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THE NEW YORK HORROR.

THE CAUSE OF THE EXPLOSION A MYSTERY.

Removal of the Debris — Attention of Friends to the Wounded.

NEW YORK, Dec. 22.—There was the same anxious crowd of people at the scene of the Barclay street fire to-day. The ruins are still smouldering on, and two streams of water are being poured upon the debris. The cause of the explosion is still a mystery. There are many theories advanced, but the one most generally accepted is that there were chemicals of some description in the cellar.

No more bodies have been found. The removal of the debris is being pushed as rapidly as the force employed and the circumstances will allow. The wounded are being cared for with the greatest attention, and the friends of the injured are unremitting in their attendance to the wants of their unfortunate companions.

CAPITAL NOTES.

Critical Condition of Senator Patterson.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 21.—Dispatches have been sent for Senator Patterson's friends. Dissolution is imminent.

Patterson Resting Easier.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 22.—Senator Patterson is resting easier to-day. His physicians think that, though he is dangerously sick, his condition is not critical.

Paying the New Orleans Custom-House Employes.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 22.—Dr. John Wharton, disbursing officer of the United States coast survey, has been detailed by Secretary Sherman to visit New Orleans and pay off the Custom-House employes at that port, as, the Senate having failed to confirm the Collector for New Orleans, there is no officer attached to the Custom-House there who is competent under the law to disburse the moneys of the government.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE.

CANADA.

Wanted—A Prize Fight.

QUEBEC, Dec. 22.—There is considerable excitement here over the prospect of another prize fight between Carney and one of the champions of the United States. The former's backers are jubilant over his winning the heavy weight championship of the Dominion in the contest with Labossiere, and have authorized Carney to issue a challenge to fight according to the London prize ring rules, with light gloves, Prof. Wm. Miller of New York, Goss, or any man in America for $500 and the championship. The general opinion is that Miller or Goss will meet the champion.

Pursuit of Mexican Raiders Beyond the Border.

SAN ANTONIO, Dec. 22.—Information received to-day says that Lieut. Ward, with a detachment of cavalry, followed the trail of the raiders to Rio Grande, on the 15th. When he reached the river he sent Ward to the Mexican officer, to follow them. Having the trail, he was invited by the Mexican officer to cross, and the American and Mexican troops followed the trail into Mexico twenty-five miles but, owing to recent rains which obliterated the trail, the pursuit was fruitless. Lieut. Ward returned to Texas on the 20th. The Mexicans volunteered cooperation and promised it in the future.

Mexicans Pursued Across the Border.

SAN ANTONIO, Dec. 22.—Five Mexicans, who recently robbed the town of Caliure, and stole horses at Baker's Field and other places in Kern county, were captured by the sheriff and put in jail at Baker's Field. Last night a party of 100 citizens seized the jail, or broke open the prison doors, and took out the Mexicans, and after a trial hung them in the rear of the courthouse. The lynchers made no attempt to conceal their identity.

The Pittsburg Riot Cases—Change of Venue Granted.

PITTSBURG, Pa., Dec. 22.—A change of venue has been granted by the Common Pleas Court in the suits brought against Alleghany county for damages on property destroyed during the July riots. The cases will be transferred to Beaver county. Cause, local prejudice is so great against plaintiff as to preclude a fair trial. The cases involving the liability of the county or State for losses will be appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Light Weight Championship.

PHILADELPHIA, Dec. 22.—The articles of agreement for a prize fight, for $500 a side and the light weight championship of America, sent to New York by Harry Hickens, a pugilist of this city, have been signed by Mike Coburn. The fight takes places on the 2d of February next. The pugilist's fight at catch weights. The fight takes place within 300 miles of New York.

FOREIGN NEWS.

ENGLAND.

Reduction of Iron Workers' Wages.

LONDON, Dec. 22.—In consequence of a proposed reduction of wages to take effect after the holidays, 1000 iron workers at Sheffield have ceased work.

WAR NOTES.

An Attack Upon Erzeroum Improbable.

LONDON, Dec. 22.—A dispatch to the *Times*, from Pera, says: The Russian concentration for an attack upon Erzeroum failed. The attack is now improbable. The Russians are suffering for provisions and forage.

Russia Indifferent as to England's Action.

ST. PETERSBURG, Dec. 21.—The *Golos* publishes articles upon the early meeting of the British Parliament, and the possible measures of the English Cabinet. The article declares that Russia may wait without anxiety the result of this political episode, and may quietly continue the work she begun in the firm conviction that British intrigue will in no way hinder the triumph of Russia.

Decorating Prince Charles.

BUCHAREST, Dec. 21.—Prince Charles, of Roumania, received the iron cross from the Emperor William.

THE DEMOCRAT AND THE PRINTING CONTRACT.

[Marksville (Avoyelles) Bulletin.]

The New Orleans *Times* denounces Lieut. Gov. Wiltz and Senator Robertson for the part and the position assumed by these gentlemen in the Printing Board in relation to the appointment of a Public Printer. We do not agree with the *Times*. According the contract to the DEMOCRAT may cost the people a few thousands of dollars more; still we believe that they are prepared to make this sacrifice in order to reward true merit and fidelity. The people of the State will not soon forget the valuable services of the DEMOCRAT in the last campaign, and the action of Lieut. Gov. Wiltz and Senator Robertson was but a correct interpretation of the public pulse in this matter. Dollars and cents have little to do in this matter; it is strictly one of principle, and instead of censuring we are prepared to congratulate these gentlemen upon their wise and patriotic action in giving a new lease of life to the people's champion and that firmest of all city journals, the New Orleans DEMOCRAT.

[Le Propagateur Catholique.]

The DEMOCRAT has just reached its second anniversary, which it must have celebrated with more reason in that this excellent journal is to-day in full tide of prosperity. It is certain that the DEMOCRAT has passed through many hardships, to which, in the beginning, it came well nigh succumbing. But to-day it has vanquished all difficulties and cleared every obstacle, and its efforts have been crowned with success. It is now seated upon solid foundations, the strongest of all being the great popularity which it enjoys, due as much to the patriotism as to the talent of its editors. We join our congratulations to those already addressed by the press to that journal, which is now enjoying nought but the prosperity which it well deserves.

[N. O. Bee.]

We tender our confrere, the DEMOCRAT, our sincere congratulations upon the occasion of the second anniversary of its foundation. Since it has come into existence the DEMOCRAT has passed through many trying experiences, but it has finally surmounted all obstacles and is now securely seated upon a solid basis that assures it of long life. An energetic champion of the Democratic party, it has largely contributed to the success of the electoral campaign of 1876, and since the advent of our new government, the independence and talent of its editorial columns have every day increased its popularity throughout the State. We wish it a continuation of the prosperity which is shown by the appearance of its columns.

[Shreveport Times.]

The Board of Public Printing met in New Orleans on the first Monday in this month and selected Mr. Geo. W. Dupre, of the DEMOCRAT, to do the public printing for the ensuing year. This is but a just compliment to the DEMOCRAT for the fidelity with which it has executed its last contract, and for the zeal and ability with which it has defended the best interests of the State.

The same attempt was made as last year to get the board to let out the printing to the lowest bidder. There is nothing in the letter or spirit of the law which could possibly warrant any such construction of it. The board is only required to contract with "such person as they may consider proper and responsible," "at a reasonable rate," which rate is "not to exceed the maximum fixed by the act." It will thus be observed that the board is vested with just such a discretion as it has exercised. It might happen, as it doubtless has happened, and will often happen, that the highest bidder will be the most proper and responsible person to entrust with these important duties.

The rates fixed by the act are extremely low. In fact, if it had been the design of the last Legislature to starve out the conservative press it could not have hit upon a more happy expedient. It has, therefore, been the object of the united animadversation of the whole conservative press. The laborer is worthy of his hire, no matter whether he labors for the public, or for a private individual. It is not the true policy of the State to set the example of getting work done below its legitimate value. The printing rates are as low as the work can be done for, and if any one offers to do it for less it is for some ulterior purpose. It is either to drive out all competition, or else to lay the foundation for a bill for relief before some Legislature, which should, perhaps, become as liberal as the Radical Legislatures have been.

But suppose that the object of the board was to sustain a party organ, as has not only been insinuated but openly charged. We still hold that its action was right and proper. We assume that the principles of the Democratic-Conservative party are right and will best conduce to the interests of the tax-payers of the State. If they are right, then they ought to be propagated by all legitimate means. Among these means is the voice of the public press. The support of the party press, by bestowing on it the public patronage, has ever been considered by all political parties as perfectly legitimate. No one ever thought of denouncing the Whig party for making Mr. Gales, or the Democratic party for making Mr. Ritchie printer to Congress. The newspaper, therefore, which the most faithfully upholds correct principles should receive this patronage, and no journal which is unfaithful to them should receive it at any price. We presume that no Conservative would be willing to see the *Republican* public printer, even if it should offer to do the printing at much lower rates than those fixed by law.

What the Democratic-Conservative party wants is an organ that will advocate its principles in days that are dark as well as those that are light. It wants an organ that will not run after this or that god whenever a proper occasion offers. The people of the State do not believe that there exists among the New Orleans daily papers printed in the English language any paper that comes up so nearly to these requirements as the DEMOCRAT. Hence they indorse the action of the State board. They would not indorse it if the Legislature plundered the treasury to support the DEMOCRAT as the Radicals plundered it to support the *Republican*. But of this there is no danger under the act of the Legislature which regulates the matter.

MARINE NEWS.

SOUTHWEST PASS, Dec. 22.—Arrived: British ship Stamboul, Cann, master, 44 days from Liverpool, in ballast, to master; schooner Santo Oteri, Pizzati, master, 8 days from Utilla, with fruit, to Oteri Bros. Sailed: Steamship City of Mexico. Wind N. E., light. Weather cloudy and hazy.

PORT EADS, Dec. 22.—Arrived: British steamship Abdiel, at 12:30 p. m., Jones, master, from Liverpool, to A. K. Miller & Co.; steamship Morgan City, at 6 p. m., Read, master, from New York, to C. A. Whitney & Co. Sailed: Steamship Altmore, ship Rock Terrace, bark Ystawa, bark Nimrod, bark Energie. Wind N. E., light. Weather foggy.

Trade Dollars for Circulation.

[Cincinnati Commercial.]

Several tons of trade dollars have been brought to this city, and a ready market has been found for them, but they cannot be said to be in circulation. There is a tendency to hoard these splendid dollars. We ourselves paid out about $5000 in the trade coin, and have not received half a dozen of them over the counter. This shows that the people are pleased with silver, and prefer it in making up their little reserves, put away for rainy days.

The Pacific Railroad.

[St. Louis Times.]

WASHINGTON, Dec. 18.—The Senate Judiciary Committee is disposed to compel the Pacific railroad companies to meet all their liabilities by the payment of a specific annual amount to be invested in United States bonds as a sinking fund, and will not report Thurman's bill or the proposition of the railroad companies themselves.

Danger attends teaching the catechism for purposes of exhibition. When the committee came to examine the class each boy knew what question he would be asked, and what answer would be expected. It so happened, however, that one lad was missing, and the question, "Did God make you?" was put to the next in order. The reply was original and astounding, "No, sir; the boy that God made has gone home with the toothache."

Because of the numerous classes there is greater variety of life in the streets of a Japanese city than in one of America. Tokio streets are named for trees, flowers fish, articles of food, trades, etc., and I lived at the corner of Brocade street and Congratulation Avenue. The crookedest in the whole city is called Conjugal Avenue.—[Prof. Griffis.

They say that Stanley Matthews is trimming his sails for the next gubernatorial nomination in Ohio, in which event, of course, Stanley is wasting his precious time. A good many things may happen to Ohio, but it will be a very long time before Stanley Matthews will be again struck by office of any kind.—[Philadelphia Times.

Maryland is to have a convention in Baltimore on the 20th and 21st inst., to consider the tramp nuisance, especially as an annoyance to farmers. Hon. Montgomery Blair will preside.

HANDSOME BILLIARD TABLE, COMPLETE, FOR SALE.—See the advertisement of Messrs. Nash & Hodgson, in our "For Sale" column.

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

A REVIEW OF THE GREATEST BATTLE OF THE WAR OF THE STATES.

By Gen. J. A. Early.

The following is the first part of the exhaustive and graphic account of the battle of Gettysburg, which appears in the December number of the *Southern Historical Papers*, from the pen of Major Gen. J. A. Early, one of the most distinguished Confederate leaders who took part in that great battle. A number of errors occur in the article as printed in the magazine; these Gen. Early has corrected with his own hand for the DEMOCRAT. The balance of the article, or rather history, of the battle of Gettysburg, will appear during the week in our columns.—[EDITOR DEMOCRAT.

Several of the papers recently published in relation to the battle of Gettysburg contain statements and views which in some respects are erroneous, especially in regard to the part which Ewell's corps and its commander bore in the first and second day's operations, and I therefore propose to review them, as I am the senior surviving officer of that corps, whose right to vindicate its reputation and that of its commander will hardly be disputed.

I have too much respect and regard for the officers whose statements and comments in relation to the battle I shall notice and correct, to suspect either of them of the slightest desire to misrepresent or pervert the facts, or to mislead others by their own speculations. I shall, therefore, endeavor to be entirely courteous to each one of them, and shall not attempt to controvert any fact stated on the knowledge of the writer who gives it.

Before proceeding to the execution of the main object I have in view, I must notice a slight variance between the estimate of the strength of Gen. Lee's army at Gettysburg made by Col. Walter H. Taylor and that made by myself; and in doing so, I will go to some length in giving the data on which my estimate is based, as the question of numbers at that battle is one of great interest.

In his memorandum in the August number of the Southern Historical Society Papers, as well as in the paper reprinted in the September number from the Philadelphia *Times*, and understood to be an extract from the manuscript of a volume on the war now in the hands of a publisher, Col. Taylor puts Gen. Lee's strength at Gettysburg at 62,000 effectives, and his estimate is repeated by Gen. Heth, whereas I put it at something under 60,000. This variance is caused by the fact that he includes in his estimate the two cavalry brigades of Robertson and Jones, which had been left guarding the passes of the Blue Ridge when the last of our infantry and artillery, under Longstreet and Hill, crossed the Potomac, whilst I exclude them from mine. Those brigades had remained south of the Potomac on the duty assigned them until orders reached them to rejoin the army, which orders were sent after Gen. Lee received information, on the night of the 28th of June, that the Federal army, then under Hooker, had crossed the Potomac. Those brigades crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, on the 2d of July, (see Schenck's telegram, 1st vol. Congressional Report on the Conduct of the War, 2d series p. 489), and arrived near Gettysburg on the 3d of July, too late to take any part in the battle, and were posted on our right, near Fairfield, as Stuart says, (2d vol. Society Papers, 65.)

They were, therefore, of no avail to us in the invasion of Pennsylvania or in the battle of Gettysburg, but merely aided in guarding our trains to the rear and observing the enemy when we retired. There is no more reason for counting those brigades as a part of the force with which Gen. Lee fought the battle of Gettysburg, than there is for counting as a part of Meade's force at the same battle the 10,000 or 11,000 men under French, at Frederick and Harper's Ferry, and the very considerable force under Couch, at Harrisburg, all of which were placed under Meade's orders, and were actually employed for the purpose of watching Ewell's advance to the Susquehanna and harassing his rear on the march to Gettysburg from Carlisle, as was the case with Couch's force, and protecting Meade's communications to the rear, as was the case with French's command. Robinson's and Jones' Brigades certainly numbered over 2000 men, and very probably over 3000. Take them from Col. Taylor's estimate of 62,000, and there will be left less than 60,000 as our real strength at Gettysburg. Imboden's small brigade might also be excluded from the estimate of our force at the battle, as he had been employed in destroying the bridges on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and moved by way of McConnellsburg, west of Chambersburg, and by the latter place, reaching the vicinity of Gettysburg late on the afternoon of the 3d; but I have not made any allowance for that brigade.

As stated by Col. Taylor, our infantry, as shown by the official returns of the 31st of May previous, then numbered 54,356, the artillery 4460 and the cavalry 9536, making our whole force then 68,352.

He says Pettigrew's Brigade joined the army after that date; but to offset the increase by reason of that accession, one of his regiments and the whole of Corse's Brigade of Pickett's Division remained in Virginia, at Hanover Junction.

My division was included in the force of infantry shown by the returns of May 31. It left the vicinity of Fredericksburg on the 4th of June and at Culpeper Court-House on the 10th, when its strength was somewhat less than when my return of May 3 was made, by reason of the exhaustion, foot soreness and straggling common to all armies, another return was made, which is now before me, and shows:

	Officers.	Men.
In Hayes' Brigade, for duty	137	1,495
In Hoke's Brigade, for duty	136	1,684
In Gordon's Brigade, for duty	188	2,194
In Smith's Brigade, for duty	149	1,243
	610	6,616
		610
In all, exclusive of division and brigade staff		7,226

My return for June 20, made at Shepherdstown, two days before I crossed the Potomac, also now before me, shows:

	Officers.	Men.
In Hays' Brigade, for duty	119	1,281
In Hoke's Brigade, for duty	96	1,225
In Gordon's Brigade, for duty	175	1,869
In Smith's Brigade, for duty	97	758
	487	5,124
		487
In all, exclusive of division and brigade staff		5,611

This shows a decrease of 1615; but that in Hoke's and Smith's Brigades was caused mainly by the absence of three regiments from those brigades left to occupy Winchester and guard the prisoners taken there and at Martinsburg back to Staunton. The decrease in Hays' and Gordon's Brigades was 679, of which 163 resulted from the loss in the fighting at Winchester, leaving the net loss in those two brigades, from exhaustion, foot-soreness and straggling, 516. Their aggregate strength on the 10th of June was 4024; so there was a loss of a little more than 12 per cent in those two brigades from other causes than casualties in battle, from the 10th to the 20th. They were composed of as good and well-seasoned soldiers as any in that army, and I think I can certainly assume that there was at least the same percentage of loss in the entire infantry of the army from the 31st of May to the time it crossed the Potomac. Twelve per cent on 54,356 gives 6552, which being deducted, leaves 47,834 as the strength of our infantry when it crossed the Potomac, without deducting my three regiments that were left behind, or the loss sustained in Ewell's Corps in the fighting at Winchester and Martinsburg, which amounted to 269.

Add the entire artillery and cavalry without any deduction and our whole force would be only 61,830. But the fact was that the cavalry had had a very severe engagement with that of the enemy near Brandy Station, on the 9th of June and several other severe engagements near the Blue Ridge before it crossed the Potomac, in which, if Hooker's telegrams are to be accepted as correct, our cavalry was very badly handled, if not almost destroyed; but I take no account of them.

It is well known how rapidly cavalry diminishes from the loss of horses in action or on the march—in fact, much more than from loss of men, when there are no means of replacing the horses, as was the case with our cavalry. Stuart carried three brigades with him across the Potomac, to wit: Fitz Lee's, Hampton's, and Wm. H. F. Lee's; Jenkins' Brigade, not exceeding 1500 or 1600, accompanied Ewell, and one battalion of cavalry, White's, was with my division, while Imboden went along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, then to McConnellsburg, and from thence by the way of Chambersburg to Gettysburg. This was all the cavalry that went into Pennsylvania at the time our army invaded that State, Robertson's and Jones' being left behind, as already stated. Even Hooker, who estimated our force that passed through Hagerstown at 97,000 infantry and cavalry and 280 guns, and was, by no means, disposed to underrate any part of our army, does not put the cavalry with Stuart beyond 5000 (see Con. Rep., page 173), and Mr. J. Everett Pearson, of Westminster, Maryland, whose narrative is contained in the transactions of the Southern Historical Society (Southern Magazine for January, 1875), says of Stuart's command, as it passed through that place on the 28th of June: "Although 4000 men comprised the whole command each of its regiments seemed that number to a novice." Gen. Fitz Lee, without giving any statement as to the force with Stuart, says: "The brigade of Gen. Jenkins, Stuart estimated at 3800 troops when leaving Virginia." Now, the fact is, that Stuart had no means of knowing Jenkins' strength, as that brigade had never served under him. Rodes, in his report, says it numbered about 1600 men when it joined him on the twelfth of June, and Meade sent a dispatch to Halleck on the twenty-eighth of June, giving a statement furnished him by persons from Hagerstown, who saw with very large magnifying glasses, and placed our army at very heavy figures, which says: "Robt cavalry came first a week ago last Monday—Gen Jenkins having 1200 mounted infantry, said to be picked men from Jackson's men, and three or four hundred cavalry of his own." (Con. Rep., 479.) Jenkins had then with him all of his cavalry, but no mounted infantry—though all of his cavalry might be said to be infantry mounted, for it was armed as such only. I think it very safe to assume that the whole of our cavalry in Pennsylvania, exclusive of Robertson's and Jones' Brigades, did not exceed 6000, or 7000 at the most. Estimating the artillery at 4000, which makes a very small allowance for decrease, and our entire strength must have been less than 60,000 by some 2000 or 3000; and even including Robertson's and Jones' Brigades, it could not have exceeded that number more than a few hundred, if it reached it. It must be borne in mind that our march, all the time from the start, led us from the sources from which our ranks could be refilled, and hence, our losses were permanent for the entire campaign. I have made no allowance for the decrease after we crossed the Potomac; but we had some even then.

Col. Taylor gives our strength on the 20th of July, after we had returned to the Valley, as 41,388 effective infantry and artillery, and 7612 cavalry—in all 49,000; and, hence, he deduces our loss at about 19,000.

This mode of estimating the loss may ascertain very nearly the real loss, that is, the number of men placed *hors de combat*; but it is calculated to give rise to misapprehension. The official reports show the losses in the infantry and artillery of the several corps alone, as follows:

In Longstreet's corps	7,659
In Ewell's corps	6,094
In Hill's corps	8,982
Total	22,735

This is exclusive of the loss in the cavalry, which was not inconsiderable.

Add this reported loss of 22,735 to the 49,000, and it would give 71,735 as our force in the campaign. Add the same loss to the effective infantry and artillery shown by the returns of July 20, and it would give 64,125 as the strength of those arms; and deducting the artillery from this latter number, it would appear that we had about 60,000 infantry in the campaign, whereas the returns of May 31 show only 54,356.

Col. Taylor omits to take into consideration the very large regiment of infantry, commanded by Col. Wharton, the Fifty-first Virginia, which arrived at Winchester from Southwestern Virginia while we were in Pennsylvania, the convalescent wounded from the battle fields of Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg (Second) that had, by the twentieth of July, reached the valley, as well as my three regiments that were left behind, and the stragglers and disabled men who had come up. This omission gives rise to a criticism on his estimates, which has already been made by a distinguished foreign writer on the war in a private letter to myself.

The discrepancy between Col. Taylor's estimate and the official returns of the loss may be reconciled in this way: Those who lagged behind or fell out of the ranks for any cause before we crossed the Potomac could not rejoin the army after that time before our return. When we returned we began to meet the stragglers and the convalescent wounded from the battlefields of May and the early part of June, and perhaps some recruits. Some of them came with the supply ordnance train, which was a part of that at acked by the enemy's cavalry at Williamsport after the battle, and many more reached us in the Valley by the 20th of July, having been assembled there while we were in Pennsylvania. My three regiments that had been left behind were then counted in the returns, as I suppose was the case with Wharton's regiment. By these means the ranks of the army had been increased probably to the extent of some 8000 or 10,000 men; moreover, many of those reported wounded were very slightly wounded, as it was the custom to report as such all who were hurt, however slightly, and some very insignificant scratches sometimes were reported under the head of wounds. Many of the slightly wounded did not, in fact, properly come under the head of losses to the army, as they marched with it or with the ambulance trains, bringing off their arms and equipments, and, without being sent to hospitals, soon returned to duty. Their services were not actually lost, or were lost for so short a time as not to warrant their being counted in the real losses of the army.

Making this allowance, and Col. Taylor's estimate of our losses in the whole campaign is not far from correct.

To illustrate this view: The official reports of Longstreet, Jackson and D. H. Hill, in whose commands were comprised the whole of our infantry and artillery engaged in the campaign, beginning with Cedar Run in August, 1862, and ending with the minor engagements in the Valley after Sharpsburg, from first to last, show for that period a loss of 21,294 in killed and wounded alone. This, of course, excludes the cavalry, and yet the returns made by the medical director of the army, which accompany Gen. Lee's report, show only 19,306 killed and wounded in all arms, including the cavalry, for the same period. This results from the fact that a considerable number of those reported as wounded did not even require surgical treatment or attention.

The returns at the close of July, 1862, nine days before the battle of Cedar Run, or Slaughter's Mountain, show 69,559 for duty in the Department of Northern Virginia. No new troops reached the army after those returns were made before the campaign opened; some embraced in it were left at Richmond, and did not participate in the campaign. The returns for September, made after Sharpsburg and the minor engagements following it, show for duty 52,609, while the loss in Longstreet's, Jackson's and D. H. Hill's commands, including missing, for the period above stated, was 23,575. This again excludes the cavalry. Add the number shown by the returns at the close of September and the above loss, and there will appear a force of 76,184; yet it is very certain that Gen. Lee did not have, in the campaign against Pope and McClellan, including all that came up while it was progressing, that number of men by many thousands. Add the 52,609 shown by the September returns to the loss shown by the Medical Director's report in killed and wounded alone for Boonsboro', Crampton's Gap, Harper's Ferry, Sharpsburg and Shepherdstown, which was 12,291, and we have 62,900 to begin that series of engagements with, and yet we know that we had no such force there. Without counting the loss in killed, wounded and missing at Sharpsburg, which was 8000 or 10,000, and the September returns would give us 52,609 to fight that battle with, and counting the losses, about 60,000, yet Gen. Lee says he had less than 40,000 men at Sharpsburg, and I feel sure that 30,000 would cover our force of infantry and artillery on the field at that battle.

It comes within my personal knowledge that Lawton's brigade of Ewell's division, which division I commanded during the latter part of the battle at Sharpsburg and from that time, had on the field only 1150 men, and its loss there was 554 in killed and wounded; and yet before the return of September was made it numbered nearly 2000. This great accession of strength was caused by the return of convalescents, stragglers and temporarily disabled men who had fallen out of ranks before we crossed the Potomac. A less time elapsed between the battle of Sharpsburg and the close of September than between the battle of Gettysburg and the 20th of July, and these illustrations will serve to confirm my view that the force shown by the returns of July 20, 1863, included in it very many men who had never crossed the Potomac at all.

I think it may be assumed as very certain that we had less than 60,000 effectives of all arms at Gettysburg, and that the battle was fought with something under 50,000 infantry and about 4000 artillerymen on our side, the cavalry merely serving to protect our flanks and guard our trains, as from the nature of the ground they could not be employed in the battle.

I will now give some consideration to the evidence in regard to the Federal strength at the battle, as that bears a very important relation to a just estimate of the battle itself. It must be borne in mind that when Hooker moved from the banks of the Rappahannock, his route led him all the time towards the sources from which his army was to be recruited; that while the route of our army was the arc of a circle, he moved on the chord of it; and that, therefore, our movements had to be rapid while his were slow. When our army had crossed the Potomac he was enabled to recruit his strength, not only from the convalescents from the hospitals at Washington, Baltimore, and further North, time enough having elapsed to enable the wounded from the fields of Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg to begin to return to duty, but also from the troops in the defenses of Washington south of the Potomac, now rendered useless there, as well as from new recruits answering to the many earnest appeals to the "loyal North" to rally to the "standard of the Union" and the defense of the invaded "loyal State," as well as of the national capital. It was not probable, therefore, that his army should decrease from causes similar to those that were diminishing ours. His chief of staff, who subsequently occupied the same relation to Meade, in his testimony (Con. Rep., 428), says that on the tenth of June, when Hooker was yet on the Rappahannock, "the First Corps had 11,350; Second Corps, 11,361; Third Corps, 11,898; Fifth Corps, 10,136; Sixth Corps, 15,468; Eleventh Corps, 10,177; Twelfth Corps, 7925; making in all, 78,245."

This was exclusive of the cavalry, which Bates, in his history of the battle, concedes to have been 12,000, and of the reserve artillery, which Gen. Hunt, in his testimony, says constituted one-third of the artillery of the army. Butterfield, the chief of staff, in reply to the question: "Had there been any considerable change in the army between the 10th of June and the time the battle of Gettysburg was fought?" says: "A portion of the Pennsylvania Reserves, some 4000 or 5000, had been added to the Fifth Corps; General Stannard's Vermont Brigade had been added to the First Corps, but were to go out of service very shortly. It was, however, at Gettysburg; General Lockwood, with the Maryland Brigade, of about 2500 men, had joined the Twelfth Corps. I have a memorandum among my papers at Look out Valley, which will show all the additions made to the Army of the Potomac. I do not remember the exact figures."

On pages 417-18, he says: "General Hooker had had in mind, as a part of his operations, to use the garrison at Harper's Ferry, which consisted of 10,000 or 11,000 men under General French. * * General Hooker's intention had been to take that garrison, with General Slocum's Corps (the Twelfth), near Knoxville, the two making about 25,000 men, throw them rapidly in rear of General Lee," etc.

It does not appear whether Lockwood had then joined; but it will be seen that the Twelfth Corps had been increased from 7925 to about 12,000, even if Lockwood had then joined, without counting his brigade, which was an increase of 4000. The other corps must also have increased, and accordingly we find Hooker telegraphing to Halleck on the 27th of June, as follows (Con. Rep., 291): "I would respectfully state that, including the portions of Gen. Heintzelman's command and Schenck's now with me, my whole force of enlisted men for duty will not exceed 105,000." He is then protesting that too much must not be expected of him, and, of course, was not disposed to overstate his force. A force of 105,000 must have had at least 5000 officers, which would make the whole 110,000, and this was exclusive of French's command, as shown by Col. Taylor. There is no reason to presume that this force decreased as Meade approached Gettysburg after he assumed command, for he was probably joined by other troops, and there are very cogent reasons for believing that he had between 90,000 and 100,000 men, perhaps fully the latter number, on the field of Gettysburg, exclusive of his cavalry.

The absurd estimate of Prof. Bates that the 105,000 reported by Hooker had been reduced to only 72,000 between the 27th of June and the 2d of July, if true, would furnish a curious commentary on the "loyalty" and patriotism of the North, and on the morale of the soldiers who had rallied to the "standard of the Union" in order to "save the life of the nation." Equally as preposterous is the statement of Doubleday that there were only 14,000 men on the Federal side on the 1st of July to oppose 60,000 on our side.

We know that we got as many as 6000 prisoners, including the wounded left on the field and in the hospitals in Gettysburg from the First and Eleventh Corps, and there must have been a loss of as many more in killed and wounded; in fact, Bates puts the loss in those two corps at about 10,000. Butterfield says that on the 4th their commanders reported, respectively, in the First Corps 5000, and in the Eleventh 5500, left after all the fighting of the 2d and 3d, which does not accord, by any means, with Doubleday's statement.

It is a little strange that Northern writers grope in the dark, and resort to conjecture to ascertain the strength of Meade's army at Gettysburg, when the official returns on file in the Adjutant General's office should settle the question. They always persist in putting our force far beyond that shown by any official returns of ours, and the Federal force greatly under that shown by their own returns. This applies to all the battles.

The assumption that the Confederate government, with at best only a population of 5,000,000 of whites to draw from, when it was hard pressed on all sides, and a large portion of its population beyond its reach, could furnish more troops for the invasion of Pennsylvania than the Federal government, with a population of 20,000,000 to draw from, besides its foreign recruits, could furnish to defend the soil of the "loyal North" and the national capital, and that, while the soil of Pennsylvania resounded with the tread of the "rebel horde," "the defenders of the Union" were availing themselves of the expiration of their terms of service to go home, and otherwise abandoning the standard to which they had rallied with "patriotic ardor," furnishes food for curious reflection.

I will now come to a consideration of the points, to notice which is the main object of this paper.

Gen. Fitz Lee, after paying a very just tribute to the memory of Gen. Ewell, says, in reference to the first day's fight:

"I believe a little more marching, perhaps a little more fighting, would have given us the coveted position, and that in such an event the battle of Gettysburg would have had another name, and possibly another result—who knows?"

Col. Allan says:

"The Confederates would probably have been successful—first, had Ewell and Hill pushed Howard's broken troops over the top of Cemetery Hill on the first day."

He then assigns four other conditions that would have given us success.

Col. Taylor, in his memorandum, makes the same point as to Ewell's conduct, but it is more fully set forth in the paper from the Philadelphia *Times*, as follows:

"Gen. Lee witnessed the flight of the Federals through Gettysburg and up the hills beyond. He then directed me to go to Gen. Ewell and say to him that from the position he occupied he could see the enemy retreating over those hills, without organization and in great confusion: that it was only necessary to press 'those people' in order to secure possession of the heights, and that, if possible, he wished him to do this. In obedience to these instructions, I proceeded immediately to Gen. Ewell and delivered the order of Gen. Lee; and after receiving from him some message for the commanding General in regard to the prisoners captured, returned to the latter and reported that his order had been delivered. Gen. Ewell did not express any objection or indicate the existence of any impediment to the execution of the order conveyed to him, but left the impression upon my mind that it would be executed. In the exercise of that discretion, however, which Gen. Lee was accustomed to accord his lieutenants, and probably because of an undue regard for his admonition, given early in the day, not to precipitate a general engagement, Gen. Ewell deemed it unwise to make the pursuit. The troops were not moved forward, and the enemy proceeded to occupy and fortify the position which it was designed that Gen. Ewell should seize. Major Gen. Edward Johnson, whose division reached the field after the engagement and formed on the left of Early, in a conversation had with me since the war about this circumstance, in which I sought an explanation of our inaction at the time, assured me that there was no hindrance to his moving forward, but that, after getting his command in line of battle, and before it became seriously engaged, or had advanced any great distance for some unexplained reason he had orders to halt. This was after Gen. Lee's message was delivered to Gen. Ewell."

The language quoted from all three of the officers named conveys a very serious imputation upon Gen. Ewell—if not by direct imputation, at least by necessary inference. It implies that he was inactive when he should have pressed on, and that he was, therefore, remiss in the discharge of his duty. Col. Allan's language would make this implication equally applicable to Gen. Hill, and, in fact, to Gen. Lee—for, as shown by the statements of Col. Taylor and Gen. Heth, he was on the field in full time to direct all the movements looking to a pursuit and the realization of the legitimate fruits of the success that had been gained. In reality there is no earthly reason why the failure to seize Cemetery Hill that afternoon should rest exclusively on Ewell's shoulders. Col. Allan's criticism, therefore, to that extent, is more impartial and judicious than that of the others; but it is to be remarked that neither of these gentlemen gives a solitary "reason for the faith that is in them," that Gen. Ewell, by going on, could have seized Cemetery Hill, or that the seizure of that hill on the afternoon of the 1st would have been of material advantage to us. All this is assumed.

Without controverting any fact stated by Col. Taylor on his own knowledge (the other gentlemen state no facts in this connection), I propose to show that they are all under a misapprehension as to the real facts of the case, and that all of their conjectures and speculations in regard to the probable result of a further effort on our part on the afternoon of the 1st have no basis to rest on.

In order to get at what are called the "bottom facts" affecting the question in hand, I will give a detailed account of what came under my personal observation on that day, and my own part therein.

It is only necessary to refer to the well-known facts that the advance of Heth's division on the road from Cashtown, supported by Pender's, had brought on the engagement, and that Rodes, who had camped at Heidlersburg the night before, and was on his way to Cashtown, came down on the road from Mummasburgh about 2 o'clock p. m., and became engaged on Heth's left. I arrived about an hour after Rodes got up. I had marched from about three miles from Heidlersburg in the direction of York, a distance of fully fourteen miles, I think, and perhaps more. Of course as I was moving by flank, it required a little time to get my division in line, but the formation was as rapid as possible. The enemy was then holding his line on the north of the town firmly, and his right was pressing back Rodes' brigade. I had not seen Ewell or Rodes since the night before, and had on my march merely received directions from Ewell, in a note sent by courier, to move towards to Gettysburg, as Hill was advancing on that place. Without waiting to communicate with Rodes or Ewell, as soon as the division was formed in line the advance was made with three brigades—Gordon's, Hays' and Hoke's—the latter commanded by Col. Avery; Smith's brigade being posted near the York road to protect our trains and flank from some cavalry reported to be on it. Gordon first struck Barlow's division, and drove it back in great disorder. Hays and Avery then advanced beyond Gordon's left, and struck another line, retired back from the first, and routed that, driving it through the town. Hays' alone entered the town, Avery going into open ground, or rather a field, on the left of the town. Gordon's ammunition had been nearly exhausted, and he had stopped to refill his cartridge-boxes. The movements of my brigades had been very prompt and rapid, and brought them on the rear and flank of the force confronting Rodes. That force then commenced falling back, and the rout soon became general. The troops from Rodes' front moved to our right of the town, followed by his division, and I soon saw the Federal troops from Seminary Hill coming back also. I sent for Smith's brigade, and for my artillery also; but Smith did not come, and I sent a second time. Before the artillery came to me the Federal troops, passing to the right of the town toward Cemetery Hill, had got out of reach. Elated with the success, I rode into the town, past the prisoners streaming to the rear with scarcely any guard, and found Hays forming line along a street on the left of the town. The enemy had begun firing with artillery from Cemetery Hill as soon as my line was formed, and still continued it. It was very apparent that a force was there which had not participated in the fight below, and sharp-shooters were firing from the part of the town nearest the hill, and from the foot of the latter. As soon as I saw that Hays had formed his line and Avery had got his men under cover behind a low ridge in the field, I rode to find Ewell and Rodes, or either, to urge that we should advance at once upon the hill in our front, before the