will pay twenty dollars to the bearer, but that this is twenty dollars. It does not need to be paid, they say, for it rests on the resources of a great people. A rich man's note need not be paid! The average man had rather take a poor man's note that will be paid than a rich man's which won't be paid. There is no arguing with a man who believes such stuff.

An argument proceeds on the basis that you must have a certain definition of terms. A dollar is a well-known thing—as absolute a thing as a pitcher, or a glass, or a table. The Statutes of the United States of 1791, drafted by Alexander Hamilton and signed by George Washington, define what a dollar is in silver and in gold. But the Greenbackers have a trick worth two of that, and they say this piece of paper is twenty dollars. Why not hold it up and say, this is a horse, and mount it? [Laughter.] No greater stretch of the imagination; just as easy to say one as the other. When you hear that you have got inside the realms—I want to speak with respect of all men—but I was going to say, inside the realms of lunatics. Those who think to get this paper into circulation reckon entirely without their host. They can not force it on the people beyond the existing volume of debt at the time it is issued, and subsequent transactions will be in coin. We are to-day doing business on a coin basis largely. Obligations are given and taken in coin, and the business of the country will be driven to it, because no people in the world can stand a currency which is liable to be shifted and changed with the annual meeting of anybody, whether it is the Congress of the United States or any other body. You can not do business on that basis. No man in Boston will engage to sell or deliver or accept or receive any commodity a year hence, at any price, with an impending session of Congress that may contract or expand the currency. The balance of foreign trade within the past few years has been steadily growing in favor of this country, and gold will continue to flow here in exchange for our exports. Hemlock bark goes to a tannery. Every commodity goes to the place where it is most useful. Gold piled up in this country, earning nothing, will inevitably flow out where it is used. There is nothing in the world so sure or proved more frequently than that the moment a country is on the point of specie payment gold flows in where it is in demand. It would flow here, even against the balance of trade. But with the balance of trade in our favor we are in better position to maintain specie payments in our business than any other country in the world, not excepting England. [Applause.]

I don't know exactly what you find in the shade of arguments in Massachusetts, but in Maine we have the example of France held up to us in all shapes. You would have supposed that if there was a paradise in this world it was in France. Yet there the laborer receives only thirty-one cents a day for his toil. These gentlemen tell us that we are in the condition that France was, and that the financial management of the country has been against the interest of the people. I have alwas said to these gentlemen that there was a great difference between the condition of France and of this country. In the first place France paid for a licking and we paid for a victory. [Applause.]

All the statements about the finances of France are based on misrepresentations. France has managed her finances with extraordinary ability, but in directly the opposite course to that indicated by the Greenbackers. During all her troubles she never issued a dollar in public money. As soon as her thousand million of dollars were paid she forced her great bank back into specie payments, and they have been on a specie basis for four years, and the flow of gold into France from England even in the last year has been almost marvelous. The gold and silver currency in France, per capita, is almost marvelous. But in France they have not been able to approach our record on the national debt. In the last ten years we have reduced our debt from twenty-eight hundred millions to a little over twenty hundred millions. France's debt is forty-six hundred millions—double ours and six hundred millions more; nearly three times our bonded debt. And now the peasantry of France are working at that great indemnity which they are compelled to pay. Commend us to France, if you please, but at a long distance. [Applause.]

There is another fact which retards the prosperity of this country, and it is this agitation about the currency. There is not a man here to-night who thinks he knows definitely what is going to happen. You have a general feeling that something is impending, that a session of Congress will be much like a visitation of yellow fever or pestilence, that it will carry destuction in its way, and that all business must wait upon its deliberations. There is in the country a feeling of anxiety produced wholly by the uncertainty about the currency. There never was a stronger basis of currency in the United States than now. We have three hundred and forty-six millions of greenbacks which may be reduced to three hundred millions. The last Congress stopped the reduction at three hundred and forty-six. They did it on the theory that it would be a much less sum than we need of paper money. In addition to that is the national bank currency which regulates the amount necessary for trade. It is said that we must have a currency in this country that is abundant. I agree to that. We want just as abundant currency in this country as can be kept at the redeemable point in coin. The currency is not too much if we can redeem it. [Applause.] Now, those gentlemen who protest against the national bonds having great advantages are the same who are demanding a liberal supply of paper money. But do you suppose a bank is going to be run purely for the accommodation of the public, without any profit? You must base your currency on some law that will adapt it to the necessities of trade.

Now we are just at this critical point. We are just at the point where we would begin to do a solid business. Gentlemen talk about the hard times as if legislation could have prevented them. What did the war do? Nine thousand million dollars, on both sides the line, were destroyed property. Just think of that! And our energy has been so amazing that for nearly ten years after the war we pursued our work without any great loss coming upon us and making us reflect upon what was gone. Now we are wondering whether anything is retarding us.

You cannot strike out 9,000,000,000 without forcing a great deal of hard times to make it up again. We have gone through five years of the trial and have nearly approached the point where the whole discussion in regard to our currency is to be settled. We are nearly on Pisgah's top and seem to enter the promised land, when up steps a Greenbacker, and says: "Don't go in there. Come back and wander forty years more in the wilderness with us." That is the very question to night, whether this people has wisdom enough to go forward, or whether it will turn back and undo all that has been so well none. When a man is addressed on the side of self-interest to join in this extraordinary crusade for lowering values, and the destruction of everything we hold sacred in property, he is addressed by an argument that is utterly unsound.

We are called upon to overturn the bondholder in this country. The Greenbackers always proceed on the theory that bondholders are a peculiar class; that these men are sitting in some high places and oppressing the rest of us, and it is our first duty to get up and destroy these bondholders. Do you ever reflect who these bondholers are? These Wall street men are not bondholders. They would laugh at the idea of being invited to put their money at four per cent. When you strike down the bondholders you don't strike down that class of men. Who are the bondholders? Every man who has a deposit in a savings bank. A very large proportion of his savings are invested in bonds. Every man who has a marine insurance, fire insurance or life insurance for the surplus funds of these enterprises are largely invested in government bonds, and that is what guarantees the insurance. So you may go on. You cannot strike down the holder of United States bonds without striking down every poor woman who has a deposit in a savings bank, every man who has a life insurance policy for the benefit of his wife and children, who may be his widow and orphans. [Applause.] My friends, you cannot do this question. It is the question of questions. Everything else can away till it is settled. Everything else must await till it is settled. [Applause.] The future waits for it. All present political issues wait for it. It is a question so vital that it is the business of every man to be at and doing. [Applause.] There are points on which I have differed from the Republicans of Massachusetts, and shall do, but on this I am bound to work to the end till the victory shall come for the which concerns every man in the land. [Long applause.] The longer we postpone, the worse it will be for us. We have fought in Maine, for the time, a losing battle, but I tell you, gentlemen, as old Lyman Beecher said, we have only stepped back to spit on our hands for a fresh grip. [Applause.]

Now you who are citizens of the weakiest state of the Union, per capita, it for you to stand and win the victory. If Massachusetts falls back, I do not say the battle is lost, for this is a battle that never can be lost, for whatever we may do in error we must pay it in suffering both as individuals and as a people we come back to hard pan; but if Massachusetts stands firm we shall find one strong rock to which to attach our anchor in the future.

The Third Congressional District Nomination.

The Republican State Central Committee in regular session on Thursday the seventeenth instant, on motion of Colonel W. M. Burwell, and seconded by Colonel James Lewis adopted the following:

WHEREAS, The resolutions adopted by this Committee have conferred upon the several committees of the Congressional Districts exclusive authority to direct the nominations for Congress in each district, and

Whereas, It appears from the proceedings of the Republican Convention of the of the Third Congressional District, held at Bayou Goula, on the twelfth October, 1878, that Mr. Robert O. Hebert received a majority of the votes thereof, and is duly certified thereby, as having been nominated as the Republican candidate for that district, therefore

Resolved, That all Republicans of the Third Congressional District are hereby instructed to bestow their united influence in favor of Mr. R. O. Hebert, the regular candidate of the Republican party for the Third Congressional District.

Resolved, That the president of this committee is hereby instructed to communicate copies of these resolutions to the presidents of the several Republican committees of the several parishes comprising the Third Congressional District.

MARRIED.

PALAO—SPRIGGS.—EDWARD PALAO to Miss REBECCA SPRIGGS, eldest daughter of James Spriggs, at St. Mary's Church, by the Reverend Father Brady. Both of this city. No cards.

Algiers, La., October 18, 1878.

Sixth Congressional District Convention.

WEST BATON ROUGE, October 14, 1878.

By virtue of the authority in me vested as Chairman of the Republican Congressional Committee for the Sixth Congressional District of the State of Louisiana, which authority has been enlarged by a resolution adopted by the State Central Committee of the Republican party of this State, at a regular meeting held on the seventeenth day of September, 1878, I do hereby call a convention of the delegates duly elected to assemble at the Court House, in West Baton Rouge parish, on

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1878,

at 12 o'clock m., for the purpose of placing before the Republican voters of the Sixth Congressional District a candidate to represent said Sixth Congressional District of the State of Louisiana in the Congress of the United States, and for the purpose of transacting such other business as may be brought before said convention.

The representation in the convention is as follows, to wit:

	Delegates
Avoyelles	[illegible]
Baton Rouge, East	[illegible]
Baton Rouge, West	[illegible]
Feliciana, East	[illegible]
Feliciana, West	[illegible]
Livingston	[illegible]
Pointe Coupee	[illegible]
St. Helena	[illegible]
St. Landry	[illegible]
St. Tammany	[illegible]
Tangipahoa	[illegible]
Washington	[illegible]
Total	[illegible]

The credentials (or copies) of the duly elected delegates will be forwarded to me, directed to Baton Rouge, La.

OSCAR HOLT,
Chairman of the Sixth Congressional District Republican Committee.

ORLEANS CENTRAL RELIEF COMMITTEE.

ORLEANS CENTRAL RELIEF COMMITTEE,
Customhouse, New Orleans, October 18, 1878.

The ORLEANS CENTRAL RELIEF COMMITTEE respectfully acknowledges the receipt of the following donations:

From Julius G. Tucker, Esq., Brownsville, Texas, proceeds of entertainment for relief of yellow fever sufferers	$164
From J. G. Emerson, Esq., Brockton, Massachusetts, through H. & N. Samory	50 00
From H. L. Jacques, Bryan, Williams county, Ohio, per J. W. Rose	3 00
From Mayor Hopper, Jersey City, N. J., through National Park Bank, N. Y., through Hon. Ed. Pilsbury, Mayor	500 00
From Bella Union Theatre, consigner, San Francisco, Cal., through Wells, Fargo & Co.'s Express, through Hon. Ed. Pilsbury, Mayor	200 00
From two citizens of Madison, Wis., who do not wish their names known, through State Treasurer of Wisconsin, through Hon. Ed. Pilsbury, Mayor	15 00

ALBERT BALDWIN, Treasurer.