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Daily Nashville patriot. (Nashville, Tenn.) 1860-1862, March 26, 1862, Image 1

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VOL': I.
: NASHVILLE, TENN.. WEDNESDAY, MARCH 20, 1862
NEW SERIES NO. 11
T;1P
a A VTA
PA.
SUaa .Pieis PrElii.j Contrm!
11-..
THE lISailllE PiTBIAT
t?r tlic pJ.TSiSi le" prist: eg e-SUiiUuiiK-Et ff lie
Asms, aai recent tvidiuuia of blw piterlaj from tiie
naJt:e, tie Job lines of tbe Pjtw.w fcM beea n:Jde
it:-; ''ar-3;aii ibxi .oru'.el.; in ;'uj Soula-Wist. it is
suri'aed iili tie cisf ccaipeuut worler.. a.
Mill lu "beiii appii.-d t- our rr-:f',vh-.i i i.rc
tsa ct ifc li. We ire pr-par-sl ta pr'.nt, iu th? "u
t".i of t!.e art. j-laio. u co'or. or bront,
HOtT-SILLS,
SHO .V BILLS.
BALL ricizrs,
STTAM30A7 YVt.r.K.
Til LOiLVS,
SHOT CXTJ5S.
2iiLF.0.VD voiix,
DRAT Ti'SLZrS,
Ar;4, izii-i. every taiaj from ti smaliet T.p to tl:-e
Qaaaxa FCUX. or th least Pci;h---t to the larjt-st
lb iars c rcolaitoo ot the PiTairrr, grit!y irai?c
,cJ by lie M.tiOB thereto of th E-ibsesTptioa 1UU ef
iVac!, racers it aa esct!!eni JvertLil5 sneJiuci.
Xoc better la tie city.
j- w-i !x:l orders, &t our c:Scs, No. 13 riAsxs-
KATES OF ADVERTISING
(t-c irsis ok ixss tj ausTrrn i jr-k
Cji srare 1 dav tl C-0 each dd:tonl itiSTtion 50
4. "j Ct,3 00 each ajtiitumii br.uare 1 W
fc. 2 4 i9
" 1 month 8 00 "
- 2 " 9 C-) . - "
.4 4. 2 12 0 l '
" j " 13 0-J " '
"id "25 ':
3 CO
3 0-3
4 60
8 00
Id 0)
rtswiBii at ruu--f&.
Oac square, cce Tear, $00 each a-l-Hurrai F-jnare $1 0
Wr-.io notk-J must he given to take eat and si- p
Jvartx?iECCts of yearly advertisers it-fore the year
ei;ires. otherwise e shi3 charge till Cone.
i"o contract of yearly advert jcju uls wii! be dioon
izncjtl without previous co'.ico to u?. cor Jy
ztmrs be niaJo lor lei ihaa oae year at t'-e yearly
W Advertisera exceeding the epaea ccn
rectel for will be caarfeedfor tie excess.-
TESXESSEE 5CHSERI
FRIIT
GAI1DEXS,
AT FSAXELIS COLLEGE
FITEiULESFEOil X.VSHVILLE. TENX.
r-rjc jJers gui'i o3"?r ti th-? ruViic over a br.n-'.pl
i tb-vii icd cho:c; Fruit and Ornameniu! TI.h.K.
Tu pei-ior partoer ta3 dihg'-ntiy liibon-J i ir rurt
thaa tvreaty yers, to S'-carc tie fruits !kv: a i'tij to
tae Soa b. and ruautfy to enure yran,' . h u:e
Ute Urtr. or tandoa & lie.-ry has bc-cn a-iJi-l t Uip
collet turn. .SatiitTH-ir.ry !. rueas gear jrtecJ,sn't -r-m
jj, h; ,th irt;.-V ' '"Jtl;; '.tf 'l'''n' s :e,,t
"Eicsa Lar?? taro y-ar? oil Ar?1' r-.?. its r
t-iadrt-J; Yei.-:i:it;s all smili two years cl i Iras.
sV); Pears 4U to 60 Cin'-s; i'ev.Leo ljo uts: Apriru-
ati-1 ISi-c'-iranes, .3 ccr.it, una ritiu.-, i.ci
Vines, Evisrrreirtis, Oriarn-ntal J-nn
t K'
it jrtN u'-airy tnco.
C.-0. A. KIN' Mr.'.
FAXNiX'i;.
riak.Ln Col:--j..', T- -r-r.
OiLS ! OILSH OiLSIH
iiETCALFE CiiOTilwiiS CO.,
.NASHVILLE. TKN..
004-L OILS,
4t.iFFIXE BC?.MXti OIL,
CA.50N" BrnXTXG C I.,
CQTW.: SPlSi'l. ou.,
fv ;xx oil.
cap. axle oil
1:ach1n"e?.y oil,
4X, i"r-:?ircO uJ ReSn-i,
CA?. AND n AG-JN' (i'.'.A.-S.
' UlFrLVri WAX HANDLES;
Ezcinsivcly at T7holssalo
'-us m:; lottos ya-ix
or. r-jx r.oi'S.
iSXA3C:v,i AXI t'lii'iTiTKtTO,"
cuiTON.PL.c; Axr stp.:pi-3
We refer bv r?rTiil3i-3 to
iitX. G I'.VviTi! Pr:ieit? ii' nf T--cnfie i-;.
JOUS A. rii.-.-i. i'aibi- r -:.-t of TBti:.ve.
AiBO to tie fo:iOw:ng Wrutstiio ?I.jrcaaj!3 in thj
riiy:
itsPJ. MORRI- i ?TRATTON .
tTRATTON'tvSEYHOL'K.
" OARD.VLR& CO..
" FALL CCXXLr.GHAil
TERMS CASH-
Hareiil-ly
SSOASL.BY ii itLTIl,
A. 1, Dtaderick tlreely XaiKviUe, Tain., tux
door to JL'iulerson IS res,,
Ap.p p.-i,..! to ''- a'! trfi ?s of Piatinz, Graining.
Mjrbliiag l'ajtfr-liacginj, prtxM to sa.t
lie Unci. jaac30-tf.
The Battles at Fort- Donelson.
Cam r- XrTAr. M i ;;! klei;ui;o.
rdTuarr 27, 18iV2 S
CiKSKKAI. A. S. Jo-iX-lOX
?iV: Your nr.! or of the 1-ih of ('.is
miiilh, transmit te'd tj use at Cuinberlaiiti
City, rcaolicil nje same evening. It.
dii-cctcl me to repair at osico, with what
force I could command, to t!if support of
the iim rison at Fort Dow-lson. I imme
diatoly prepared for my departure, ar.d
ellectcd it in time o rt-ach Fort Donil -son
the next morning lHth, ln-forc day
light. 3Ie.urc had heen already takt-n
by Brigadier-General Pillow, tlan in
comuiand. to rentier our resistance to the
attack of the cm-iiiy as cflecfive as possi
ble, lie had. with activity and indus
try, pushed forward I lie defensive works
toward completion. These defenses con
sisted in an earthwork in Fort Donelson,
in which were mount'-d guns of diilcrent
caliber to the number f jbiitccn; a field
WOTk.inlepiv ?, fo li. CTrr.stipports -
anu'coTistructt-d immedianrTV' behind the
battery and upon the summit pf the hill
in rear. Sweeping away from this field
work eastward, to the extent of nearly
two miles in its windings, was a line of
inirt nchments, defended on the outside,
at some points, with abattis. These in
trenebments were occupied by the troops
already there, and by the addition of
those who came upon the field with m.-.
The position of the fort, which was es
tablished iy the Tennessee authorities,
w: by no means commanding, nor was
the least military significance attached
to the fsilion. The intrenebments af
terwards hastily made, in main- places,
were injudiciously constructed, because
of the distance they u'cre placed from
the brow of the hill, subjecting the men
to a heavy lire from the enemy's sharp
shooters opposite, as they advanced to or
retired from the entrenchments. Soon
after my arrival the infrenchments were
fully occupied from one end to the other,
and just as the sun ro-e the cannonade
from one of the enemy's gunboats an
nounced the owning f the conflict
which was destined to continue for three
davs and nights.
In a short time the tire became general
a!uig orr wIk.I? I ires, rind tj- i-nemv,
rtiioiinct aireauy planteu batteries at
several points armnd the whole circuit
of our i ntrenchuicnts as shown by a dia
gram heiewith sent, opened a general and
active lire fr-mi all arms upon our trenches
v hich continued uuiil darkness put an
end to the eonlli. t. They charged with
uncommon spirit at several points along
on the line, but most particularly- at a
point undefended by er.trenchmenls
down a hollow which separated the right
wing. under Brigadier-General Buckner
from the light of the center cammanded
by Col. Ib-iman. This charge was pros
ecuted with uncommon vigor, but was
met with a determined spirit of resist
ance, a cool, deliberate courage both hy
the troops of Brig-den. Buckner and Col.
Heinian. which drove the enemy, dis
comfited and cut to piece?, back upon
tile position h had assumed in the morn
ing. Too high praise cannot be bestow
ed upon the battery of Capt. Porter for
their participation in the rout of the en
emy in this assault. My position was
immediately in front of the point of at
tack, and I was thus enabled to witness
more distinctly the incidents of it.
The enemy continued their lire upon
difierent parts of our intrenchnients
through nt tbe night, which deprived
our men of every opportunity to sleep.
We lay that night upon our arms in the
Trenches. We confidently expected at
th - dawn of da;,- a more vigorus attack
than ever. But in this we were entirely
mistaken. The day advanced, and no
preparation seemed to be making for a
general onst t. But an extremely annoy -inzir
was kept up from the enemy's
sharpshooters throughout the whole line
of the inlrcnchmenis, Horn their long
rang-3 rilles. While this mode of r.l
taek,was not attended with and consid
erable lo-is, it nevertheless confined the
men to their trem-hes and prevented their
taking their usual rest. o stood the
aCairsofthe field until three o'clock r. w.
when the fleet of gunboats in full forco
advanced upon the fort and opened fire.
They advanced in the shape of a crescent,
and kept up a constant and incessant lire
tor one hour arid a half which was re
plied ! with uncommon spirit and vigor
bribe "fori." Once the boats reached
a point wit hin one hundred yards of the
"fort"' at which time it was that three of
their boats sustained serious injuries
from our batteries, and were compelled
to fill ha-k. The line was broken and
the enemy discornfiied on the water, giv
ing up the light entirely, which he nwver
aftejward renewed. 1 was satisfied from
the incidents of the last two days that
the enemy did not intend again to. give
us battle in our trenches. They had
been fairly repulsed, with very heavy
slaughter, upon ellbrt to storm our posi
tion : and it was fair to infer that they
would not again rti.ew the unavailing at
tempt at our disludgment, when certain
means to effect the same end without loss
were perfectly at their command.
We were aware of the fact that ex-
trenicly heavy reinforcements had been
continually arriving, day and night for
three da38 and nights, and : I ' had - no
doubt whatever that their whole avail
able force on the western waters could
and would be concentrab-d here if it wr.s
deemed r.ccessaiy to reduce our position,
I had already seen the impossibility of
holding out any. length of time with our(
inadequate nuniber and indefensible po
sition. There was no place v.ithin our
iutrenchmento but could be reached by
the enemy's artillery from their boats or
their batferies. It was but fair to infer
that, Avliile they kept up a suflieient lire
upon our intrenebments to keep our men
Trom sleep and prevent repose, their ob
ject was merely to give time to pass a
column above us on the river, both en the
right and on tire left banks, and thus to
cut otf all onr communications and to
prevent the possibility of egress. I thus
saw clearly that but one course was left
by which a rational hope could be enter
tained of saving the garrison, or a part of
it. That was to dislodge the enemy from
his position on our left, and thus to pass
our people into the ripen country, lying
southward towards Nashville. 1 called
-p n rem. ''fr ion of the officers of divi-
JBotrsraird - bhtrades, to take place alter
dark, when this plan was laid .before
tbm. approved and adopted, and at
which it was determined to move from
the trenches at an early horn- on the next
morning, and attack the enemy in his
position.
It was agreed that the attack should
commence upon our extreme left, and this
duly was assigned Brigadier-General
I'd low, a-sisted by Brigadier-General
Johnson, having also under his command
commanders of biigades. Colonel Bald
win, commanding Mississippi and Ten
nessee troops, and Colonel Wharton and
Colonel Clausland, commanding Virgini
ans.. To Brigadier-General Buckner was
asbi.-neil the duty of making the attack
from near the center of our lines upon the
enemv's forces upon (he Wvnn's Ferrv
road. The attack on the left was delayed
longer than i expected, and consequently
the enemy was lound in position when
o-.:r troops advanced. The attack, how
ever, on our part was extremely spirited,
and although the resistance of the enemy
was obstinate, and their numbers far ex
ceeded ours, our people succeeded in
driving them discomfitted and terribly
cut to piecc3 from the entire left. The
Krnfiu-kv troons. under Briuadier-Gen-
eraJ B.irfcr..r, advanced from their ?oi
tion behind the intrenchnients upon the
Wyim's Ferry road, but not until the
enemy had been driven in a great meas
ure from the position he occupied in ihe
morning.
I bad ordered o:i the night before the
two regiments stationed in ''Fort Donel
son"" to occupy the trendies vacated by
Brigadier-Gen. Buckner" s forces, which,
together with the men whom he marched
to assist in this purpose, I thought suffi
cient to hold them.
My intention was to hold, with Brig.
Gcn. Buekner's command, the Wynn's
Ferry road, and thus to prevent the ene
my, during the night, from occupying
the position on our loft, which he occu
pied in the morning. I gave him orders
upon the field to that effect. Leaving
him in position, I started for the right of
our command to see that all was secure
there, my intention being, if thingscould
be held in the condition they then were,
to move the whole army, if possible, to
the open country lying southward be
yond the Randolph. Forges. During my
absence. and from some misapprehension,
I presume, of the previous order given,
Brig.-Gcn. Billow ordered Brig.- Gen.
Buckner to leave his position on the
Wynn's Ferry road ami to resume his
place in his trenches on the right. This
movement was nearly executed before I
was aware of it. As the enemy were
pressing upon the trenches, I deemed
that the eieufiin of this last order was
all that was left to be done. The ene
my, in fact, succeeded in occupying an
angle of the trenches on the extreme right
of Brig.-Oen. Buekner's command; and
as the iresh forces of the enemy had be
gun already to move toward our left to
occupy the position they held in the
morning, and as we had no f.ireo ade
quate fo oppose their progress, we had to
submit to llie mortification cf seeing the
ground which we bad won by such a
severe conliiet in the morning occupied
by the enemy before midnight. The
enemy had been landing reinforcements
throughout the day. lli numbers had
been augmented to eigh'y-ihreti regi
ments. Our troops v.-1 re completely exhausted
by four d.i33 ar.d nights of continued
conflict. To renew it vt ith any hope of
successful result was obi ously vain, and
such I understood to be the unanimous
opinion of all the officers present at the
council called fo consider what was best
to be done. 1 thought, ami so announced,
that a desperate onset on the right, of the
enemy's forces on t he ground where we
had attacked them in the morning might
result in the extrication of a -.-onsidorable
proportion of the command from the po
sition we were in, ami this opinion I un
derstood to be concurred in ly all who
were present. But it was likewise agreed,
with the same uuanimity, that it would
result in the slaughter of nearly all who
did not succeed in effecting liie-ir escape.
The question then arose whether, ill point
of humanity si ml A sonnd military polity.
a co 'rse should be adopted from which
tie,' -probabilities were that the larger
if-.iy n of the command would be cut to
ju'.4 - in an unavailing light against nvcr-wii-ir.ing
numbers. I understood the
genial sentiment to be adverse to the
pro; jsilion. I felt that in this coniin
gcn;y, whilst it might be questioned,
whf-iher I should, as commander c f the
arfiij , lead it to certain destruction in an
unavailing fight, yet 1 had a right indi
vidiully to def ermine that T would not
surv.ve a surrender there. To satisfy both
propsi ions. 1 agreed to hand over the
ccii' Hand to Brigadier-General B.iekner,
thru'.igh Brigadier-General 1'illow, and
to i , ike an effort for my own extrication
byuy and every means that might pre
sent themselves to me.
I 'here fore directed Col: Forrest, a dar
ing r.nd determined ofiieer, at the head of
an Mieient regiment of cavalry, to be
present for the purpose of accompanying
me in what I supposed would be an ef
for'. to pass 'hrough the enemy's lines.
I a-nounced the fact upm turning the
command over to Brigadier-Gen. Buck
ner. the t 1 would bring away with me,
by ;nyaieaiis I could, my own particular
brigade, the propriety of which was ac
quiescou in on alt hands. This, by va
riou Hindis, 1 succeeded in accomplish
ing to a great extent, and would have
r , ;bt oil my whole command in one
way or anot'icr if I had had the assist
ance of licit' officers, who were absent
from several of the regiments. The
command was turned over to Brigadier
Gen. Buckner, who at once opened nego
tiations with the enemy, which resulted
in ihe surrender of the place. Thus
ended the conflict running through four
doji and Jur tiiijuts : a large portion of
which time it was maintained with the
greatest fierceness and obstinacy; in
which we, with a force not exceeding
13,UW, a large portion of whom were
illy armed, succeeded in resisting and
driving back, with discomfiture, an army
of l iore than s-'O.OM) men. f have no
means ol accurately estimating the loss
of the enemy. From what I saw upon
the battle-field; from what I witnessed
throughout the whole period of the con
flict : from what I was fible to lea'-n from
sources of information deemed .y me
worthy of credit, I have no doubt that
the inemy's loss in killed and wounded
reached a number beyond fuse tJionnhh
Onr own losses were extremely heavy,
bnli f want of exact returns 1 am un
;h ib Kt iyec;se number. I think-
tl -v will not i;e far troni f-VHi i tiled and
womnied. Nothing could exceed the
coolness and determined spirit of resis
tance which animated the men in this
long and ferocious conflict; nothing could
exceed the determined courage which
characterized them throughout this ter
rible struggle, and nothing could be more
admirable than the steadiness which
they exhibited, nature itself was ex
hausted in what they knew to be a des
perate fight against a foe very many times
their superior in numbers. J cannot par
ticularize in this report to you the num
berless instances of heroic daring per
formed by both officers and men, but
must content myself for the present by
saying, in my judgment, they all de
serve well of their country.
I have the honor to be, very respectful
ly, your obedient servant,
Signed JOHN" B. FLOYD,
Brigadier-Gen. Commanding.
M'!e i:-siiilcratr C'onfjrei.
an !ve;f:y in'o lie !:a-yk:s j t.n.w:.-:?:!;.
In the Rebel House of Representatives,
on March 10, Mr. Currin, of Tennessee,
offered a resolution touching the manage
ment of the Quartermaster's Department
in the State of Tennessee,, and especially
with regard to the recent disaster fo our
arms at Fort Donelson and elsewhere;
and more particularly with reference to
tlie action of the IJuaitermaster, Ma
jor V. K. Stevenson.of t hat service, before
the surrender of the city of Nashville;
and also with reference to the quantity
of stores provisions, munitions of war,
and hospital stores which were lost to
the Goyt rnmeut at that place.
A lor.g debate followed, in the course
of which Mr. Atkins, of Tennessee, said
that while- investigations were being
made, they should also bo made into the
conduit of General Johnston. General
Jo'inston had command of the entire
army of the West until General Beaure
gard was sent to Columbus. He knew
thit the Cumberland liver, when swollen,
wcuhl aflbrd entrance into every pu t of
Tennessee. He knew that the Tennessee
river, at high tide, would conduct the
eii'-my's vessels into the very heart of
tin- Southern Confederacy. lie knew
tlut it would let th enemy on his rear.
Bt t General Johnston had but one i lea
a single idea to make a stand at
Bewling Given. It was his great idea.
Xtiiv he would not impeach the patriot
ism and chivalry of General Albert Sitl
ney Johnston, but it would be well
enough if wc took pattern from Lincoln's
Government, antl whenever a General lost
a battle remove him, unless there was
.-orae sufficiently strong reason andjusti
fkble caue for the failure.
When Gen. Johnston fdi back from
Bewling Green he had between ten and
fill cell thousand troops. B-.-foro he had
en'ered Nashville he had determined to
surrender it ; before be had reached the
confines of that proud city of Tennessee
the capital of a State whose citizens
never turned their back upon the foe.
During the three days of the struggle at
Fort Donelson, when men stood a foot
deep in blood and snow, the citizens of
Tennessee showed as much gallantry as
any Slate in the Confederacy. Gen.
Johnston had been desired to make a
stand at Nashville, but he declined do
ing if. The speaker had heard that the
1'resident had a very high opinion of Gen.
Albert Sidney Johnston. If such was
the case, he was sorry to differ with him.
The people, the army under Gen John
ston's command, and the people of Ten
nessee, had lost confidence in the mili
tary capacity of Gen. Johnston.
Mr. Moore, of Kentucky, defended
General, Johnston. Ife wished to give a
wide scope ( investigation. It wss oiAj
until of late that Gen. Johnston had as
many as twenty-five thonsand f liiciont
men in the field. He was .asked for no
reinforcements during the battle at Fort
Donelson. He could not reinforce that
point, for on the instant that he moved
his army from the point at which he was
stationed, the large force of the enemy,
amounting to one hundred thousand
men, would have marched on Nashville,
arrd thus the whole army, instead of a
portion of it, would have been captured,
am! Gen. Johnston would now have been
where the gallant Jen. Buckner is, in ex
ile. Gen. Johnston had no power fo
prevent the passage of gunboats up the
Tenne-ssee fiver. Five steamers were
lying off Nashville, and had been for six
months past, and the most that he knew
to work ou them all at one time was five
men. He (the speaker) wanted the
blame to fall where it properly belongs.
What woultl have been the e-onsequenee
of making a strnd at Nashville V That
beautiful city, instead of now standing,
and in a condition still fo be the pride
of the South if she is retaken, would, in
all probability, have been in ashes. Why
did not the people of Nashville them
selves fortify the city?
Mr. Footc said that Gen. Johnston had
called for 1,000 or 1,500 slaves to work
on the fortifications, and that the call
had been fully answered when Nashville
was surrendered. Gen. Johnston had
been importuned time and time again fo
fortify Nashville, but he bad failed to do
if. The people of Nashville had surren
dered every arm fhat they haa shot
guns and everything else of that sort ;
those that were there had nothing to fight
with. He rinder.sfoo.l lii.it ;nna vile
siaiKterer nau called them cowards, n....
had asked why did not the women and
children go onf and fight the foe? When
the armed soldiery was Hying fast, when
Generals rillow and Floyd would noi
remain in it, when armed forces consi
dered it impolitic and unsafe, some one
asks the question why did not the wo
men and children fight? It was the
most contemptible and foul slander that
ever appearetl in the columns of a news
paper, in the city of Richmond or else
where, and the man w ho perpetrated it
was worthy of a place upon the scaffold.
Mr. Moore said that the gentleman
evidently had no reference to his speech.
The resolution was passed yeas, o2 :
nays, 2o.
: 1'. tc ua t Cot :neroi,.
'I' lie I'rospect of 'Xrside ivttU t!ic
Occupied Portion of Tcnuctuce,
Nashvillk, Tenn., March 11, lfSOii.
Kns. Coif.: Knowing the great inter
est of the wholesale merchants of your
city in the reopening of the Southern
trade. I have taken special pains to in
form nyself as to the probability of a
speedy resumption of lucrative commer
cial relations with the portion of Tenne-ssee
now under the control of the Fed
eral Government. That the anxiety of
yinir business men iu reference to this
subject is vivid, may tvell be supposed,
and that the more sanguine among them
have entertained high expectations since
the occupation of this city by the Fed
eral troops. I infer from your commer
cial columns. I would feel much grati
fied by being able to amioiince, that
Northern trade can safely, immediately,
anil profitably follow in the wake of the
Northern army l this section of the
country. But the result of my investi
gations does not warrant me in giving
expression to any such opinion. I hole!,
on the contrary, in view of. what I have
seen ami learned during the lasf two
weeks, that the prospect of successful
mercantile ventures in this direction is
rather faint, and this because
1. The only means of buying at the
command oT the tradesmen and people
of this vicinity are Southern fuuds.
2. The quantify of cotton, tobacco,
grain, ami such other produce as might
aiford a basis for an exchange trade, on
store in this city, is very small.
o. The mass of the agricultural popu
lation within the Federal lines is fright
ened and unfriendly, aud will not bring
their productions info market until ne
cessity compels them to do so, which
will not be the case for some time.
In regard to reason first, it is evident,
in the face of the war, and the incidental
uncertainty of the fate of most Southern
Banks, that an exchange of Northern
goods for Southern money is the oniy
mc-ans of buying, as stated, of the trades
men and people at large, hereabouts
would involve a risk that no prudent
shipper would wish to run. Even if the
high prices that prevailed here during
Ihe last six months shouId.be readily re
alized, the heavy rates of discount fo
which Southern currency is subject in
the North, would render profits more than
questionable. The rufhlessness of th
leaders of the rebellion, in this and other
States, makes it very probable that many
banks will go down with the rebel cause.
The books and funds of banks in this
city, as well as in most towns of thi
Southern part of Middle Tennessee, have
been carried off, and the same is likely
to be done in Alabama, Mississippi, etc,
as our troops will advance. It is proba
ble fhat the rebel leaders, whose violence
will grow more desperate and unspairing,
in proportion to the lessening of their
chances of success, will allow them toba
returned to the institutions in question.
As fo the second reason, it will be re
membered that the accumulation of cot
ton was prevented by the rebel authori
ties. The blockade caused the dealers
in tobacco to abstain from buying mow
than local consumption required. Othc
farming produce was brought up for, ani
consumed by, the rebel armies.
It may be that it will not be locg- b
fore the farmers of this neighborhood
will come to their senses, and bring their
surplus productions into market. But
present appearances indicate that they
will not do this, until they are fully sat
isfied of the certainty of the ultimate
overthrow of the Confederate Government.
For the above reasons, I am persuaded!
that Northern merchants will not lose
anything by not being too hastr in send
ing goods on speeulafion fo this place.
Things may possibly change sooner to
the better than I expect. Asmatters are
situated now, however, the safest course
for them will undeniably be to wait for
the appearance of Nashville merchants
with specie or bankable funds in. Cincin
nati. ;H.j-;irl Tailor Visits; Center villo
:ut;l flananis-What lie lias
to say.
F a Ta 1 ir s I .-liars to tbe X. Y. ?nbi:ae J
I am r.ot a military man, you know. I
could be easily puzzled by a dexterous
use of the technology or a staff officer. I
hear, on good authority, that several of
ficers of high rank have -declared to day ;
" The fortifications at CenterviUe are per
fect! v imprr-gnab!c.'r Imnregnable ' Good"
- 1 . tn 1 . 9 r . . .1
must enferiain of our gallant soldiery!
1 have seen Cerro Gordo: the position afc
Centerville is not so strong yet we took
Cerro Gordo. 1 have seen Chapultepeci
it is five times as formidable vet we
took it. J have seen Narva: the hill is
twice as sleep, and twice as high yet
S.030 Swedes, rushing up it, drove 50,(X))
Russians, under I'efer the "Great, from
their intrenchnients. This is supposing;
of course, fhat we should be so obliging
as lo attack ihe T?el..T inct l.. ,t,w
. . .u j ...it i hi 4 ixitjr
could most easily defend, omitting the
opportunities of turning their position.
But it is useless to talk : I am a civilian.
We have escaped a terrible danger, antf
gained a great and "a bloodless victory ;
I do not wish to be misunderstood as
blaming any individual. I was most fa
vorably impressed, last fall with the
bearing c f Gen. McClellan, and with his
evident success in resolving order out of
chaos. I have deprecated the popular
impatience with the inaction of the army
of the I'ofomac during the winter, ami
insisted that the organizing power which
had moulded a demoralized military
mob into obedient capacity for action-,
should be allowed fo develop its plan in.
its own goo 1 time, without interference.
It is for those in authority to judg?
where the blame lies. But, using my
eyes and my ears employing (modestly
speaking) average powers of deduction
1 cannot escape the following deductions:
Fir! That the topographical charac
acter of the wsition at Manassas haa,,
been vi holly misunderstood. Instead ofV
a high plain, with descending tenaces,
furnishing concentric lines of tlefense, it
is a low plain, of which the only natural
advantage is the stream of Bull Run,
wit h a low bluff bank.
Y:oitJ That the position at Centre
ville, though naturally formidable to rvn
advance from Fairfax, has no flank or
rear defenses, is imperfectly fortified,
and. from all indications, never had any
siege guns.
'J ''fd That the three or four small
forts near Manassas Junction, on an open
plain, do not constitute a strategic posi
tion of any importance.
F-.urth That f lie strongest of the re
bel works was inferior, both in construc
tion and armament, to the weakest of
our forts on the Virginia side of Wash
ington. FijVt That the rebels never had, at
any one time, in all the camps between
Centrevilte and Manassas, more than 75,
O0O men.
Sixth That an'advance of our whole
army, made anytime since the 1st of
November last, would very likely have
reached Manassas with as much expedi
tion awd as little loss as the advance at
this time. It is scarcely likely fhat the
rebels, who have been all along so well
informed as to our strength and our con
templated movements, would hive haz
arded an engagement which must have,
resulted disastrously to them. ,

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