TERMS OF SUBSCRIPTION.

One Year...$2 00
Six Months.................................... 1 25
City Subscribers, served by Carrier. 2 50

☞ Names invariably discontinued at expiration of time paid for, unless renewed.

THE WEEKLY CLARION.

VOLUME XLII. JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI, WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1879. NUMBER 53.

TERMS OF ADVERTISING:

Space.	1w.	2w.	3w.	4w.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
One inch	1 00	2 00	3 00	4 00	9 00	15 00	20 00
Two in.	2 00	3 00	4 00	6 00	12 00	20 00	30 00
Three in.	3 00	5 00	7 00	9 00	15 00	25 00	40 00
Four in.	4 00	6 00	9 00	12 00	20 00	35 00	60 00
Five in.	5 00	7 50	12 00	15 00	30 00	50 00	75 00

☞ Special, or local notices, 20 cents per line each insertion.

The New England Laws of a Former Day.

In the course of researches among the mouldering records of a former time, we came across an interesting resume of what, in slang phrase, was known as the Blue Laws of Connecticut. It was a nick-name, suggested by the old English phrase "blue-devils," and the vulgarism to "look blue" under calamity and sorrow. The peculiarity of these enactments was that they interfered with the privileges of conscience, which, with enlightened, high-minded people, are like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched; and pressed severely upon private judgment. The intermeddling spirit which these laws produced, though they have long since been consigned to "the tomb of the Capulets," and their authors

—"are dust,
And their souls with the saints we trust"—

has survived, and its outcroppings are seen in the propensity of the New England communities, to regulate the concerns of their neighbors of other States. A criminal offence of any kind cannot be reported, for example, from Mississippi, Alabama or any other State, particularly if it is Southern, without the men, women and children of the country where Blue Lawism has been bred in the bone, undertaking to sit in judgment upon it and to prescribe the punishment that ought to be inflicted. But the essence of these laws, was intolerance, and it is to this spirit, coupled with intermeddling that has produced the sectional troubles that have disturbed the peace of the Union since its foundation. Believing especially in the Old Testament, they ignored and despised the mercy and charity exhibited by the Saviour as taught in the New. Here are some examples of these laws:

"I. If any man, after legall conviction, shall have or worship any other god but the Lord God, *hee shall bee put to death* (Deut. xiii. 6; xvii. 2; Exod. xxii. 20)."

"III. If any man shall blaspheme the name of God the Father, Sonne, or Holy Ghost, with direct, express, presumptuous, or high-handed blasphemy, or shall curse any one in the like manner, *hee shall bee put to death* (Lev. xxiv. 15, 16)."

"X. If any man stealeth a man or mankinde, *hee shall bee put to death* (Exod. xxi. 16)."

"XI. If any man rise up by false witnesse, willingly and of purpose, to take away any man's life, *hee shall bee put to death* (Deut. xix. 16)."

"XIII. If any childe or children above sixteene yeares old, and of sufficient understanding, shall curse or smite his or their naturall father or mother, *hee or they shall bee put to death*, unless it can bee sufficiently testified that the parents have beene very unchristianly negligent in the education of such children, as to provoke them by extreme and cruell correction, that they have been forced thereunto to preserve themselves from death (or) maiming (Exod. xxi. 17-25; Lev.)"

"XIV. If any man have a stubborn and rebellious sonne of sufficient yeares and understanding—viz: sixteene yeares of age—which will not obey the voice of his father, or the voice of his mother, and that, when they have chastened him, will not hearken unto them, then may his father and mother, being his naturall parents, lay hold on him, and bring him to the magistrates assembled in courte, and testifie there that their sonne is stubborn and rebellious, and will not obey their voice and chastisement, but lives in sundry notorious crimes, *such a sonne shall bee put to death* (Deut. xx.)"

For minor offences such penalties as the following were prescribed:

It was ordered that no person under the age of twenty-one years, nor any other (however old) who had not already accustomed himself to the use of tobacco, should be permitted to smoke or snuff or chew, unless he brought a certificate from a physician that it was useful for his health. Any one who smoked either in his own house or publicly on the streets, was to be fined sixpence for each offence on the testimony of a single witness. It was ordered also that "such fines should be paid without gainsaying."

This law remained in operation, so far as it applied to smoking in the public streets, until within living memory in the city of Boston and elsewhere, the fine for disobedience having been raised from sixpence to a dollar.

Slander was punished by fine, whipping, and imprisonment. Unchastity in man or woman was punished by *whipping through eleven towns.* After a time, when it was found that the penalty offended the conscience of the people as being too severe, it was reduced to whipping, through *three* towns only.

Burglary and highway robbery were treated in a peculiar manner. Any person who committed these crimes was for the first offence to be branded on the forehead with the letter B. For the second offence he was to have a second letter B imprinted indelibly on his front, and to be severely whipped. If he fell into the offence a third time, he was to be put to death, as incorrigible. If the first offence were committed on the Lord's day, the offender, in addition to the branding, was to have one of his ears cut off. If the second offence were in like manner committed on the "Sabbath," the remaining ear was to be cut off.

Contempt of court is an offence in all civilized countries, but it was left to the Puritans to make contempt of a preacher, or of his sermon, a crime to be severely dealt with. It was ordered in the Blue Laws that if any one within the jurisdiction of Connecticut "should bear himself contemptuously towards the word preached," or towards "the messengers (ministers) that are called to dispense the same, he should for the first offence be publicly and severely reprimanded by the magistrates, and bound over for his good behaviour; and for the second or any subsequent offence, he should either pay a fine of £5 to the public treasury, or in default "stand for two hours openly upon a block or stoole foure foot high, with a paper fixed upon his breast, written with capital letters, *an open and obstinate contemner of God's holy ordinance,*' in order that others might feare and bee ashamed of breaking out into the like wickedness." Under the same clause it was ordered that any person who, without just and necessary cause, withdrew himself from attendance at public worship, should be fined five shillings for every such offence.

The use of imprecations against one's self or any other person, was punishable by fine of ten shillings. This has been cited as a remarkable instance of lenity on the part of the Puritans, inasmuch as in England the penalty was more severe; and any irreverent allusion to the Deity in a play was punished by a fine of £10. Possibly the Puritans, had they permitted stage plays, would have judged such irreverent allusions to be as fully deserving of death as filial disobedience or other crimes and offences to which they adjudged the same penalty.

The records of many convictions under these laws are still preserved in Connecticut; and in Massachusetts, where a very similar, if not in all respects identical, code was adopted. The worthy Justice Ludlow, to whom was intrusted the task of codification, was shortly after its completion publicly called "Justass Ludlow," by one Captain Stone, to whose taste the laws were too "blue" to be agreeable. For this offence the Captain was fined £100, banished from the colony, and prohibited to return without the Governor's permission, *under pain of death.*

Among other convictions, the following that took place before the arrival of Sir Edward Andros and the establishment of a milder code of government, may serve as specimens of Blue justice:—

Nicholas Taner, servant to Mr. Perry, was publicly whipped for being drunk and abusing his master.

Isaiah, Captain Turner's son, was fined £5 for being drunk on the Lord's Day.

William Bromfield was set in the stocks for profaning the Lord's Day, and stealing the wine of Mr. Malborn, his master.

David Anderson was publicly whipped for being drunk; and Goodman Leone was whipped and sent out of the plantation, being not only a disorderly person himself, but an encourager of others to be drunk.

George Spenser, being profane and disorderly in his whole conversation, and an abettor of others to sin, was whipped and sent out of the plantation; and John Proute, Henry Brazier and William Bromfield, for joining in a conspiracy with the said Spenser "to carry away the Cock to Virginia," were also sentenced to be whipped, but not banished. Bromfield, being an old offender, was sentenced to "wear irons during the magistrate's pleasure."

Thomas Parsons, servant to Elias Parkmore, was whipped for his sinful dalliance and folly with Lydia Browne.

John Lobell, the miller, for sinful dalliance with a little wench of Goodman Hall's, was whipped.

Ruth Acie, a covenant servant to Mr. Malborn, was whipped for stubbornness, lying, stealing from her mistress, and yielding to dalliance with William Harding.

Martha Malbon (daughter of Mr. Malbon) for consenting to go in the night to a venison feast with William Harding, and yielding to dalliance with the said Harding, was whipped.

Goodman Hunt and his wife, for keeping the counsels of the said William Harding, baking him a pasty and a plum cake, and keeping company with him on the Lord's Day, and she suffering Harding to kiss her, were ordered to be sent out of the town within one month—"yea, in a shorter time, if any miscarriage (misbehaviour) be found in them." It would be interesting to learn what was the ultimate fate of this Don Giovanni Harding, but the records of the colony are silent on the subject.

Josias Plaistowe, for stealing four baskets of corn from the Indians, was ordered to return them eight baskets, to be fined £5, and hereafter to be called Josias Plaistowe, and not *Mr.* Josias Plaistowe, as heretofore.

Phillip Ratcliffe, a servant to Mr. Craddock being convicted of most foul and scandalous tenets against the Church and the Government, was sentenced to be "whipped, to have both his ears cut off, to be fined £40, and to be banished the plantation." All of which were forthwith executed.

Thomas Petit, for *suspicion* of slander, idleness, and stubbornness, was ordered to be severely whipped, and to be kept in hold.

John Wedgewood, *for being in the company of drunkards* (sic.), was ordered to be set in the stocks.

John Kitchen, for showing books which he was commanded to bring to the Governor, and forbidden to show to any other, was fined ten shillings.

In the matter of dress—although in this respect the Puritans were by no means peculiar, and might have found abundant precedents in the practice of the English sovereigns up to and during the reign of Elizabeth—they objected to the extravagance of servants, and forbade them to attire themselves like their masters and their mistresses. A New England ordinance declared:—

"That intolerable excesse and bravery hath crept in upon us, and that it was a matter of detestation and dislike that men of mean conditions and callings should take upon them the garb of gentlemen by wearing gold or silver lace, or buttons, or points at their knees, to walk in great boots; or women of the same ranke, to wear silk or tiffany hoods or scarfs; *which, though allowable to persons of greater estates or more liberal education, was intolerable in persons of such low condition*"

In the Blue Laws of New Haven, which were not, however, drawn up or codified by the State of Connecticut, it was ordered that no one should "travel, cook victuals, make beds, sweep house, cut hair, or shave on the Sabbath day; that no woman should kiss her child on the Sabbath or Fasting day; that no one should keep Christmas or Saint days; and that every male should have his hair cut round according to a cap." To "make any motion of marriage to any man's daughter or maid-servant, not having first obtained leave and consent of the parents and masters so to do, was made punishable "either by fine or whipping, or both, at the discretion of the bench," and according to the gravity or aggravation of the offence.

Such were the laws of the New England communities in former times. The laws have become obsolete; but, as before remarked, the intermeddling and intolerant spirit which produced them still lives, and develops itself malignantly in the agitations that have convulsed the country from time to time.

He Was Growing Uneasy.

"What is the matter, Alfred? What do you find so interesting in the river that you stare at it so fixedly?"

"My wife is in bathing and took a dive from that boat out there, and she has been under such a time that I'm getting uneasy?"

"How long has she been under?"

"About two hours—it wasn't quite eight o'clock when she went in."

"Does he know anything?" anxiously inquired a friend, bending over the body of the man who had just fallen from the roof of a house. "Don't know I'm sure," the physician replied, "He never did know anything, but you can't tell what effect the fall may have had upon him until he regains consciousness."

The wind and our esteemed contemporary, the Herald, always find something to blow about.

The man who cannot ride in a carriage when he goes on a spree cannot afford to have the gout.

A novel scheme—a proposition to write a romance.

The Maintenance of the Legal Tender Quality of Greenbacks.

THE RESTORATION OF SILVER COINAGE.

Speech Delivered in Favor of these Propositions by Hon. John T. Morgan, of Alabama, in the United States Senate, December 17, 1879.

Mr. Morgan. I hold in my hand a resolution which I desire to present to the Senate this morning, and I ask the indulgence of the Senate while I submit some remarks upon it. I will send the resolution to the Clerk's desk and have it read for the information of the Senate.

The Vice-President. The resolution will be reported.

The Chief Clerk read as follows:

Resolved by the Senate, That the continuance of the existing volume of United States Treasury notes, with their legal tender quality preserved, and the maintenance of their equivalency in value with coin, is demanded by the present necessities of trade, commerce, and industry; and that the full restoration of silver coinage to an equality with gold is necessary to secure to the people of the United States a sufficient and permanent supply of money to maintain our national prosperity.

By unanimous consent, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution.

Mr. Morgan. Mr. President, the resolution which I offer is antagonized in principle to the joint resolution already referred to the Committee on Finance, which was offered by the honorable Senator from Delaware, [Mr. Bayard,] and which I will read:

That from and after the passage of this resolution the Treasury notes of the United States shall be receivable for all dues to the United States excepting duties on imports, and shall not be otherwise a legal tender; and any of said notes hereafter reissued shall bear this superscription.

In the city of New York this resolution is strongly supported by the classes that control the large mercantile, commercial, and banking interests of the country.

Their opinions are set forth in a petition to Congress, which has been largely signed, as we are informed, by the newspapers, asking for the passage of the joint resolution of the Senator from Delaware. I will refer to that petition as an expression of public sentiment, and although it has not been presented, I hope there is no impropriety in referring to it, as a popular movement, in advance of its actual presentation here. It is useful, as a public fact, to the proper argument of the resolution that I propose to offer. I will refer to the petition as it appears in the public prints.

In discussing the resolution I propose to offer, the merits of the resolution of the Senator from Delaware and the petitions that support it seem to be drawn directly in question.

Stimulated, if not overborne, by a strong demand for radical legislation in reference to our financial system coming from the great center of banking power, there is danger that we shall go too fast and too far in the assertion of theories that we may hold to with strong convictions, but which cannot be enforced at this time and under existing circumstances without serious injury to the people.

We are too prone to believe that our present prosperity is permanent, and I fear we are too confident that it will be maintained.

Starvation in Ireland and depression in Germany and France and England because of the reduction of their volume of money, shipped to this country to purchase food, have resulted, in the usual manner, in putting the price of labor in those countries down to a very low figure. Already they are beginning to undersell us in our own markets, and they must be able to cripple us seriously in foreign markets. American patriotism, like the patriotism of all other people, is not severely shocked at being permitted to purchase foreign goods at low prices. If foreign countries undersell us here they will get our gold to pay the balance of trade. This condition of affairs may well be expected to come around at no distant day, and it seems to me that it is unwise to refuse to recognize its possibility. When this does occur we shall have need of all the good, sound money we have or can get, and possibly more, to prevent a most calamitous revulsion in every department of trade and production.

The petition to Congress to which I have referred is signed by many of the leading capitalists of New York, and represents largely the best and most successful business talent in that great city. It is entitled to respect because of the character of the signers, and to the gravest consideration because of the importance of the subject to which it refers.

The conspicuous absence of names, on the list of signatures, of men who represent the laboring classes and people engaged in small dealings—having little capital—informs us in the most distinct manner that it is the great capitalists and large dealers who are urging this movement.

The industrial classes are all content to earn United States legal-tender notes with their hard labors. But at the first moment after the people's credit has lifted this currency to par with gold, and indeed above par, a sudden and furious demand is made for its demonetization by the capitalists of our great monetary metropolis. I confess that I can discern no just cause for this movement at this time. If a reason ever existed why United States legal-tender currency should be abolished, it was when it was below par. It has cost the people untold losses, sorrows, and calamities to build up the credit of this money, in the face of repressive laws designed to keep it down, and when they have borne it in triumph to assured success, it must be destroyed at the bidding of those who fear its competition in business.

The people believe in the maxim that nothing in the shape of a promise to pay is money, in the true sense, that is not redeemable in coin; that a government that endeavors to pay its debts, as a matter of right, and not of contract, in fiat money, or in promises that are not to be redeemed, cannot have and is not entitled to have credit at home or abroad. And faithfully and patiently they have labored and suffered to act upon this maxim, and to provide for the redemption of all our promises in coin. They will be astonished to find that their honor and credit are suspected at the very moment when they began to redeem greenbacks with coin. The injustice of this reflection upon them becomes very cruel when we recur to the history of our public debt, and to the sacrifices it has cost the people to provide for it. A few of the most prominent facts are sufficient to illustrate the cruelty of this wrongful and unjust suspicion of the people.

In the beginning of our new financial system which sprung from the war greenbacks were the only public debts that we agreed to pay in coin. The great body of our interest-bearing debt was, by express agreement with every bondholder, payable, at our option, in coin or in our legal-tender currency. On the 25th of February, 1862, Congress enacted that "United States notes shall be received the same as coin, at their par value, in payment for any loans that may be hereafter sold or negotiated by the Secretary of the Treasury, and may be re-issued from time to time as the exigencies of the public interest shall require," and that they shall be receivable in payment of all taxes, except for duties on imports, &c., and of all claims against the United States, except for interest upon bonds and notes, which shall be paid in coin, and shall also be lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States, except duties on imports and interest as aforesaid. That law authorized the issue of one hundred and fifty millions of these Treasury notes and five hundred millions 6 per cent. bonds. On the 1st of March, 1862, Congress authorized the issue of 6 per cent. certificates of indebtedness for the whole amount of audited and settled demands against the United States, and on the 17th of March, 1862, it authorized the issue of any amount of certificates of indebtedness that the Secretary of the Treasury could sell for coin, upon such terms and at such rates as he might deem most advantageous to the public interests. On the 11th of July, 1862, an additional issue of legal tender notes was authorized to the amount of $ 50,000,000.

On the 17th of January, 1863, an issue of one hundred millions legal-tender Treasury notes was authorized. On the 3d of March, 1863, bonds to the amount of nine hundred millions, and four hundred and fifty millions in legal-tender Treasury notes, and fifty millions to redeem postal and revenue stamp currency were authorized. And by a supplementary act of March 3, 1864, bonds were authorized to be issued to the amount of two hundred millions in lieu of those authorized by the act of March, 3, 1863, "payable at any period not more than forty years from date in coin." This was the first express provision of law for the payment in coin of any of bonds, and that was limited to $200,000,000. On the 30th of June, 1864, the issue of four hundred millions was authorized, the interest payable in coin. On the 3d of March, 1865, the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to issue bonds to the amount of $600,000,000, "and the principal, or interest, or both, may be payable in coin or in other lawful money," at his discretion. So that in all these issues of bonds, the Secretary of the Treasury was required to issue only two hundred millions of bonds payable in coin, and was authorized at his discretion to issue six hundred millions of bonds payable in coin, or other lawful money. The great body of the national debt was subject to the provisions of the act of February 25, 1862, making Treasury notes legal tender and lawful money for their payment, and whoever bought these bonds took them subject to this law, which was a part of every such contract. And every bond that was issued contained an express contract providing for the description of money in which it was to be paid. Since these special contracts were made with the bond-holders we have changed their terms by converting all of them into bonds payable in coin. This was done by the Republican party on the 18th of March, 1869, by act of Congress, on the pretext of strengthening the public credit, and at the cost to our people of an additional burden of debt amounting to near six hundred millions of dollars. And then on the 14th of July, 1870, the grip of the vise was thus further intensified, as I will show by reading the statute:

Be enacted, &c., That the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized to issue, in a sum or sums not exceeding in the aggregate $200,000,000, coupon or registered bonds of the United States, in such forms as he may prescribe, and of denominations of $50, or some multiple of that sum, redeemable in coin of the present standard value, at the pleasure of the United States, after ten years from the date of their issue, and bearing interest, payable semi-annually in such coin, at the rate of 5 per cent. annum.

At the same time, and largely by this means, the greenback currency, which was redeemable in coin, was left to decline in value for the want of coin with which to redeem it. Under the act of Congress of April 12, 1866, greenbacks were required to be retired by being funded in bonds at the rate of not more than $10,000,000 within the first six months from the passage of the act, and not more than $4,000,000 monthly thereafter.

This process sent up the currency price of new bonds of 1865 from 111 in April, 1865, to 122 in April, 1869, and gold went down from 48 per cent. premium in April, 1865, to 35 per cent. in April, 1869. This was the result of restored confidence in the redeemability of our promises, not by the process of contraction, but through the faith of the people that our promises would at some time be kept. On the 4th of February, 1868, Congress suspended further contraction of the currency, and yet the premium on gold continued to sink from that time until greenbackers became its equivalent of value, in January, 1879. The coin resources of the Government had been set apart under a legislative mortgage of our customs receipts for the exclusive benefits of the bondholders, whose agreement was to accept greenbacks for much the greater part of their bonds, while the holders of greenbacks that were payable in coin were cut off from all hope of getting coin for them until after the lapse of many years. Of course they went down in the money market, and those who took them at par found them worth little more than about one-third of their face value in gold in July, 1864, while our bonds were selling at 118 in currency. It was the bad faith of the Government toward the people, and not the bad faith of the people toward the Government, that caused this terrible depreciation of the legal-tender currency. I do not claim that when we reach the period of peace and reaction we should have issued legal-tender currency equal in amount to our bonded debt, for the purpose even of converting into a non-interest-bearing debt, for I believe that such a policy would have recoiled upon our industries to an extent almost as injurious as it was to add $600,000,000 to the burden of the debt. But I do claim that the contract should have been allowed to remain as it was originally made, so that we could have had the advantage of the option to pay such part of the debt in greenbacks as we had in circulation in March, 1869.

It was a breach of plighted faith and a gross injustice to create an enormous demand of gold to pay one class of creditors a mere gratuity upon their untaxed bonds, while we caused another class, who held a different class of debts, redeemable in coin, to lose nearly two-thirds of the face value of their debts and pay the taxes to raise the gold for more fortunate people.

If these obligations had been left unchanged, every bondholder would have been the firm ally of every tax-payer, and of every holder of greenbacks in the effort to maintain them at par for gold. When the bondholders were bound by contract to accept greenbacks for their bonds, they were interested to uphold their value. When they were released from this obligation, the position was reversed, and they were more interested to reduce their value as much as possible be low the par of gold. And thus our people were "ground beneath the upper and nether millstone."

But all these advantages were not considered as being enough for the capitalists. They had gained great ascendency over the people, and it had naturally taken a political form. It entered into the State and demanded a share in the powers of government. It claimed to be able to control the election of a President; and it was. It demanded the further concession to its electoral power that its novated contract, which in express terms was payable "in coin of the standard value of the United States on the 14th day of July, 1870," should be paid only in gold coin. Silver was then legal tender for all sums, and our mines opened up to meet the necessities of an impoverished people almost as the waters rushed from the rock when smitten with the rod of Moses.

Silver was likely to dethrone gold from its imperial dominion, and the capitalist saw the victimized people preparing to supply a silver coinage from their mines for their own deliverence; and the Republican party on their demand demonetized silver. How did they do this fatal work? By exactly the means that are now attempted with reference to greenbacks—they simply destroyed its legal-tender quality. That was all they did, and it sunk and died; and when silver money was thus destroyed our bonds could only be paid in gold coin. Every other possible means of payment Congress had destroyed. The people still had United States notes with which they could pay their debts, one to another, because Congress had imparted to them the legal-tender quality. They were below the par of gold, and to that extent they were a constant loss to the people.

Again, when a President was to be elected, capitalists made another demand upon the Republican party, and it was granted. In 1875 they demanded that the volume of greenback currency should be contracted, and that of the national banks expanded. This demand was not made on the grounds that greenbacks were legal-tender currency, far from it. National-bank notes were redeemable in coin or in legal-tender paper money, at the option of the banks, and in these banks capital had established its citadel. The national bank was its keep and stronghold, where no enemy could prevail against capital. Its untaxed bonds drew interest there, and the Government, while paying interest on the whole sum of the bonds, paid to the bondholders, in advance, nine-tenths of that sum in notes to circulate as money, the final redemption of which in coin was guaranteed by the United States. The Government also gave the bondholders bank charters which they could use in any State or Territory, and then the exclusive monopoly of banking in any and every State; and to make this monopoly effectual and more valuable, the Government destroyed by its laws every State bank of issue by a direct tax of 10 per cent. upon its circulation. Greenback currency would have been long since destroyed but for its usefulness to the national banks as a means of redeeming their circulation. While greenbacks were below par the national banks used them to redeem their circulation and to keep up their reserves. As soon as greenbacks attained the par value of gold, they ceased to be a convenience to the national banks of heavy capital, such as they have in New York, for the redemption of their issues, and they then became an obstruction to their business. They occupy a field of circulation nearly as large as that covered by national-bank circulation, and if they can be driven out the national banks will have all that field to themselves. And so it seems they must go.

For several years very strenuous efforts were made by capitalists to force a contraction of greenback currency, with a view, as they asserted, to bring the sum of that currency within the capacity of the Government to redeem it in gold. It was to their interest then, as it is to the interest of capitalists now, to get the entire volume of legal-tender money under their control, and until gold and silver became abundant, they being compelled to retain some greenbacks with which to supply a fund for the redemption of their own issues, held on to its legal-tender quality, and struck boldly for the contraction of its volume. This outcry against the volume of this currency was always a pretext to satisfy the country with its removal from the field of competition with the national-bank circulation. How could it be expected that any man would believe this pretense while we were constantly increasing the volume of our interest-bearing debt payable in gold, and increasing our national-bank circulation which the Government is as much bound to redeem in gold as it is to redeem greenbacks in gold? All these debts alike rest on the credit of the people, and their credit was as good to sustain greenbacks at par for gold as it was to sustain one thousand seven hundred and ninety millions of bonds at from 2 to 6 per cent. premium over gold, and as it is to sustain the constantly increasing volume of national-bank currency at par. The contraction policy of 1868, which was such a cruel and ruinous visitation upon the country, leaving the whole land strewn with wrecks of families of good and frugal men brought to poverty and want, and the policy now urged in this petition, and in the resolutions it asks us to adopt, to destroy the legal-tender quality of this currency, are alike in principle, and will, as I fear, result in like disasters to the people.

The contraction policy of 1875 did not renew these evils in their full effect for many reasons, one of which was that a series of very hard years had prevented the extension of credit, but the principal reason was that there was a pledge in the act of 1875—the resumption act—that the volume of greenbacks should not be reduced by compulsory funding below three hundred millions, and after January, 1879, the people were permitted to decide for themselves whether they would accept its redemption in coin. When Congress prohibited the destruction of greenbacks and required their reissue, they did not sink in value, but constantly appreciated, and this is the final proof that the people consider them as good as gold under any system of fair treatment.

Whenever any descriptions of money, whether silver or coin certificates, or greenbacks, or State bank issues, have come in competition with the national-bank currency, they have been assailed with violence, and abused with epithets and revilings, and have been either destroyed or else so crippled that they could not exert their proper influence in our national system of finance.

We have now reached the fifth act in the financial tragedy. The first four acts were under the management of the Republican party, namely: first, the change of the character of our debt from a "lawful money" contract to a coin contract through the demonetization of silver; third, the rapid and forced contraction of the volume of the greenback currency while we were expending the national-bank currency and increasing the public debt; fourth, the bankruptcy of the people and the desolation of the workshops, filling the land with tramps who were once good citizens; and the making bonfires of cities by compelling the employees of great corporation monopolies to fight for the bread they could not otherwise earn. These were the four acts of the tragedy in which the Republican party played all the parts. But most of the stock actors grew faint with overwork, and alarmed at the contemplation of the dreadful *denouement* that awaits them, and deserted the stage. Some of the great stars are also alarmed and are now attempting to conceal their deadly splendors in clouds of obscurity, and stand by to watch in utter silence, while others—the Democrats—are about to finish the performance.

The fifth act, the destruction of one-half of the legal-tender money that remains to the people, is left to the care of the Democratic party, which, it is supposed, will be compelled to complete the tragedy under a threat that, if they refuse, New York will withdraw its support. I prefer to let the Republicans play out their programme.

Their President, not the people's President, is already on the boards in the title role of the Great Pretender who comes forth with apparently desperate purpose to destroy the greenback currency which is the child of his own household, but reassures his alarmed confreres by telling them, in a stage whisper, that he is not dangerously in earnest, but only acting a part to frighten the Democrats into some wild folly. And their Secretary of the Treasury is stepping cautiously toward the stage to resume his character of "Artful Dodger," if the applause seems to justify the venture. Let them play it out and see whether these greater stars now in total eclipse will also come forth again.

Let them complete their work and appeal to a betrayed and ruined country for their reward.

After incalculable sufferings we have reached the point of resumption, and I rejoice at the fact, but deplore the cost of it. The people of the United States have resumed specie payments. Their confidence in their own credit has inspired all classes with the belief that their promises to pay are as good as coin, and that confidence, and only that, has brought us to resumption; and that confidence alone will enable us to maintain it. We know full well that with about four hundred and eighty millions of coin and bullion in the country we cannot pay the annual gold interest of $88,000,000 on the national bonded debt and redeem $683,336,000 of paper currency, but we know that we can, under existing laws, meet promptly every demand that will be made upon us for its redemption, and this fact makes every promise of the Government equivalent of gold.

Has this result been brought about by the pretext of resumption under which we agreed that on the 1st day of last January we would pay coin for greenbacks over a single counter in New York when presented in sums of not less than $50? As well might we say that the smallest outlet to the sea which helps to drain off the water of the Mississippi put into action the myriad fountain springs that suply a vast volume of water. The act of resumption only indicated a period of time at which our people would give expression to a common consent and understanding that all our promises should be considered as the equivalent of coin.

When our people uttered this great decree, it was impossible that any power could resist its influence, and it will stand good in despite of any effort of Congress to cast a new and darker shadow of discredit on their good faith by declaring that they are not to be trusted with the duty of keeping their promise at par with gold.

The Democratic party attempted to provide two aids to resumption, so as to make the burden easier upon the country. They succeeded over the veto of the President in securing the remonetization of silver. They restored to that coin its legal-tender quality, but were prevented from restoring the coinage of silver to its former equality of privilege with gold. Still, what they succeeded in accomplishing was the most efficient, if not the indispensable, preparation for the resumption of coin payment. They fenced in the Treasury with a barricade of silver, and that saved it from exhaustion. It was only when we had made it possible for the Secretary of the Treasury to pay out silver to the holders of our paper currency when they should demand gold that he was ever able to venture to attempt resumption in its restricted form over a single counter in New York.

The Democratic party attempted also as a measure to facilitate resumption, and as a measure of justice to the people as well, to compel by law the Secretary of the Treasury to accept our legal-tender paper money at the custom-houses in payment of duties on imports. This measure was opposed by the great body of the Republican party and by its President and Secretary of the Treasury, and was defeated. And yet within a very short time after Congress had adjourned the Secretary of the Treasury, by his mere order to his customs officers, required them to violate the express statute and to receive greenbacks in payment of all customs dues. He found himself compelled to accept Democratic policy as a necessary means to resumption, but he availed himself of it through the constitutional powers of Congress, but by usurping those powers to himself and by enacting a law that Congress had just refused to enact.

It is worse than idle for the demonetizers to declaim against instability in our system and the insecurity of the value of the money when a Secretary of the Treasury is permitted, without any objection or even a question of his authority, to annul the most important laws governing finance, and to issue orders by which the whole of our customs revenues are required to be received in a sort of money that he is expressly prohibited to take.

I have presented, as I believe, a just and correct view of the situation and of the measures which have enabled us to reach resumption.

If any further legislation is needed now, I believe that it is to amend the statutes so that greenbacks can be received for customs duties, and so relieve the Secretary of the Treasury from the necessity of violating the laws that he is sworn to execute, and to place silver on an equal footing with gold as to all the privilege of coinage.

I have heard but one argument in support of the resolution of the Senator from Delaware. That argument is, that the existing volume of greenback currency was issued and is kept in circulation in violation of the Constitution of the United States; or that, if this is not true, there is a strong current of opinion against its constitutionality, and that our currency should not be kept in any debatable condition.

The President approved the act of May 31, 1878, requiring that United States legal-tender notes after they have been redeemed should be reissued and paid out again and kept in circulation, and in December, 1879, he declares in his message to Congress that not only was that law unconstitutional but that all the laws making United States notes legal tenders that have ever been enacted are in the like category. He thus destroys not only the opinions of every Congress—nine in number—that have met since 1861—opinions that have stood for eighteen years and have been constantly reiterated, and also the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States—but his own opinions. This is a sad havoc of opinions. But the Secretary of the Treasury, not taking such bold ground of hostility to its opinions heretofore expressed, furnishes a door of escape from their consequences, which I will read from his report for 1879, pages 11 and 12:

The note of the United States is now received for all public dues, it is carefully limited in amount, it is promptly redeemed on demand, and ample reserves in coin are provided to give confidence in and security for such redemption. With these conditions maintained the United States note will be readily received and paid on all demands. While they are maintained, the legal-tender clause gives no additional credit or sanction to the notes, but tends to impair confidence and to create fears of overissue.

As if it were not quite as easy to overissue national-bank notes as it is legal-tenders or any other Treasury notes that may not be legal-tenders!

It would seem, therefore, that now and during the maintenance of resumption it is a useless and objectionable assertion of power, which Congress might now repeal on the ground of expediency alone. When it is considered that its constitutionality is seriously contested, and that from its nature it is subject to grave abuse, it would now appear to be wise to withdraw the exercise of such a power, leaving it in reserve to be again resorted to in such a period of war or grave emergency as existed in 1862. The Government derives an advantage in circulating its notes without interest, and the people prefer such notes to coin, as money, for their convenience in use and their certain redemption in coin on demand. This mutual advantage may be secured without the exercise of questionable power; nor need any inconvenience arise from the repeal of the legal-tender clause as to future contracts. Contracting parties may stipulate for either gold or silver coin or current money.

A blessed privilege to a man, you will observe, Mr. President, who has his rights secured in the Constitution of the United States, that he must further secure them, in order that they should be available to him under any circumstances, by an express, special contract!

In the absence of an express stipulation for coin the reasonable presumption would exist that the parties contemplated payment in current money, and such presumption might properly be declared by law and the contract enforced accordingly.

It would be a wonderful act of Congress for us to pass if we should enact that hereafter there should be a presumption attending every contract that was made with reference to its payment in national-bank notes, and that, unless the contract expressly stipulated otherwise, national-bank notes should be a legal-tender, in consequence of that established legal presumption, in the payment of debts. It is a wonder what has become of the Constitution in the contemplation of the Secretary of the Treasury when he states propositions of law like this. I do not know a respectable court in the United States that has ever yet held that the debts created between persons in this country, where we have gold coin, silver coin, and greenback notes which are legal-tender, and contracted in view of such a currency as this, were followed by the legal presumption that they were not to be paid in that kind of currency, but that they were to be paid in national-bank notes.

There is such a thing in this country as a final settlement of judicial questions, and when the Supreme Court has settled a question purely judicial in its charter I think it is right and proper to let that question rest where they have left it. My right under the Constitution to pay my creditor a debt in paper currency can only be upheld or denied by the judgment of a court, when an act of Congress declares that I have such a right. Neither the executive nor legislative departments can adjudge this question. This right to demand gold or silver coin in payment of debts due me, in which I firmly believe, is an individual right—a right as personal to myself as the right to have my person or papers or property protected from unlawful arrest or seizure or destruction. It is a right of the same class as those named. It is in no sense a political privilege, and Congress has no power to deny it or to treat it as a political privilege.

A question is said to be pending in a case now before the Supreme Court with reference to the constitutionality of our reissued legal-tender paper currency, and is thought best by some not to risk that eminent tribunal on this question, but to treat it as a political question, which Congress may decide at once by an act depriving that currency of its legal-tender quality.

I must deny the power of Congress to do such a thing so as to prevent any man from paying a debt existing at the time of the passage of such an act in legal-tender notes if he had the constitutional right so to pay it when the debt was created. If a debtor ever had the right under the Constitution to pay his debt in legal-tender paper, Congress cannot take from him that right so as to discharge that debt so long as that currency is in circulation. If Congress can do this it can as well declare that gold and silver shall not be a legal tender for debts already existing, and I do not believe it has that power. To do that would be to deprive a man of his property or his rights by a mere legislative declaration, which is not "by due course of law." If Congress can declare that no gold and silver coins and no paper money shall be legal tender it can put a stop to all payment or collection of debts. If any description of money is made legal tender by act of Congress, and if the act is constitutional, it must necessarily follow that Congress cannot pass a retroactive law which will operate to prevent any debtor from paying his debt, contracted before its passage, in that description of money if he can get it. But the resolution of the honorable Senator from Delaware destroys the legal-tender quality of our greenback currency "from and after the passage of this resolution," and makes no reservation of the right of debtors to pay their debts then existing in that sort of money.

I may safely assume, as I believe, that the private indebtedness of the people of this country, and of our numerous corporations, private, public, and municipal, and of the States, is more than four times greater in amount than all the gold and silver coin and all the paper money now in existence in the United States; and this resolution attempts to destroy the right of all these debtors to pay their debts in money that was legal tender when they were created. It is urged, however, by the friends of this measure, that because our legal-tender notes are redeemable now in coin, that their demonetization will not affect their value. Yet I cannot understand why, if this be so, we should find it necessary, as a measure of relief to the country, to convert greenbacks from a legal-tender currency into a currency through which legal-tender money may be obtained. If no other change than this will occur from the demonetization of greenbacks, we are controverting here over a mere abstraction—a question of constitutional law that the Supreme Court should decide and must decide, and that is not brought into Congress by the pressure of any public necessity. Without attempting to forecast what may be the effect of such a measure upon our newly dawning prosperity, or to predict the evils that will follow such harsh legislation, I cannot justly refrain from declaring it as my belief that a more serious breach of public faith could not be enacted into a law. All of this vast mass of indebtedness that was contracted since the war was based upon the solemn pledge of the Government that the creditor should be compelled to receive payment in United States legal-tender notes whenever they were duly tendered to him on or after the maturity of the debt.

To deprive this currency of its legal-tender quality, and yet leave it in circulation as money, as is proposed in the resolution, is to destroy an important element of its value and to cancel the promise of the Government printed on every bill, that it should be legal-tender in payment of debts, while they remain in the pockets of the people. I cannot conceive of worse treatment than this. They must stand as they are or be redeemed. The laws under which this currency was created were enacted in time of war, and the necessity so created is regarded by some great jurists as justifying its issue under the constitutional power to declare war and to raise and support the Army and Navy. I may not be convinced, as I am not indeed, that the power thus derived is sufficient to support the act imputing to paper money a legal-tender quality.

It would be better to amend the Constitution and define and make specific the power to create legal-tender paper money, and confine the power to fixed limits, than to rest it upon the uncertain event of war or other urgent necessity. I am afraid, if this is a war power, and cannot be exercised in time of peace, that some of our inflationists might even be willing to force the country into some foreign or domestic war with a view to an increase of legal tenders and the restoration of financial prosperity, as they view it. It might even be better to have the unlimited power of inflation in the keeping of the national banks, that now possess it under our laws up to the amount of our entire bonded debt, if they choose to use it, rather than risk a war to justify the expansion of legal-tender currency.

But that question has been authoritatively decided by the Supreme Court, which has the right to follow its reasoning, and that is the only tribunal that can finally decide this question, which, as a question of law, can only affect two classes of people, the debtors and creditors.

If there was ever an occasion when the necessity of the rule *stare decisis* was more obvious than in all others, it is in this case. These decisions of the Supreme Court affirming the constitutionality of these laws have become all-pervading laws of property, and have entered into and controlled every transaction in which there is no special contract for payment of a debt in coin or in some commodity, so that it may be said with absolute certainty that almost the entire existing volume of indebtedness among the people was contracted with direct reference to the legal-tender quality of greenbacks.

Because some of us differ in opinion with the Supreme Court on these subjects it is proposed to destroy their jurisdiction to enforce their decision in cases now pending in that court and in all that may come before it, and by joint resolutions to revise their judgment declaring the law as it stood originally to be constitutional. I have endeavored to show that the resolution of the honorable Senator can never constitutionally reach its purpose. It will die of the same infirmity that it proposes to cure. It will perish under the guarantees of the Constitution that provide a due course of law, to be administered in the courts, for the protection of citizens in their personal rights with reference to their rights of property and indebtedness. The statutes upon which this currency rests are still unrepealed, and their constitutionality has been settled by a judicial decree. If there has been any essential changes in these laws let the Supreme Court decide whether they are constitutional enactments. If we declare them unconstitutional we only set the opinion of one Congress against another, against many others indeed that have directed the reissue of this money, and it is our plain duty in such conflicts of opinion to submit the question to the arbitrament of the Supreme Court.

I wish to call the attention of the Senate for a very few minutes to the statutes on this subject, first the act of 1862, which originally ordained and established the greenback system. In the first section it is provided:

"And such United States notes shall be received the same as coin, at their par value, in payment for any loans that may be hereafter sold or negotiated by the Secretary of the Treasury, and may be reissued from time to time as the exigencies of the public interest shall require.

Every single greenback act that was passed subsequent to that time by the Congress of the United States contained that provision substantially. Whenever a new issue of greenbacks was authorized by law it contained the express provision that they should be reissued by the Secretary of the Treasury as the exigencies of the country might from time to time require."

Was not that part of the constitutionality of the law as the time of its enactment? Did that feature have anything to do with its constitutionality? It had as much to do with the constitutionality of the law as the original provision for the issue of greenbacks had. So that when the Supreme Court decided that that law was constitutional, that law provided for the reissue of the greenbacks, and none of these laws have ever yet been repealed; they stand upon the statute-book, and the act of the last Congress for the reissue of these notes was a mere further declaration of the will of Congress, based upon the original authority contained in the laws themselves, that these notes should be reissued—part of the original law itself, part of the elementary nature of the issue itself, that they might be reissued and should be reissued.

Let us have these great controversies settled for the sake of the public welfare, and let the people know that there is an end of strife concerning them. These questions are too grave to admit of light or passionate treatment, and the use of epithet or denunciation is extremely ill-timed in this discussion. United States legal-tender notes are being bitterly denounced as dishonest money. It is a noteworthy fact, however, that the destruction of this currency for the cause of their dishonesty was never urged while it was below the par of gold. As soon as it has reached that standard and become everywhere the equal of gold, and, indeed, its superior in popular favor, it is assailed for dishonesty. Who are they who thus assail it? Chiefly those who also denounce silver as dishonest money, and who deny to all coin except gold an honest character, and to all paper money except national bank notes an approximation toward respectability.

The $346,000,000 of United States notes now in circulation perform the same functions as if every dollar they call for was a gold dollar. But its presence reduces the power of gold over the labor and industries and property of the people, and at the same time relieves the people from the necessity of paying a heavy premium to the national banks on $346,000,000 of their issues which will take the place of greenbacks, and it is not a matter of surprise that gold and the national banks are moving in concert to destroy their great rival and regulator. The prize they seek to win is worthy of their best efforts.

It is true that some of the weaker national banks will break if their charter right to redeem their issues in legal-tender notes is taken from them, but the sections of the country from which these petitions come have strong banks that are backed by the concentration of immense capital in the great commercial cities, and the failure of the weaker banks elsewhere would only leave open to them a wider field, and a more perfect control of finance and commerce.

I believe that to demonetize greenbacks now would be as fatal to our prosperity as was the demonetization of silver. I cannot understand why the destruction of the legal-tender quality of $346,000,000 of greenbacks would not work as serious mischief to our people as would result from the demonetization of that sum of silver coin. I cannot rid myself of the conviction also that this measure is only the first step in a movement that is designed to re-establish gold as the only full legal-tender coin, and national bank notes as the only paper currency. The friends of these two projects are always found together, and their movements are in complete harmony.

The political significance of this movement is calculated to excite the gravest apprehensions of danger in some sections of the country.

It is more than intimated in the leading papers that demand the demonetization of the legal-tender currency, that largely capitalized cities control great States having many electoral votes, and unless those who strive to defend the people against the power of monopolies, and the power of privileged classes, will agree to adopt their financial policy, they will be handed over to a party that has always been the friend of privilege and monopoly for political control. I fear that such a coalition will be too easily made.

It appears that the alternative is about to be presented to us that we shall submit to the power of centralized capital to control the prosperity and industries of the people, or the dominion of centralized political power to control their privileges as citizens and their rights as individuals. What we shall do when such an alternative is presented it is only for me to conjecture. But I hope we shall still stand by the people and still endeavor to protect their personal rights and liberties against the encroachments of monopoly and privilege, whether they are supported by the power of money or by the powers of domestic political government. If we yield to this demand, it may again reduce us to poverty and sorrow and haunt our firesides with the gaunt specter of starvation that hovered about them when gold reigned a supreme monarch in the land and all industry was paralyzed.

I am not ready to suddenly dispense with any fiscal agency or any currency that has been proven by experience to be a valuable assistance to the people in their patriotic effort to bear the great burden of our public debt. This debt still hangs over us and demands an annual contribution of $88,000,000 from the the people. This debt is as much a part of the war as if hostilities had not yet ceased. Its shadow hangs, like the smoke of the battle-field, over the entire country. If its origin was in a time of extreme necessity and if its justification as a legal tender is under the law of necessity, so long as that debt remains unpaid the necessity that gave it origin and constitutional sanction remains to support it. Legal tender notes were both born of the necessities of the times.

If this great sum that that we pay for interest was annually contributed to the increase our wealth, we would soon become the richest people in the world. Even at the moderate rate of interest that we are paying we will have expended in that way more than four times the sum of the entire debt before we get it paid. We are also paying about $40,000,000 per annum for the use of $337,000,000 of national bank curaency. Of this sum about $16,000,000 are for interest on their bonds deposited to secure the circulation of the national banks, and the remainder is at the low rate of 5 per cent. upon the loan of their issues to the people. I say a low rate, because I believe that every dollar of national-bank issues cost the borrowers at least 10 per cent. per annum. The sum of the loans by the national banks in 1878 was $834,000,000, being more than twice the amount of their circulation, and this sum could not have yielded less than 5 per cent. by way of interest, discount and exchange. With the national debt still to be paid, and with about one-third of our entire volume of money thus hampered with the price of extortionate interest, it is not unnatural or unjust that the people should be jealous of all attempts to demonetize greenbacks and silver money, which cost them nothing for interest when it issues from the Government.

We cannot keep gold in this country by legislation that relates only to its value as money. If we keep it here, it will be by maintaining the balances of trade in our favor. As soon as these balances of trade are against us our recent acquisitions of gold which we have made, from the same cause, will flow away from us. The notes of the Bank of England and of the Imperial Bank of Germany do not come here to pay balances. Gold, and only gold, comes to pay the balances. If our only paper money is to be the notes of the national banks, not one dollar of them will ever go abroad to pay balances. Neither will United States notes go abroad for this purpose. But when gold shall leave us, as sometimes it must in the discharge of its functions in international commerce, if we have a proper volume of legal-tender paper money, kept at par by the confidence of our people in its redemption in gold or silver coin, we shall not find our industries paralyzed by the absence of gold, and we can keep at work to earn enough again to change the balance of trade in our favor.

Why, then, should we at this time strike down the legal-tender quality of the existing volume of greenback currency that the Supreme Court has decided to be constitutional money? Whether that decision was right or wrong in principle it is an accomplished fact, and it is rashness now to attempt to destroy it. If this policy must be adopted, let it take effect five years hence, and let the people have time to prepare for this contraction, as was done with reference to resumption. It would be cruelty to force them into this strait at this time, and the first panic among the wild men of Wall street or the first material failure in our crops would remand the people to the miseries of 1873-1877. I would not now abolish the national banks, neither would I cripple them in their legitimate business; on the other hand, I would not consent that our bonds should never be paid in order to keep up a supply of capital for those banks.

I would fully respect their charter rights until their charters expire, or until I found that they were abusing them, as was done by some great national railroad corporations, and then, as we did with them, I would control them so that they should not disturb the general welfare.

I would, as soon as might be safe and just, require all banking to be done on terms of equality, and would abolish the monopoly that enables the national banks to draw interest on the fund deposited with the Government to secure their circulation, while the holders of gold and silver are not permitted to bank upon it at all.

I would remove all taxation from the circulation of the national banks so as to cheapen the money to the people. They now pay this tax to the banks, and they in turn pay it to the Government. I was never in favor of a national-bank system, but that it is a useful and safe fiscal agency through which the Government can issue money to the people I must admit, and that it has done good service in regulating exchanges is beyond question. Still the banks, as the laws are now, have the unlimited power of expansion, and when legal tender paper money is destroyed will have an unrestricted power of contraction, and I believe they should be controlled in the exercise of these powers. They are powerful, and may become dangerous combinations, and I would never increase their power by removing any other currency that will keep them in check, at least while they possess their existing ability to control the value of the labor and property of the people. At this time, when the country is just rising from its disastrous fall in 1873, I must vote against any measure that I am convinced would disturb the financial condition of the country, because there is no existing evil than I can discover that it is necessary to correct by Radical legislation, and there is extreme danger that we shall destroy the confidence of our own people in the good faith of the Government in its dealings with them, and hereby put a stop to the progress we are just beginning to make toward a general and assured prosperity.

The Vice-President. What motion does the Senator submit in reference to the resolution?

Mr. Morgan. I move that it be referred to the Committee on Finance.

The motion was agreed to.

A bird on a bonnet is worth two on toast.

Public Schools of Mississippi.

The following extract from the annual report of Dr. Sears, the general agent of the Peabody Education Fund, will be interesting to many of our readers:

The number of children of school age in Mississippi is 338,153, and the total attendance only 202,316; a little under two-thirds of the whole number. The expenditures, including salaries of officers, amount to $592,807,13. These and other facts, so far as we are able to report them, are derived from various letters, for the reason that the Reports of the Superintendent are made only once in two years, and the year 1878 is the first of the biennial period. In a pamphlet published by the Superintendent, April, 1878, explaining the school laws, we find the following general statement: "It cannot be questioned that much of the opposition which the public free school system has hitherto encountered in our State is gradually but surely giving way to more advanced ideas. But the system is yet in its infancy, and its growth in the early years of its existence was slow. In fact, there was a time when the friends of popular education entertained serious doubts as to its fate. But a more economical and judicious administration of its affairs, and a clearer insight into its advantages, and the consequent removal of prejudice, have in a great measure dissipated these fears. Its destiny is now fixed; and, guided by wisdom and sound policy, a bright future awaits it. It is essentially an institution of the people, and the people will sustain it." In a letter of June 21, 1879, he says:

"The public school system has never been in so healthy a condition as at present."

A little more than a year ago the Superintendent requested that the funds designed for his State, as the amount was not large, should be applied mostly to scholarships at Nashville; but it was already so late in the season that only seven of the applicants could make the necessary preparations. He has recently renewed the request.

Early in the year, efforts were made to establish a Normal Institute for the summer, on the plan adopted with so much success in North Carolina. At the request of the Superintendent, I selected and employed two men from other States, eminently qualified by attainments and experience to conduct the teaching exercises. The Superintendent made all the other arrangements, and procured additional teachers and lecturers. For the sake of attracting greater numbers to attend on these instructions, it was thought expedient, for the first year, to hold the sessions in five cities consecutively. At the end of the first week, the Superintendent, under date of July 4, 1879, wrote: "All are pleased with the excellent gentlemen you sent us. So far, the results of our effort have exceed my expectations."

All the Teachers' Institutes which had been appointed were held, except the last of the series; and this one was prevented by the appearance of the yellow fever at Memphis. The effect of the several meetings was very great. The city governments formally expressed their gratitude; the daily papers spoke of them in terms of unqualified praise; opposers of the school system attended them, and gave up their opposition; in short, nothing has been done during the last ten years which has produced such an impression upon the public mind. All this has resulted from putting the conduct of these institutes into the hands of men of the highest qualifications.

"Panning Out" a Witness.

From the New Haven Register.]

Counsel. How large should you say this pan, of which you speak, was?

Witness. A four-quart pan, I should say.

"What do you mean by a four-quart pan?"

"A pan that holds four quarts."

"Wine or beer measure?"

"Wine, no; beer, I guess it's beer, I won't be certain."

"But do you think it's beer? What is the shape of the four-quart pan?"

"Round."

"Like a ball?"

"No, like a—like a barrel."

"Round like a barrel. Yes. Well, is a four-quart pan tall or short?"

"It don't make any difference."

"If a pan was four inches across the bottom and twelve inches tall?"

"It wouldn't be a pan at all. It would be a pail."

"Then a pan can be a pail?"

"Why, no."

"But you just said so. Was there a hole in this pan?"

"Yes, a little hole."

"In the bottom or top?"

"Of course there wasn't any hole in the top."

"Then how could anything be poured into the pan?"

"Oh, I forgot. The top is all hole."

"And the bottom?"

"Is all pan."

"That will do. You see, gentlemen of the jury, the witness has no idea of a four-quart pan at all," and the jury, having been awakened by the Sheriff, nod off again in acquiescence.

Arkansaw Etiquette.

Little Rock Gazette.]

Last night two men from Philadelphia engaged in a quarrel at a hotel in this city. After using all kinds of epithets, one of the men thrust his hand behind as though about to draw a pistol and then took it away. The quarrel terminated without damage to either party. An old man from South Arkansas shook back his long hair and, advancing to the man who had made the hip-pocket motion, remarked:

"Both of you men are strangers here, I reckon?"

"Yes."

"Not acquainted with our little rules of politeness?"

"How?"

"Why, you put your hand behind you just now."

"Yes."

"You didn't pull a gun."

"I haven't got a gun."

"Now, young man, let me give you a piece of advice. While you are in this country don't put your hand behind you unless you intend to shoot. Don't even run your hand into your pocket for a chaw of tobacker. Don't spit. Don't wink, for if you do your pardner, if he's an Arkansaw man, will jolt you. You must learn these little rules of politeness. You may know how to conduct yourself at church, but you've got a good many rules of etiquette to learn."

"UNCONSIDERED TRIFLES."

Shakespeare.]

It is the heir-brained man who marries.

A tight squeeze—The embrace of a drunken man.

A man is known by the company he declines to keep.

A girl's mottoes: In summer, I scream; in winter, I stir.

Grant's message to the American people—Mum's the word.

My son, emulate the mule; it is backward in deeds of violence.

This country wants no king—so long as it can get plenty of knaves.

General Grant has at least one negative virtue—he will not lecture.

"A rolling stone gathers no moss," especially if it is a grindstone.

Boston girls sigh for an intellectual method of banging the hair.

The business of the divorce lawyer is described as sawing beats in two.

However comfortable they may be, the undressed kid-glove cannot be dressy.