FROM GEN. ROSECRANS'S ARMY.

Battle of Stones River—Sharp Action at Night—Rebels Driven from Intrenchments—Tennessee, Ohio, and Indiana United—Murfreesboro Evacuated—The Enemy in Full Retreat—Review of the Field.

From Our Special Correspondent.

MURFREESBORO, Tenn., Jan. 6, 1863.

Sullen reverberations of cannon rolled through the darkling forests when I concluded my last narrative. We know now that the battle of Stones River was ended. The enemy was flying even then, under cover of night. The sharp combat which was brewing precipitated their movements. The ruins of Smith's mansion—a brick dwelling on the right of Murfreesboro Pike, not far in front of the enemy's intrenchments—had furnished nasty cover for Rebel sharpshooters. Gen. Rousseau had directed the famous batteries of Loomis and Guenther to demolish it. A brief batter had sent the murderous rascals flying to better cover, with the loss of a Louisiana Colonel and some men.

But the persistent Rebels, until dark, had annoyed some of Rousseau's regiments from a line of intrenchments in front. He determined to put a rod in pickle for them, and as soon as it was dark enough the 3d Ohio, Col. Beatty, and 88th Indiana, commanded by Beatty, were sent out to take the works. Beatty managed the affair neatly, and reached a point within twenty five yards of the Rebel works before his advance was discovered. The moment the alarm was given our troops fell flat upon the ground and a flight of bullets passed over them. Rising to their knees, our gallant fellows let drive quickly and charged at treble quick, with electrifying yells. Their fire had been murderous, and the crippled enemy fled rapidly. The point, however, was too important to yield easily. Reenforcements were sent in and a furious combat ensued. The atmosphere blazed as if with magnetic lights irradiating darkness, and suffusing the mist which was spreading with a lurid glow.

The 1st Tennessee Brigade, under Gen. Spear, which had long yearned for an opportunity to exercise its valorous disposition, had arrived but an hour before from Nashville, guarding a supply train. They sought permission to engage, and it was granted. Spear led them gallantly in. The bitter fellows rushed foward with wild yells, and dashed upon the flank of the enemy. It was a short shrift. The Ohio and Indiana boys already had possession of the Rebel works, and Tennessee closed in from the flank with a motley hive of prisoners. The remnant of the famous fighting 1st Louisiana received its finisher in the gloom. Friday had left but a little fragment of it. That night left that sorrowful fragment of it in tatters. After the affair was concluded, Gen. Rousseau reported at headquarters in person—his splendid face in a glow of exultation. "Don't let them drive you out," said Gen. Rosecrans. "*D—d* if I do," was the pious response—and he did not.

Headquarters were then in the mud, a tattered log hut sheltering the Staff, while the General occupied a tent. You could not imagine a more comfortless position under an apology for shelter. Some of us had enjoyed no change of raiment for eight days—days of incessant labor, unremitting vigilance and almost constant fighting from Tuesday until Saturday night. Nevertheless, we were cheerful and happy. I had already forwarded you a telegram predicting that Sunday would be quiet unless the enemy attacked, because the unaffected piety of the General, and observation of his habits, justified me in the opinion that he would not willfully violate the sanctity of the Sabbath.

An hour after the fight, Major-Gen. Crittenden dropped into the General's marquee. Incidental allusion being made touching Sunday, Gen. Crittenden remarked: "I will obey all orders, General; but I can't help but feel that the Old Master takes care of those who regard his laws. I never feel right when I violate the Sabbath day. Ours is a sacred cause, and a sacred war." Gen. Rosecrans replied: "I have just telegraphed Gen. Halleck that we should be quiet to-morrow. I will not fight to-morrow unless we are attacked." You may rely that unless compelled to violate this principle, by inexorable necessity, Major-Gen. Rosecrans will not violate the Sabbath day.

Here there is inquiry, Why was Gen. Rosecrans quiet on Friday and Saturday? He was twenty-eight miles from Nashville. He received supplies by wagon-trains. His cavalry force was not numerous enough for his service. The Rebel cavalry was very strong. They had intercepted our communication with our base, cut our trains, and the terrific nature of the battle on Wednesday had so reduced our supply of artillery ammunition that we were obliged to delay movements; besides, it rained hard all day on Saturday, and the facile movement of artillery was impracticable. Observe that the enemy was intrenched, and his artillery in position against attack.

The troops had suffered sorely. Eight days marching against sharp resistance, with heavy fighting on Tuesday, a tremendous battle all day Wednesday, serious engagements on Thursday, with incessant skirmishing; a terrific conflict on Friday, beside unremitting skirmishing, which was continued along the front on Saturday, together with hunger and the vicissitudes of bivouac life on the wet soil and heavy rain, and constant vigilance, not to consider the embarrassments involved by care for the thousands of wounded and stragglers, were facts necessarily causing suspension of operations. Saturday night we were satisfied that victory awaited us.

Sunday morning we learned that the enemy had retreated under cover of night. We had heard the whistles of their locomotives, but we had heard them nightly before. We could not prudently ascertain that the enemy were retiring. It was night. We did not know the ground, and they sustained a strong show of force in front. Brig.-Gen. D. S. Stanley was pushed forward on several roads to harass the Rebel rear, but they were too far among the rugged hills to be damaged.

We rested on the Sabbath. God knows the whole army needed it after such toil. The lads revisited the scenes of their late appalling struggle. Many of the dead yet remained unburied. The plains and forests were strewn with the wreck of battle. The trees in the woods were stripped of their bark. They were white with the rude signature of battle. The carcasses of slain horses were sickening—hundreds lay swollen and mangled where they were destroyed. The bodies of those of our dead who fell upon that portion of the field captured on the right by the enemy were stripped—some of them of their shoes. Officers were completely denuded, excepting their under-clothing. Most shameful! Now they try to blame the negroes. Bodies of the negro servants and teamsters connected with our armies were found on the sanguinary field wantonly butchered.

Monday morning the 8th Division under Gen. Negley had the advance, and was the first to occupy Murfreesboro. After dinner Gen. Rosecrans removed his headquarters to the residence of the Hon. Speaker Keeble, of the Rebel House of Representatives of Tennessee. When we entered the town it seemed deserted. Now and then a solitary face peered from shaded windows; many door knobs sustained funeral crape, but nearly half the houses were distinguished by hospital flags. They were full of Rebel wounded, and 414 of our own were here. Col. McGregor of the 1st Arkansas (Rebel) was found at the dwelling of Mrs. Lytle, mortally wounded, and he is since dead.

A resume of the battles after the elaborate letter I forwarded would be superfluous. It began on Wednesday in disaster. We were surprised. Many would be glad to be satisfied upon this point—Was "suprise" all? The skill, persistence, and tenacity of purpose of Gen. Rosecrans preserved us all from fearful catastrophe. I knew that Wednesday night, even, when the enemy had been successfully repulsed, and we held him firmly at bay in position to take the aggressive when supplies should arrive, many of our Generals supposed we would retreat.

The constant mind of the General Commanding remained unshaken. "We shall defeat them," said he, repeatedly; "It is working all right;" "Never mind—we will yet show them tricks worth two of theirs." The magnanimity of the man is as great as his ability. Not one word of reproach at the misfortune of the right wing has as yet fallen from his lips. Yet his disappointment must have been most painful—he had relied so confidently on the splendid qualities of the right wing. Alas, noble Sill! Had you retained command of the division which was the first to yield!

After halting in Murfreesboro, there was opportunity to ascertain Rebel views of the conflict. It was believed by Major-Gen. Thomas—never prone to exaggerate—that the Rebel army outnumbered us by five or six thousand men. He believes it now. *The Rebel Banner* admitted 40,000, which, according to the usual mode of Rebel assertions, justifies us in adding 15,000 or 20,000 more, excluding cavalry. Put many Rebel captives, wounded, and otherwise, assert that they had eight divisions of infantry—some which were very large, numbering sixteen full regiments. An Alabama Captain told the General that his regiment numbered over a thousand men.

They estimate their loss at from 12,000 to 15,000 killed and wounded. We know we have about 2,000 prisoners. Our own loss was not so large, yet appalling enough—6,500 wounded, about 1,100 killed, and several thousand captured. Bragg's army mainly escaped by rail. His officers agree that the Battle of Stone River was the gamest of the war. Said one: "We agree that you are too much for us in the open field—but we can whip you in the woods." A few months ago, they boasted they could flog us anywhere, excepting within range of gunboats.

Among the regiments distinguished were the 2d, 6th, 15th, 18th, 19th, 21st, 24th, 26th, 49th, 51st, 74th, and 101st Ohio; 1st, 2d, 3d, 6th, 9th, 15th, and 21st Kentucky; 9th, 37th, 15th, 40th, 51st, 57th, 88th, and 35th Indiana; 11th and 21st Michigan; 78th Pennsylvania; 36th, 88th, 44th, 73d, 2d, 27th, 42d, and 51st Illinois, the 19th, Colonel Scott, most conspicuously, and the 24 and 15th Missouri. The most conspicuous batteries were Loomis's Michigan Battery, Guenther's, Parson's, the Chicago Board of Trade Battery, Cox's, Bush's, and all in Negley's division. Every regiment in Negley's (8th) division won imperishable renown. But perhaps this is invidious, where most of the regiments did so splendidly.

The attitudes of the two armies are briefly as follows: The enemy is retreating. At last reports it was near Manchester, and it was asserted it would retire to Chattanooga. Our own is posted about Murfreesboro, awaiting supplies. The country before it is rude, and its supplies are nearly exhausted. A winter campaign through it is almost impracticable. We shall not tarry here long.

Among officers who will be recommended for promotion I may mention Brig.-Gen. Negley, Col. Huzen, Col. Harker, and St. Clair Morton, Captain and Chief Engineer of the Department. The latter was conspicuous in battle for brilliant "conduct" and courage, and his skill and service in his own line of the profession were prominent. No man speaks of him but with unbounded admiration.

PONTMERCY.

A Glance at the Situation—The Flight of the Enemy—Why We Did Not Pursue—A Great Army Massed on the Center—Appalling Slaughter of Rebels—Gen. Rosecrans's Address to the Soldiers—Reward of Merit—The Proclamation and its Modification—A Boudsman Emancipated.

From Our Special Correspondent.

MURFREESBORO, Tenn., Jan. 10, 1863.

Since the great conflicts on Stones River the Army of the Cumberland has been recuperating around Murfreesboro, and peparing for further operations. A great battle is always exhaustive, and the incessant and harrassing operations of this army from the 26th of Dec. to the 4th of Jan.—ten days—during which a considerable portion of it was engaged unremittingly in combat, rendered rest imperative.

Pursuit of the enemy was vain. A large and powerful army cannot anywhere be pursued, profitably, much less in this rugged region, without very large numbers of efficient cavalry. We were deficient in this arm; besides, the enemy had the advantage of a right in advance, and railway communication to promote their flight, beside rivers between them and us, with a fortified line within two or three days march.

The interruption of our communications with Nashville, and the difficulty of accumulating supplies for a fighting army, are sufficient explanation of our status cotemporaneous with the flight of the enemy. Besides, it was well understood then, and it has since been confirmed, that the numerical force of the enemy really exceeded ours. They hurled eight divisions upon us, and theirs so excessively outnumbered our cavalry that pursuit would not have resulted in any advantage. Indeed it would have brought us vis a vis with a foe of equal strength upon the rude banks of Duck River, much further away than Murfreesboro from our base of supplies.

On Sunday morning, Jan. 4, when the flight of the enemy was announced, our army was impregnably posted, and was ready to resume the offensive on Monday morning. It was so massed in columns, by division, upon the center, that it was impregnable to any attack; besides, its front was protected by a line of intrenchments which greatly increased our effective offensive strength.

Old campaigners have remarked that the disposition of the army, after the disaster of Friday morning gave them an idea of massing forces which they had never before comprehended. Aside from the unconquerableness of the army thus concentrated, there was a magnificence of pageantry about it impossible to describe. The legions were folded up in their most compact shape, and the army was an instrument devised with masterly skill for the sure accomplishment of the most decisive results. You saw no extended flanks with feeble wings stretched far and wide to tempt the enterprise of vigilant foes, but a solid and mobile mass, which could be unfolded at the will of a master, and hurled as a stone from a sling upon any given point. The plan of battle, so unhappily marred by accident or worse, was strategy, the matchless handling of troops subsequently was grand tactics, the magnificent deportment of the Commanding General throughout all that tumultuous tornado of fire, death, and destruction, was sublime heroism.

You know that our bivouacs were gloomy Wednesday night. The foe was fiercely swarming around us, evincing relentless determination to cut us off from Nashville and crush us. Many Generals felt despondent; some favored retreat; but the constancy of Gen. Rosecrans remained untouched. He repeatedly exclaimed: "We shall defeat them! We will show them a trick worth two of theirs." Bragg knew that when the right of the Union army was once securely established, the left would certainly crush him, and the stinging disaster of Breckinridge, Friday evening, satisfied him that ruin of his army was impending, therefore he retreated.

If the extent of slaughter affected victory, neither army could boast greatly. Our mutual losses were awful. But the number of slain and mangled sustains but a comparatively trifling relationship compared with the moral and material results of the conflict. It was substantially a decisive victory for the Union arms. Regarding it negatively, it was one of the most important triumphs of the war. The enemy had assumed the offensive. The President of the Southern Confederacy had proclaimed in this very town that Nashville should soon be theirs. Had our army been defeated, the fate of the war would have been decided favorably to the Rebellion.

At this point I beg to submit a suggestion. With such momentous interests hanging upon the success or disaster of this army, is it wise to drive it onward into the mountains without doubling its numerical strength. It seems to me the War Department should thoroughly consider the situation. It is now fair to presume that when Gen. Rosecrans moves again, he will meet a Rebel army greatly strengthened by reenforcements from Richmond.

Before we marched into Murfreesboro we had been advised of the terrible losses of the enemy, but the extent was not known until we entered the town. Here we found almost every house a hospital. The Provost-Marshal General, Capt. Wiles, immediately directed a visitation, that wounded prisoners might be paroled, and three or four thousand have been discovered; besides, the dwellings in the surrounding country are filled with them. Some of their officers were reticent, but others freely admitted their losses in killed and wounded alone would reach 15,000. Thousands were moved from the field of battle to the rear upon the railway. Among the mortally wounded were Col. McGregor of the 1st Arkansas (since dead), and Capt. Ben. Yancey, son of the Hon. W. L. Yancey. The Adjutant-General of Breckinridge was killed, and the General himself got a minie bullet through his ear.

The gallantry and steadiness of our troops in battle is an exhaustless theme of eulogy. They had exhibited splendid qualities from the beginning of the movement, and in the heavy combats of the 30th, their conduct was beyond praise. The next morning when battle was roaring on the right, the General Commanding addressed an "order" to the troops, of which the following is a copy, viz:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, IN FRONT OF MURFREESBORO, Tenn., Dec. 31, 1862.

ORDERS: The General Commanding desires to say to the soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland, that he was well pleased with their conduct yesterday. It was all that he could have wished for. He neither saw nor heard of any skulking. They behaved with the coolness and gallantry of veterans. He now feels perfectly confident, with God's grace and their help, of striking this day a blow for the country, the most crushing perhaps, which the Rebellion has yet sustained. Soldiers! the eyes of the whole nation are upon you; the very fate of the nation may be said to hang on the issues of this days battle. Be true, then, to yourselves, true to your own manly character and soldierly reputation, true to the love of your own dear ones at home, whose prayers ascend this day to God for your success. Be cool, I need not ask you to be brave. Keep ranks, do not throw away your fire; fire slowly, deliberately—above all, fire low, and be always sure of your aim. Close readily in upon the enemy, and when you get within charging distance, rush upon him with the bayonet. Do this and victory will certainly be yours. Recollect that there are hardly any troops in the world that will stand a bayonet charge, and that those who make it are sure to win.

By command of Major-Gen. ROSECRANS.
JAMES P. CHARESCHE,
Assist.-Adjt. General and Chief of Staff.

Discoursing upon the battle after the enemy had fled, a staff officer remarked: "Your tenacity of purpose, General, is a theme of universal comment." "I guess," he replied, "that the troops have discovered that Bragg is a good dog, but hold fast is better." He is universally called "Old Holdfast" at the bivouac fires. A wounded Rebel officer in Murfreesboro, discussing the battle with Father Tracy—the clerical guest of the General—said, "We think your General is a d—d Dutch fool. He don't know when he is whipped." The fancy that Gen. Rosecrans is a Dutchman widely prevails in the South—whereas his ancestors, "native and to the manor born," fought in the Revolutionary War. The General is of the sixth generation of the American Rosecrans family, and is about as deeply bred American as the nativest of them all.

After the battle the General began immediately to reward merit. The splendor of Capt. St. Clair Morton's deportment in action, and the signal energy and skill as Chief Engineer of the Department, which he had displayed, designated him at once for promotion. Secretary Stanton, replying promptly to the recommendation of Gen. Rosecrans, telegraphed that Morton's name for Brigadier should be sent into the Senate for confirmation that day, so that late Captain is now Brigadier-General Morton. The fidelity and courage of Major C. Goddard, Senior Aid-de-Camp, and of Capt. R. C. Thompson, were immediately rewarded. The former was recommended for Assistant Adjutant-General, in the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel; the latter for Senior A. D. C., with rank of Major—a splendid distinction for a youth of twenty-three years. But Major Thompson fought at New-Madrid. He displayed the most dashing courage and constant fidelity in the latter.

Captain R. S. Thomas, a youthful Cincinnatian, who had attached himself to the staff as a volunteer aid, in order to serve his country, was conspicuously gallant, and the General recommends his appointment in the service as Captain. So staunch Kirby of the 6th Regulars, who suffers now from a severe wound, will be promoted to a captaincy.

Captain Hazen, of the 41st Ohio, is booked for Brigadier, and also Col. John F. Miller of the 29th Indiana. It was the fortune of his gallant brigade to capture Byrne's Rebel battery on the 2d, the colors of the 4th Florida, and of the 56th Tennessee. Said Major-General Thomas, "If anybody is made Brigadier, it should be Col. Miller." Col. M. received a stinging wound in his neck from a Minie ball, but he refused to leave the field.

The official reports of casualties are not yet returned. Those of the left wing, consisting of Wood's, Palmer's and Van Cleve's divisions, under Major-General Crittenden, are as follows:

Officers killed, 42; officers wounded, 173; total, 215. Enlisted men killed, 505; enlisted men wounded, 2,546. Total enlisted men killed and wounded, 3,051. Grand total killed and wounded, 3,266.

First Cavalry Division, commanded by Col. John Kennett: officers killed, 3; wounded, 2; total 5. Enlisted men killed, 16; wounded, 62; total 79. Grand total, 84.

Seventh Brigade, commanded by Col. John F. Miller (Negley's Division of the "Center"); 74 killed, 425 wounded.

Our whole loss of killed and wounded will not fall much short of 8,000 men, of whom 1,200 were killed, or have since died.

At this time the enemy are preparing to resist the crossing of Duck River. It is a very strong position, which may be held by an inferior against a greatly superior force. A freshet in the Tennessee River, however, may affect the situation.

The modification of the President's Proclamation, so as to exempt Tennessee, is a mystery to those who are familiar with the intense rebelliousness of this people. It must have been a sop to Gov. Andy Johnson. It cannot accomplish any conceivable good.

The first emancipation under the Proclamation occurred here a few days ago. Gen. Rosecrans directed free papers to be issued to a servant of Col. Walters of Charleston, S. C., and the bondman went free. Said Gen. Rosecrans to a friend, soon after, "I wish the American people to know that I have loved justice and hated iniquity." God bless him.

PONTMERCY.

FROM MISSOURI.

Springfield all Safe—The Rebel Slip—Their Attack, Retreat, and Escape—The Damage done by their Raid—Honorable Individual Bravery—Panic in Jefferson City—A New Iron-Clad—Gov. Gamble and the Assessments.

From Our Special Correspondent.

ST. LOUIS, Jan. 14, 1863.

The old proverb, "There's many a slip 'twixt cup and lip," was never more applicable than in the recent threatening situation of affairs at Springfield, in this State. Everybody hereabout conceded its capture—Gen. Curtis did not attempt to conceal his mortification. The Commissary Department was instructed to fit out provision trains at Rolla for Springfield immediately, to replenish the stock of supplies for the use of the Army of the Frontier. Dispatches from Lebanon to members of the Legislature from the south-west were received, and couriers from the country between Springfield and the Pomme de Terre announced with great confidence that Springfield had been captured. The stories all agreed that the defenders were still holding out inside of Fort Lyon, but the occupancy of the town, with full control over the Government supplies at that point, was considered an accomplished fact. Not until nearly 11 o'clock on Sunday night was the gloom relieved by contrary news, and when the city awoke on Monday morning to find that Springfield had not been taken by the Rebels, and that the enemy had been repulsed, Union men drew a long breath of satisfaction.

Measures to intercept the Rebel retreat were taken, but their success is doubtful. The Rebels when they left the suburbs of Springfield were about 4,000 strong, and had four pieces of artillery. Our troops are so scattered in that section of Missouri, that it was impossible to mass a force sufficiently large to defeat the Rebels or cut off their retreat. Ere this they are doubtless safe again at Batesville, on White River. Their attack on Springfield was a bold but unsuccessful proceeding. With a commander less courageous or troops less confident, the town would have been given up, but the defenders knew no other duty than to fight as long as they had a cartridge left, and even after they lost one of the only two pieces of artillery they had the contest was continued. It is more than probable that the Rebels were short of artillery ammunition, or they would have done more execution with their guns. They pitched shells into the town quite profusely early in the attack, but when they found this proceeding did not scare Gen. Brown into a surrender, they ceased, and continued the attack with musketry and only an occasional discharge of shell. They were unprovided with grape or canister shot. If they had served their guns with either, our casualties would have been greater.

Meager accounts of the attack reach us every evening. A gentleman who left Springfield on Saturday, after all the excitement about the attack was over, and the Rebels had retreated, reports that the Rebels were composed of various guerrilla bands who have been driven from Missouri, and a part of Hindman's cavalry force, under Marmaduke. The names of the Rebel commanders were Buroridge, Joe Shelby, McDonald, Coffee, and Porter. The previous reports of the Rebel prisoners that they came from Yellville will refer only to about 900 from Hindman's army, who joined the main body on the Ozark road. The others came immediately from the vicinity of Batesville, and rode nearly 100 miles in order to make this attack. They were, of course, well advised of the defenseless condition of Springfield, and expected to make easy prey of the town and its stores before reenforcements could be brought from the Army of the Frontier.

Telegraphic communication is now open beyond Lebanon, and will be restored to Springfield to-day unless the repairers are interfered with. The movement of Porter from Sand Spring toward Lebanon was merely a feint. The rebels quickly moved off on the Harteville road, just in time to take part in the fight with seven hundred Union cavalry, composed principally of State militia, from Gen. Fitz Henry Warren's command, stationed in Texas county, and though our men fought bravely the Rebels were too strong for them, and it is lucky the brave seven hundred were not captured. The fact is that the Union soldiers in this State begin to believe they can whip any number of bushwhackers, and small squads do not hesitate to attack large bands of guerrillas whenever and wherever they can find them.

The Legislature has set a precedent for complimenting individual bravery which ought to incite many such examples. Resolutions have been unanimously adopted complimenting the heroic conduct of Major Halloran of the 47th Regiment of Enrolled Militia, who recently captured, without any aid whatever six Confederate soldiers, one of them armed as efficiently as the Major. He was riding homeward about 25 miles from Linn Creek, a few days ago, when he espied six bushwhacks. Major Halloran saw one of them carrying arms, and concluded they were guerrillas. He rode up boldly and demanded their surrender; after some parleying they complied. The armed man gave up a revolver and shot-gun, and the whole six were marched to the nearest military post and put in prison. They have since arrived at Jefferson City.

On receipt of news that the Rebels were advancing on Lebanon, a panic occurred in Jefferson City, the road from Lebanon to the State Capital being open to any Rebel force that chooses to travel it. The panic was communicated to the Legislature, and resolutions were offered pledging the members of both Houses as individuals to cooperate with the military authorities in resisting the invaders. Upon this proposition a lively discussion occurred, some members sneering at the panic, and others calling on the Legislature to show its patriotism by shouldering muskets. One member was biased for inquiring whether a suitable hall for the use of the Legislature could be secured in St. Louis. A motion to lay the whole subject on the table was lost by 70 majority. While the discussion was in progress, dispatches were received from St. Louis announcing the retreat of the Rebels. The panic thereupon subsided, and the resolutions were withdrawn.

A new iron-clad gunboat, called the Osage, was launched at Carondelet yesterday. The Osage is built partly on the Monitor model, and partly from original designs. She is 180 feet long, by 45 feet breadth of beam, and 4 feet depth of hold. Her hull is entirely of iron, and is divided into six water-tight compartments. The Osage will, when finished, be provided with a turret, and her armament will consist of two guns. The deck is designed to be only twelve inches above the water. The wheel will be encased in iron, and the rudder apparatus will be likewise protected. The other features of the Osage need no description for eastern readers, who are familiar with accounts of vessels of the Monitor class. The Osage will be a sea-going vessel, in so far as the Monitors are seaworthy, and will be ready for service in a short time.

There is loud groaning here over the loss of several thousand bales of cotton in Mississippi and Tennessee by the raids of Van Dorn and Forrest. Three parties in this city alone lose about $125,000, and several small dealers lose various amounts, from $3,000 to $5,000, by the cotton burners.

The discussion in Congress a few days ago on Missouri affairs elicited a remark from Mr. Hall of this State that Gov. Gamble disclaims any approval of the recent assessments upon disloyal persons levied in this city. The probability is that Mr. Hall is mistaken. Gov. Gamble recommended such assessments in his famous Mercantile Library Hall speech last August, and he furthermore borrowed $150,000 from the St. Louis banks for the equipment of enrolled militia on his promise to reimburse the banks out of the first moneys collected under the $500,000 assessment—a transaction which makes the Governor responsible for the levy so far as his official approval is concerned.

The Provost-Marshal General has lately been issuing passes to all contrabands who could furnish evidence of their being owned by Rebels, but yesterday it was decided to require the testimony of a white person to enable the slave of a Missouri Rebel to leave the State. The reason for this exemption is the exclusion of Missouri from the Proclamation of the President.

The course of *The Republican* of this city is exciting attention. *The Republican* is in full harmony with *The Chicago Times*, and papers of that stamp, and calls upon the President to revoke his Proclamation of Freedom. Whatever can be said derogatory to the Government *The Republican* publishes—*The World*, *Journal of Commerce*, and *Express*, seem to be its exclusive source for New-York opinions.

St. Louis is overrun with gamblers. Why they are not arrested and set to work on fortifications is beyond comprehension. The Provost Marshal has the power to do it without fear of habeas corpus or defective indictments, and he knows full well that their chief victims are connected with the army. Their locale is as well defined as the river itself and the city ought to be freed from them at once.

The McDowell Court of Inquiry—The Advance on Richmond via The Peninsula—Proceedings of the Council of Generals—Directions by the President for the Protection of Washington.

WASHINGTON, Saturday, Jan. 17, 1863.

In the McDowell Court of Inquiry to-day, the record was but brief. Lieut.-Col. Tillson was recalled by Gen. McDowell, to show that the force of the enemy that attacked Gen. King on the evening of the 28th August, was not the same force that had attacked Gen. Reynolds in the morning. Col. Tillson states to the effect that while out on a reconnoissance with Gen. McDowell subsequently to the engagement of Gen. King's division, he ascertained from Gen. Heintzelman, and Col. Allen of the Maine Cavalry, the position that the enemy had occupied previous to that engagement, which he judged must have been five or six miles from the Warrenton turnpike.

At the time of the engagement he said they approached on what he understood to be the road from Sudley Springs to Haymarket, which neared the Warrenton turnpike at the point of attack.

Capt. Chandler was called by Gen. McDowell, and stated that last Summer the field of wheat that had been protected by Gen. McDowell east of the Lacey House, near Falmouth, had been harvested by the Quartermaster of the post, ground at Fredericksburg for the United States Government, and the flour distributed among the National troops.

The Court adjourned until 11 o'clock on Monday.

The following documents have been introduced in the testimony taken by the Court:

PROCEEDINGS OF A COUNCIL OF GENERALS.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, FAIRFAX COURT HOUSE, March 13, 1862.

A council of the Generals commanding army corps at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, were of the opinion:

First: That the enemy having retreated from Manassas to Gordonsville, behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan, it is the opinion of the Generals commanding army corps that the operations to be carried on will be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between the York and James Rivers, upon Richmond; provided, first, that the enemy's vessel, the Merrimac can be neutralized; second, the means of transportation sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base can be ready at Washington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac; third, that a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence or aid in silencing the enemy's batteries in York River; fourth, that the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace. Unanimous.

Second: If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved against the enemy behind the Rappahannock at the earliest possible moment, and the means for reconstructing bridges, repairing railroads and stocking them with material sufficient for supplying the army, should at once be collected for both the Orange and Alexandria and the Acquia and Richmond railroads. Unanimous.

NOTE.—That with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and these on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice Keyes, Heintzelman and McDowell. A total of 40,000 men for the defense of the city would suffice Sumner.

SECRETARY STANTON TO GEN. M'CLELLAN.

WAR DEPARTMENT, March 13, 1862.

To Major-Gen. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN.

The President, having considered the plan of operations agreed upon by yourself and the commanders of army corps, makes no objection to the same, but gives the following directions as to its execution:

First: Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication.

Second: Leave Washington entirely secure.

Third: Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there, or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

REPORT OF GENERALS THOMAS AND HITCHCOCK.

7:40 o'clock.

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 2, 1862.

In compliance with your instructions I have examined the papers submitted to me, and have the honor to make the following report:

First: The President's war order No. 3, dated March 8, requires that on taking up any new base of operations the City of Washington shall be left entirely secure. The other points of the order it is unnecessary to consider, as the enemy since its date have abandoned their positions and batteries on the Potomac and retired behind the Rappahannock.

Second: The council of General Officers held at Fairfax Court-House, March 13, took place after the enemy had retired from Manassas and destroyed the railroad in their rear. The council decided unanimously to take up a new base of operations from Fort Monroe, and three of the Generals—a majority—decided that the force necessary to be left shou'd be sufficient to fully garrison the forts on the right bank of the Potomac, and "to occupy" those on the left bank with a covering force of 25,000. It is, we think, the judgment of officers, that some 30,000 men would be necessary thus to man these forts, which, with the number of the covering force, would make a total of 55,000.

Third: The President's directions of March 13 to Gen. McClellan direct, first, to leave such a force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy may not repossess it; second, that Washington shall be left entirely secure; third, that the remainder of the army move down the Potomac, or move in pursuit of the enemy. In regard to occupying Manassas Junction, as the enemy have destroyed the railroads leading to it, it may be fair to assume that they have no intention of returning for the reoccupation of their late position, and therefore no very large force would be necessary to hold that position.

Fourth: Maj.-Gen. McClellan's report to the Adjutant-General of April 1, after giving the several positions of the troops proposed to be left for the defense of Washington, gives a representation as follows: At Warrenton there is to be 7,750; at Manassas, say 10,859; in the Valley of the Shenandoah, 35,467; on the Lower Potomac, 1,356. Total in all, 55,456. And there would be left for the garrisons and the front of Washington, under Gen. Wadsworth, some 12,000. In the above enumeration Gen. Banks's army corps is included; but whether this corps, operating in the Shenandoah Valley should be regarded as a part of the force available for the protection of the immediate front of Washington, the undersigned express no opinion.

Fifth: Gen. Wadsworth's report of April 2d gives his force as follows: Infantry, 15,335; artillery, 4,494; cavalry, 856—six companies only mounted. Total, 20,477.

Deduct sick, in arrest and confinement, 1,455. Total for duty, 19,022.

From this force Gen. Wadsworth is directed to detach two good regiments to Richardson's Division, Sumner's corps, which should be deducted from his command, one regiment to replace the 5 thirty-seventh New-York in Heintzelman's old division, and one to relieve a regiment of Hooker's division at Budd's Ferry—total, four regiments.

It is also ordered to send 4,000 men to relieve Sumner at Manassas and Warrenton. Gen. Wadsworth represents that he has no mounted light artillery under his command; states that there were several companies of reserve artillery still here, but not under his command or fit for service.

Gen. Wadsworth further reports that nearly all the force is new and imperfectly disciplined; that several of the regiments are in a very disorganized condition, some of them having been relieved from brigades which have gone into the field in consequence of their unfitness for service, the best regiments remaining having been selected to take their place, two heavy artillery regiments and one infantry regiment, which had been drilled for months in artillery service, having been withdrawn from the forts on the south side of the Potomac, and their places supplied with new infantry regiments entirely unacquainted with the duties of that arm, and of little or no value in their present position. If there was need of a military force for the safety of the City of Washington within its own limits that referred to in the report of Gen. Wadsworth would seem to be entirely inadequate.

In view of the opinion expressed by the council of the commanders of army corps of the force necessary for the defense of the capital, though not numerically stated, and of the force represented by Gen. McClellan as left for that purpose, we are of the opinion that the requirements of the President, that the city shall be left "entirely secure," not only in the opinion of the General-in-Chief, but that of the "commanders of the army corps" also, has not been fully complied with.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.
E. A. HITCHCOCK, Major-General U. S. A.

REPORT OF GEN. HITCHCOCK TO THE PRESIDENT.

The following is a copy of a paper handed to the President by Gen. Hitchcock:

MARCH 30, 1862.

The main line of the enemy extends from Richmond through Chattanooga and Corinth to Memphis, and at Corinth there is a connection south. Gen. Halleck, at St. Louis, is acting west of this line, with Gen. Buell as his immediate commander, having Corinth in view as one object, and some point at or near Cumberland Gap as another object.

Gen. McClellan, before Yorktown, has Richmond for his object, with Washington under his safe keeping. The immediate interest of this war is connected with the above indications, and all adjacent operations are incidental. It is necessary to break the line of communication between Corinth and Richmond. This may be done by Buell, and if he should occupy the Cumberland Gap, near the railroad, this object will be sufficiently accomplished. If some point east of the Gap be also made an object, as proposed by the President, it will require a large force to reach and maintain it, or that force might be destroyed by the enemy.

Instead, therefore, of employing a force necessary for seizing a point east of the gap, it might be better to employ a less force in the protection of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad—the duty assigned to Gen. Fremont. From present indications it might be better, instead of sending to the Mountain Department all of the force desired by its commander, to divide that force, one part to go to him for the protection of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the country immediately south of it, and the other part to strengthen McClellan's right, now occupied by Shields, the route to Richmond in that direction being open to the enemy, who, though not likely to take it, might be invited by its weakness to make some desperate attempt similar to one already made by Jackson upon Shields.

A movement from McClellan's left is known to the enemy. Hence nothing is more natural than a blow on McClellan's right. Nothing has intervened since that made a few days since to prevent a repetition of it with a larger force. If McClellan shall fell at Yorktown—not likely to happen; but if he should fall, what would be the movement of the enemy? It might be a desperate attempt to turn the right of the Army of the Potomac—the Shenandoah Valley. This should be guarded against by a part of the force called for by Fremont, instead of sending that force to cut the Richmond and Knoxville Railroad, the success of which might even aid in forcing the enemy to make some desperate attempt on the right of Washington.

PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL WAR ORDER—NO. 1.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, Jan. 31, 1862.

Ordered, That all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defense of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction. All details to be in the discretion of the General-in-Chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

PRESIDENT'S GENERAL WAR ORDER—NO. 3.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 8, 1862.

Ordered, That no change of the base of operations of the Army of the Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as, in the opinion of the General-in-Chief and the commanders of all the army corps, shall leave the said city entirely secure.

That no more than two army corps—about fifty thousand troops—of said Army of the Potomac shall be moved en route for a new base of operations until the navigation of the Potomac, from Washington to the Chesapeake Bay, shall be freed from the enemy's batteries and other obstructions, or until the President shall hereafter give express permission.

That any movement aforesaid en route for a new base of operations which may be ordered by the General-in-Chief, and which may be intended to move upon the Chesapeak Bay, shall begin to move upon the Bay on the 18th March inst., and the General-in Chief shall be responsible that it moves as early as that day.

Ordered, That the army and navy co-operate in an immediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac, between Washington and the Chesapeake Bay.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.

THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL M'CLELLAN.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, Feb. 3, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL MCCLELLAN—

MY DEAR SIR: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac. Your's, to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on York River; mine, to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas. If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions I shall gladly yield my plan to yours:

1. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine?

2. Wherein is a victory more certain by your