

After Italy---What? Asks Norman Angell

Though Her Entrance Into the War Makes the Allies' Military Task More Easy, Italy's Participation Increases the Difficulties of the Final Settlement, with a New Europe To Be Considered, the Pacifist Writes



By Norman Angell

HOW will the entrance of Italy affect the war in its outcome? Obviously it will make the military task of the western allies easier; but what of the final settlement—the ultimate end, to which the military task is only the means?

For even though war be an "inevitable" phase of human affairs, so is peace. War must come to an end at some time. Its object presumably is to change something, to give us a condition different to that which previously existed, to secure the destruction of a menace or a new shaping of Europe. How does Italy's participation affect that?

There is, perhaps, only this that we can answer with any approach to certainty: That though Italy's act will make the military task, the waging of the war by the Allies, easier, it will make the final settlement more difficult.

For not all the Allies have gone into this war with the same ultimate ends. If the settlement involved simply the retention of the status quo ante bellum minus the German military menace the problem would be relatively a simple one. But all the western Allies, save perhaps Britain and Belgium, are waging the war with the destruction of the Teutonic power; not as the end, but as the means to a further end. In the case of France, for instance, it is the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine. In the case of Serbia, the rescue of men of the Serbian race from alien rule. In the case of Russia, the readjustment of her relationship with the Poles, on the one hand, and certain Balkan populations and territory, on the other. As for Italy, she has for months been trying to achieve her special ends without reference to the need for destroying the German menace; she would presumably have been perfectly ready to allow that menace to remain had her demands been satisfied. And she has made no secret of her ends. They are her battlecry: "Italia irredenta!"

To give adequately the pros and cons of the demands which "Italia irredenta" embraces, or indicate even the complications which at the settlement it may bring, would involve entering into matters upon which lifelong students of these problems are in fundamental disagreement: into the complex difficulties of Balkan politics, with all their welter of language and nationalities; the relations of Serbs, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Turks, Greeks, Albanians; the struggle between the Germans, Magyars, Croats, Serbians, Italians, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles; to say nothing of the religious problems arising out of the relations of the Vatican to the Italian government, on the one hand, and the Austrian and German and French, on the other; or the relations of Moslems, Catholics, the Orthodox and United Greek churches; to the conflicting ambitions of Russian, Rumanian, Austrian, Italian, French and British policies in the Balkans and the Levant; or of such historical problems as the various legacies of the Crimean war; the issues of the Serbo-Bulgarian war of 1885; the formation of the Balkan League and the intrigues which provoked the second Balkan war; of all the questions of recent European alliances; the balance of power, the conflict between Slav and Teuton and all the endless moral and material problems that arise therefrom.

But nevertheless out of all this welter one or two outstanding truths—the "constants" as distinct from the "variables" of the problem—emerge. These, if they do not enable us to foretell what will happen, do at least give us the means of disentangling rival principles, permitting us to see what alternative solutions are possible and to judge in some measure on which side it would be desirable for the influence of the great western liberal powers to be thrown; what ought to happen and what might happen.

The outstanding motive which has impelled Italy's entrance into this war is indicative of a certain moral factor which may certainly be classed among the "constants" of the problem. The "irredentism" which has been the motive force of Italy's action is revealed as an intensely emotional nationalism, finding articulation in the poetry of a d'Annunzio and the extravagances of Futurism; the claim and expression among great masses of the population for the assertion of national prestige being among the mass perhaps little more than a vague aspiration and an almost blind instinct, which overrides reason and nullifies rationally determined courses of action.

Incidentally, we see here that one of the outstanding causes of the war in Italy's case has been a "theory," a tradition, an attitude of mind—things, by the way, which certain militarist students and advocates are apt to treat with a quite ferocious scorn. These traditions, ideas, theories, attitudes of mind, are also facts; facts, quite as much as dreadnoughts or balances at the bank. In one sense, indeed, they are more important than either, for they are the forces which build the dreadnoughts and put them in motion. Moreover, they are not facts which, like Topsy, "just growed." They have quite definite parents, however little they may be known of them.

They are the outcome of preceding ideas, good, bad or indifferent, as the case may be; of discussion, of books, of literature, of a tradition which has grown up, and in all of which the human mind and will have played their part.

This is not an irrelevant reflection, because these non-constant factors are generally treated as a fixed and ultimate thing, which human effort or will or discussion or understanding can in no way alter. But, far from that being the truth, they are most variable and alterable things in the world. They are the direct outcome of the discussion of them. A Voltaire, a Rousseau, a Rougel de l'Isle, a Mazzini, a Mill or Cobden can change their character and direction. Men make them and unmake them, and what writing and talking and discussion has done in rendering them mischievous, writing and talking and discussion can undo.

What part will be played at the final settlement by this tradition of irredentism in Italy's case, assuming that the Allies are rapidly victorious? If they are it is to be feared that Italy will look upon herself as having presented the Allies with the gift of victory and will not be disposed to take any modest view of her reward. If we examine what would have obtained as the price of neutrality—that is to say, of not going to war—we may get some idea of what she would demand for going to war, and still more for victory. And assuming that the Allies are able so to disregard the counter demands of Austria and Germany so far as to satisfy Italian ambition, we shall be confronted with a new Europe, which will include these conditions:

- 1. Such possible new states as Bohemia and Hungary, or what remains of Austria, excluded from all political access to the sea, having no "little window."
2. The presence under Italian rule of non-Italian peoples, like the Croats of Dalmatia, the Germans of the Tyrol, even a purely German population, like that of Bozen, the country of the Teuton hero Andreas Hofer.
3. By these facts, large populations of Slavs representing the hinterland of the Italian coast country, excluded from normal and natural economic development. As one

American authority (Herbert Adams Gibbons) has said: "Fifty million people cut off from the sea, to satisfy the national aspirations of a few hundred thousand Italians." And,

4. Should irredentism of this kind grow by what it fed on, a possible demand, to-morrow, for the "ultimate irredentism," which would threaten the interests of France in Corsica and Savoy, and even, in the opinion of some, the safety, finally, of Switzerland as well.

Whatever view we make take as to the relative weight of these four main classifications, this much is certain—that the realization of even the present Irredentist creed would give us a Europe more restless and as pregnant of war as that which has produced the present cataclysm.

One obvious objection presents itself as an offset to this conclusion, namely, that the Western Allies have arranged with Italy that she shall not present demands at the close of the war which shall stand in the way of a general settlement on lines insuring permanent peace.

Now the only real ground for that assumption is the fact that Italy has joined the agreement not to make a separate peace. But Italy has already shown that she is capable of

putting her own interpretation upon alliances, even though she has profited from them for a generation or more. Three facts stand out: First, that the definite offer to satisfy ambitions which eighteen months ago eminent Italians declared to be irrealizable has not to-day prevented Italy going to war against her former allies to realize more than those so recently "irrealizable" ambitions. Obviously her appetite has grown.

Secondly, the action of Italy has been determined by popular sentiment rather than by governmental judgment, or it may be, even, obligation. The third fact is this: That the Allies are not in a position to prevent Italy going to war, even if they were unable to secure Italy's subscription to their view as to the ultimate settlement. If Italy took the view that she was entitled to profit by what she doubtless regards as the impending break-up of Austria and the helplessness of Serbia, certainly the Allies are not now in a position to challenge that view. They must do so, if at all, later. Never probably has Italy had so free a hand before: never, apparently, have her aspirations run so high; that is not a combination which argues the likelihood of any very severe self-denying ordinance.

The reader will, of course, realize that this pessimism is based on an assumption which is a very general one, and that is why I have discussed it—but is not necessarily that of the writer. And the assumption is, of course, this: That the methods and principles which have dominated diplomatic settlements in the past will prevail at that of to-morrow. The one hope for a saner Europe is that those principles and methods will be modified. Let us see at what point it might be possible for the liberal powers, at least, to effect some modification.

Heretofore, at every post-bellum congress the representative of each state has played for one main object: to increase the power in territory of his own nation. If he could "take" territory, he "took" it. That is to say, he extended the area of his government's administration. For, of course, when a government "takes" territory it acquires nothing for its citizens. Germany may have "acquired" Alsace-Lorraine, but Germans certainly did not: the farms, the factories, the fields, the houses remained in the hands of those who had owned them when the province was France's "property." All the Germans acquired was the knowledge that the government of the province was being directed by certain Berlin bureaucrats instead of by certain Paris bureaucrats, and the fact that the adult males could be compelled to fight on the side of Germans instead of against them. This last might, indeed, have represented a tangible gain had it not been that the fact of such compulsion increased for Germans the very risk against which it was designed to protect them. If diplomatic conceptions had in the past been away less by a belief in the superlative value of power and been concerned more with tangible problems of the real welfare of the people whose interests it was the business of the diplomats to promote, they might have managed to solve most of the real problems that confronted them.

But not all. The desire for national unity, based not upon sheer desire for expansion of administration, but upon the desire of a population of similar tradition to live as a political unit; and then the tendency of that unit to make its economic adjustments so as to exclude the population of other political units, would still present difficulties like those

presented in the case of the Italian occupation of Italian ports on the shores of the Adriatic. And this difficulty—which in part at least is democratic—is still further complicated by the fact of another tradition or theory mainly diplomatic, which is this: That the nations of Christendom do not form a society with definite obligations, one to the other, with their independence limited by those obligations, just as the independence of the individual in a society within the state is so limited.

The political or diplomatic fiction insulates instead that the nations are a mere congeries of "sovereign independent groups," whose sovereignty can, on no account, be impaired for the purposes of civilized life in common. It is a pure fiction, of course, and the attempt to maintain it results in most grievous sacrifices both of sovereignty and independence. Thus the United States, though "sovereign and independent" and at peace with other "sovereign and independent" states (say Holland or Sweden), is not allowed to have trade or intercourse with those states, save by the grace and at the discretion of and in conditions imposed by a third party, say Great Britain, with whom they all happen to be at peace. So little is the United States or any other neutral state in war "independent" that they have come to accept it as an international arrangement that any predominating belligerent of any war which happens to be raging shall absolutely dictate the conditions of their commercial intercourse.

But there is a further fact which stands in the way of national groups living as sovereign and independent units, and that is that the national unit does not coincide at times with the geographical unit; the different groups may occupy the same river valley, the same port, the same street. But this will be noted: That wherever people have liberated themselves from the diplomatic fictions, from what Mr. Lowes Dickinson has called the "governmental mind," they have not found the other difficulties insoluble. Where a people have arrived at a really democratic conception of government, a conception of government, that is, not as the power to rule other men or groups, but as the co-operation for mutual aid between men and groups, the presence of different race or language within the one political unit presents no real difficulty. It is the case of Switzerland, where Italian, German and French groups live together without it ever occurring to any that they must dominate the others or are "oppressed" by them. There is no desire on the part of the Swiss-Italian for "reunion with the fatherland," though less democratic Italy might conceivably one day start on a crusade to "rescue" their "brothers" from the Franco-German "yoke" of the Swiss Republic.

In the same way, it is possible for a nation to occupy territory which blocks sea-access of another nation occupying the hinterland without damage to that other. It is the case of Holland, which, for the best part of a century has occupied both banks of the Scheldt at the mouth, but has so far sacrificed its "sovereignty" as to bind itself by treaty to keep open the river for Belgian commerce. And the fact that the Dutch straddle the mouth of the river, which is the approach to Antwerp, constitutes no menace to Belgium. Something similar occurs in the case of the Danube. But it will be noted also that these arrangements work in the case of small states not bitten with dreams of "national expansion," nor possessing the power to realize those dreams if they had them. It would seem, indeed, that the power to realize them is of itself sufficient to give rise to them.

Italy Has Made No Secret of Her Ends. They Are Her Battle Cry, "Italia Irredenta."

The Action of Italy Has Been Determined by Popular Sentiment Rather Than by Governmental Judgment.



Reasons for Delay in Germany's Reply Professor Usher Presents Considerations Which Might Move Germany to Desire War with the U. S.

By Roland L. Usher

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IT IS quite clear that neither the President nor the American people desires war with Germany as an outcome of the present crisis. But we seem to have forgotten to ask ourselves whether war with the United States might not accord with Germany's interests, and this fact lead the Kaiser and his advisers to utilize the Lusitania protest as a method of drawing the United States step by step into the European conflict.

We must realize that we shall have war, if it comes, not because of notes on diplomatic quarrels, but because Germany conceives it her interest to force war upon us. If she makes amends, it will be because she does not consider war advisable on general grounds; if she does not meet the demands of the President fully, it will be because for far-reaching reasons she does consider war expedient and to her advantage. What could those interests be? In a word, the entry of the United States into the war might make possible, if not probable, a German victory in Europe, or at the very least postpone a German defeat for months, if not years.

It may be well for me to say at once that I am not a German, but

am of American ancestry; that I do not wish war with Germany, or any steps taken which might give Germany an opportunity to declare war; nor do I feel that a statement as plausible as it can be made of interests or reasoning which might cause the Germans to make war on us is a dangerous thing for American people to read.

I am not afraid of the good sense of the American people nor of their judgment, and believe them quite capable of estimating the situation and the evidence regarding it, if only it can be brought to their attention. The true armistist, to my thinking, is the man who wishes to hush up all thinking for fear it might suggest war. Obviously, he believes the suggestion of war is what creates it. I am not of his opinion. I am thus explicit in my denial of German sympathy, because certain agencies are now attempting to claim that such is my attitude.

Let us look at the situation in which Germany finds herself, and see in what way the United States is related to it. There is no half way about it. The Germans must win the war decisively within the next year or two, or they will decisively lose it. The failure to win will be as serious as actual defeat. The Germans may be able to defend them-

selves indefinitely, but they certainly cannot hope indefinitely to win the war. The number of their foes is increasing. Every month swells the total troops against them; each month makes greater the resources of their adversaries, and makes less their own preponderance in troops and munitions of war. They must win the war before it comes to a test of endurance. In that they will infallibly be beaten.

The great difficulty which Germany's enemies are experiencing at present is that of making immediately effective their greater numbers and resources. Men they have in abundance, but just at present they lack decisively three things, and these they are not able to supply for themselves in sufficient quantity—unlimited ammunition, unlimited equipment and food supplies.

Only France seems to be reasonably well supplied with all three, but she has no surplus. England confesses to a shortage in ammunition and equipment which is alarming in the extreme. To all intents and purposes the English government has admitted its inability to carry out the proposed campaign this summer because of this shortage. It also confesses England's entire inability to produce the necessary amount herself.

In Russia the facilities for manufacturing ammunition are hopelessly inadequate, and the shortage, already serious, is becoming worse every month. Even should the Dardanelles be opened, England and France cannot supply their ally with as much ammunition and equipment as she needs to fight the summer's campaign on the scale planned. We are beginning to hear that even under the best of circumstances the Allies will be forced to fight a defensive campaign this summer, simply because of a lack of wherewithal to take the offensive. The entry of Italy does not greatly change this aspect of the situation.

It will be apparent, therefore, that the efficiency of the defensive campaign of the Allies—to say nothing of an offensive campaign—will depend entirely upon the continuance of the stream of ammunition, equipment and food, which the United States is sending them every week. This is a palpable and well known fact, and is not questioned. The assistance of the United States is vital to the enemies of Germany.

How now, can Germany deal her enemies a most deadly blow, most easily impair their ability to continue the campaign, and make effective resistance to her own offensive movements? There is no way

one-half as feasible as interfering with the imports which the Allies are receiving from the United States. Without ammunition the soldiers in the trenches are powerless. Without an almost unlimited supply of ammunition it seems to be difficult to carry on modern warfare, which is largely a matter of artillery. If the Allies are thrown upon their own resources, the excellence of the German preparations may conceivably enable the latter to win the war this summer or winter. This is not prophecy nor speculation, but sober fact—attested by all the combatants.

How can this be done? The German press campaign to change the sentiment of the United States and thus prevent the sale of ammunition has hopelessly failed. The submarine warfare meant to blockade the British Isles has not materially interfered with the stream of supplies. There is one way left, a last resort, perhaps, one which may not work as anticipated, but worth trying: The dragging of the United States into the war in such a way that the United States would begin to arm on a large scale and utilize at home most, if not all, of her output of military supplies for some months to come.

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How far will the victorious allies be guided by principles which might spell improvement, and how far will they refuse to apply methods which in the past have spelled disaster?

That is a question no man can answer, though we all have it in our power to some extent, however small, to influence the answer which events shall give.

What I have tried to do here within the limits of my space is to indicate the factors involved—the alternatives that are possible. Personally, I am convinced that only by international co-operation over a very large area can anything like constant improvement in the relations of states be secured. Whether any sufficient effort will be made to that end—and much improvement is perfectly feasible if the effort were made—I cannot pretend even to guess. What I know is that it should be made, and would be made if Christendom took its larger human obligations seriously.

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