

MAKING ARMY SUBALTERNES AT HARVARD

More than Twenty Courses Will Be Utilized to Help Create a National Reserve of Officers—Stress Will Be Laid on Scientific Subjects, Writes Professor Johnston.

Professor Johnston, who wrote for *The Sunday Tribune* the series of enlightening articles on the military problems of the United States in its preparation of a preparedness policy, is a member of the committee which originated the idea of a course of lectures which would give instruction in military science. In expert in military history, professor of history at Harvard, and lecturer before the War College, Professor Johnston prepared the course of lectures now instituted at Harvard. He has given a history of the inception of these studies in military science which will most likely find their way into the curriculum of other universities.

By R. M. Johnston.

A STANDING committee has just been appointed at Harvard to take charge of military instruction. This does not refer to the student battalion recently formed nor to the military arts course now being given by officers of the United States Army, though these obviously cover some part of military training; but it refers to some twenty or more courses of the regular curriculum that may be utilized with little or no change for the same general purpose in connection with a national system for creating a reserve of officers. The question will naturally be asked: Does this step mean that Harvard is coming into the field as a competitor of West Point? Is Harvard abandoning her academic traditions and becoming militant? Such questions undoubtedly deserve careful answers.

In the first place, it may be best to analyze military instruction as it actually is in this country and also as it might become with modern ideas infused into it. But it will not be possible in a short article to take military instruction in more than its primary phase—the one that is dealt with at West Point—

the formation of the sub-lieutenant. The far more complex problems of the training of staff officers and the high command and the simpler problem of the training of the private soldier cannot be dealt with on this occasion.

Now, in the education of the sub-lieutenant we may, for convenience, distinguish (1) drill and disciplinary training, (2) scientific training, (3) theoretical and cultural training. Military exercises, parades, equitation, gymnastics, punctuality, obedience, all these are matters coming under the first head. They are firmly handled at West Point, and with results excellent in one direction, somewhat doubtful in another. For the good effect, disciplinary and of character, is produced at a heavy price, one that nearly all systems of military education involve, which is that of reducing knowledge to the common denominator of learning correctly, by brute will power, the official formula. Learning lessons is perhaps an inevitable outcome of West Point conditions; but it is a grave misfortune that the West Pointer should be so deeply impressed for his whole life with that particular habit of mind.

THE DRILL FACTOR.

Now, as regards Harvard certain differences in this aspect of the question may at once be noticed. In the first place, it is not possible, for many reasons, that the university should compete with West Point in the matter of drill, equitation and physical exercises of all sorts. There is, of course, the student battalion; but that cannot begin to compare in time, opportunity or general efficiency with the summer camps or even with the militia, let alone West Point, while so far there is no symptom discernible that the Harvard faculty will admit battalion training to count for a degree. So that it may be said, roughly, that the college man will have to seek for the drill

factor in agencies outside of the university. General Wood's camp instruction lies ready at hand for this purpose. And in the upshot it may be said that by this makeshift the student may, on the one hand, get less character building and may develop to a less extent the military habits of obedience, punctuality, order and discipline; on the other hand, he will escape some of the deadening intellectual effect which is inseparable from the other system.

LITTLE DIFFERENCE IN SCIENTIFIC TRAINING.

In the matter of science—and I mean here particularly what relates to mathematics, engineering, topography and theoretical tactics—the situation as between Harvard and West Point would not be vastly different. With an army instructor who has qualified at the army service schools in charge primarily of the tactical work, with mathematicians and engineers of the first rank to reinforce the army instructor at almost every point, the result would inevitably be that while in details the instruction offered by the two institutions would differ, the result for the student would be of the same general character, with topography perhaps a little backward at Harvard for lack of sufficient summer opportunity.

A third group of studies may be described as representing theory and scientific specialties. As to military history and theory I will say nothing, being in part responsible for that instruction. But in scientific specialties, whether for undergraduate (sub-lieutenant) or for advanced work, Harvard has resources to



HARVARD REGIMENT UNIFORMS

In the fitting room of Harvard's war uniform department.

offer that go much beyond those of West Point. Whereas at the government institution it is hardly possible to find time for more than a smattering survey of electrical engineering, military law, explosives, these subjects can be thoroughly studied at Harvard; while others equally important, geography, economics, meteorology, military roadmaking among them, can be added to the list.

There are two points to be kept in mind, as it seems to me, in framing a system of instruction such as that under discussion. One is the immediate object, which is the training of sub-lieutenants, the great majority of whom will never attain high rank or staff duties. The other is to combine with that first object the elements or foundations of the much broader system of education which the man who aspires to command large bodies or to enter into the intricacies of staff work or, most vital of all, to attack the great problems of the conduct of war, must master. It will take him many years of his life; it will necessitate the creation by the government of the United States of a solid system of higher training in the army; but for the individual officer much will depend on whether he has been started right. And in this respect I feel confident that Harvard can accomplish a great deal.

The matter is not, however, just up to Harvard or to other universities, several of which have for months past shown a desire to play their part in this movement. It is also up to Congress. Legislation is now before Congress that may or may not facilitate the utilization for national military purposes of the teaching resources of our universities for training reserve officers. This legislation should be kept on as broad a basis as possible; it should view line instruction in a less narrow spirit than it is in the land grant colleges, and it should particularly encourage the study of scientific specialties, whether in the under-

graduate or in the graduate stage. At the same time the reserve officers bill should provide, in my personal judgment, that no reserve commission shall be issued merely for technical attainment, and that the line instruction should be made a prerequisite in every case without exception.

THE LINE COURSE THE OFFICER'S A B C.

To illustrate what is involved let us assume that we have a student, perhaps an advanced student, who has mastered several courses in meteorology and climatology and who enters a course specially designed to fill the needs of an observer of weather and air current conditions, such as would be required at every aeroplane squadron base. Is that man to be given a commission and to be put on to that special work because he has acquired the scientific end of the job? Not at all. He is unsafe and unfitted to deal with all the possibilities that might come his way unless he has first been through the officer's A B C—the line course. In that only can he acquire the vocabulary of the military profession, making what he says to others and what others say to him intelligible; in that only can he get an understanding of the intricate machinery of which his own little wheel may at any moment be called on to bear the whole weight. And as it is with the meteorologist so it is with the field engineer, the statistician, the wireless man, the economist and perhaps even the chemist or munitions expert.


THE NEED OF ECONOMICS.

Stating once more what is merely a personal opinion, it would appear that there is no subject in which Harvard can give more valuable military instruction, both general and special, than in that of economics. This field is neglected by, or unknown to, our army; yet the German General Staff of to-day is in some ways to be thought possessed of a faculty of war economics. We shall not, of course, convert our sophomores and juniors into staff experts, but we may hope to plant in a few of them

the seeds from which expert staff work may eventually grow. How little do we recognize the immense difficulties with which an army staff has to grapple! We look on a successful railroad president as a very great man. But the transportation section of a staff has to perform feats with railroads under abnormal conditions that would leave many railroad presidents helpless. Finance, statistics of supplies and transportation, are all in the day's journey of the staff officers; and in all these subjects Harvard can offer the best instruction. If only a businesslike system of accounting were taught to some few officers of the United States Army, who know but that in time the present primitive and extravagant methods of the War Department might be swept away!

HARVARD MILITARISTIC.

I have by no means exhausted the possibilities of what Harvard could do in the field of military instruction; but I am limiting myself to general indications, for it is clear that the elements of the problem are at the present moment in a state of flux. Enough has been said, however, to show what the answers are to the two questions which were asked at the outset. There is no possibility that Harvard shall compete with West Point. Its methods and subjects of instruction are different and must remain different. This does not preclude the giving of military instruction of a valuable and practical kind. This instruction would remain distinctive, less effective in one direction, more effective in another, and in that respect, let us hope, stimulating to our regular army system. The other question to be answered is, Will Harvard become militaristic? That depends on the meaning attached to the word. If it means response to a great national emergency, preparation for self-defence, a faith in scientific and economic methods, an appreciation of all the qualities of courage, generosity and self-denial, in which our students have shown themselves well prepared, then I think it may be said that anti-militarism stands no show at Harvard to-day.



Learning the intricacies of a field gun at Yale.

What of the German Spring Campaign?

Roland G. Usher Discusses the Neglected Rear of the Allies and the Third Road to Paris, So Successfully Utilized by Napoleon.

By Roland G. Usher, Author of "Pan-Germanism," "Pan-Americanism," etc.

WE SHALL in all probability be not far wrong if we suppose that the object of the campaign which the Germans will unquestionably begin this spring is nothing short of the ending of the war by a crushing defeat of France and Great Britain. The attack will not come from the north or east, nor will it be directed upon the present trenches, but, if the logic which I propose to expound be valid, it will come from the south and be aimed at the rear of the present armies in France. Unquestionably the defeat of the Allies in France will be crushing and disastrous and as sweeping a victory as the Germans can in all probability hope to attain. This opinion of the spring campaign, it should be said, is based upon deductions from facts accessible to all. I am not talking of certainties, nor yet of facts which I know. I have no such information from the German General Staff, nor yet am I attempting to disseminate news favorable to the German cause. On the contrary, I sympathize with the Allies, and should be very sorry to see this forecast fulfilled. At the same time, a good general prepares for defeat, and we shall do well to consider the probable German plans for

the spring with an eye to something more than victory for our own friends.

The general situation makes it sufficiently clear that a military victory is essential for an inconclusive peace will be the equivalent of defeat. Moreover, it is necessary that they should win the military victory in Europe. Egypt, Persia and India cannot be won in the Near East. Mere possession is nothing, because subsequent defeat in Europe would make the position untenable; whereas, on the other hand, a victory in Europe would certainly make military operations unnecessary in the Near East to secure all that can be permanently held. Nor is there any probability that Great Britain would make peace on the basis of a simple exchange of Belgium for Egypt, let us say. There have been some in Germany who advocated such a method, but there is no great likelihood that the British will fall to see that such an exchange is for them a sacrifice of everything. If the war is to be won at all by the Central Powers, it must be won in the field, and it must be won in Europe.

Victory in the coming year is probably a necessity. In common with many other observers, I was of the opinion last spring that if the Germans did not win in that campaign their golden opportunity would disappear. This was based upon the assumption that the industrial mobilization of Great Britain, Russia and the United States would have become effective by this spring. Most conservative observers are, however, of the opinion that much yet remains to be done in England before the work can be called completed, and that the United States has not yet shipped high explosives, rifles or big guns in any quantity, and will not be ready for some months more to turn out a sufficient quantity of mu-

nitions to influence events abroad. The Allies must apparently continue to fight for time until 1917. This fact is a premise of the German campaign. It will be a great effort, if possible a decisive effort, to win a sweeping victory, because it is hardly possible that Fate will give them another chance if they do not succeed this time.

The deadlock in the trenches in Northern France and in Poland is so convincing, and the inability of either side to break through effectively has been so clearly demonstrated, that it has been common to declare the Allies already victors because the Germans cannot win in the field. From all I have read of the German trenches in Northern France since first occupied I have concluded and still hold that the line is a defensive and not an offensive line, meant from the first to keep the British and French where they are, but never intended as a basis for a campaign to win the war. It is the rear which the students seem to neglect. It is the third road upon Paris for which no provision seems yet to have been made by the Allies, and which the Germans calculate to use. In all the accounts predicting German defeat we find no importance attached to the surest approach upon Paris along the indirect road still open.

A military road older than that through Belgium runs between Paris and Vienna through Italy, and is, when operations are being conducted on a large scale, incomparably safer than the approaches through Lorraine or Belgium. Lorraine is the shortest road, but the most dangerous; Belgium the easiest, but one possible of use only for a dash so rapid and conclusive as to end the war. Once the two sides are locked, the only real available offensive upon France lies through Italy, for there alone can the real strength of the aggressor be placed behind the blow itself, and not necessarily dissipated to preserve its communications from flank assaults. The Balkans and the Alps afford admirable defenses for the flanks of such an army.

After three years of indecisive campaigning in Belgium, Lorraine and the Danube Valley

in the early stages of the French Revolutionary struggle, the genius of Napoleon saw that the true road from Paris to Vienna ran through Italy. In that decision, as much as in his brilliant strategy, lay the crushing effect of the Italian campaign of 1796 and 1797. The vulnerability of Vienna after a defeat in Italy leads the Germans to hope that a defeat in Italy will be similarly fatal to Paris.

Compared to the other possibilities, this third road offers the invader striking advantages. The majority of the strategic approaches of the Valley of the Po are in Austrian hands. Indeed, that is precisely why the Italians have entered the war. They hope that the victory will deprive Austria of this hand at Italy's throat and allow them to occupy themselves positions so strong that the assumption has been that the occupant may enter Italy at will with all the chances in his favor. The strategic approaches between France and Italy are not adequately fortified. General advice as well as personal correspondence from Switzerland agree that the German cantons which occupy the more important roads will facilitate the movements of a German army proceeding through Switzerland upon France or Italy.

The position of the Italian army, if military opinions are worth anything, is thoroughly vulnerable and certainly can be held against a determined attack only by an extremely efficient and capable army. The Germans are certain that the Italian army is worthless as against them. While they have hoped for its cooperation in this particular campaign, should it be attempted, they have never supposed the Italian army capable of bearing the brunt of the attack on France, and are outspoken in regard to the ability of a German army to sweep the Italians to one side in any such offensive.

Truth to tell, it is hardly probable that any army can hold the Valley of the Po against the triple assault through Trieste, Lake Garda and Milan. A glance at the map will show the reader that, whichever position the Italian army takes, it is flanked by one of the at-

Kaiser Hopes to End the War, Writer Surmises, by a Crushing Defeat of France and Great Britain in an Attack from the South.

tacking columns, and that defeat, therefore, means annihilation. Evacuation of this false military position, of course, means that the Italian army will be thrown back upon the Apennines, and could be held there by a relatively small force, while the main army marched on toward France. In this case a trench line would have to be made across Italy, and would impose new but not insuperable difficulties for the Germans.

If now we study the recent movement in the Balkans in relation to the Italian approaches and the possible campaign through Italy upon the rear of the present French and British armies, we shall see that the Germans have been very busy with precisely the preparations indispensable for such a campaign. Obviously, the crushing of Serbia was of itself foolish; obviously, an invasion of the Near East for its offensive purposes was folly. It should, therefore, have been obvious that these were not the objects of the German campaign. So long as Serbia afforded a foothold for military insurrection in the German rear, so long as Montenegro and Albania afforded a foothold for Italian or British troops, and, indeed, so long as Bulgaria and Rumania seemed to waver and the Dardanelles was apparently in danger of being forced, no campaign on Paris through Italy could be safely undertaken.

Communications from Vienna to Trieste must be absolutely safe and unimpaired. No effort to hold this part of the rear could be spared, once the campaign was launched. Therefore, the annihilation of Serbia, the occupation of Montenegro and Albania, the expulsion of the Allied army from Greece and the Dardanelles were necessary to make the German rear absolutely safe and to enable them to leave it in the hands of the Bulgars

and the Turks. Furthermore, one of the oldest Continental roads between Greece and Italy runs through Epirus and up the eastern shore of the Adriatic, a road so thoroughly feasible for large bodies of men that it was trodden centuries ago by Alaric and the Visigoths. This road flanks the approaches from Austria to Italy, and must at all cost be closed tightly. Nor must the British sea power be able to land, on the Illyrian coast, additional troops to interfere with communications.

What other conceivable purpose can these be in overrunning the little kingdom of Montenegro, in taking the hills of Albania, in driving the Serbs from their last resting place? Surely, the German campaign in France had nothing to fear from them; nor were the Turks in the least threatened. Unless these are the preliminaries of a great and extended campaign they are meaningless; worse, they are futile. While there are many who believe the Germans wicked, and not a few who doubt the wisdom of German strategy, hardly any one will assert that the Germans have as yet undertaken anything without a definite purpose clearly related to the general scheme for winning the war.

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