IN FAVOR OF SCHLEY.

YESTERDAY'S TESTIMONY IN THE NAVAL INQUIRY.

HODGSON PRAISES SCHLEY'S CONDUCT IN BATTLE—CAPTAIN FOLGER ON BOMBARDMENT AND BLOCKADE.

[BY TELEGRAPH TO THE TRIBUNE.]

Washington, Oct. 7.—The preponderance of to-day's testimony before the naval court of inquiry was in Schley's favor, although the defence has not yet formally begun. Most of the day was spent in questioning Hodgson, the Brooklyn's navigator, who, while he adhered strictly to his version of the conversation that he declared had occurred between the Commodore and himself at the crisis of the battle of Santiago, was none the less disposed to construe Schley's language in a more favorable light than had been attached to it in some quarters. He resented the stigma of trepidation which had been sought to be attached to his superior officer, and combated the notion that the celebrated expletive regarding the Texas was ever intended in its literal sense, but declared that, on the contrary, it was apparently an expression of impatience.

The witness was most at ease when recounting the work of the Brooklyn in the battle, which he did with great zeal, bringing out many interesting facts with emphatic exactness, relating particularly to distances and bearings between ships and ranges at different periods, established by instrumental measurements. He declared that the Brooklyn's turn to seaward carried her offshore only by the length of her tactical diameter at eleven knots, or about 600 yards, instead of the 2,000 yards estimated from the Indiana, and he corrected to 1,400 yards the last range of 1,100 yards to the closest Spanish ship just after the loop, given by Yeoman Ellis before he was killed.

It was notable that the three members of the court gave closer attention to this witness than to any who had preceded him on the stand, and that when he closed they asked him more questions than they have put to others. At their instance he was compelled to retell the story of the crisis of the battle for th ethird time. It was also noticeable that none of the court's questions related to the voluminous correspondence which consumed all the Saturday session and part of to-day's in its reading.

Captain William M. Folger testified at the afternoon session for an hour. His ship, the New-Orleans, joined the Flying Squadron on May 30, and he was therefore limited to occurrences of two days and two nights, including the reconnoissance of May 31, in which his ship took part. The reconnoissance, he thought, was eminently successful in developing the insignificance of the Santiago batteries, and for that reason he thought the attack on the Colon should have been made at much closer range to be effective. He discredited his log where it disagreed with him as to distance from shore of the blockade and the duration of fire on the Colon. He also said that if the Spanish vessels had attempted to escape at night they could not have been seen by the blockading fleet in bad weather.

Lieutenant Dyson, of the Steam Engineering Bureau, just before the court adjourned, presented data on the coal endurance of the squadron at high speed, to show how far the Spanish ships might have been pursued if they had made a sortie when Schley first arrived off Santiago.

The Judge-Advocate expects to recall Lieutenant-Commander Heilner, to prove a version of the loop colloquy said to have been given to him by Hodgson, and in that way introduce a letter from Captain Chadwick, which was ruled out by the court.

PROCEEDINGS IN DETAIL.

HODGSON CROSS-EXAMINED—CAPTAIN FOLGER AND LIEUTENANT DOYLE TESTIFY.

(By The Associated Press.)

Washington, Oct. 7.—The Schley Court of Inquiry to-day entered upon the third straight week of the investigation of Admiral Schley's conduct in the war with Spain. The crowd in attendance was as large as at any previous time, indicating that the interest in the case is unabated. It had been expected that the Navy Department would be able to complete its presentation of the case by the close of last week, but when the court opened to-day Captain Lemly's list of witnesses still contained almost a dozen names. Prominent among these is Captain Chadwick, who was Admiral Sampson's chief-of-staff, and who was in immediate command of the flagship New-York in the Santiago campaign.

The day's proceedings began with the recall of Lieutenant Doyle and Commander Rodgers for the purpose of correcting their previous testimony, and when they had been excused Lieutenant-Commander Hodgson, navigator of the Brooklyn, resumed the stand. There were still a few of the letters constituting the correspondence between the witness and Admiral Schley to be read.

When the reading of the Schley-Hodgson correspondence had been finished Captain Lemly asked Mr. Hodgson whether his denial of the colloquy between himself and Commodore Schley had ever been published entire. Mr. Hodgson replied in the negative, saying that the last paragraph of his letter of denial had not been printed. This paragraph referred to the inclosure of a newspaper clipping.

CROSS-EXAMINING HODGSON.

Mr. Rayner began his cross-examination by asking Mr. Hodgson whether the Marblehead had hailed the Brooklyn when the two vessels passed each other as the Brooklyn was on her way to Cienfuegos. The witness replied in the negative. The examination then turned upon events about Cienfuegos, and in reply to Mr. Rayner's inquiry Mr. Hodgson detailed these at length. He said in reply to these questions that he had seen the lights on the shore at Cienfuegos, which were afterward determined to be signals, but he had supposed they were signals between different branches of the Spanish forces on shore. He added that when Captain McCalla arrived with information as to the meaning of the signals he was immediately dispatched to the shore to communicate with the insurgents.

He said that the progress of the squadron was impeded between Cienfuegos and Santiago by the heavy weather the smaller vessels, the Vixen and the Eagle, were making, especially the Eagle.

Mr. Rayner asked: "How far were you off during this blockade of Santiago from the Morro during the day and night of May 28, 29, 30 and 31?"

In response the witness said: "Early in the daytime our habitual position was about six miles. In the night I think we steamed up and down in front of the harbor a distance of about six miles."

He stated that the picket boats, the Marblehead and the Vixen, were inside the line of the fleet, about midway between that line and the shore line.

The witness then, in response to a request from Mr. Rayner, continued his description of the naval battle of July 3 from the point where he had dropped that description at Captain Lemly's request while he was on the stand on Friday.

THE BROOKLYN IN ACTION.

In describing this fight he said:

The Brooklyn did all she could. She got into action just as quick as steam could carry her there. We began firing as soon as the first gun on the port bow would bear, and we kept the port battery firing until she turned with port helm through the arc, using the aft guns until we got all the starboard guns to bear. We got around as quickly as we could with port helm until we almost paralleled the course of the leading Spanish vessel. When the helm was eased, the ship steered a course parallel with the Vizcaya, which was then the leading vessel, although the Maria Teresa probably was further to the westward than the Vizcaya. She was standing at an angle in to the shore. When we got around, the smoke was so very dense that nothing could be seen of anything in the rear of us. The three Spanish vessels we were then engaged with were the Vizcaya, the Colon and the Oquendo. The Vizcaya was about twenty-five hundred yards on our starboard bow; the Colon probably was a little forward of the starboard beam. The Oquendo was abaft the starboard beam. We continued in that direction, when I remarked to Captain Cook that it seemed rather lonely for us out there. He was in the conning tower. He asked, "Why?" I said that we were all alone with the three Spanish vessels, and it seemed that it depended upon us to knock them out. At that time the smoke was so dense I could not see anything, and I supposed that the New-York being away, the Brooklyn was steaming ahead of the slower vessels.

He stepped out of the conning tower and exclaimed to me, "What's that off our starboard quarter?" I looked in that direction and saw the heavy bow of a ship, and said, "That must be the Massachusetts." He said, "No, it could not be the Massachusetts; she has gone to Guantanamo." I said, "It must be the Oregon," and he remarked, "God bless the Oregon!" I said, "Well, I am very glad to see her."

The Oregon was at that time about, I should say, four hundred or five hundred yards off our starboard quarter, at full speed. We continued in that position until the Brooklyn's speed began to increase as we got up steam, and probably drew a little further ahead from the Oregon. She never was that close to us again, as I remember. The Oquendo very shortly fell out and went ashore. The Colon gradually drew ahead and also went inshore.

I remember very well the time that the Vizcaya blanketed her from our fire. This chase was continued in that direction until, when off Acrerederas, the Vizcaya ported her helm and ran inshore. The Colon at this time had gained speed and was inshore, I suppose, some seven miles. After passing the Vizcaya we steamed ahead and ceased firing. The men were allowed to come out of the turrets, one at a time, to get a breathing spell, although of course all guns were manned and everything was ready, but the gaining upon the Colon was very slow; in fact, she gained apparently on us. This was about 11:15 o'clock when the Vizcaya stood in for Acrerederas. The chase was continued then after the Colon. I knew it must be six or seven miles away, until we gradually began to gain. I remember keeping the stadimeter at work on her, although the 13,000 yards would not register on the stadimeter. I remember at one time telling Commodore Schley that it was within about 13,000 yards, and my recollection is he told some one to signal the Oregon to try one of her "railroad trains." At any rate, shortly afterward the Oregon fired one of her 13-inch shells, which fell short. Then we tried with 8-inch shells, and they fell short. The Oregon was signalling to us the fall of our shot, and we signalled to her the fall of her shot. We continued occasionally to fire, the Oregon her 13 and 8 inch guns and we our 8-inch guns. I remember seeing one of the 13-inch shells of the Oregon fall well ahead of the Colon, and one of our 8-inch shells apparently fell inshore of the Colon. At that time the Colon ported her helm hard aport. Previously to this she had ported her helm once or twice, apparently seeking a soft spot on shore. She fired her lee gun and hauled down her flag. I pulled out my watch. It was exactly 1:15 p. m. We then ceased firing and slowed down, and orders were given to get out a boat. The captain was ordered to go on board to make terms with or tell the terms to the commanding officer of the Colon. On account of steam having been cut off, and there being some trouble with the boat, we were some little time getting the boat out. In the mean time we had slowed, and as rapidly as could be accomplished one of the cutters was finally got out and a crew put in. Captain Cook went in the boat and boarded the Colon. I think he probably had a mile and a half pull. At any rate, we had our guns trained on the Colon all this time, in case of treachery or any act of that kind on her part, although I saw her throwing breech locks overboard. I did not suspect anything of that kind.

"How far was the Oregon from the Brooklyn?"

"From 1,000 to 1,500 yards, on the starboard quarter."

The witness, in reply to questions, continued his report of the battle. He said that at the beginning of the fight he had given the range at 1,400 yards, but that after the loop it was about 2,400 or 2,500 yards.

PRAISES SCHLEY'S CONDUCT.

Mr. Rayner—What was the bearing of Commodore Schley during this engagement or any engagement in which you saw him?

"His bearing and manner, with respect to an officer of his rank and station in the naval service, were naturally those of a commander-in-chief of a naval force on that occasion."

The witness said that the Commodore had occupied a place on a platform around the conning tower during the engagement. This, he said, was a position of danger, as the Commodore was there always in full view of the enemy's ships.

"It has been stated here," said Mr. Rayner, "that the Brooklyn ran 2,000 yards away from the enemy's ships in making her loop."

The witness replied: "Any witness who made that statement, although he may have stated what he thought had occurred, was absolutely mistaken."

"How far did she go from the enemy's vessels?"

"She must have gone about six hundred yards to the southward, as that is about the tactical diameter of the Brooklyn at that speed."

"Did this turn interfere with the Brooklyn's ability to keep up her fire?"

"It did not; she continued to fire from her aft turrets."

"Did you ever see the Indiana during the engagement?"

"I did not. The smoke was very dense in the direction of the Indiana."

THE SCHLEY-HODGSON COLLOQUY.

At this point Mr. Rayner questioned the witness at length concerning his reported colloquy with Admiral Schley during the battle off Santiago, in which the Commodore was reported to have said: "Damn the Texas."

Mr. Rayner asked the witness if it was not Captain Cook who had given the order to "port helm." The reply was that Captain Cook might have given the order to the man at the wheel.

Mr. Rayner then asked: "Did Commodore Schley give the order to port the helm?"

"He did," was the reply.

"Was the helm already aport?"

"I guess so; Captain Cook says so."

Objection was made by Captain Lemly to the use of the word "guess" by the witness, but Admiral Dewey said that the form of expression was immaterial, and asked that counsel should not interrupt.

Continuing his statement in response to Mr. Rayner's question, the witness said that when his conversation with Commodore Schley had occurred on the Brooklyn the Commodore was standing on the platform around the conning tower, and two or three feet from himself (the witness), and that Captain Cook a part of time stood in the door of the conning tower, four or five feet distant. He said that Captain Cook had taken part in the conversation.

Mr. Rayner then questioned the witness closely in regard to the language in which this colloquy was reported by the newspapers, and the language used by Mr. Hodgson in his correspondence with Admiral Schley. He read the newspaper version of Commander Hodgson's statement of the colloquy as follows:

Schley—Hard aport.

Hodgson—You mean starboard.

Schley—No, I don't. We are near enough to them (the Spaniards) already.

Hodgson—But we will cut down the Texas.

Schley—Damn the Texas; let her look out for herself.

Mr. Rayner then had the witness scrutinize the letter which he had written to Admiral Schley on June 8, and drew from him the statement that he had not then informed the Admiral that he had used the expression, "Damn the Texas." When the witness was asked if he thought there was any suggestion of such an expression he replied: "When I suggested to Commodore Schley that there was danger of colliding with the Texas, he said 'Damn the Texas.' He used the expression as not in any way condemning the Texas for being there, but as if he were irritated as one might be about anything."

Mr. Rayner asked then about the expression attributed to the witness, "She will cut down the Texas." Commander Hodgson replied that there was no such expression in the letter, and that he never had said that the Brooklyn would cut down the Texas. "There is a good deal in that reported colloquy that I did not say," he added. "The statement was never made," he went on, "but the Commodore did say 'Damn the Texas.'" Continuing he said that the dialogue as reported was fictitious and that he had denied its verbal accuracy, while not denying the truth of a part of it. He said he had told Admiral Schley that he could not repudiate the entire statement, and that he had not understood him to request that he should do more than deny its verbal accuracy. He already had before writing his explicit denial told the Admiral that he could not deny the whole story. He had given the newspaper reporter authority originally to quote him as authority for the gist of the statement.

THE COURT WANTS ONLY FACTS.

At this point Mr. Rayner introduced as evidence the official report made by Captain Chadwick, of his examination of the witness with regard to this colloquy, for the purpose, as he said, of showing discrepancies between the statement made in that examination and the statement made now. The introduction of this report caused Captain Lemly to offer a statement made by Lieutenant-Commander Heilner on the same subject, but Mr. Rayner objected to this statement as not pertinent, and the court, after a consultation, sustained the objection. Other statements were put in as evidence without objection, and Captain Lemly offered a letter from Captain Chadwick to the Secretary of the Navy in regard to an explanation contained in a letter from Commander Hodgson which had just been read and offered as evidence. Mr Rayner called attention to the fact that this letter contained an expression of opinion, whereupon Admiral Dewey said: "We don't want it. We have not taken opinions here."

Captain Lemly said that he had only offered these documents for the purpose of making the record complete.

The court at this point adjourned for luncheon.

The afternoon session began with a question put to Lieutenant-Commander Hodgson by Mr. Hanna. He asked why he had written his categorical denial of the newspaper report of the colloquy between himself and Commodore Schley. The question was objected to and Admiral Dewey said: "We have the facts. The letters were written. That is all the court wants. We want facts—facts. People are influenced by different kinds of things. We want the facts. Draw out the facts."

Mr. Hanna—All I want to find out is the occasion for writing this letter.

Admiral Dewey—The court doesn't want that information. We don't need that.

Mr. Hanna then changed his question, and the witness said that he had written his explicit denial in response to a request from Admiral Schley. "He wanted me to write a denial of the controversy," he continued. "I had previously written that I could not deny the statement. A letter followed asking for a denial of the colloquy. I gave him this, at the same time explaining that I had admitted the gist of the report."

"Have you anywhere denied the substantial accuracy of the facts as set forth in the report of that colloquy?"

"On the contrary, I have admitted it."

Continuing, the witness said that Commodore Schley had not said, as reported, that the Brooklyn was too near the Spaniards. Commander Hodgson said that he objected to the tone of the newspaper report which had put him, a junior officer, in the absurd position of holding a controversy with the Commodore.

Changing the line of examination, Mr. Hanna then asked: "When the Brooklyn turned with port helm, did she blanket the fire of the Texas? Did she go between the Texas and the enemy?"

DID NOT BLANKET THE TEXAS.

"I do not think she did. I thought, however, she was going to do it."

"Had she turned the other way was there space enough for her to have made such turn without endangering the Texas?"

"Perfectly—perfectly clear enough space."

"How much would she have gained to the northward and westward had she turned with starboard helm?"

"She would have gained a position of about six hundred or seven hundred yards nearer the Spanish line."

"Would that distance have been reduced by reversing the port engine?"

"If you turned the port engine the tactical diameter would have been shortened but the speed of turning would have been reduced."

"I understood you to say you suggested the reversal of the starboard engine at the time this turn was made, but that that was rejected by Commodore Schley, after consideration and discussion. Are you clear that the starboard engine was not reversed?"

"I am very clear on that fact. No signal was made."

Captain Lemly—Are you clear that the colloquy or, as you call it, the dialogue, as given by you to-day was between you and Commodore Schley, and not between you and some other person on board the Brooklyn?

"There was no dialogue. There were three people interested in that conversation—Commodore Schley, Captain Cook and myself participating in it."

Mr. Hanna then asked about the cruise from Cienfuegos to Santiago, and inquired how the fleet had got twenty-five or thirty miles south of Santiago. The reply was that the captain of the Brooklyn had given him (the witness) the course, and that he (the witness) had supposed it was because of the supposition that the fleet might fall in with Cervera. He said the course pursued would not have taken the squadron to Santiago.

Speaking of the blockade of Santiago, the witness said that at night the blockading fleet steamed in column in front of the mouth of the harbor and about four hundred yards apart.

Questions were then asked by the court as follows:

"What was the distance of the Brooklyn from the nearest Spanish vessel when Commodore Schley said to Captain Cook: "Look out, Cook; they're going to ram you'?"

"I should say the distance was about two thousand or two thousand two hundred yards.

"Did you observe the whole movement of the Brooklyn from the time Commodore Schley gave the order 'hard aport, Cook,' until the Brooklyn was steadied on her course to the westward parallel to the Viscaya?"

"I did."

"Did you hear any order given while the Brooklyn was making the turn, to ease or steady the helm?"

"Not until it was eased to parallel the course of the leading Spanish vessel."

"In making the turn did the Brooklyn turn rapidly and continuously, or did she have her head longer on some heading than on others?"

"She turned rapidly and fired continuously."

"Did any of the Spanish ships attempt to ram the Brooklyn in the early part of the battle of July 3?"

"The Maria Teresea evidently made a rank sheer to port toward the Brooklyn with the evident intention of getting into close quarters or ramming."

"Did you see the Texas at the commencement of the engagement on July 3 about the time you say the Brooklyn's course was changed?"

"I saw her at the commencement of the engagement. Just at the moment of making the helm hard aport I did not see her. I knew where she was. I was down on the platform at that time. Probably I had seen her just an instant before that. I did not see her while she was turning."

"What effort was made to ascertain if the Spanish squadron was at Cienfuegos prior to the arrival of the Marblehead?"

"Outside of having the quartermaster go as far aloft as he could and look over the hill tops, I know of none until after the arrival of the Marblehead."

ORDERS SCHLEY GAVE.

"What orders were signalled by the Brooklyn to the fleet July 3, 1898?"

"I can only say from recollection that my orders were: 'Clear ship for action and close up or close in.'"

"Did Commodore Schley consult you regarding the feasibility of coaling the squadron at Cape Cruz or any other point between Cienfuegos and Santiago?"

"Not unless he did it through his flag lieutenant."

"On the occasion of the Flying Squadron falling in with the Marblehead near Key West, did you hear any report made by megaphone regarding the code of signals which had been established with the insurgents at Cienfuegos?"

"I heard none."

"Do you know of any plan of battle having been promulgated by Commodore Schley in case of falling in with the Spanish squadron?"

"I do not."

The court then asked Commander Hodgson to repeat the conversation he had had with Commodore Schley during the early part of the engagement of July 3 and he did so.

CAPTAIN FOLGER'S TESTIMONY.

Commander Hodgson was then excused, and Captain W. M. Folger, who commanded the cruiser New-Orleans in the Spanish war, was called. He detailed his part in the campaign, beginning with the arrival of the New-Orleans at Santiago as the convoy of the collier Sterling. He also related how, on May 31, the New-Orleans had participated in the bombardment of the Cristobal Colon, then lying in the mouth of Santiago Harbor. He said that the shots of the New-Orleans on that day had been fired at a range of from 8,000 to 10,000 yards and that all had fallen short.

"What damage was done to the enemy on that occasion?" asked Captain Lemly.

"I don't think there was any," replied the witness.

"Was there any further effort to capture or destroy the Colon?"

"Not to my knowledge."

"Were all the vessels available engaged in that action?"

"No; the Texas and the Brooklyn were in the rear."

"Was the fire of the enemy's batteries heavy enough to seriously endanger the attacking ships?"

"I do not so consider."

"What was developed as to the shore batteries?"

"That they had not strength enough to do any material damage."

Captain Lemly asked in regard to the developments concerning the bombardment of June 14, but Mr. Rayner objected. The court ruled that the question was admissible, a similar question by Admiral Schley's counsel having been admitted on a former occasion. "We cannot blow hot one time and blow cold the next," said Admiral Dewey, in admitting the question.

Replying to the question, Captain Folger said that the occurrence had failed to develop that the batteries had any material strength, as a single vessel had silenced them.

Recurring to the bombardment of May 31, Captain Folger expressed the opinion that the shots which had fallen near the fleet on that date were from Spanish ships in the harbor, fired over the hill, and not from the shore batteries. For this reason he had directed all the fire of the New-Orleans on that occasion at the Colon, instead of at the land batteries.

Describing the blockade of Santiago Harbor maintained by Commodore Schley, the witness said that the distance out was from five to eight miles and that at night the vessels steamed in column back and forth across the harbor, somewhat nearer in. He added that, even though the log of the New-Orleans had placed the vessels nearer the shore, he would not change his opinion. He did not believe the vessels were more than four miles from the Morro on May 31.

Mr. Rayner asked: "What do you know about the strength of the batteries, the number of batteries or the strength of the guns before the reconnoissance on May 31? What actual knowledge did you have?"

The witness replied: "I had no knowledge whatever before the reconnoissance."

"Then, on May 31, when this reconnoissance or bombardment took place, so far as you were concerned, you were absolutely in ignorance of the number of the batteries or the strength of the guns?"

"Prior to the fire by the batteries I had no knowledge."

"What knowledge did you acquire as the result of that reconnoissance or bombardment?"

"By the number of shots that were fired, by the character of the discharge, the smoke, etc., as indicating the calibre of the guns; by the fall of the projectiles, the amount of water they would throw up, and the evident direction of the fall, as indicating whether the projectiles were moving with great velocity or slowly. In that way I judged, alone."

RECONNOISSANCE SUCCESSFUL.

"Those things were developed as the result of the reconnoissance, were they not?"

"I consider the reconnoissance in that particular to have been successful."

"The reconnoissance was successful for the purpose of developing the number and strength of the batteries at Santiago?"

"Eminently so."

When the Judge-Advocate again took the witness he asked: "Referring to your answer that the firing of the 31st was eminently successful in developing the strength of the Santiago batteries, what, as a matter of fact, was developed as to the strength of such batteries? Were they strong or otherwise?"

"They were weak."

The Judge-Advocate—Can you state whether the engagement of May 31 developed the fact that the Colon had anything larger than 6-inch guns on board at that time?"

"It did not occur to us that she fired heavy guns. The calibre I cannot specify. It did not appear she fired the 11-inch guns, for which we knew she had been designed."

The court asked questions of Captain Folger as follows:

"For what length of time was the New-Orleans able to fire at the Colon and the batteries on May 31 on each run?"

"I think it was between five and ten minutes."

"Did you have any conversation with Commodore Schley as to his purpose in attacking the Colon on May 31?"

"I did not. The information I received was by signal only."

"By what method did you obtain the range for your guns on May 31 while firing at the Colon?"

"We obtained the necessity for a change of range by the fall of the projectiles."

"Were you furnished any plan of battle by Commodore Schley to be followed in case the Spanish squadron should come out?"

"No, sir."

Admiral Dewey—You referred to a signal from the flagship. The court would like to know what that signal was.

"The signal was, 'New-Orleans, clear ship for action,' and I think it was followed by the signal, 'The New-Orleans, the Iowa and the Massachusetts will engage the forts,' indicating that there was to be a reconnoissance or bombardment. I do not remember any conversation with the Commodore that forenoon on that subject."

Admiral Dewey—The court would like to know from the signal book exactly what signals were made by the Massachusetts.

The Witness (reading)—"At 12:48, in obedience to flagship, the Massachusetts signalled to the New-Orleans and the Iowa to clear ship for action, sounded to general quarters and cleared ship for action. At 1 started ahead both engines, the Massachusetts leading." There were no other signals in that watch. That is all that appears to be in the log. I do not remember discussing the subject with the Commodore.

THE SANTIAGO BLOCKADE.

By the Court—Were the blockading vessels near enough to the entrance of the harbor at night to prevent the escape of the enemy, had such an attempt been made?

"Had the weather been persistently clear, yes; if the weather were thick, rainy or foggy, no."

Captain Parker—Were not the Vixen and the Marblehead inside the line?

"They were."

"Was the weather good or bad during those nights?"

"The weather was generally bad—rainy."

Lieutenant C. W. Dyson was recalled. He testified concerning the coal supply of the scout boats on May 29, the day the retrograde movement toward Key West was begun. He said in reply to questions that no battleship could travel for more than eight to twelve knots on forced draught, and that on the day of the battle off Santiago the flagship New-York had all her boilers on, and was making seventeen knots, but that neither the Brooklyn nor the Oregon made full speed on that occasion, their maximum for the day being fourteen or fifteen knots.

At 3:55 o'clock the court adjourned until to-morrow.

FALSE IMPRESSIONS CORRECTED.

SOME HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED FACTS IN THE SAMPSON-SCHLEY CONTROVERSY.

Trenton, N. J., Oct. 7 (Special).—Colonel Robert M. Thompson, chief of Governor Voorhees's staff, is the president of the United States Naval Academy Alumni Association, and in that capacity he naturally takes a great interest in all things relating to the navy. When asked regarding the present inquiry in progress in Washington, Colonel Thompson said:

I am interested in the so-called Sampson-Schley controversy. I say "so-called," because if it had not been for the politicians and unwise civilian friends there would never have been any controversy between Sampson and Schley. After the battle of Santiago, Schley, in a handsome manner, in his telegram of July 10, expressed to the Secretary of the Navy what was undoubtedly his own feeling and the general feeling of the fleet, that the greater credit for the happy issue of the battle of Santiago was due to Sampson, as commander-in-chief of the North Atlantic Squadron.

Sampson, on the other hand, while not approving of Schley's conduct in its entirety, was yet so satisfied with his conduct in the battle and the prominent part that his ship bore, that he urged upon the Secretary to disregard Schley's conduct prior to June 1, from which, after all, no serious harm had come, and did his best to secure his promotion.

There is one story which I am anxious should be truthfully presented to the public. After Maclay's book was published, Mr. Maclay stated that his proofs had been submitted to the commanding officers, including Admiral Sampson, and that they approved his statements. A reporter calling upon Admiral Sampson when he was ill in his bed obtained from the Admiral what appeared to be a confirmation of this statement. The Admiral was asked if he had seen and read the proofs of Maclay's book, and he said yes, but unfortunately he was too ill to go into the matter at any length and explain everything, and so the public was informed, and to-day believes, that Admiral Sampson entirely approved the statement that Schley was a coward and a caitiff, which was the gist of Maclay's charge against Schley.

I am in a position to state the true facts, and you may absolutely rely upon them as the truth. The proofs were sent by Mr. Maclay to Admiral Sampson, with the request that they should be read and corrected. The Admiral at the time was not in good health, and did not wish to undertake the labor, but his secretary pointed out that the Maclay history was a standard one, and used at the Naval Academy as a textbook. This volume brought the history down through the period of the Spanish war, and it was desirable that there should be no inaccuracies in it. The Admiral, therefore, consented to read them, and did correct a certain part of them, but as soon as he arrived at the part which contained the statement that Schley was a coward and a caitiff, he was much angered, and said the statement was one the author had no right to make; that it was unjust and unfair to speak of any naval officer in such terms, and declined to have anything further to do with the proofs. His secretary, impressed with the great desirability of having the statement of facts accurate, and not believing that he was in any way responsible for the statements of opinion, did, on his own account, compare the book with the records and make on the margins a number of corrections. As these were in the same handwriting as those made when Admiral Sampson was giving his personal attention to the corrections, Mr. Maclay was perfectly justified in his statement. The order of the Secretary of the Navy, forbidding naval officers to make any statement for publication regarding this controversy, issued immediately after this interview, prevented the above correction being officially made. Fortunately, I am in a position to learn accurately the facts, and it gives me great pleasure to make them public, just as it gives me great pleasure to be able to note that the statement that Admiral Schley, while blockading Santiago, ran out at night to a distance of twenty or twenty-five miles, thus leaving the port entirely open, has been proved to be untrue.

My interest in these matters, and I believe it is the interest of every good American, is to learn the truth, and to be able to believe that our naval officers are the high toned, manly, generous, courageous men we have always believed them to be.

FRANCE'S FAILING REVENUE.

A GREAT DEFICIT TO BE FACED BY THE REPUBLIC.

Paris, Oct. 7.—Official returns for September show that the decrease in the revenue is 22,096,700 francs, compared with 20,082,300 in the same month of 1900. Under the estimates, the total deficit for the first nine months of 1901 amounts to 137,000,000 francs, compared with 88,000,000 during the same period of 1900. Under the estimates, sugar is responsible for a deficit of 40,000,000 francs.

The "Temps" to-day takes a gloomy view of the prospects. It says it is impossible to face such a situation without serious anxiety, with no particular circumstance or unusual expenditure to justify it. The "Temps" adds:

Therefore, there is no reason to expect its disappearance, and we are compelled to ask ourselves with anguish, if we are thus ruined in peace time what would happen if we had war? In such a case the people would find a simple explanation, in attributing the situation to the fault of the government. This explanation is open to discussion, but it will be prudent to take it into serious account in a country where universal suffrage, where current discontent might destroy the republic. We must remember that a deficit was the immediate cause of the overthrow of the monarchy of Louis XVI.

The "Temps" demands rigid economy in the budget of 1902, which will come before Parliament immediately after it reassembles on October 22.

MR. MEIKLEJOHN TESTIFIES.

SEES NO IMPROPRIETY IN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS' CONNECTION WITH HEMP COMPANY—HEISTAND INQUIRY NEARLY ENDED.

Washington, Oct. 7.—George D. Meiklejohn, formerly Assistant Secretary of War, was a witness before the Senate Military Affairs Committee at the Heistand investigation to-day. He had come to Washington from Chihuahua, Mexico, to testify. He detailed his recollection of the proposed hemp company. He said that when the proposition was made to him by Colonel Heistand to take stock in the company he replied that he would give it his consideration when he had leisure. He declared that he had not signed the "To whom it may concern" letter, introducing Major Hawkes, with his official title. He explained at length Major Hawkes's appointment to the Philippine service, and asserted that the appointment was made solely on the strength of Hawkes's recommendations and on his record as a soldier. He declared it had nothing to do with Hawkes's controversy with Heistand.

Mr. Meiklejohn explained that the opening and closing of hemp ports in the Philippines was wholly within the control of the military governor of the islands, and he could not, and would not, if he could, have influenced him in the matter. He said that he saw no impropriety in officers of the government investing in such an enterprise as the proposed hemp company, if they desired to do so. Reverting to the appointment of Major Hawkes to the Philippine service, Mr. Meiklejohn testified that he had told Hawkes's attorney that although Major Hawkes had excellent indorsements it would not be in the interest of the service to appoint a man who was engaged in a controversy with an army officer, as the civilian some time might be placed in a position of a subordinate to that officer. Mr. Meiklejohn emphatically denied the intimations in the resolution authorizing the inquiry that he had at any time used his official place to pay private obligations.

L. S. Holt, of North Carolina, testified as to conversations with Major Hawkes concerning the settlement of the latter's alleged claim against the proposed company. Hawkes had said that he would "get even" with certain parties in the hemp combination if they did not settle with him. He said that Hawkes had told him he would have an investigation which would involve high officials of the government. Hawkes had not said to him that he would stop the investigation for $800.

The remainder of the testimony taken by the committee was comparatively inconsequential. The committee announced that it would finish to-morrow the taking of testimony for the present. At a date to be announced later some other witnesses will be examined and the committee then will make up its report.

BARRING OUT ANARCHISTS.

SUGGESTIONS MADE BY COMMISSIONER FITCHIE IN HIS ANNUAL REPORT.

[BY TELEGRAPH TO THE TRIBUNE.]

Washington, Oct. 7.—Thomas Fitchie, Commissioner of Immigration of the Port of New-York, in his annual report for the fiscal year ended June 30 last, in connection with the proposition to establish an immigrant inspection service at European seaports for the purpose of determining the eligibility of intending immigrants to come to the United States under existing statutes, has this to say:

As a means of protection against the coming of convicts, fugitives from justice or anarchists, the presence of our inspectors abroad would be either futile or unnecessary. These inspectors would naturally be dependent upon the local police authorities for any information of the above character. If no efforts were made to secure such information their certificate as to the non-existence of bad antecedents in the case of a prospective immigrant would be worthless. If they were to assume the right to exact evidence of an unobjectionable police record from him, why not make it at once a requisite for admission to the country, or make the absence of such upon arrival prima facie evidence of criminality and let the vessel that allowed him to embark assume the risk?

Although such a measure may seem radical, it would really impose no hardship upon legitimate travellers from Continental Europe. Subjects of these countries cannot now leave in a lawful manner unless in the possession of passports, and in most instances passports are supposed to be denied to those whose police records are such as would disqualify the person from landing here, or if issued contain specific reference to previous criminal conviction. But even the above procedure would not offer a complete solution of the difficulty. Some governments, like Great Britain, do not possess a system of police surveillance that would enable them to give a guarantee of moral character that would be of any value whatever. We already have ample evidence that certain governments having such a system frequently issue passports to those not entitled to them.

The proportion of immigrants who actually possess criminal records at home, or are fugitives from justice, is comparatively small. Those who have anarchistic or criminal proclivities constitute, of course, a larger proportion. Many of the former class, and all of the latter, will be able to evade any form of inspection that we may be able to devise if they are otherwise qualified. Their undesirability can only be demonstrated by their careers after landing in this country. It is perfectly proper to adopt any measures to prevent the coming of such people, provided the method is not likely to degenerate into a mere annoyance to legitimate travel. But however well an inspection service can be organized and conducted, it must, to accomplish any great extent of the object desired, be supplemented by some provision for apprehending and deporting those who will gain admission to the country from lack of evidence at the time of examination to show that they are not entitled to land.

RIGORS OF ALASKAN WINTER.

GENERAL RANDALL'S REPORT MADE PUBLIC—PUSHING TELEGRAPH CONSTRUCTION.

Washington, Oct. 7.—The War Department to-day made public the annual report of Brigadier-General Randall, commanding the Department of Alaska. General Randall lays much stress on the rigors of an Alaskan winter. The cold, he says, is intense, and continues so from November to April, with severe and frequent blizzards. There is no dockage for ocean vessels at the supply port, Fort St. Michael, and all supplies must be lightered from ships in open roadstead. If the weather is rough the work of lightering becomes impossible.

General Randall says that the most important work in the department, after providing for the housing and supply of troops, was that of constructing the military telegraph line and military road through Alaska. The total length of line constructed up to the date of the report, August 15, was about four hundred miles. The work is being pushed as fast as possible, and by the close of navigation this year it is hoped that telegraphic communication between Fort St. Michael and Fort Gibbon, 420 miles distant, will have been established. The construction of these lines, General Randall says, is attended with many difficulties peculiar to an arctic climate.

Owing to the isolation of army posts in Alaska, and to the lack of facilities for instruction in drill and for convening courts-martial, General Randall says troops left to serve there for several years must deteriorate in military efficiency. He, therefore, recommends that troops stationed in Alaska be relieved every two years, and that only men with more than two years to serve be ordered there. In conclusion, General Randall says:

The location of department headquarters in Alaska for the last year is believed to have had a pronounced beneficial effect toward the protection of persons and property and the establishment of good order in the Territory. This has been accomplished without friction with the civil authorities, and in harmony, it is thought, with the sentiment of all lawabiding and self-respecting civilians.

A DANISH CRUISER TO VISIT US.

Copenhagen, Oct. 7.—A Danish cruiser will start on October 19 on a visit of courtesy to the United States by way of England, Spain and the Danish West Indies. She will arrive at New-York on January 8, and will remain there until January 20. Owing to the King's age, Prince Waldemar will not command the vessel, which will be commanded by Captain G. F. Holm, head of the hydrographic department of the Marine Ministry.

Sarah Bernhardt,

the great French Actress and woman, says: "I find the Urbana Wine Co.'s

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excellent, in fact equal to many French Champagnes. It surprises me that such a fine wine can be produced in America."

"SARAH BERNHARDT."

Gold Seal is served in every first-class café and club, and sold everywhere at half the price of French wine.

URBANA WINE CO., URBANA, N. Y., SOLE MAKERS.

APOLLO

IN THE LEAD.

A Person once brought clothes to a pirate who had been cast ashore and almost killed by the severity of the weather; then carried him to his house and furnished him with all necessaries. Being reproached by some one for doing good to the evil, he answered: "I have paid this regard, not to the man, but to humanity."

MORAL: We place on sale to-day,

One **Pianola**, ebonized case, good condition, $125.

One **Pianola**, mahogany case, good condition, $165.

One **Angelus**, ebonized case, good condition, $125.

One **Angelus**, mahogany case, good condition, $165.

We have paid these prices for the *Piano Players* named above, not to the makers, but to good people (names will be given when requested) who were prevailed upon to purchase them. After hearing and playing the **APOLLO** these people asked to exchange the former for **Apollo's**, paying us for same the difference between the prices of each *Piano Player* quoted above and the prices of **Apollo's**.

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