# GERMANY PUBLISHES DOCUMENTS IN EFFORT TO PROVE BELGIUM AND ENGLAND IN SECRET PACT

## Alleges Discovery in Brussels of Evidence That Neutrality Agreement Was Abrogated by Small Kingdom.

## SUPPOSED TREATY DATES FROM 1906

### Dr. Dernburg Interpreting These Papers Quotes U. S. Supreme Court Decision in Support of His View.

Two documents alleged to have been found by the German authorities in Brussels among the archives of the Belgian General Staff indicate the existence before the war of an arrangement between the British military attaché there and the Belgian Minister of War regarding British intervention in Belgium. One of these documents is reproduced on this page in facsimile. Translations of both are appended hereto. Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, Privy Councillor of the German Empire and former German Minister of the Colonies, has prepared the following remarks explanatory of the two documents:

By DR. BERNHARD DERNBURG.

To-day is published facsimiles of a paper found among the documents of the Belgian General Staff at Brussels referring to arrangements between the British military attaché and the Belgian Minister of War regarding British intervention in Belgium.

It will be remembered from the British White Book that in November, 1912, a correspondence passed between Sir Edward Grey and the French Ambassador in London, in which it was stated that British and French military and naval experts had consulted together from time to time as to plans to be followed in case of war, and it was stated in this correspondence that in accordance with such prearranged plans the French fleet would stay in the Mediterranean to safeguard the joint interests there, whereas the British fleet would safeguard their interests in the north.

Of this correspondence the members of the British Cabinet remained ignorant until the Cabinet meeting immediately preceding the written statement by Great Britain on August 2 that in case a German fleet attacked the French coast or passed into the Channel, England would give all the assistance in her power (British White Papers No. 148), and it was also, of course, concealed from the British public until the speech of Sir Edward Grey on August 3. It will be remembered that in consequence of this revelation the president of the British Board of Trade, Mr. John Burns, and two other members, Lord Morley and Mr. Trevelyan, left the British Cabinet under protest; that the leader of the British Labor party, Mr. Ramsey McDonald, resigned from the leadership, and that Mr. Arthur Ponsonby in his famous letter denounced Sir Edward Grey's practices.

Mr. Ponsonby said that time and again they had been assured that there were no obligations whatsoever on the part of Great Britain to come to France's assistance, and that they found themselves now so hopelessly entangled that as a matter of fact the British government could not back out.

**A Secret Understanding.**

The fact of these consultations, by which, of course, all the plans of mobilization of both the British and French armies were disclosed to the two allies, and which included the landing of English troops in France, is now fully established by the annexed documents. They show that these conversations were also held with Belgium, that the plans had been concerted to invade Belgium with an army of 100,000 men by way of three French ports—viz., Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne—and that the British plans even considered a landing by way of the Scheldt, thus violating also the Dutch neutrality.

The documents, giving all the details as translated and showing that Belgian railway cars were to be sent to the named French ports in order to transport the British troops into Belgium, are dated from 1906.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin, Baron Greindl, a well known Belgian patriot, protested to his government. In it he said that it was not quite safe to trust to the British and French to keep the Belgian neutrality, that it was not wise to take all measures only against a German infraction of Belgian neutrality, and that the British spirit was clearly shown by the words of Colonel Barnardiston that the Scheldt might be used for transporting troops into Belgium.

Furthermore, it will be remembered that the British and French governments violently protested when the plans were made public that the Dutch government intended to fortify the mouth of the Scheldt in 1906. But in 1912, when the Balkan crisis became acute, the British went one step further. When Colonel Bridges, in a conversation with General Jungblut, said that England was ready to strike, that 160,000 men were ready to be landed and that they would land them as soon as any European conflict should break out, General Jungblut protested that for such a step the permission of Belgium was necessary. The cool reply was that the English knew it, but thought that, as Belgium was not strong enough alone to protect herself, England would land troons, anyway. General Jungblut answered that Belgium felt strong enough to protect herself, which is in keeping with her declaration to France, when she offered to protect Belgium by five army corps, as reported in the British White Book.

**Plans for Joint Action.**

The position of England was therefore that, while in 1906 they had already concerted plans for a joint action, in 1912 England intended action in any case, should a European conflagration break out.

Now it must be recollected that as early as July 28, 1914, Sir Edward Grey said to Prince Lichndwsky, as mentioned in his communication to Sir E. Goschen: "The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved, we had not thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it and then France the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests, and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation—which I hoped would continue—into thinking that we should stand aside." (British White Papers No. 89.)

This was at a time when the Belgian issue had not been raised at all. It only came about by Sir Edward Grey's notes written on July 31. Thus the British entanglement with France, as evidenced by the British White Book, prevented England taking the same attitude in 1914 which she had taken in 1870, when she made a treaty with Prussia as against the German invasion of Belgium, and with Germany as against the French invasion of Belgium. A similiar agreement was suggested by Prince Lichnowsky to Sir Edward Grey on August 1, 1914, as reported in the English White Book No. 123, when the former asked Sir Edward Grey whether if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality England would engage to remain neutral; upon which Grey replied that he could not say that.

**Czar Forced Into War.**

It is therefore perfectly evident, in the first place, that in case of a German war that was sure to be brought about by Russia's mobilization against Germany, England would go to war against Germany, and it has been proved that the English assurance to that effect has strengthened the hands of the Russian war party, which thereupon got the upper hand and forced the Russian Czar into the war (see report of Belgian Chargé d'Affairs at St. Petersburg to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Brussels July 30).

In the second place, it is shown that England meant, with or without Belgium's will, to land her troops in violation of Belgium's neutrality in Belgium irrespective of whether German troops were marching through Belgium or not, because no such declaration had been made in 1912, or any time thereafter until August 4 in the German "Reichstag." It is further evident that as soon as Russia mobilized, Germany would have to fight Russia as well as France and England, and that in such a fight she was forced to draw quickly when she saw her enemies reaching for their hip pockets. And only the prompt action at Liège that put this important railway centre, commanding the railway connections to France and Germany, into German hands prevented the English landing and invading Belgium.

The guilt of the Belgian government in this matter consists, in the first place, in making and concerting plans with the English and French governments as to what steps to take in case of war. A plan of the French mobilization was found in the same docket, and it cannot be presumed that the conference between British and French experts was known to the British military attaché in Brussels.

**Greindl's Advice Unheeded.**

It is, furthermore, impossible to believe that the French railway for the shipping of British troops from Calais, Dunkirk and Boulogne into Belgium in Belgian cars could have been used without the knowledge of the French authorities. Second, that Belgium did not heed the advice of Baron Greindl, and did not try to insure her independence in the same way by approaching Germany and making a similar contract with her. This disposes of the contention that the Belgian conversations had a purely defensive character as against all comers. It shows the one sidedness of the inclination, which is evidenced also by the display of all Belgium's fortresses on the eastern frontier.

The Belgian people had been told at the beginning of the war that Germany demanded that the Belgian force should fight with the Germans against the French and the English, and the truth had become known only three full months later, when the Belgian Gray Book was published. Then Belgium was practically occupied territory. While Belgium pretended neutrality and friendship toward Germany, it was secretly planning for her defeat in a war which was considered unavoidable. The poor Belgian people, however, must suffer because of the large ambitions of King Leopold, of Congo fame, and of a broken down diplomacy.

The Imperial Chancellor has declared that there was irrefutable proof that if Germany did not march through Belgium her enemies would. This proof, as now being produced, is of the strongest character. So the Chancellor was right in appealing to the law of necessity, although he had to regret that it violated international law. This law of necessity has been recognized as paramount by nearly every prominent statesman, including Gladstone, and by all teachers of international law, even by the United States Supreme Court's decision, Volume 130, page 601, stating in regard to the treaty with China concerning Chinese immigration into the United States:

"It will not be presumed that the legislative department of the government will lightly pass laws which are in conflict with the treaties of the country, but that circumstances may arise which would not only justify the government in disregarding their stipulations, but demand in the interests of the country that it should do so, there can be no question. Unexpectedly events may call for a change in the policy of the country."

And to strengthen this opinion another decision by Justice Curtis, rendered in 1908, may be cited, stating that, "while it would be a matter of the utmost gravity and delicacy to refuse to execute a treaty, the power to do so was a prerogative of which no country could be deprived without deeply affecting its independence."

We now let these Belgian documents speak for themselves:

I.

Translation of the original draft of the report of the Belgian Major General Ducarme to the Belgian Minister of War concerning the former's conferences with the British military attaché, Lieutenant Colonel Barnardiston.

Letter to the minister concerning confidential conversations with the War Minister.

[Confidential.]

Brussels, April 10, 1906.

Sir: I have the honor to report to you briefly about the conversations which I had with Lieutenant Colonel Barnardiston and which have already been the subject of my oral communications. The first visit took place in the middle of January. Mr. Barnardiston referred to the anxieties of the General Staff of his country with regard to the general political situation and because of the possibility that war may soon break out. In case Belgium should be attacked the sending of about 100,000 troops was provided for.

The lieutenant colonel asked me how such a measure would be regarded by us. I answered him that from a military point of view it could not be but favorable, but that this question of intervention was just as much a matter for the political authorities and that, therefore, it was my duty to inform the Minister of War about it.

Mr. Barnardiston answered that his minister in Brussels would speak about it with our Minister of Foreign Affairs.

He proceeded in the following sense: The landing of the English troops would take place at the French coast in the vicinity of Dunkirk and Calais, so as to hasten their movements as much as possible. The entry of the English in Belgium would only take place after the violation of our neutrality by Germany. A landing at Antwerp would take much more time, because larger transports would be needed and because, on the other hand, the safety would be less complete.

This admitted, there would be several other points to consider, such as railway transportation, the question of requisition, which the English army could make, the question concerning the chief command of the allied forces.

He inquired whether our preparations were sufficient in order to secure the defence of the country during the crossing and the transportation of English troops, which he estimated to last about ten days.

I answered him that the places Namur and Liège were protected from a "coup de main" and that our field army of 100,000 men would be capable of intervention within four days.

After having expressed his full satisfaction with my explanation my visitor laid emphasis on the following facts:

First—That our conversation was entirely confidential.

Second—That it was not binding on his government.

Third—That his minister, the English General Staff, he and I were, up to the present, the only ones informed about the matter.

Fourth—That he did not know whether the opinion of his sovereign had been consulted.

In a following discussion Lieutenant Colonel Barnardiston assured me he never had received confidential reports of the other military attachés about our army. He then gave the exact numerical data of the English forces. We could depend on it that in twelve or thirteen days two army corps, four cavalry brigades and two brigades of horse infantry would be landed. He asked me to study the question of the transport of these forces to that part of the country where they would be useful, and he promised to give me for this purpose details about the composition of the landing army.

He reverted to the question concerning the effective strength of our field army, and he emphasized that no detachments should be sent from this army to Namur and Liège, because these places were provided with garrisons of sufficient strength. He asked me to direct my attention to the necessity of granting the English army the advantages which the regulations concerning the military requisitions provided for. Finally, he insisted upon the question of the chief command.

I answered him that I could say nothing with reference to this last point, and promised him that I would study the other questions carefully.

Later on the English military attaché confirmed his former calculations. Twelve days would at least be necessary to carry out the landing at the French coast. It would take a considerably longer time (one to two and a half months) to land 100,000 men in Antwerp.

Upon my objection that it would be unnecessary to await the end of the landing in order to begin with the railway transportations and that it would be better to proceed with these, as when the troops arrived at the coast Lieutenant Colonel Barnardiston promised to give me exact data as to the number of troops that could be landed daily.

As regards the military requisitions, I told my visitor that this question could be easily regulated.

The further the plans of the English General Staff progressed, the clearer became the details of the problem. The colonel assured me that one-half of the English army could be landed within eight days, the rest at the conclusion of the twelfth or thirteenth day, with the exception of the horse infantry, which could not be counted upon until later.

In spite of this, I thought I had to insist again upon the necessity of knowing the exact number of the daily shipments, in order to regulate the railway transportation for every day.

The English military attaché conversed with me about several other questions—namely:

First—The necessity of keeping the operations secret and of demanding strict secrecy from the press.

Second—The advantages which would accrue from giving one Belgian officer to each English General Staff, one interpreter to each commanding officer and gendarmes to each unit of troops in order to assist the British police troops.

In the course of another interview Lieutenant Colonel Barnardiston and I studied the combined operations to take place in the event of a German offensive with Antwerp was its object, and under the hypothesis of the German troops marching through our country in order to reach the French Ardennes.

In this question, the colonel said, he quite agreed with the plan which I had submitted to him, and he assured me also of the approval of General Grierson, chief of the English General Staff.

Other secondary questions, which were likewise settled, had particular reference to intermediary officers, interpreters, gendarmes, maps, photographs of the uniforms, special copies translated into English of some Belgian regulations, the regulations concerning the import duties on English provisions, to the accommodations of the wounded of the allied armies, etc. Nothing was resolved on as regards the activity which the government or the military authorities might exert on the press.

During the final meetings which I had with the British attaché he informed me about the number of troops which would be daily disembarked at Boulogne, Calais and Cherbourg.

The distance of the last place, which is necessary for technical considerations, will involve a certain delay. The 1st Army Corps would be disembarked on the tenth day and the 2d on the fifteenth. Our railways would carry out the transportation so that the arrival of the 1st Corps, either in the direction of Brussels-Louvain or of Namur-Dinant, would be assured on the eleventh day and that of the 2d on the sixteenth day.

I have again, for a last time and as emphatically as I could, insisted on the necessity to hasten the sea transports, so that the English troops could be with us between the eleventh and twelfth days. The happiest and most favorable results can be reached by a convergent and simultaneous action of the allied forces. But if that co-operation should not take place, the failure would be most serious. Colonel Barnardiston assured me that everything serving this end would be done.

In the course of our conversations I had occasion to convince the British military attaché that we were willing, so far as possible, to thwart the movements of the enemy and not to take refuge in Antwerp from the beginning.

Lieutenant Colonel Barnardiston on his part told me that at the time he had little hope for any support or intervention on the part of Holland. At the same time he informed me that his government intended to transfer the basis of the British commissariat from the French coast to Antwerp as soon as all German ships were swept off the North Sea.

In all our conversations the colonel regularly informed me about the secret news which he had concerning the military circumstances and the situation of our eastern neighbors, etc. At the same time he emphasized that Belgium was under the imperative necessity to keep herself constantly informed of the happenings in the adjoining Rhinelands. I had to admit that with us the surveillance service abroad was, in times of peace, not directly in the hands of the General Staff, our legations had no military attachés. But I was careful not to admit that I did not know whether the espionage service which is prescribed in our regulations was in working order or not. But I consider it my duty to point out this position, which places us in a state of evident inferiority to our neighbors, our presumable enemies.

Major General, Chief of the General Staff.

(Initials of General Ducarme.)

P. S.—When I met General Grierson at Compeigne during the manœuvres of 1906 he assured me the result of the reorganization of the English army would be that the landing of 150,000 would be assured and that, moreover, they would stand ready for action in a shorter time than has been assumed above.

Concluded September, 1906.

(Initials of General Ducarme.)

II.

Minutes of a conference between the Belgian Chief of the General Staff, General Jungbluth, and the British military attaché, Lieutenant Colonel Bridges (successor to Lieutenant Colonel Barnardiston), dated April 23, presumably of the year 1912. The document has been marked "Confidentielle" by the hand of Count van der Straaten, director in the Belgian Department for Foreign Affairs.

[Confidential.]

The British military attaché has asked to see General Jungbluth. The two gentlemen have met on April 23.

Lieutenant Colonel Bridges told the general that England had at her disposal an army, which could be sent to the Continent, composed of six divisions of infantry and eight brigades of cavalry—together 160,000 troops. She has also everything which is necessary for her to defend her insular territory. Everything is ready.

At the time of the recent event the British government would have immediately effected a disembarkment in Belgium (chez nous), even if we had not asked for assistance.

The general has objected that for that our consent was necessary.

The military attaché has answered that he knew this, but that since we were not able to prevent the Germans from passing through our country England would have landed her troops in Belgium under all circumstances (en tout etat de cause).

As for the place of landing the military attaché has not made a precise statement. He said that the coast was rather long, but the general knows that Mr. Bridges during Easter has paid daily visits to Zeebrugge from Ostend.

The general has added that we were, besides, perfectly able to prevent the Germans from passing through.

III.

[On Dec. 2, 1911, Baron Greindl, for many years Belgian minister plenipotentiary in Berlin, sent a very long report anent the Anglo-Belgian military arrangements to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, extracts of which were published in the "North German Gazette" of October 13, 1914, and appeared in several American newspapers in English translation. This important dispatch, which was likewise found at Brussels, is only a copy of the original report. Its official character is, however evident from the official imprint on the paper used for the copy. It reads as follows:]

[Copy.]

.....Section.
No. .....
.....Enclosure.
Reply to No.....
General Department
Office of.....
Berlin, Dec. 23, 1911.
Belgian Legation.
No. 3022—1626.
Strictly Confidential.

What is Belgium to do in case of war?

Sir—I have had the honor to receive the dispatch of the 27th November last, P without docket number, registration No. 1108.



Confidentielle

Section
N°
Annexe
Réponse au N°
Sur les
Bruxelles, le 10 Novembre 1906

Copie

Légation de Belgique
N° 3022/1626

Très Confidentielle.

Que faire en Belgique en cas de guerre?

A Monsieur le Ministre
J'ai l'honneur de vous rendre compte des entretiens que j'ai eus avec le Lt.-Colonel Barnardiston et qui ont fait l'objet de mes communications orales.
La première visite dont il m'a fait part, Mr. Barnardiston m'a fait part des préoccupations de l'état-major de son pays relativement à la situation politique générale et aux circonstances de guerre du moment. Les envois de troupes, d'un total de 100.000 hommes environ, étaient projetés pour le cas où la Belgique serait attaquée.
Le Lieut.-Colonel a alors demandé comment cette action serait interprétée par nous, je lui répondis que, au point de vue militaire, elle ne pourrait qu'être favorable; mais que cette question d'intervention relevait également du pouvoir politique et que, dès lors, j'étais tenu d'en entretenir le Ministre de la guerre.
Mr. Barnardiston me répondit que son ministre à Bruxelles en parlerait à votre Min. des aff. étr.
Il continua dans ce sens: Le débarq.t des nos troupes aurait lieu sur la côte de France, vers Dunkerque et Calais, de façon à hâter le plus possible le mouvement. Le débarq.t par Anvers demanderait beaucoup plus de temps parce qu'il faudrait disposer des transports plus considérables et que la sécurité serait moins complète.
Ceci admis, il restait à régler divers autres points, savoir: les transports par ch. de fer, la question des réquisitions auxquelles l'armée anglaise pourrait avoir recours, la question du commandement sup.r des forces alliées.
Il s'informera si pendant la traversée des transports, nos dispositions étaient suffisantes pour assurer la défense du pays durant la traversée et le transport des troupes anglaises, qui devaient environ 10 jours après.
Je répondis que les places de Namur et Liège étaient à l'abri d'un coup de main et que, au 4e jour, notre armée de campagne, forte de 100.000 hommes, serait en état d'intervenir — ce qui lui donne complète garantie.

Confidentielle

Lettre à Mr le Ministre au sujet des entretiens confidentiels

Bruxelles, le 10 avril 1906

Mr le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de vous rendre compte sommairement des entretiens que j'ai eus avec le Lt.-Colonel Barnardiston et qui ont fait l'objet de nos communications orales.
La première visite dont il m'a fait part, Mr. Barnardiston m'a fait part des préoccupations de l'état-major de son pays relativement à la situation politique générale et aux circonstances de guerre du moment. Les envois de troupes, d'un total de 100.000 hommes environ, étaient projetés pour le cas où la Belgique serait attaquée.
Le Lieut.-Colonel a alors demandé comment cette action serait interprétée par nous, je lui répondis que, au point de vue militaire, elle ne pourrait qu'être favorable; mais que cette question d'intervention relevait également du pouvoir politique et que, dès lors, j'étais tenu d'en entretenir le Ministre de la guerre.
Mr. Barnardiston me répondit que son ministre à Bruxelles en parlerait à votre Min. des aff. étr.
Il continua dans ce sens: Le débarq.t des nos troupes aurait lieu sur la côte de France, vers Dunkerque et Calais, de façon à hâter le plus possible le mouvement. Le débarq.t par Anvers demanderait beaucoup plus de temps parce qu'il faudrait disposer des transports plus considérables et que la sécurité serait moins complète.
Ceci admis, il restait à régler divers autres points, savoir: les transports par ch. de fer, la question des réquisitions auxquelles l'armée anglaise pourrait avoir recours, la question du commandement sup.r des forces alliées.
Il s'informera si pendant la traversée des transports, nos dispositions étaient suffisantes pour assurer la défense du pays durant la traversée et le transport des troupes anglaises, qui devaient environ 10 jours après.
Je répondis que les places de Namur et Liège étaient à l'abri d'un coup de main et que, au 4e jour, notre armée de campagne, forte de 100.000 hommes, serait en état d'intervenir — ce qui lui donne complète garantie.

L'armée des anglais en Belgique ne se ferait qu'après la violation de notre neutralité par l'Allemagne.

Le Ministre de la guerre

L'Attaché militaire anglais a demandé à voir le Général Jungbluth. Ces Messieurs se sont rencontrés le 23 avril.

Le Lieutenant Colonel Bridges a dit au Général que l'Angleterre disposait d'une armée pouvant être envoyée sur le continent, composée de six divisions d'infanterie et de huit brigades de cavalerie—en tout 160.000 hommes. Elle a aussi tout ce qu'il lui faut pour défendre son territoire insulaire. Tout est prêt.

Le Gouvernement britannique, lors des dernières événements, aurait débarqué immédiatement chez nous, même si nous n'avions pas demandé de secours.

Le Général a objecté qu'il faudrait pour cela notre assentiment.

L'Attaché militaire a répondu qu'il le savait, mais que comme nous n'étions pas à même d'empêcher les Allemands de passer chez nous, l'Angleterre aurait débarqué ses troupes en Belgique en tout état de cause.

Quant au lieu de débarquement, l'Attaché militaire n'a pas précisé; il a dit que la côte était assez longue, mais le Général sait que M. Bridges a fait, d'Ostende, des visites journalières à Zeebrugge pendant les fêtes de Pâques.

Le Général a ajouté que nous étions parfaitement à même d'empêcher les Allemands de passer.

Conventions anglo-belges

## POEMS BRING HIGH PRICE

### Loyalist Poetry of Revolution Gets Top Bid at Sale

An extra illustrated copy of "The Loyalist Poetry of the Revolution," edited by Winthrop Sargent, brought the highest price at the fourth and final session of the sale of Part I of the Joline collection at the Anderson Galleries yesterday. It is the first of only 99 copies printed. G. D. Smith gave $210 for the two volumes. He also paid $120 for "The Engraved Portraits of Washington, with Notices of the Originals and Brief Biographical Sketches of the Painters."

The same buyer paid $100 for a scarce set of Wilkinson's "Memoirs of My Own Times," in three volumes, and $95 for Lester Wallack's "Memories of Fifty Years," with an introduction by Lawrence Hutton.

Gabriel Weis gave $186 for an edition de luxe copy of Virginia F. Townsend's "Our Presidents, or the Lives of the Twenty-three Presidents of the United States," illustrated with a portrait of each. W. R. Benjamin obtained for $127 50 an extra illustrated volume of James Grant Wilson's "The Presidents of the United States, 1789-1902." The total of the session was $2,569 35 and of the entire sale $10,651 10.

## STOLE $1,200, HE ADMITS

### Conscience Forces Surrender For Theft Two Years Ago.

Conscience stricken because of his theft of $1,200 in Cincinnati two years ago, Theodore Herdeman, eighteen years old, walked into Police Headquarters yesterday and announced that he wanted to be arrested. He spent the money on Broadway in four months, he said.

Herdeman, according to his own story, lived at 14 West Liberty st., Cincinnati. He took the money, he said, from a haberdashery in which he worked. After spending the money he enlisted in the navy, but was discharged a year ago.

## DUTCH PROFESSOR UPBRAIDS GERMANS

### Says Government's Policy of Denial Has Made Nation Ridiculous.

### CRITICISES LETTER OF "INTELLECTUALS"

### Asserts Attitude of Defence Writers Argues Lack of National Pride.

Recent German newspapers copies of which have just reached New York give prominence to a letter written by a Dutch university professor to a German colleague, in which the writer criticises the proclamation sent by a large number of German "intellectuals" to the universities of the United States, denying German atrocity charges.

The letter was first published in the "Koelnische Zeitung," and a translation follows:

"A certain lack of national pride speaks out of those German defence writers. That, at least, is the impression they make upon us neutrals. We Netherlanders have a saying which means, 'Do right and don't look around.' The Germans would make a greater hit with me if they would live up to that theory.

"Another thing about these defence papers is that they are all written in a broad tone of conviction, scorn and authority, in the style of congressional speeches, that upon the sober Dutch people they make an impression almost humorous.

"What is it supposed to mean, that expression which is repeated time and time again, 'It is not true. Perhaps, it is not true.' But the mere assertion that it is not can be convincing only for those who presumed from the beginning that everything the Germans said or did must be absolutely right and just.

"No German savant would allow himself to be told what he should believe, or not believe, in any question, no matter by what authority. But we neutrals are supposed to believe without question, 'It is not true!' Another feature is that a noted scientist, whose judgment in this respected profession everybody appreciates, certainly is not necessarily a man who can decide such questions properly.

"We Hollanders know very well that armies turn to barbarism. That has been taught us often enough by our colonial army of about 30,000 men. The troops in the field are therefore changed as often as possible, so that brutality is prevented as much as possible.

"All the warring nations, however, by acting as if their own soldiers never did anything wrong, create an unpleasant impression. I was very indignant when Germany violated the neutrality of Belgium. But when the Imperial Chancellor said, 'We are doing wrong, but we must do it for military reasons,' I was partially conciliated. Necessity offers a strong excuse.

"But there the thing should have ended. Afterwards, when all kinds of little excuses were made to show that Germany had the right to take the action she took, it served only to antagonize the neutrals. The standpoint represented by the Chancellor in the beginning was more manly. I can understand his attitude; yet I maintain that Germany is no longer entitled to such a tone of disgust when others do not keep international treaties.

"Some people think only of this unfair proportion, and they do not have to be asked with whom they sympathize. If I may take the liberty to give the Germans a piece of advice, I would say, 'For goodness sake, quit excusing yourselves.' Let us have nothing of that which only history can judge."

## LEGISLATORS ACQUITTED

### Lieutenant Governor and 12 Others Exonerated in Indiana.

Indianapolis, Dec. 19.—Lieutenant Governor W. P. O'Neill and twelve other officers and employes of the 1913 Legislature, who were indicted December 4, charged with signing and presenting illegal claims against the state, were acquitted by Judge J. T. Markey in the Criminal Court here late to-day.

In addition to Lieutenant Governor O'Neill, those acquitted were Homer L. Cook, ex-Speaker of the House and now Secretary of State; Levi P. Harlan, state Senator; George W. Sands and John J. Keegan, state Representatives, and Wade H. Free, George M. Raab, S. I. Quillen, Paul C. Hill, John D. Shea, Mason J. Niblack, George C. Stelhorn and Douglas Bolser, employes of the two houses.

## $3,000 RAISED FOR VOTE CAUSE

### Sum Obtained in Few Minutes at Meeting of Congressional Union.

In a few minutes $3,000 was raised at the meeting of the Congressional Union held yesterday at the home of Mrs. O. H. P. Belmont, 477 Madison av. This money will be used in widening the scope of the work in various states.

Plans for a branch office in this city were not definitely settled. It depended, Miss Alice Paul, chairman of the union, said, on the finding of just the right organizer to take charge. It was decided to begin work at once among the women of the eleven voting states to awaken them to the need of using their influence to enfranchise their sisters in the other states.

"As many women as can be gathered from the voting states will go to San Francisco in August to hold a great meeting at the Panama Exposition," Miss Paul said. "After that these women will proceed in groups to Washington to be ready for Congress when that body convenes. The groups will go by different routes and hold meetings everywhere along the way. Will they 'hike'? I don't know, but probably some of them will choose picturesque ways of travelling."

The union will be active in the Delaware campaign. In that state no referendum is necessary. A bill passed twice by the Legislature will enfranchise the women.

"And that," Miss Paul pointed out, "will give us two more suffrage Senators in Washington."

The advisory council of the union, consisting of more than one hundred women, will meet in Washington on January 10.

Miss Lucy Burns, vice-chairman, and Mrs. Kent, wife of Representative Kent, of California, were among those who came from Washington to attend the meeting yesterday. Some of the New York women present were Mrs. Harriot Stanton Blatch, Mrs. John Rogers, jr., Mrs. John Winters Brannan, Mrs. Florence Kelly, Mrs. Crystal Eastman Benedict and Mrs. Charles. So many of the women there announced their intention of going to Washington on December 23 to hear Congress discuss the Bristow-Mondell amendment that it was decided to have a special car.

GIFT AT $1

Lucky Cat Knocker. Prepaid $1. Tea Caddy & Russian Caravan Tea. Prepaid $1. Colonial Knocker. Prepaid $1.

RUSSIAN ANTIQUE SHOP
2000 Unusual Gifts in Stock. 1 East 28th St.

MALKAN'S BOOKS
New York's Largest Bookstore
42 BROADWAY
Visit our Book Store and your difficulty for a Christmas Gift will quickly disappear.

FOR SALE—150 cows and heifers. Part grades, part registered. All tuberculin tested. Certificates furnished. Shipped anywhere by rail. Harry Vail, New Milford, Orange Co., N. Y.

## SUFFRAGE TO CURE RESTLESS NERVES

### Women Advised to Work for Vote Cause by Speaker at Suffrage Shop.

Sufferers from neurasthenia and melancholia, get out and work for suffrage! A votes for women campaign will tone up your nerves and restore your mental poise.

This prescription was issued by Hutchins Hapgood at the Fifth Avenue Suffrage Shop yesterday. His advice, he said, was the result of a wide observation of women.

"I have known so many women," he explained, "women whose nerves were all out of order and whose minds were confused because they didn't have anything to occupy them—husbands took too good care of them—well, I've known them to be completely changed through getting waked up to suffrage and working for it. It's the best cure for ills of the mind that I know."

This age is the renaissance of the middle class women, Mr. Hapgood declared.

"They are restless," he said, "because they can no longer absorb themselves in the tasks supposed to be theirs. The feministic movement doesn't take in the working women, because they are exploited to a point which smothers restlessness. But middle class women are full of uneasiness, and therefore more interesting than they ever were before."

All this awakening, Mr. Hapgood said, was making woman the spiritual sex, as contrasted to man.

Miss Alice Carpenter made a speech, taking the place of Mrs. Raymond Brown, who, owing to the death of her father, was unable to be there.

Richard Waldo, of The Tribune, will be one of the speakers on Monday, and Miss Annie Goodrich, of Teachers College, the other. On Tuesday Lawrence Abbott, president of "The Outlook" Company, and Miss Madeline Doty, prison investigator, will speak. The programme on Wednesday consists of talks by the Rev. A. W. McCurdy and by Miss Ruutz-Rees, of Rosemary Hall. On Thursday and Friday there will be no meetings. On Saturday Irvin S. Cobb will attest his faith in suffrage. Mrs. Rheta Childe Dorr is the other speaker that day.

The meetings are held at 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon. The shop is at 663 Fifth av.

## RESERVE BOARD AN INDEPENDENT BODY

### Not Responsible to Treasury Department, Attorney General Tells McAdoo.

Washington, Dec. 19.—Attorney General Gregory rendered an opinion today defining the status of the Federal Reserve Board as a body independent of any government department and one over which the Treasury Department has no control. It is held to be an absolutely independent body.

The opinion was called forth by a request from Secretary McAdoo asking the status and powers of the Reserve Board in its relation to other federal departments.

In his opinion Attorney General Gregory said:

"Consideration of the history of the Federal Reserve act, of the general scheme of the whole act, of the functions to be performed by the Federal Reserve Board and of the method of their performance leads me to the clear opinion that the board is an independent board of government establishment.

"The Federal Reserve Board is not merely a supervisory, but is a distinctly administrative board with extensive powers.

"The act contains no express provision that the Federal Reserve Board shall be considered as a bureau, division or office of the Treasury Department, a significant omission in view of the fact that in Section 16 it amended the Revised Statutes relative to that 'bureau' of which the Controller of the Currency was the 'chief officer,' and the provision in Section L that 'the Secretary of the Treasury may assign offices in the Department of the Treasury for the use of the Federal Reserve Board' (a provision added to the House bill by the Senate committee) would be highly superfluous if the board were a bureau of that department for which the Secretary already possessed complete authority to assign offices in his own departmental buildings."

A MERRY CHRISTMAS
AND
A HAPPY NEW YEAR

A SEASONABLE SUGGESTION

It is the desire of all at Christmas time to give happiness and joy to others. Let us therefore suggest that you buy your wife, child or friend a Book of Tickets, which will give them health and pleasure, at

DURLAND'S RIDING ACADEMY

the most exclusive and perfectly equipped School in this country.

In past years we have had a very large demand for Books of Tickets and this year we expect an even larger call for Tickets, as our prices have been reduced to what they were ten years ago.

Mail orders accepted if accompanied by a check.

THE DURLAND COMPANY
5 West 66th Street, New York City.