"half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union "to be dissolved. I do not expect the house to fall, "but I do expect that it will cease to be divided. It "will become all one thing, or all the other. Either "the opponents of Slavery will arrest the further "spread of it, and place it where the public mind "shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward until it shall become alike lawful in all the "States, old as well as new, North as well as South."

[Tremendous cheers. Cries of "Good! Good!"] Yes, I have no doubt it is, and I am delighted to hear you say good. [Good! good! laughter.] I have no doubt that that doctrine expresses your sentiments, and yet I will prove to you, if you will listen to me, that doctrine is revolutionary, and destructive of the existence of our Government. Mr. Lincoln here says that our Government cannot endure permanently in the same condition in which it was made by its framers. It was made divided into Free States and Slave States. Mr. Lincoln says it has existed for near eighty years thus divided; but he tells you that it cannot endure permanently on the same principles and in the same condition relatively in which your fathers made it. Why can't it endure divided into Free and Slave States? Washington, as the President of the Convention, Franklin, and Madison, and Hamilton, and Jay, and the patriots of that day, made this Government, divided into Free States and Slave States, leaving each State perfectly free to do as it pleased on that subject of Slavery. Why can't it exist upon the same principles upon which our fathers made it? Our fathers knew when they made this Government that in a country as wide and broad as this—with such a variety of climate, of interests, of productions, as this—that the people necessarily required different local laws and local institutions in certain localities from those in other localities. They knew that the laws and regulations that would suit the granite hills of New-Hampshire would be unsuited to the rice plantations of South Carolina. Hence, they provided that each State should retain its own Legislature and its own sovereignty, with the full and complete power to do as it pleased within its own limits in all that was local and not national. One of the reserved rights of the States was that of regulating the relation between master and slave, or the Slavery question. At that time—that is, when the Constitution was made—there were thirteen States in the Union, twelve of which were Slave States, and one was a Free State. Suppose this doctrine of uniformity—all to be one or all to be the other—now preached by Mr. Lincoln had prevailed then, what would have been the result? Of course the twelve slaveholding States would have overruled the one Free State, and Slavery would have been fastened by a Constitutional provision on every inch of the American Continent, instead of being left, as our fathers wisely left it, for each State to decide for itself. I therefore say that uniformity in the local laws and local institutions of the different States was neither possible nor desirable. If any uniformity had been adopted, it must inevitably have been the uniformity of Slavery everywhere, or the uniformity of negro citizenship and negro equality everywhere.

We are told by Lincoln that he is utterly opposed to the Dred Scott decision, and will not submit to it, for the reason, as he says, that it deprives the negro of the rights and privileges of citizens. That is the first and main reason, he says, for his warfare upon the Supreme Court of the United States, that it deprives the negro of the rights and privileges of citizenship. Now, I ask you, are you in favor of conferring upon the negro the rights and privileges of citizenship? Do you desire to strike out of our State Constitution that clause which keeps slaves and free negroes out of the State, and allow the free negro to flow in and cover our prairies with his settlements? Do you desire to ram this beautiful State into a free negro colony, in order that when Missouri shall abolish Slavery, she can send us these emancipated slaves to become citizens and voters on an equality with you? If you desire negro citizenship—if you desire them to come into the State and stay with white men—if you desire to let them vote on an equality with yourselves—if you desire to make them eligible to office—to have them serve on juries and judge of your rights—then go with Mr. Lincoln and the Black Republicans in favor of negro citizenship. For one, I am opposed to negro citizenship in any form. I believe that this Government was made on the white basis. I believe it was made by white men for the benefit of white men and their posterity forever, and I am in favor of confining the citizenship to white men—men of European birth and European descent, instead of conferring it upon Negroes and Indians, and other inferior races. But Mr. Lincoln, following the lead of the Abolition orators that came here and lectured in the basement of your churches and school houses, reads the Declaration of Independence, that all men are created free and equal, and then says: "How can you deprive the negro of "that equality which God and the Declaration of In-"dependence award to him?" He and they maintain that negro equality is guaranteed by the laws of God, and reasserted in the Declaration of Independence. If they think so, they ought thus to say and thus to vote.

I do not question Mr. Lincoln's conscientious belief that the negro was made his equal, and hence is his brother. But, for my own part, I do not regard the negro as my equal, and I positively deny that he is my brother, or any kin to me whatever. But he has learned Lovejoy's catechism, and can repeat it as well as Farnsworth, and could receive baptism from Father Giddings or Fred. Douglass in Abolitionism. He holds that the negro was endowed with equality by the Almighty, and hence that no human power alone can deprive him of those rights which the Almighty has guaranteed to him. I do not believe the Almighty ever intended the negro to be the equal of the white man. If he did, he has been a long time demonstrating the fact. [Laughter.] For six thousand years the negro has been a race upon the earth, and during that whole six thousand years—in all latitudes and climates wherever the negro has been—he has been inferior to whatever race adjoined him. The fact is, he belongs to an inferior race, and must occupy an inferior position. I do not hold that merely because the negro belongs to an inferior race, therefore he ought to be a slave. By no means can such a conclusion be drawn. On the contrary, I do hold that humanity and Christianity both require that the negro should have and enjoy every right, every privilege, and every immunity, consistent with the safety of the society in which he lives. On that point I presume there can be no diversity of opinion. You and I are bound to extend to every inferior dependent being every right, every privilege, and every facility and immunity, consistent with the public good.

Then the question arises, What rights and privileges are consistent with the public good? That is a question which each State and each Territory must decide for itself. Illinois has decided that question for herself. We, in Illinois, have provided that the negro shall not be a slave. We have also provided that he shall not be a citizen, but we protect him in his civil rights—in his life—in his person—in his property—while we deprive him of any political right whatsoever, and refuse to treat him on an equality with the white man. That policy of Illinois is satisfactory to me. If it were to the Republicans, then there would be no question upon the subject. But the Republicans say that the negro ought to be made a citizen, and when he becomes a citizen, he becomes your equal in all rights and privileges of citizenship. They assert that the Dred Scott decision is wicked and monstrous, because it denies that a negro is or can be a citizen under the Constitution. Now I hold that Illinois had a right to abolish and prohibit Slavery as she did, but I hold that Kentucky has the same right to continue and protect Slavery that Illinois has to abolish it. I hold that each and every State of this Union is a sovereign power, with the right to do as it pleases upon this question of Slavery, and all domestic institutions. But Slavery is not the only domestic relation that comes upon this controversy. The question is far more important to you, What shall be done with the free negro? We have settled the Slavery question as far as we are concerned; we have prohibited it in Illinois forever. In doing so, I think we have done wisely, and there is no man in the State who would be more strenuous in his opposition to the introduction of Slavery than I would. But when we have settled it for ourselves we have exhausted all our power over that subject—we have done our whole duty; we have no right to go further, but we must leave each and every other State to decide for itself beyond our limits. Then the question arises, what shall be our policy in regard to free negroes? We have said they shall not vote. The State of Maine says free negroes may vote. Maine is a sovereign State, and has the power to regulate the qualifications within her limits. While I would not be in favor of conferring the rights of citizenship upon free negroes in our own State, yet I shall not quarrel with the State of Maine because it differs from me in opinion. Let Maine take care of her own negroes and let Illinois alone, and we will let the State of Maine alone. So with the State of New-York. She allows the free negro to vote and hold office, provided he owns $250 worth of property, but not otherwise. While I would make no distinction between a negro who held property and one who did not, yet if the sovereign State of New-York adjudges to make that distinction, it is her business and not mine. I will not quarrel with her if she does this. She may do as she pleases upon this question, and mind her own business, and we will do the same.

Now, my friends, if we will only act rigidly and conscientiously upon this great principle of popular sovereignty which guarantees to each State and each Territory the right to do as it pleases, instead of Congress interfering, we will be at peace one with another. Why should Illinois be at war with Missouri, or Kentucky with Ohio, or Virginia with New-York, merely because their institutions differ? Our fathers intended that these institutions should differ. Our fathers knew that the South and the North, so far apart, differing in climate and production, had different interests requiring different institutions. This doctrine of uniformity of Mr. Lincoln's, making all of them conform alike, is a new doctrine, never dreamed of by Washington or Madison, or the framers of the Constitution. Mr. Lincoln and the Republican party set themselves up as wiser than those who made the Government. This Government has flourished for 70 years upon the principle of popular sovereignty, recognizing the right of each State to do as it pleases. Under that principle, we have grown up from three or four millions to about thirty millions of people. Under that principle, we have crossed the Alleghany Mountains, and filled up the whole North-West, turning the prairie into a garden, building up cities, and towns, and churches, and schools, and spreading civilization and Christianity where before there was nothing but savage barbarism. Under that principle, we have become from a feeble nation the most powerful nation on the face of the earth. If we will only obey that principle, we can go forward increasing in territory, increasing in power, in strength and glory, until the Republic of America shall be the North Star that shall guide the friends of freedom throughout the civilized world. Then, my friends, why can we not adhere to that great principle of self-government upon which our institutions were originally made? I believe that this new doctrine preached by Mr. Lincoln and this Abolition party would dissolve the Union. They try to array all the Northern States in one body against the South, inviting a sectional war of the Free States against the Slave States—Northern States against Southern States, to just until the one or the other shall be driven to the wall.

I am told that my time is out. You will now hear Mr. Lincoln for an hour and a half, and then myself for half an hour in reply.

MR. LINCOLN'S REPLY.

Mr. Lincoln then came forward and was greeted with loud and protracted cheers. It was some minutes before he could make himself heard, even by those on the stand. At last he said:

MY FELLOW-CITIZENS: When a man hears himself somewhat misrepresented, it provokes him—at least I find it so with myself; but when the misrepresentation becomes very gross and palpable, it is more apt to amuse him. [Laughter.] The first thing I see fit to notice is the fact that Judge Douglas alleges, after running through the history of the old Democratic and the old Whig parties, that Judge Trumbull and myself made an arrangement in 1854, by which I was to have the place of Gen. Shields in the United States Senate, and Judge Trumbull was to have the place of Judge Douglas. Now, all I have to say upon the subject is, that I think no man—not even Judge Douglas—can prove it, because it is not true. [Cheers.] I have no doubt he is "conscientious" in saying it. [Laughter.] As to those resolutions that he took such a length of time to read, as being the platform of the Republican party in 1854,

I say I never had anything to do with them, and I think Trumbull never had. [Renewed laughter.] Judge Douglas cannot show that either one of us ever did have anything to do with them. I believe this is true about those resolutions: There was a call for a Convention to form a Republican party at Springfield, and I think that my friend, Mr. Lovejoy, who is here upon this stand, had a hand in it. I think this is true, and I think if he will remember accurately, he will be able to recollect that he tried to get me into it, and I would not go in. [Cheers and laughter.] I believe it is also true, that I went away from Springfield when the Convention was in session, to attend court in Tazewell County. It is true they did place my name, without authority, upon the Committee, and afterward wrote me to attend the meeting of the Committee, but I refused to do so, and never had anything to do with that organization. This is the plain truth about all that matter of the resolutions.

Now, about this story that Judge Douglas tells of Trumbull bargaining to sell out the old Democratic party, and Lincoln agreeing to sell out the old Whig party, I have the means of knowing about that [laughter]; Judge Douglas cannot have; and I know there there is no substance to it whatever. [Applause.] Yet I have no doubt he is "conscientious" about it. [Laughter.] I know that after Mr. Lovejoy got into the Legislature that Winter, he complained of me that I had told all the old Whigs in his district that the old Whig party was good enough for them, and some of them voted against him, because I told them so. Now, I have no means of totally disproving such charges as this which the Judge makes. A man cannot prove a negative, but he has a right to claim that when a man makes an affirmative charge, he must offer some proof to show the truth of what he says. I certainly cannot introduce testimony to show the negative about things, but I have a right to claim that if a man says he knows a thing, then he must show how he knows it. I always have a right to claim this, and it is not satisfactory to me that he may be "conscientious" on this subject. [Cheers and Laughter.]

Now, gentlemen, I hate to waste my time on such things, but in regard to that general Abolition tilt that Judge Douglas makes, when he says that I was engaged at that time in selling out and abolitionizing the old Whig party—I hope you will permit me to read a part of a printed speech that I made then at Peoria, which will show altogether a different view of the position I took in that contest of 1854.

Voice—Put on your specs.

Mr. Lincoln—Yes, Sir, I am obliged to do so. I am no longer a young man. [Laughter.]

"When Southern people tell us they are no more responsible for Slavery than we are, I acknowledge the fact. When they say that it is an existing institution, and there is no way to get rid of it, I assure them I shall not blame them for not knowing what to do. If all earthly power were given to me, I would not know what to do with it. My first impulse would be to free them all, and send them to Liberia—their own native land; but a moment's reflection would convince me that whatever of high hope there might be in this, its execution would be impossible. I reflect that, if they were all landed there in a day, they would all perish in the next ten days, and that there is not surplus money and surplus shipping enough in the world to accomplish it in many times ten days. Shall we free them and keep them as underlings? Are we quite sure this would better their condition? I think I would not hold one in Slavery at any rate, but my opinion is not clear enough to denounce people upon. Shall we make them politically and socially our equals?

Let the Judge frown, [illegible] have some abolition tendencies.

"Shall we free them, and make them politically and socially our equals? My own feelings will not admit of this, and if they would, the feelings of the great mass of white people would not. Whether this accords with strict justice or not, is not the wise question. A universal feeling, whether well or ill founded, cannot safely be disregarded. We cannot, then, make them our equals. . . . When they remind us of their constitutional rights, I acknowledge them fully and freely, and I would give them any legislation for the recovery of their fugitives, which would not be more likely in the stringency of its provisions to take a free man into Slavery than our ordinary criminal laws are to hang an innocent one." [Loud applause.]

I have reason to know that Judge Douglas knows that I said this. I think he has the answer here to one of the questions he put to me. I do not mean to allow him to catechise me unless he pays back for it in kind. I will not answer questions, one after another, unless he reciprocates; but as he made this inquiry and I have answered it before, he has got it without my getting anything in return. He has got my answer on the Fugitive Slave Law.

Now, gentlemen, I don't want to read at any greater length, but this is the true complexion of all I have ever said in regard to the institution of Slavery and the black race. This is the whole of it, and anything that argues me into his idea of perfect social and political equality with the negro, is but a specious and fantastic arrangement of words, by which a man can prove a horse chestnut to be a chestnut horse. [Laughter.] I will say here, while upon this subject, that I have no purpose directly or indirectly to interfere with the institution of Slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so. I have no purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white and the black races. There is a physical difference between the two, which in my judgment will probably for ever forbid their living together upon the footing of perfect equality; and inasmuch as it becomes a necessity that there must be a difference, I, as well Judge Douglas, am in favor of the race to which I belong having the superior position. I have never said anything to the contrary, but I hold that notwithstanding all this, there is no reason in the world why the negro is not entitled to all the natural rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. [Loud cheers.] I hold that he is as much entitled to these as the white man. I agree with Judge Douglas he is not my equal in many respects—certainly not in color, perhaps not in moral or intellectual endowment. But in the right to eat the bread, without leave of anybody else, which his own hand earns, he is my equal and the equal of Judge Douglas, and the equal of every living man. [Great applause.]

Now I pass on to consider one or two more of these little follies. The Judge is wofully at fault about his early friend Lincoln being a "grocery keeper." [Laughter.] I don't know as if it would be a great sin if I had been, but he is mistaken. Lincoln never kept a grocery anywhere in the world. [Laughter.] It is true that Lincoln did work the latter part of one Winter in a little still-house up at the head of a hollow. [Roars of laughter.] And so I think my friend, the Judge, is equally at fault when he charges me at the time when I was in Congress of having opposed our soldiers who were fighting in the Mexican war. The Judge did not make his charge very distinctly, but I can tell you what he can prove by referring to the record. You remember I was an old Whig, and whenever the Democratic party tried to get me to vote that the war had been righteously begun by the President, I would not do it. But whenever they asked for any money, or land warrants, or anything to pay the soldiers there, during all that time, I gave the same votes that Judge Douglas did. [Loud applause.] You can think as you please as to whether that was consistent. Such is the truth, and the Judge has the right to make all he can out of it. But when he, by a general charge, conveys the idea that I withheld supplies from the soldiers who were fighting in the Mexican war, or did anything else to hinder the soldiers, he is, to say the least, grossly and altogether mistaken, as consultation of the records will prove to him.

As I have not used up so much of my time as I had supposed, I will dwell a little longer upon one or two of these minor topics upon which the Judge has spoken. He has read from my speech in Springfield, in which I say that "a house divided against itself cannot stand." Does the Judge say it can stand? [Laughter.] I don't know whether he does or not. The Judge don't seem to be attending to me just now, but I would like to know if it is his opinion that a house divided against itself can stand. If he does, then there is a question of veracity, not between him and me, but between the Judge and an authority of a somewhat higher character. [Laughter and applause.]

Now, my friends, I ask your attention to this matter for the purpose of saying something seriously. I know that the Judge may readily enough agree with me that the maxim which was put forth by the Savior is true, but he may allege that I misapply it; and the Judge has a right to urge that, in my application, I do misapply it, and then I have a right to show that I do not misapply it. When he undertakes to say that because I think this nation, so far as the question of Slavery is concerned, will all become one thing or all the other, I am in favor of bringing about a dead uniformity in the various States, in all their institutions, he argues erroneously. The great variety of the local institutions in the States, springing from differences in the soil, differences in the face of the country, and in the climate, are bonds of union. They do not make a "house divided against itself," but they make a house united. If they produce in one section of the country what is called for by the wants of another section, and this other section can supply the wants of the first, they are not matters of discord but bonds of union. But can this question of Slavery be considered as among these varieties in the institutions of the country? I leave it to you to say whether, in the history of our Government, this institution of Slavery has not always failed to be a bond of union, and, on the contrary, been an apple of discord, and an element of division in the house. [Cries of "Yes, yes," and applause.] I ask you to consider whether, so long as the moral constitution of men's minds shall continue to be the same, after this generation and assemblage shall sink into the grave, and another race shall arise, with the same moral and intellectual development we have—whether, if that institution is standing in the same irritating position in which it now is, it will not continue an element of division? [Cries of "Yes, yes."] If so, then I have a right to say that in regard to this question, the Union is a house divided against itself, and when the Judge reminds me that I have often said to him that the institution of Slavery has existed for eighty years in some States, and yet it does not exist in some others, I agree to the fact, and I account for it by looking at the position in which our fathers originally placed it—restricting it from the new Territories where it had not gone, and legislating to cut off its source by the abrogation of the slave-trade, thus putting the seal of legislation against its spread. The public mind did rest in the belief that it was in the course of ultimate extinction. [Cries of "Yes, yes."] But, lately, I think—and in this I charge nothing on the Judge's motives—lately, I think, that he and those acting with him have placed that institution on a new basis, which looks to the perpetuity and nationalization of Slavery. [Loud cheers.] And while it is placed upon this new basis, I say, and I have said, that I believe we shall not have peace upon the question until the opponents of Slavery arrest the farther spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or, on the other hand, that its advocates will push it forward until it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South. Now, I believe if we could arrest the spread, and place it where Washington, and Jefferson, and Madison placed it, it would be in the course of ultimate extinction, and the public mind would, as for eighty years past, believe that it was in the course of ultimate extinction. The crisis would be past, and the institution might be let alone for a hundred years, if it should live so long, in the States where it exists, yet it would be going out of existence in the way best for both the black and the white races. [Great cheering.]

A Voice—Then do you repudiate Popular Sovereignty?

Mr. Lincoln—Well, then, let us talk about Popular Sovereignty. [Laughter.] What is Popular Sovereignty? [Cries of "A humbug, a humbug."] Is it the right of the people to have Slavery or not have it, as they see fit, in the Territories? I will state—and I have an able man to watch me—my understanding is that Popular Sovereignty, as now applied to the question of Slavery, does allow the people of a Territory to have Slavery if they want to, but does not allow them not to have it if they do not want it. [Applause and laughter.] I do not mean that if this vast concourse of people were in a Territory of the United States, any one of them would be obliged to have a slave if he did not want one; but I do say that, as I understand the Dred Scott decision, if any one man wants slaves, all the rest have no way of keeping that one man from holding them.

When I made my speech at Springfield, of which the Judge complains, and from which he quotes, I really was not thinking of the things which he ascribes to me at all. I had no thought in the world that I was doing anything to bring about a war between the Free and Slave States. I had no thought in the world that I was doing anything to bring about a political and social equality of the black and white races. It never occurred to me that I was doing anything or favoring anything to reduce to a dead uniformity all the local institutions of the various States. But I must say, in all fairness to him, if he thinks I am doing something which leads to these bad results, it is none the better that I did not mean it. It is just as fatal to the country, if I have any influence in producing it, whether I intend it or not. But can it be true, that placing this institution upon the original basis—the basis upon which our fathers placed it—can have any tendency to set the Northern and the Southern States at war with one another, or that it can have any tendency to make the people of Vermont raise sugar cane, because they raise it in Louisiana, or that it can compel the people of Illinois to cut pine logs on the Grand Prairie, where they will not grow, because they cut pine logs in Maine, where they do grow. [Laughter.] The Judge says this is a new principle started in regard to this question. Does the Judge claim that he is working on the plan of the founders of Government? I think he says in some of his speeches—indeed I have one here now—that he saw evidence of a policy to allow Slavery to be south of a certain line, while north of it it should be excluded, and he saw an indisposition on the part of the country to stand upon that policy, and therefore he set about studying the subject upon original principles, and upon original principles he got up the Nebraska bill! I am fighting it upon these "original principles"—fighting it in the Jeffersonian, Washingtonian and Madisonian fashion. [Laughter and applause.]

Now, my friends, I wish you to attend for a little while to one or two other things in that Springfield speech. My main object was to show, so far as my humble ability was capable of showing to the people of this country, what I believed was the truth—that there was a *tendency*, if not a conspiracy among those who have engineered this Slavery question for the last four or five years, to make Slavery perpetual and universal in this nation. Having made that speech principally for that object, after arranging the evidences that I thought tended to prove my proposition, I concluded with this bit of comment:

"We cannot absolutely know that these exact adaptations are the result of preconcert, but when we see a lot of framed timbers, different portions of which we know have been gotten out at different times and places, and by different workmen—Stephen, Franklin, Roger and James, for instance—and when we see these timbers joined together, and see they exactly make the frame of a house or a mill, all the tenons and mortices exactly fitting, and all the lengths and proportions of the different pieces exactly adapted to their respective places, and not a piece too many or too few—not omitting even the scaffolding—or if a single piece be lacking we see the place in the frame exactly fitted and prepared yet to bring such piece in—in such a case we feel it impossible not to believe that Stephen and Franklin, and Roger and James, all understood one another from the beginning, and all worked upon a common plan or draft drawn before the first blow was struck." [Great cheers.]

When my friend, Judge Douglas, came to Chicago, on the 9th of July, this speech having been delivered on the 16th of June, he made an harangue there, in which he took hold of this speech of mine, showing that he had carefully read it, and while he paid no attention to this matter at all, but complimented me as being a "kind, amiable and intelligent gentleman," notwithstanding I had said this, he goes on and eliminates, or draws out, from my speech this tendency of mine to set the States at war with one another, to make all the institutions uniform, and set the niggers and white people to marrying together. [Laughter.] Then, as the Judge had complimented me with these pleasant titles (I must confess to my weakness), I was a little "taken," [laughter] for it came from a great man. I was not very much accustomed to flattery, and it came the sweeter to me. I was rather like the Hoosier, with the gingerbread, when he said he reckoned he loved it better than any other man, and got less of it. [Roars of laughter.] As the Judge had so flattered me, I could not make up my mind that he meant to deal unfairly with me; so I went to work to show him that he misunderstood the whole scope of my speech, and that I really never intended to set the people at war with one another. As an illustration, the next time I met him, which was at Springfield, I used this expression, that I claimed no right under the Constitution, nor had I any inclination, to enter into the Slave States and interfere with the institutions of Slavery. He says upon that: Lincoln will not enter into the Slave States, but will go to the banks of the Ohio, on this side, and shoot over! [Laughter.] He runs on step by step, in the horse-chestnut plan of argument, until in the Springfield speech he says, "Unless he shall be successful "in firing his batteries until he shall have ex-"tinguished Slavery in all the States, the Union shall "be dissolved." Now I don't think that was exactly the way to treat a kind, amiable, intelligent gentleman. [Roars of laughter.] I know if I had asked the Judge to show when or where it was I had said that if I didn't succeed in firing into the Slave States until Slavery should be extinguished, the Union should be dissolved, he could not have shown it. I understand what he would do. He would say, "I don't mean to quote from you, but this was the result of what you say." But I have the right to ask, and I do ask now, did you not put it in such a form that an ordinary reader or listener would take it as an expression from me? [Laughter.]

In a speech at Springfield, on the night of the 17th, I thought I might as well attend to my own business a little, and I recalled his attention as well as I could to this charge of conspiracy to nationalize Slavery. I called his attention to the fact that he had acknowledged, in my hearing twice, that he had carefully read the speech, and, in the language of the lawyers, as he had twice read the speech, and still had put in no plea or answer, I took a default on him. I insisted that I had a right then to renew that charge of conspiracy. Ten days afterward, I met the Judge at Clinton—that is to say, I was on the ground, but not in the discussion—and heard him make a speech. Then he comes in with his plea to this charge, for the first time, and his plea when put in, as well as I can recollect it, amounted to this: that he never had any talk with Judge Taney or the President of the United States with regard to the Dred Scott decision before it was made—I (Lincoln) ought to know that the man who makes a charge without knowing it to be true, falsifies as much as he who knowingly tells a falsehood; and lastly, that he would pronounce the whole thing a falsehood; but he would make no personal application of the charge of falsehood, not because of any regard for the "kind, amiable, intelligent gentleman," but because of his own personal self-respect! [Roars of laughter.] I have understood since then, [but [turning to Judge Douglas] will not hold the Judge to it if he is not willing] that he has broken through the "self-respect," and has got to saying the thing out. The Judge nods to me that it is so. [Laughter.] It is fortunate for me that I can keep as good humored as I do, when the Judge acknowledges that he has been trying to make a question of veracity with me. I know the Judge is a great man, while I am only a small man, but I feel that I have got him. [Tremendous cheering.] I demur to that plea. I waive all objections that it was not filed till after the default was taken, and demur to it upon the merits. What if Judge Douglas never did talk with Chief Justice Taney and the President before the Dred Scott decision was made, does it follow that he could not have had as perfect an understanding without talking as with it? I am not disposed to stand upon my legal advantage. I am disposed to take his denial as being like an answer in chancery, that he neither had any knowledge, information or belief in the existence of such a conspiracy. I am disposed to take his answer as being as broad as though he had put it in these words. And now, I ask, even if he has done so, have not I a right to prove it on him, and to offer the evidence of more than two witnesses by whom to prove it; and if the evidence proves the existence of the conspiracy, does his broad answer denying all knowledge, information or belief disturb the fact? It can only show that he was used by conspirators, and was not a leader of them. [Vociferous cheering.]

Now, in regard to his reminding me of the moral rule that persons who tell what they do not know to be true, falsify as much as those who knowingly tell falsehoods. I remember the rule, and it must be borne in mind that in what I have read to you, I do not say that I know such a conspiracy to exist. To that I reply, I believe it. If the Judge says that I do not believe it, then he says what he does not know, and falls within his own rule, that he who asserts a thing which he does not know to be true, falsifies as much as he who knowingly tells a falsehood. I want to call your attention to a little discussion on that branch of the case, and the evidence which brought my mind to the conclusion which I expressed as my belief. If, in arraying that evidence, I had stated anything which was false or erroneous, it needed but that Judge Douglas should point it out, and I would have taken it back with all the kindness in the world. I do not deal in that way. If I have brought forward anything not a fact, if he will point it out, it will not even ruffle me to take it back. But if he will not point out anything erroneous in the evidence, is it not rather for him to show, by a comparison of the evidence, that I have reasoned falsely, than to call the "kind, amiable, intelligent gentleman" a liar? [Cheers and laughter.] If I have reasoned to a false conclusion, it is the vocation of an able debater to show by argument that I have wandered to an erroneous conclusion. I want to ask your attention to a portion of the Nebraska bill, which Judge Douglas has quoted: "It being the true intent and meaning of "this act, not to legislate Slavery into any Territory "or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave "the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, "subject only to the Constitution of the United "States." Thereupon Judge Douglas and others began to argue in favor of "Popular Sovereignty"—the right of the people to have slaves if they wanted them, and to exclude Slavery if they did not want them. "But," said, in substance, a Senator from Ohio (Mr. Chase, I believe), "we more than suspect "that you do not mean to allow the people to exclude "Slavery if they wish, and if you do mean it, accept "an amendment which I propose, expressly authorizing the people to exclude Slavery." I believe I have the amendment before me which was offered, and under which the people of the Territory, through their proper representatives, might, if they saw fit, prohibit the existence of Slavery therein. And now I state it as a fact, to be taken back if there is any mistake about it, that Judge Douglas, and those acting with him, voted that amendment down. [Tremendous applause.] I now think that those men who voted it down had a real reason for doing so. They know what that reason was. It looks to us, since we have seen the Dred Scott decision pronounced, holding that "under the Constitution" the people cannot exclude Slavery—I say it looks to outsiders, poor, simple, "amiable, intelligent gentlemen" [great laughter], as though the niche was left as a place to put that Dred Scott decision in [laughter and cheers]—a niche which would have been spoiled by adopting the amendment. And now, I say again, if this was not the reason, it will avail the Judge much more to calmly and good-naturedly point out to these people what that other reason was for voting the amendment down, than, swelling himself up, to vociferate that he may be provoked to call somebody a liar. [Tremendous applause.]

Again: there is in that same quotation from the Nebraska bill this clause: "It being the true intent "and meaning of this bill not to legislate Slavery into "any Territory or State." I have always been puzzled to know what business the word "State" had in that connection. Judge Douglas knows. He put it there. He knows what he put it there for. We outsiders cannot say what he put it there for. The law they were passing was not about States, and was not making provisions for States. What was it placed there for? After seeing the Dred Scott decision, which holds that the people cannot exclude Slavery from a Territory, if another Dred Scott decision shall come, holding that they cannot exclude it from a State, we shall discover that when the word was originally put there, it was in view of something which was to come in due time; we shall see that it was the other half of something. [Applause.] I now say again, if there is any different reason for putting it there, Judge Douglas, in a good-humored way, without calling anybody a liar, can tell what the reason was. [Renewed cheers.]

When the Judge spoke at Clinton, he came very near making a charge of falsehood against me. He used, as I found it printed in a newspaper, which I remember was very nearly like the real speech, the following language:

"I did not answer the charge [of conspiracy] before, for the reason that I did not suppose there was a man in America with a heart so corrupt as to believe such a charge could be true. I have too much respect for Mr. Lincoln to suppose he is serious in making the charge."

I confess this is rather a curious view, that out of respect for me he should consider I was making what I deemed rather a grave charge in fun. [Laughter.] It confers it strikes me rather strangely. But I let it pass. As the Judge did not for a moment believe that there was a man in America whose heart was so "corrupt" as to make such a charge, and as he places me among the "men in America" who have hearts base enough to make such a charge, I hope he will excuse me if I hunt out another charge very like this; and if it should turn out that in hunting I should find that other, and it should turn out to be Judge Douglas himself who made it, I hope he will reconsider this question of the deep corruption of heart he has thought fit to ascribe to me. [Great applause and laughter.] In Judge Douglas's speech of March 22, 1858, which I hold in my hand, he says:

"In this connection there is another topic to which I desire to allude. I seldom refer to the course of newspapers, or notice the articles which they publish in regard to myself; but the course of *The Washington Union* has been so extraordinary for the last two or three months, that I think it well enough to make some allusion to it. It has read me out of the Democratic party every other day at least for two or three months, and keeps reading me out [laughter]; and, as if it had not succeeded, still continues to read me out, using such terms as 'traitor,' 'renegade,' 'deserter,' and other kind and polite epithets of that nature. Sir, I have no vindication to make of my democracy against *The Washington Union*, or any other newspaper. I am willing to allow my history and action for the last twenty years to speak for themselves as to my political principles, and my fidelity to political obligations. *The Washington Union* has a personal grievance. When its editor was nominated for Public Printer I declined to vote for him, and stated that at some time I might give my reasons for doing so. Since I declined to give that vote, this scurrilous abuse, these vindictive and constant attacks have been repeated almost daily on me. Will my friend from Michigan read the article to which I allude?"

This is a part of the speech. You must excuse me from reading the entire article of *The Washington Union*, as Mr. Stuart read it for Mr. Douglas. The Judge goes on and sums up, as I think correctly:

Mr. President: You here find several distinct propositions advanced boldly by *The Washington Union* editorially and apparently authoritatively, and every man who questions any of them is denounced as an Abolitionist, a Free Soiler, a fanatic. The propositions are, first, that the primary object of all government and its original institution is the protection of person and property; second, that the Constitution of the United States declares that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States; and that, therefore, thirdly, all State laws, whether organic or otherwise, which prohibit the citizens of one State from settling in another with their slave property, and especially declaring it forfeited, are direct violations of the original intention of the Government and Constitution of the United States; and fourth, that the emancipation of the slaves of the Northern States was a gross outrage on the rights of property, inasmuch as it was involuntarily done on the part of the owner.

Remember that this article was published in *The Union* on the 17th of November, and on the 18th appeared the first article giving the adhesion of *The Union* to the Lecompton Constitution. It was in these words:

"KANSAS AND HER CONSTITUTION.—The vexed question is settled. The problem is solved. The dread point of danger is passed. All serious trouble to Kansas affairs is over and gone"—

And a column, nearly, of the same sort. Then, when you come to look into the Lecompton Constitution, you find the same doctrine incorporated in it which was put forth editorially in *The Union*. What is it?

"ART. 7, SEC. 1. The right of property is before and higher than any Constitutional sanction; and the right of the owner of a slave to such slave and its increase is the same and as inviolate as the right of the owner of any property whatever."

Then in the schedule is a provision that the Constitution may be amended after 1864 by a two-thirds vote.

"But no alteration shall be made to affect the right of property in the ownership of slaves."

It will be seen by these clauses in the Lecompton Constitution that they are identical in spirit with this authoritative article in *The Washington Union* of the day previous to its indorsement of this Constitution.

I pass over some portions of the speech, and I hope that any one who feels interested in this matter will read the entire section of the speech, and see whether I do the Judge injustice. He proceeds:

"When I saw that article in *The Union* of the 17th of November, followed by the glorification of the Lecompton Constitution on the 18th of November, and this clause in the Constitution asserting the doctrine that a State has no right to prohibit Slavery within its limits, I saw that there was a fatal blow being struck at the sovereignty of the States of this Union."

I stop the quotation there, again requesting that it may all be read. I have read all of the portion I desire to comment upon. What is this charge, that the Judge thinks I must have a very corrupt heart to make? It was a purpose on the part of certain high functionaries to make it impossible for the people of one State to prohibit the people of any other State from entering it with their "property," so called, and making it a Slave State. In other words, it was a charge implying a design to make the institution of Slavery national. And now I ask your attention to what Judge Douglas has himself done here. I know he made that part of the speech as a reason why he had refused to vote for a certain man for public printer; but when we get at it, the charge itself is the very one I made against him, that he thinks I am so corrupt for uttering. Now, whom does he make that charge against? Does he make it against that newspaper editor merely? No; he says it is identical in spirit with the Lecompton Constitution, and so the framers of that Constitution are brought in with the editor of the newspaper in that "fatal blow being struck." He did not call it a "conspiracy." In his language, it is a "fatal blow being struck." And if the words carry the meaning better when changed from a "conspiracy" into a "fatal blow being struck," I will change *my* expression, and call it "fatal blow being struck." [Cheers and laughter.] We see the charge made not merely against the editor of *The Union*, but all the framers of the Lecompton Constitution; and not only so, but the article was an *authoritative* article. By whose authority? Is there any question but he means it was by the authority of the President and his Cabinet—the Administration?

Is there any sort of question but he means to make that charge? Then there are the editors of *The Union*, the framers of the Lecompton Constitution, the President of the United States and his Cabinet, and all the supporters of the Lecompton Constitution in Congress and out of Congress, who are all involved in this "fatal blow being struck." I commend to Judge Douglas's consideration the question of *how corrupt a man's heart must be to make such a charge!* [Vociferous cheering.]

Now, my friends, I have but one branch of the subject, in the little time I have left, to which to call your attention, and as I shall come to a close at the end of that branch, it is probable that I shall not occupy quite all the time allotted to me. Although on these questions I would like to talk twice as long as I have, I could not enter upon another head and discuss it properly without running over my time. I ask the attention of the people here assembled and elsewhere, to the course that Judge Douglas is pursuing every day as bearing upon this question of making Slavery national. Not going back to the records but taking the speeches he makes, the speeches he made yesterday and day before and makes constantly all over the country—I ask your attention to them. In the first place what is necessary to make the institution national? Not war. There is no danger that the people of Kentucky will shoulder their muskets and with a young nigger stuck on every bayonet march into Illinois and force them upon us. There is no danger of our going over there and making war upon them. Then what is necessary for the nationalization of Slavery? It is simply the next Dred Scott decision. It is merely for the Supreme Court to decide that no State under the Constitution can exclude it, just as they have already decided that under the Constitution neither Congress nor the Territorial Legislature can do it. When that is decided and acquiesced in, the whole thing is done. This being true, and this being the way as I think that Slavery is to be made national, let us consider what Judge Douglas is doing every day to that end. In the first place, let us see what influence he is exerting on public sentiment. In this and like communities, public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed. Consequently he who molds public sentiment, goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. He makes statutes and decisions possible or impossible to be executed. This must be borne in mind, as also the additional fact that Judge Douglas is a man of vast influence, so great that it is enough for many men to profess to believe anything when they once find out that Judge Douglas professes to believe it. Consider also the attitude he occupies at the head of a large party—a party which he claims has a majority of all the voters in the country. This man sticks