New York Tribune

First to Last—the Truth: News—Editorials—Advertisements

Member of the Audit Bureau of Circulations

SATURDAY, AUGUST 24, 1918

Owned and published daily by The Tribune Association, a New York Corporation. Ogden Reid, President; G. Vernor Rogers, Vice-President; Richard H. Lee, Secretary; F. A. Suter, Treasurer. Address, Tribune Building, 154 Nassau Street, New York. Telephone, Beekman 3000.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES—By Mail, including Postage: IN THE UNITED STATES OUTSIDE OF GREATER NEW YORK

FIRST AND SECOND ZONES—Within 150 Miles of New York City.

	1 yr.	6 mo.	3 mo.	1 mo.
Daily and Sunday	$10.00	$5.00	$2.75	$1.00
Daily only	8.00	4.00	2.00	.75
Sunday only	3.00	1.50	.75	.50

THIRD TO EIGHTH ZONE, INCLUSIVE—More than 150 Miles from New York City.

Daily and Sunday	$11.00	$6.00	$3.00	$1.00
Daily only	9.00	4.50	2.25	.80
Sunday only	3.00	1.75	.90	.50

CANADIAN RATES

Daily and Sunday	$11.80	$6.00	$3.00	$1.00
Daily only	9.00	4.50	2.25	.80
Sunday only	5.00	2.75	1.40	.50

FOREIGN RATES

Daily and Sunday	$24.00	$12.50	$6.50	$2.25
Daily only	18.00	9.50	5.00	1.75
Sunday only	7.00	4.00	2.25	.85

Entered at the Postoffice at New York as Second Class Mail Matter

GUARANTEE

You can purchase merchandise advertised in THE TRIBUNE with absolute safety—for if dissatisfaction results in any case THE TRIBUNE guarantees to pay your money back upon request. No red tape. No quibbling. We make good promptly if the advertiser does not.

MEMBER OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

The Associated Press is exclusively entitled to the use for republication of all news dispatches credited to it or not otherwise credited in this paper and also the local news of spontaneous origin published herein.

All rights of republication of all other matter herein are also reserved.

To Whom It Shall Concern

As this is the only newspaper that prints the news of the fight of the newsdealers, supported by The Tribune, against Hearst, the Publishers' Association of New York and the Hylan administration, the other side of the case is not brought into the open. Those papers that mention the matter at all, as the *Herald* and *Sun* did very briefly yesterday morning, make it out to be merely a strike on the part of some newsdealers for a lower wholesale price on papers, so as to increase their margin of profit. The *Globe* puts the responsibility on the government, saying:

> "The January strike for cheaper papers was stopped on February 7 when the publishers agreed to restore 'return' privileges, so that the dealers might adjust their purchases to the public demands upon them. The strike was resumed when the publishers, obeying the instructions of the War Industries Board, discontinued the 'return' privilege, as wasteful of white paper."

It is for us, therefore, to state one of the main contentions on the other side. It is the one that impugns our good faith. Privately, it is being said that in cutting the price of The Tribune from $1.40 to $1.20 per hundred copies to newsdealers we broke our word with the Publishers' Association not to change the price except on ninety days' notice.

To this we say, first, that as a member of the Publishers' Association we knew of no such agreement; second, that we challenge proof of its existence by any minutes, resolutions or writings; third, that all of this is immaterial and tends to confuse the main issue.

The Tribune's decision to act independently was inevitable from the nature of the circumstances.

First, the newsdealers of their own accord declared war upon the Hearst newspapers for reasons in which economic interest, a desire for revenge, and feelings of patriotism were inextricably mixed. The Tribune had nothing to do with the newsdealers' decision, and did not know of it until after it had been reached.

But what happened next was of vital concern to us. The Publishers' Association met, resolved to treat the newsdealers' ban upon the Hearst papers as an illegal boycott, and agreed—The Tribune alone dissenting—that newsdealers who refused to sell Hearst papers should be cut off from all other papers.

The Tribune had either to support Hearst against the newsdealers or stand alone. We elected to stand alone. We advertised our intention to supply papers to all newsdealers without discrimination.

Thereupon the Publishers' Association instructed the American News Company to refuse to deliver Tribunes to any newsdealers who cut the Hearst papers.

The American News Company is an air-tight monopoly. It absolutely controls the distribution of morning newspapers in New York City.

By this action on the part of the Publishers' Association, through the American News Company, The Tribune's circulation was threatened with destruction. We could submit. We could stultify ourselves by going over to the support of Hearst. Or we could organize an independent delivery system. This no New York morning paper has yet succeeded in doing, and nobody believed The Tribune would attempt it.

We accepted the challenge and decided to stand entirely with the newsdealers and against Hearst. We gave the newsdealers the price they were asking for, namely, $1.20 per hundred, which, incidentally, we believe to be a fair price. We shall now proceed to organize our own system of distribution.

The American News Company not only has refused to deliver us to newsdealers who will not sell Hearst papers also, but it has refused to deliver us at all to any newsdealer except at the old price of $1.40 per hundred.

That is to say, the American News Company, acting under instructions from the Publishers' Association, undertakes to say, in the first place, to whom we shall sell The Tribune, and, in the second place, what price shall be paid for it by those to whom we are allowed to sell it.

The Aircraft Report

We have before us the full official text of the sensational report of the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs on "Aircraft Production in the United States." It is the most humiliating document that has been contributed to all the controversial literature of our participation in the war. It is a story of $640,000,000 mostly wasted, a story of blundering, of running to and fro, of inefficiency in many dimensions, of silly optimism, of hopeless and utter disorder. Yet it is inconclusive and will stand itself as an example of the very thing it denounces—namely, wasteful confusion. For this investigation ran parallel to another. The committee lamely says: "The committee has not exhausted all sources of information. No attempt has been made to investigate charges of personal dishonesty or official corruption. That subject more properly belongs to the Department of Justice, which, under the direction of Hon. Charles E. Hughes, has been conducting an inquiry of its own regarding that and other phases of the subject."

One does not see why this confessedly inconclusive report should have been published separately; if it had not been so published there might have been no necessity for publishing it at all. The sensational content is historical; the constructive part is tentative. In view of the diffuse and contradictory character of the evidence so far, we purpose to wait for the Hughes report before assisting further at the obsequies. Some of the ceremonies may be premature.

On Taking Chances

Everybody has to take a chance to have any fun in life—to have any safety in life, you might with accuracy say. But there are sensible chances and foolish chances, and the risk that the Sheepshead Bay Canoe Club took in towing strings of laden canoes in the open ocean distinctly belongs in the latter class.

A canoe is one of the safest craft afloat, in its own waters, in proper hands. It is one of the most dangerous in a seaway for any one not a crack swimmer and prepared for an offshore wrestle in the water. The route that these canoes took brought them clear into the open sea. There was nothing nearer to the southeast than the coast of Africa—excepting Ambrose Channel Lightship and the U-boats. The tragedy that happened, one of the worst pleasure boating catastrophes these waters have ever seen, might with luck have been long postponed. But it was inherent in the situation and the risk was beyond reason.

A dory is a bad and risky boat in rapids; it is the safest thing afloat in an offshore gale. A canoe should be kept to its own job and not asked to undertake work for which it was never designed. That is the moral of these unfortunate and needless deaths in the pursuit of pleasure.

Still the Finest

Better shows this city may have contained than the Police Field Day spreading itself forth to-day and a week from to-day. But when? A sham battle in the sky, forty-two aeroplanes in action, is not to be witnessed often even much nearer the front than Sheepshead Bay. A sham battle on firm earth happens along for good measure. Our mounted police (still among the best riders in the world, by the way) will race. And the police dogs will do a little more than ever. The shade of old P. T. Barnum might well pass a restless and envious day.

As for the cause, it has a particularly forceful appeal to New Yorkers, whose homes and shops need protection quite as urgently as ever, war or no war, and whose police force finds itself seriously depleted by the war. The proceeds of the Field Day go this year to supply uniforms and equipment for the Police Reserve. That is a volunteer organization, serving without pay, to supplement the police force where and when needed. Commissioner Woods organized the movement under the name of the Home Defence League. It now bears the name of Police Reserve. Its usefulness and efficiency have been abundantly proved.

Every New Yorker should make it his duty to help the cause with his contribution for tickets. And every New Yorker with an eye for a big show should make it his pleasure to go.

The Acid Is on Nebraska

Out of the maze of Nebraska politics, with its diverse factions to obscure the loyalty issue, it seems to have been established by the primary elections Tuesday that the "wets" scored a victory over the "drys" and that the "acid test" was disregarded. Senator George W. Norris, who voted against the declaration of war, has been renominated by the Republicans for reelection to the United States Senate. He will have the undivided support of the Kaiser's paid propagandist in this country, George Sylvester Viereck, now under indictment, whose *American Weekly* printed on the cover of its issue of March 21, 1917, a full-page likeness of the Senator, with the caption:

"SENATOR GEORGE WILLIAM NORRIS, whose sturdy Americanism is based on the Constitution."

He stood behind the Hearst slogan, "America first." He held that in fighting the Hun we were putting the dollar mark on the American flag. He argued that we had no right to enter the war and that it was an unrighteous war. After we had got into it he voted against conscription, against taxes to support the army, against anti-sedition laws. It was natural that he should be rewarded with what remains of the vote that used to be controlled by the German-American Alliance. It was natural, also, that he should win the vote of the Non-Partisan League, against which the Nebraska State Council of Defence had waged a bitter fight on the grounds of disloyalty.

Without Conditions

There is little doubt that Congress will broaden the conscription age limits, including men between eighteen and twenty-one and men between thirty-one and forty-five. The War Department's recommendations respecting the new age limits have been embodied in both the House bill and the Senate bill.

Having authorized conscription on this wider basis, it would be exceedingly foolish for Congress to impose limitations on its grant of power. To provide that certain of the new classes shall be called first and certain others called last or that some classes shall be exhausted before others are drawn on at all would be to tie the hands of the military authorities. Latitude in such matters is indispensable. Congress should not attempt to interfere in the details of draft administration. It ought to confine itself to laying down general principles.

Nobody can tell in advance how many men a particular class will yield. And to compel the government to comb out first the classes which are least productive—those from thirty-one to forty-five—is to invite delay and imperil the General Staff's programme for speeding up the war.

Registration, examination and classification take time. If every claim for deferred classification in the higher classes must be settled before the lowest classes are called these lowest classes will be practically unavailable for several months to come. Yet General Crowder counts on getting less than 700,000 men from the registrants above thirty-one and about 1,700,000 from the registrants below twenty-one. To pass a priority amendment such as various members of the House Military Affairs Committee are advocating would mean a scrapping of the War Department's plan to have 4,000,000 American soldiers in France before next summer.

It is noteworthy that most of the committeemen who want to call men below twenty-one last belong to the group which tried to defeat the first conscription act and who have been supporting the policy which Mr. Baker described the other day as that of those who would "proceed somewhat more leisurely and do it later." They have consistently obstructed the effort to develop our manpower speedily and to use "force to the utmost."

These men are a survival of the James Hay régime in the Military Affairs Committee. He was the great proponent of unpreparedness. The miserable fiasco of army reorganization which bears his name—the Hay act of 1916—put back the modernization of our military establishment at a time when rapid preparation was sorely needed. It helped to delay for more than a year our participation in the war on a scale commensurate with our resources.

Mr. Hay packed his committee with pacifists and "anti-militarists." Have these cave-dwellers not done enough to hobble the country? Men are needed in vast numbers to end the war and end it with the least cost and sacrifice. The only thing to do is to give the War Department a free hand. The Administration must conduct the war. It has the responsibility. Give it the power. Let it call out any class or all classes, in whatever order and to whatever extent it may think necessary.

Slackers?

The heart of Mr. McAdoo was in the right place when he called all who sell their Liberty bonds slackers. But his tongue missed accuracy by a good bit.

It is true that no American should sell his Liberty bonds if he can possibly avoid doing so. He should think twice and dig deep into his resources before adopting this last resort. But there are cases of necessity where an American is perfectly justified in turning over his bonds and need have no sensation of guilt from doing so. Any number of us overbid our hands in the first flush of enthusiasm for a Liberty Loan. This may have been indiscreet, but these oversubscriptions, from the individual's viewpoint, were well meant and should certainly entail no recriminations as a consequence. In some cases there was nothing for a bondholder to do except convert his bond into cash when the pinch came and he found it impossible to be as patriotic as he hoped.

The country needs all the straining to save and invest that its men, women and children are capable of. The risk of this slacker talk is that in future loans Americans will hold back and not subscribe to their limit for fear of incurring somebody's curse if they should fail of their hopes and be compelled to sell out. The situation calls for sense and clear statement, not indiscriminate name calling, we suggest.

Montclair's Angelus

To the Editor of The Tribune.

Sir: Your suggestion of an "Angelus" is excellent. It is recognized here at the hour of 12. And the bell of the "Old First" Presbyterian Church is rung at that hour every day.

EDWIN FERRIS.

Montclair, N. J., Aug. 15, 1918.

A Lucid Interpretation

(From The Dallas News)

As we understand it from the explanations of the German war correspondents, von Hindenburg lengthened his lines in order to shorten them.

THE KAISER'S FALSTAFFIAN ARMY

Falstaff: If I be not ashamed of my soldiers, I am a soused gurnet. . . . I press me none but good householders, yeomen's sons; inquire me out contracted bachelors, such as had been asked twice on the banns; such a commodity of warm slaves, as had as lieve hear the devil as a drum; such as fear the report of a caliver worse than a struck fowl or a hurt wild duck. I pressed me none but such toasts-and-butter, with hearts in their bellies no bigger than pins' heads, and they have bought out their services; and now my whole charge consists of ancients, corporals, lieutenants, gentlemen of companies, slaves as ragged as Lazarus in the painted cloth, where the glutton's dogs licked his sores; and such as indeed were never soldiers, but discarded unjust serving-men, younger sons to younger brothers, revolted tapsters and ostlers trade-fallen, the cankers of a calm world and a long peace, ten times more dishonorable ragged than an old faced ancient; and such have I, to fill up the rooms of them that have bought out their services, that you would think that I had a hundred and fifty tattered prodigals lately come from swine-keeping, from eating draff and husks.—First Part of King Henry IV, Act IV, Scene II.

Foch's Present Aim

By Frank H. Simonds

Copyright, 1918, by The Tribune Association (New York Tribune)

FOR the confused and intricate phase of the campaign which is now going forward we have no parallel in the four years of Western warfare, unless it be in the retreat of Joffre's armies after their initial defeats at and beyond the French frontier. Exactly four years ago French armies, having been beaten at Mohange, Neufchâteau and Charleroi, together with the British army, compelled to break off its battle of Mons to conform to the retreat of the French armies, began that strategic withdrawal which terminated only in the great return to the offensive which was the Battle of the Marne.

Like Joffre, Ludendorff is now retiring after defeat and with the fixed purpose of returning to the offensive when he has recovered from the effects of his recent defeats at the Marne and the Somme. His retreat is, like Joffre's, a fighting retreat, and we must expect that behind the cover of this resistance Ludendorff is working out a new plan, a plan which must carry with it some desperate effort to recover the offensive, at least for two or three weeks in the closing hours of the campaign.

It is the purpose of Foch, on the contrary, so to maul and smash the armies involved that instead of being able to form a strategic mass of manœuvre, that is, a fresh striking force, Ludendorff will be obliged to use up such reserves as remain to him now in preventing the retreat from becoming a rout and the withdrawal from degenerating into a disorderly flight. In these terms the present phase of the struggle is unrolling under our eyes.

It is a mistake to think of the present operations from Soissons to Arras as a battle. The German is declining battle in the larger sense. He has made up his mind to retreat, as a result of defeat; to retreat until he reaches certain predetermined positions and has achieved certain essential reorganizations. He wants to get back with as little cost as possible. Foch means to harry and hustle him, compelling him to stop and fight, to fight artillery with infantry and machine guns after he has withdrawn his own artillery, to fight under unfavorable conditions and to hold positions far longer than he had planned to hold them, thus paying a price out of proportion to their temporary value to him.

Unless all signs fail the limit of the German retreat will be the Hindenburg line, from which the French and the British are on an average between fifteen and twenty miles distant still. But between the Oise and the Aisne Mangin is now almost twice as near to the part of the Hindenburg line which turned around the St. Gobain Forest, and this is at once the strongest and most important single stretch in the whole Hindenburg system. If this sector between La Fère and Laon should be pierced then the Germans would have to retire close to the French frontier, from the sea to the Meuse.

But there is not any real reason to suppose that Mangin can smash his way through this defensive line. What is more likely is that the attempt will be to turn the Germans out of this region, out of their great salient facing Paris, by attacks upon the sides, attacks made north of the Oise and of the Vesle, in Picardy and Artois, on the one hand, and in Champagne, on the other. Unless all signs fail Mangin is about at the limit of his progress, and the Germans, holding their old line, from the Vregny Heights, northeast of Soissons, to the Oise, below La Fère, will be able to stand firm.

On the other hand, from the Oise to the Scarpe, between Noyon and Arras, there is likely to be a considerable period of Allied advance. The German here is retiring, as he retired in 1917, to escape an uncomfortable position and to regain his strategic freedom. But in 1917 he stole away between frost and thaw in the March time, when he could not be watched by airplanes or promptly followed because of the condition of the roads. He can't steal away now; the moment he begins to draw his guns and masses back, before the retirement is completed, a British or a French army strikes suddenly, takes men and guns, upsets the German plans and compels the German to turn round and fight back under the worst possible conditions.

It is essential to recognize that the German is not being driven from positions he intended to hold permanently. A general readjustment was for him an inescapable consequence of the Marne and Somme defeats. We are not, by brilliant and successful attacks, hustling the German toward the frontier, each day winning new victories, like those of July 18 and August 8. What we are doing is exploiting our victories of those dates to their fullest extent.

The rearguard operations of the German since he was beaten at the Somme have been, on the whole, far less successful than those after the Marne defeat. He lost 30,000 prisoners in the first two or three days at the Marne and not more than 5,000 in the next two weeks. But having lost 30,000 at the Somme in the first three days he has certainly lost 25,000 more since, including 10,000 in the two days of Mangin's stroke between the Oise and the Aisne. A retreat after defeat is the most difficult of all military operations and at best one of the most costly, and Foch is making it expensive to the limit.

On the other hand, we must not exaggerate our success. We shall encounter the German in his new positions presently, and then will come a pause of preparation unless Foch has already prepared another offensive in a new sector. When the German does reach the limit he has fixed for his retirement we must expect a very great battle, in which the German will seek to regain the initiative and thus escape from the incessant agony of these never ending blows struck by his active enemy. But we are in the period between battles now, although the rearguard operations frequently involve more men and guns than fought at Gettysburg or Waterloo.

The real struggle between Ludendorff and Foch now is to decide whether the German will be able to reach the positions which he has fixed as the limit of his retreat in such condition as to make a new bid for the offensive, or will be so punished in his retreat and so crippled that he will still have to remain on the defensive and thus invite other blows leading eventually to a new defeat. On the whole, it has all gone Foch's way, although it is plain that Byng, about Arras, met with serious check in his attack earlier in the week and that the Germans between the Somme and the Scarpe are in great strength and are retiring from ground they expected to leave, once they lost the initiative, but, thanks to Foch's strategy, their retreat is not at their own rate.

The map is emphatically not the measure of present events. The totals of prisoners taken and guns captured supply the true measure. Just now territory means nothing. West of the Hindenburg line men and material are the whole thing. Once that line is reached, then the question of ground taken will become important again.

Bitter Appreciation

To the Editor of The Tribune.

Sir: On the theory that every little bit helps, you may be glad to know that one who left The Tribune fold more in sorrow than in anger many months ago has come back. You will need all the help available in the fight you announced in yesterday's issue and the least I could do was to switch back to you. So I am going to swallow with a gulp your occasional Stanwood Mencken spasms of holier-than-thou patriotism, your often too partisan criticism of the Administration, your too frequent laudation of the Billy Sunday of Oyster Bay, all of the things that led to my leaving, and stick with you in your fight—and more power to your elbow! I appreciate that any one who cannot sign a letter had better not write it, but I had to tell you about it, even if it has to be anonymously.

INCONSTANT READER.

New York, Aug. 18, 1918.

Old Stuff, Bill; Old Stuff!

(From The St. Louis Post-Dispatch)

Like all defeated campaign managers, the Kaiser is claiming everything.

Invincible

LOUVAIN is ruined, Rheims is ruined; but
The noble lore which dignified the first
Is only the more vitally dispersed,
Whilst in each Allied home, each trench and hut,
From the North Sea to Palestine and Kut,
The spirit of the other sates a thirst,
Which, for the Teuton, haunts him though immersed
In beer and blood and mocks his boastful strut.

Belgians were scattered by the feral flail
Swung by the threshers of the Battle Lord;
The flesh and steel of all the French may fail
To stem the onslaught of a bestial horde:
But Belgium is a force no man can jail,
And that which France is laughs at mortal sword.

RICHARD BUTLER GLAENZER.

History of the News

The Cossack

RECENT events in Siberia and other sections of the gradually evolving new Eastern front again call the world's attention to the Cossacks, who, under the Czars, formed a curious kind of democratic military Junkerthum, from the Amur River on the extreme northeast of the empire through Central Asia to Orenburg and the Black Sea.

They certainly possess one trait which wins in advance our sympathy for them: they hate and detest the Germans. The Cossack officers often refused even to eat at the same table with the German officers who permeated the whole Russian army under the old régime.

The popular idea that Siberia was subjugated to Russia by a handful of Volga Cossacks whose hetman, Yermak, is represented as having offered the immense Tartar Khanate to Ivan the Terrible in 1582-'83, is losing ground under a closer study of the facts. The truth is that Western Siberia was voluntarily colonized by the people of Eastern and Northern Russia before and after that period. To these free colonists we must add involuntary colonization by political exiles, started in the year 1593, the date of the murder of the Czarowitch Dimitri, and by criminal exiles whose first caravan started on its melancholy trip in 1754.

The original Cossack communities on the Dnieper and Don were formed as a protest against the complicated Russian state machinery and the economic condition connected therewith. The Cossacks are a racial unit with a strongly developed national sentiment which has persisted to this day, in spite of their ultimate submission to Russia and the destruction of their old organization. The Ukrainian problem, which must have already caused more than one sleepless night to William II and his advisers, cannot be fully understood without a knowledge of the, it is true, somewhat complicated Cossack situation.

Few people, for instance, are aware that the Cossack regiments, even as early as Peter the Great and Catherine II, were more dependent upon the Department of the Interior than upon the War Department.

At the time of Czar Alexander I (1801-'25) the Cossacks of Siberia formed two distinctly separated groups: the town Cossacks, a kind of police force, and the border Cossacks (Lineynyie). Some of the national traditions of the European Cossacks, which are now to be found among the Siberian Cossacks, were brought to them by the Dnieper and Ukrainian Cossacks, many thousands of whom were sent into Siberian exile in 1667, after the rising of Rasin, and in 1787, after the Ukrainian revolt.

There were about 2,000,000 Cossacks in Asiatic Russia at the beginning of the present war, each family owning about 100 acres of land, of which, however, hardly 10 per cent was under cultivation in 1910.

One of the consequences of the Russian Revolution was the union of the Asiatic and European Cossack regiments (voiska) under the leadership of the Don Cossacks.

In Siberia the Cossacks play quite a rôle in the internal affairs of the country, forming a very respected social class, a kind of bourgeois-farmers.

DIDEROT, Jr.

To Be Admitted

(From The Indianapolis News)

It must be admitted, however, that the Kaiser has come nearer fooling all his people all the time than any other ruler.