

Lloyd George Before the Bar of the British Electorate

Labor Strong and a New Mass of Women Voters to Confuse the Prophets

By S. K. Ratcliffe

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THE Lloyd George war government will come up for judgment by the British people on December 14. At first sight it would seem that the general election then to be held transcends in importance all elections of the past, and therefore that the future of Britain, and of Europe, must in an overwhelming degree, depend upon what happens at the polls a fortnight hence. This, however, may not be so. As a political event, necessarily, the election will be immensely interesting. But it is not unlikely that, as an indication of the mind of England and the forces which are to control the policy of the British Commonwealth during the next ten years, it may be quite inconclusive. War elections are always abnormal, whether they occur just before or just after the military decision has been reached. And the victory election will be no exception—unless all the party experts are at fault in their calculations. Of course, if the lid were to fly off and the Lloyd George coalition to be swept away, no one would be able to deny that something of tremendous moment had occurred.

As a matter of fact, most observers who are in a position to estimate the probabilities take for granted that Mr. George will win—although it is recognized the size of his majority and the power and character of the opposition are highly problematical.

A Vast New Electorate

Before coming to the fight, the leaders and the issues, let us look for a moment at the startlingly new conditions of this election. The House of Commons that has just been dissolved was chosen eight years ago. Britain has not had a national election since December, 1910—four years before the Deluge. At that time, when Asquith and Lloyd George were leading the assault upon the House of Lords, the electoral system of England had suffered no change since the Gladstonian epoch. Manhood suffrage was still a phase. Electoral districts were amazingly dissimilar. The man of property could, and did, vote in many separate constituencies. The polling was spread over a month or more. And, of course, no women might cast a vote.

On December 14 a new Britain will, though not without many surviving disabilities, go to the ballot. In the spring of this year Parliament carried through the most drastic of reform acts. The principle of manhood suffrage has been accepted. Practically all male civilians are now enfranchised from the age of

twenty-one; while the right to vote is conferred upon soldiers from nineteen, the age below which they are understood not to be used for foreign service. The plural voter, if not yet completely abolished, will not count as a factor. The total electorate, which was eight millions in 1910, is now about eighteen millions, and that immense number includes a great new army of women voters, maybe nearly eight millions strong.

Altogether, the coming election may be described as the most incalculable adventure in political history, for no one can forecast the combined results of the enlarged electorate, the changed constituencies, the disappearance of the plural voter, the women's entry into politics, and the unknown mind of the soldier. Moreover, women have gained the right of admission to Parliament and the new House of Commons may easily include a few of those leaders who, during the last decade or so, have displayed so remarkable a talent for organization and debate.

Lloyd George The Issue

Inevitably the issue is Lloyd George. He became Prime Minister exactly two years ago, in December, 1916. He created a victory government—in person and procedure an entirely new experiment. Mr. George transformed the old British Cabinet system. He created a fresh type of Executive. Realizing that the constitution was in great part a myth, a tradition or an idea, he refashioned its instruments as the occasion seemed to demand. His government, from March to midsummer, passed through the acutest crisis of the war. And, thanks mainly to the weight of the American stroke at the crucial moment, Mr. George remains at the head of affairs at the coming of peace. Victory having been attained, he demands, as he has a right to demand, a mandate for the settlement.

His personal position is without a parallel. For a century and a half, since the elder Pitt, no English statesman has been head of the nation without being at the same time leader of a party. Mr. George has no party. He is backed by no party machine; he commands no recognized party funds. He has not formally separated himself from the Liberals. At the recent assembly of Liberal chiefs and delegates, there was a movement toward the restoration of unity. Mr. Asquith, however, remains the official Liberal leader; Mr. Bonar Law is both titular and actual leader of the Conservatives. The Labor party, led by Arthur Henderson, is in direct opposition to the government. Mr. George, therefore, stands outside the party ranks; but he is, and has been for three

years, to all intents and purposes, the leader of the Conservative forces. And when he makes his appeal for support on behalf of his government the voter has to confront and weigh the fact that Lloyd George, from 1906 to 1914 the most powerful radical leader in the English-speaking world, is asking to be supported in his association with Mr. Bonar Law, Lord Curzon and Lord Milner, while every one of the prominent Liberals who stood with him before 1914 is ranged with the Opposition.

In the Coalition War Cabinet there is one Labor leader, George Barnes (who henceforth, presumably, will be differently labelled), and one Liberal of an emphatically non-party kind, General Smuts of the Transvaal. For the rest, Mr. George depends in the main upon the cooperation of men who, apart from the great issue of the war, are by temperament, tradition, training and interest identified with the world in which their emergency leader has no part at all.

Lloyd George's Great Stroke

That, coupled of course with the Northcliffe alliance, is Mr. George's weakness. His strength is individual and personal. In certain qualities of popular leadership he is unrivalled. Time and again since he succeeded to the first place in the government he has seemed to be at the end of his resources. The House of Commons has been resentful, the press hostile, the army suspicious, the nation perturbed. Recall, for example, the storm over the Versailles conference a year ago, the Maurice affair, the repeated crises in Ireland, the volcanic rumblings among the munitions workers, in the shipyards and the mines. But the stars in their courses have fought for the Prime Minister. Saved as a rule by the extreme emergency of war, he has pulled through. Since 1916 he has behind him a series of astonishing successes in the House of Commons. And to-day, strengthened and stimulated beyond measure by the boundless triumphs of the Allies, on the eve of the election he appears, at all events to the world outside England, as the single commanding figure among the political leaders of Britain.

The Lloyd George Strategy at Work

This being the position, what naturally would be Mr. Lloyd George's method? Any one acquainted with his extraordinary genius for political strategy could have predicted it without hesitation. A few hours after the signing of the armistice he made an appeal to his old Liberal supporters. Beginning with the announcement that the terms of the peace would dominate the election, he proclaimed that the government would enter the peace conference for a settlement upon the lines of justice and public right. There would be no vengeance; no false settlement such as that of 1871. This policy would involve as an essential element the creation of a League of Free Nations for the insurance of peace and Britain would go to the peace

conference prepared to declare that the league is and must be a reality.

Turning to domestic affairs, Mr. George affirmed that the policy of the government would include a bold programme of social reconstruction, a great project for the rebousing of the people, the reform of the land, a national minimum wage in all industries, the settlement of the Irish question upon a nationalist basis and without the coercion of the Protestant minority in Ulster. Such a policy, he declared, could not be initiated without the support of the Liberal forces in Britain, and therefore he appealed for a national vote on behalf of the coalition.

To the more radical elements of the nation it would doubtless seem that on the domestic side such a programme was anything but radical; but it was plain from Mr. George's later utterances that it went a good way beyond what his Conservative and imperialist colleagues were prepared to sanction. A day or two later the evidence of this was seen in a revised programme which implied that land and Ireland would have to wait for a more convenient opportunity, and that Mr. George had at last fully accepted the imperialist doctrine of Colonial preference, the British way of stating a scheme for an imperial customs union.

The Retort Of the Liberals

The appeal to Liberals was certainly a brilliant stroke. Lloyd George could gauge exactly their situation and their dilemma. In the first place he knew that they did not want the election at all. A divided Liberal party could not have much of a chance at such a time as this; that is, while the peace settlement, and especially such a settlement as the present, is still in suspense. Mr. George knew, moreover, that his old party is hard up for a platform; that Mr. Asquith is certainly not a leader for a new and incalculable era, and that there are large numbers of his old adherents who, while far from trusting him completely, will always admire and delight in his resourcefulness, eloquence and dash. Further, the whole Liberal world, like the world of labor, is deeply in earnest about the League of Free Nations; and Mr. George's declaration of full agreement with President Wilson, together with the knowledge that before any change of government could take effect the broad lines of the international settlement should be laid, amounts to an additional argument for keeping the present coalition in power. Clearly, the Liberal groups felt their disadvantage, and if the Prime Minister had been free to pursue the line which he at first marked out for himself, the Asquith Liberals would have found themselves without any particular reason for separate existence. But the Prime Minister was not free. Being without any powerful Liberal colleagues in the coalition, he must of necessity shape his course to that of Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. Balfour and Lord Milner. Accordingly, Mr. George's later speeches and the election address issued jointly with Mr. Law reveal his efforts to arrive at a compromise which may attract Liberals and the moderate Labor section without causing the bulk of his conservative following to take flight. The question is: How can he do that in view of the promise of such questions as land reform, tariffs and colonial preference, and Ireland?

The later declarations by Lloyd George and Bonar Law have furnished Mr. Asquith with opportunity for a retort; although, since he is most of all anxious not to widen the disagreements in the Liberal ranks, it cannot be described as a fighting retort. In the first place he deplores the election itself. It is, he says, at once a blunder and a calamity. The nation is as closely united upon the principles of the peace now being made as it was upon the waging of the war. He contends that the majority of the men who have the highest claim to register their judgment—namely, the soldiers—will be absent from the polls. This latter statement is contradicted by Mr. Bonar Law, who asserts that the electoral machinery will enable about 85 per cent of the men in the service to vote.

For the rest, Mr. Asquith comes out strongly for what have come to be called the three freedoms—freedom of person, of opinion and of trade. Censorship, he declares, must go. The full rights of free discussion and action must be restored. And, with as little delay as possible, the bureaucratic control of business must be relaxed and the national life be restored to what, in the orthodox Liberal view, is the normal and proper condition of man in society. Here, naturally, he is on his firmest ground, for the people as a whole are profoundly hostile to a continuance of the wartime system, which has placed almost the whole range of social and economic activity at the mercy of a vast and complicated bureaucratic machine, largely directed by a miscellaneous and uncoordinated body of controllers. And of course the Liberal leader insists upon his party's hostility to protective tariffs and the urgent necessity of reaching a settlement in Ireland.

The Liberals And Their Dilemma

With all this, however, Mr. Asquith is compelled to weaken his own position as the opposition leader by making it plain that he cannot sanction any contest between Liberal candidates. Wherever an acknowledged Liberal is standing (or, as Americans say, running) for Parliament, whether carrying the Coalition or the straight Liberal label, he is to have a clear field, so far as the energies of the Liberal organization are concerned. This will mean that in a large number of constituencies the Coalition forces will have it all their own way. Some working arrangement will be arrived at between the Liberal and Conservative party managers, and the man who can be depended upon least to split the vote will secure the nomination. As a consequence a good many Liberals who would prefer to follow the unembarrassed lead of Mr. Asquith will stand as Coalition candidates; thousands of persons who have always voted Tory will find themselves, through the compromise, compelled to support a Liberal-Coalition candidate, and doubtless many Liberals of the Left, before the war fervent adherents of Lloyd George, will decide to throw in their lot with the Labor party.

Labor—The Only Real Opposition

Two contrasted enterprises within the older parties have been attempted during the campaign. First, a section of the younger Liberals made a serious move toward complete Liberal reunion—that is, toward the recapture of Lloyd George as a party leader. Secondly, moderates on both sides sought to bring about a regular Liberal-Conservative alliance against

The Prospects in Favor of the "Victory Premier"—The Issues and the Leaders

the forces of Labor. The first movement could not succeed; for the two years of Mr. George's Premiership have been a period, practically, of Conservative rule, and clearly, since the twofold slogan is, "The government that has won the war" and "A coalition for the settlement," there is no possible, certainly there is no immediate, career for Mr. George as a party leader, even if his old place were recoverable—which it is not. As for a definite merging of Liberals and Conservatives against Labor-Socialism—that is in part already effected in some electoral districts, and it is obvious that the movement might go much further by December 14 if the middle classes have been in any serious degree affected by the fear of Bolshevism.

So far, as the American public in general recognizes, the British Labor party has shown itself to be remarkably free from those tendencies which, in this country as in England, are commonly identified with the principles of the Bolshevik. And the party now ranged behind Arthur Henderson will, if it should be true to its principles, stand in the election for an international settlement and by comparison with the programmes daily proclaimed in Continental countries, must seem moderate and responsible. Indeed, what the British Labor leaders to-day are arguing is that both Conservatives and Liberals, seeking for measures to meet the challenge of the new time, have been compelled to rifle the Labor party stores. It is labor, they maintain, which stands solidly behind the programme of a just European system, an equitable agreement as to raw materials and the undeveloped regions of the world, together with a league of nations for the insurance of peace and public right. And it is labor, and labor alone, they insist, which has faced the claims and needs of a world torn, embittered and exhausted by war and now calling for concrete proposals, as well as ideal aims, in the work of rebuilding industry and society.

The Strong Appeal Of Labor

Well, beyond a question, labor as a political and reconstructive force is making a potent and moving appeal to large numbers of men and women outside the ranks of the manual workers. Through the inter-Allied war and peace aims, formulated early this year, and the widely circulated manifesto called "Labor and the New Social Order" it has initiated a powerful movement of education. So much is generally admitted. But what of the British Labor party in the coming election? What of its leadership, its candidates and its majority and minority sections? Until lately the statement has been repeatedly made that Labor candidates to the number of between 300 and 400 would be standing. To-day it seems likely that the total will be nearer 200. The new rule which requires, before nomination, a deposit by each candidate of \$750, to be forfeited upon failure to poll one-eighth of the total votes, will act as a severe check upon speculative nominations. And the absorption of so many of the best in the services will limit the choice of can-

didates, so that the men standing on December 14 will, in many cases, be considerably below the level of ability and experience attainable in normal times. Moreover, despite accommodations between the parties there will be many three-cornered contests, and in such contests the advantage is nearly always with the Coalition candidate. This advantage, needless to say, is increased in all cases where more than one Labor candidate happens to be in the field; while in view of the various factions opposed to the leadership of Arthur Henderson, Ramsay-MacDonald and their associates, we may expect to see evidence of strong factional spirit in not a few important centres. Among the influences fighting on the side of labor may be reckoned the results of the war government's policy in regard to industry, the many forms of unrest arising from war conditions, the perils of demobilization, the ruinous cost of living and the various obscure grievances inseparable from a military system. Nor can we fail to take note of the widespread discontent provoked by war profiteering and the failures of the older kind of politician. To-day in England there is far more readiness among the middle classes to welcome a strong Labor party than has ever been known before. It would not surprise any observer of political forces if the Labor group in the new House should be at least twice as large as the group in the Parliament which has just been dissolved. But the influences and issues are so obscure and confused that, equally, no one would be greatly surprised by an entirely different result. And it need not be said, the general expectation is that Mr. George is sure of his majority.

But What of Ireland?

There remains the obstinate puzzle of the Irish at Westminster. The Nationalists have suffered heavily through the death of John Redmond. But, more than this, their position is made problematical in the extreme by the fierce passions of wartime Ireland, the events since the Dublin revolt of 1916, and the increase of Sinn Fein. Roughly stated, the fight is no longer between Home Rule and Unionism; it is between differing forms of Home Rule and a party, of unknown dimensions, which stands for independence, or at least for the application to Ireland of the principle of national self-determination. The evidence of recent bye-elections seems to foreshadow large successes at the polls for Sinn Fein. Such successes, of course, would be gained at the expense of the Home Rulers led by Dillon and Devlin; and if the Sinn Fein members persisted in the refusal to sit in the House of Commons, Ireland in the new Parliament would afford a problem more difficult even than the one to which Great Britain has for so long been accustomed.

Lloyd George, always sincerely anxious to find the way out, repeated his conviction in a recent speech. "There can," he said, "be no political peace in the kingdom or empire while the Irish question remains unsettled." In America, more perhaps than in any country except Ireland itself, people of all parties will recognize that as a faithful saying.

Sealing the Sisterhood of Columbia and Britannia

By P. W. Wilson

BRITAIN'S days begin next Friday, and I am asked to restate Britain's case. I do this with a full heart, because the one paramount desire of Britain is a cordial friendship with all Americans. Between Republicans and Democrats we draw no distinctions. Let a man be honestly loyal to the United States—let his loyalty be 100 per cent—and we wish him well. Given such loyalty to the Stars and Stripes and it matters nothing to us whether the American citizen be of Anglo-Saxon, German or Irish descent. American nationality is the one passport to our unshakable confidence.

We have definite reasons for wishing to be friends with America. We are not out for mere compliments. We want something deeper than flattery. Nor are we thinking about commercial advantages. At this solemn moment, when we are conscious of 900,000 British dead, our feelings will be outraged by a proposal to exploit this great victory over despotism at the expense of mankind. A great army of immortal spirits, which will never be demobilized, stands in serried array as a defence against such misunderstandings. No one will suggest that Dr. Albert Shaw, the editor of "The American Review of Reviews," is a fire-eater or hurrah patriot. He has been visiting England, and this is his impression, as cabled to his journal:

"It is not true that the British people are seeking any selfish benefit from a war which has cost them such terrible sacrifice of the lives of their young men. Their sons are as dear to them as our own. Their desire is to live and work harmoniously with the American people for the best interests of mankind, and it has no background of dangerous imperialism. Nothing has more strongly impressed us than the essential reasonableness, at this time, of British leaders of thought and action."

With that verdict every Englishman will be content. The one British interest and the one American interest is the peace and happiness of the whole world. Whatever we get for ourselves will be worthless if other less fortunate nations are plunged in disorder and misery.

Many German-Americans have set aside their ancestral predilections and shown me such kindness. I should like to thank them. And I appeal to their fairness of mind as Americans. Do they always remember that before the war German goods

were admitted into British ports either free of duty or on the same terms as British goods, that German shipping had full use of all our coaling stations, and that German capital was welcome in London, where German banks were among the most powerful in the city? May I remind them further that when war broke out British diplomacy was seeking an outlet for German energy in the Portuguese colonies and in Mesopotamia? Nor will they forget that the ink on the armistice was scarcely dry and the murdered victims of the Lusitania were scarcely buried when you had Mr. Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, pleading, if you please, for fair treatment of Germany. On my own table lie two documents. In one my wife tells me that on their new ration cards in London they have had to sign their names seventy times, which shows what privations even now are suffered in England. In the other, which is a newspaper cutting, I read of Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau agreeing with President Wilson that food be sent to Germany. In face of these facts is Britain really ungenerous? A great authority once said:

"If thine enemy hunger, feed him," believing apparently that there is no greater danger than our enemy when he is hungry. It is a hard saying, but Britain is endeavoring to live up to it.

Irish-Americans have also shown me infinite kindness. The postman who brings one's letters—the elevator men in a hotel, the waiter who serves dinner—one and all, they say a pleasant word apparently because I am English. I shall never forget how in a Baptist church an Irish Catholic girl from a Sinn Fein family, with a glorious voice, sang "Rule Britannia" and "Land of Hope and Glory" in honor of England, and sang them with her whole heart. That was a fine triumph over prejudice. Another memory which will never be effaced was my first reception in New England, where in the very teeth of the trouble over conscription three or four hundred people shook hands with me because I was English. This Home Rule business is difficult—let us admit it. Bohemia has precisely the same perplexity—namely, the presence within her borders of a minority of two and a half million people who happen to be of alien blood; that is, German. How to safeguard minorities is now the chief worry for those who want the self-determination of small peoples. The Irish case does not stand alone. And it will be solved as part of the world settlement.

But in the meantime let me put one or two matters straight.

Nailing a Few Lies

It is untrue that British soldiers shot down Irish peasants who refused conscription and afterward appropriated their farms for wounded English Tommies. It is untrue that the English outrage Irish women and slaughter Irish children. It is untrue that England and Japan are conspiring to attack America. Nor is it true that England attacked Germany in order to keep the Czar on his throne. These ideas may seem strange, but every one of them has been uttered in my hearing, and sometimes in direct questions to me. The truth is, of course, that for years past Ireland has been heavily subsidized by England. If she became independent she would have to raise millions for her old age pensions, her schools, her land purchase and other services. She is the one part of the British Empire which is demonstrably enriched by the war.

The latest charge against England is that with Germany beaten she is too powerful, especially on the sea. Columbia the Gen of the Ocean, they would have it, is not quite happy about Britannia ruling the waves. In certain newspapers the slogan has gone forth that America must have the biggest navy. I do not know what your intentions may be, but I may remark

"The Kansas City Journal" shares in this view:

"The great tidal wave of Bolshevism which for a time threatened to overwhelm not only Germany but several neutral countries and which caused very serious disturbances in some of the Allied countries in Europe, appears to be ebbing. It was inevitable that some sort of reaction would take place when the frightful strain of the past four years was even measurably relieved and it was also inevitable that this reaction would be expressed most extravagantly by the less restrained and less restrained elements in the population of the countries affected. The same attitude of mind, that is to say, which had Bolshevism in Russia transform a nation freed from centuries of despotism into a nominal nation burdened with a bloodier despotism of proletarians, produced similar effects in other countries, the effects being modified only by the extent to which the saner elements were able to curb the vicious impulses of the popular tyrants. For Bolshevism is fundamentally a tyranny, a ruthless disregard of the rights of all the people, the en-

thronement of one class above all other classes. It is so in Russia and it is so in every country in which it has been allowed to raise its head. It would operate after the conventional fashion in this country if the I. W. W. could hoodwink the American people or could employ the force which they would gladly invoke if they could."

The reason for "the lure of Bolshevism" is discussed by "The San Francisco Bulletin":

"What is there about Bolshevism to make so many regard it as a political cure-all? Wherein lies its appeal? What does the creed of Trotsky and his fellows offer? Why, for instance, should thousands of people suddenly jump to the conclusion that the abolition of all national boundaries will make races respect one another's rights? Whence comes the conviction that free love is bound to insure the well-being of families?"

"In times of distress mankind often has shown a strong tendency to seek quick for quick remedies and to hearken to charlatans who maintain that they have discovered a short cut to Utopia. The tendency has brought about some of the most ridiculous situations in history, but in no case has it produced a more remarkable spectacle than the one accorded to-day in Europe."

"Of course, Bolshevism will pass, as such movements always have, and future generations

will smile while reading history's account of this freak of popular fancy. But the mystery will remain and students will puzzle over the psychological quirk, which led people to destroy, under the fond delusion that by so doing they were creating."

"The Daily Eastern Argus" of Portland, Me., views with alarm the spread of the red flag:

"The red flag waves everywhere, and there is danger of its being carried to other countries until Europe is a seething mass of revolutionary disorder. And with this condition growing, what will be the result?"

"The spread of Bolshevism is a very real contingency, however, and the fallacy must be combatted with energy by all thoughtful people. We of this country have too much faith in the humanity and honesty of our laws, administered by just and humane officials, to entertain any Bolshevik delusions. Every patriot is as loyal to his government as he was to the flag and constitution in this great war, just ended, for human liberty."

As regards conditions in Russia The Tribune thinks that:

"The seemingly supine submission of the Russian public to a handful of visionaries and mercenaries has alienated a sympathy which might otherwise be active and warm."

failed in its duty to the same cause? On this matter I need say nothing further, because in the columns of The Tribune Colonel Roosevelt, who has visited England, interviewed our statesmen and seen our ships, has put the case precisely as Mr. Lloyd George would put it, unless it be that the Colonel is a little more forcible. When Mr. Roosevelt declares that the freedom of the seas means the enslavement of mankind it is not for an English visitor in this country to add anything.

We must have an understanding on the ocean. And this is a proposal worth considering. Let our statesmen get together and reckon up what navy is necessary to keep peace on the ocean. Then let them apportion ships to each democratic country, reserving the main force for the United States and Great Britain. Let us divide that Anglo-American fleet equally between us, making it fifty-fifty. Let us share plans and expenses. In other words, let us apply to this situation the supremely wise policy which kept warships off the Great Lakes and gave to the United States and Canada a frontier of 4,000 miles without one fort. What an achievement that would be! The people want such an arrangement. If it does not come about it will be the fault of politicians on both sides and of newspaper men and officials in a rut. If the trouble lies with mandarins in Whitehall, London, then let us know it. But at present we have before us no proposal of the kind and no definition of what America really means by freedom of the seas. All that confronts us is a kind of vague suspicion, sometimes expressed in severe terms, which has surprised us at a time when our men are still bleeding together and our factories are busy weaving American flags with which to welcome the American President. If there are mischief makers we are convinced that the soul of the American people is not with them.

Idealists Who Turn Into Cynics

Here a word of warning is needed. No man is so dangerous as the idealist who gets disappointed and then turns cynic. In England we have several people of that kind, and as cynicism is more interesting than common sense their writings are popular in your press. There is Mr. Arnold Bennett, who in his latest novel, "The Pretty Lady," gives the impression that the Seventh Commandment is in England a "scrap of paper." It is very clever—and very un-

true. Last week Mr. H. G. Wells, in "The New Republic," let himself go, and declared that our Foreign Office "is by its nature and by its original purpose a secretive, scheming, advantage snatching instrument, sly, deep, silent and deceptive," and he added: "It is very like having suddenly to shake hands with some one when you are hiding a knife up the sleeve of one hand and concealing a bludgeon behind your back with the other."

Mr. Wells is not anti-British. Quite the contrary. He is simply the typical Englishman—rather dull, with curious lapses from humor, and quite unable to appreciate how his words affect other communities than his own. He is out for a system, and if England does not fit the system so much the worse for England. The best answer to him is Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum, and the great personal prestige of Viscount Grey and Lord Bryce, who will survive even these attacks.

For the British Empire is an anomaly. If we try to put it into writing it will simply break up, and that will probably cost some million human lives. The only reason why mankind tolerates such an alliance is that we give people a fair deal. If England degenerates and adopts a colonial policy such as Spain's the world will rise against her, and rightly. The best antidote to such downward tendency would be the influence of Americans, with their unrivalled experience of the international point of view.

There is not one little nation the wide world over whose integrity and safety do not depend upon Washington understanding London. And what have we to say of France? It is the French who have brought us together. It is the French flag which chaperones the British flag in every state of the Union. If France has no misgivings about England—and she knows England too well to distrust her—is that not sufficient evidence of good faith?

Politics are important, but there are certain issues which we in England remove entirely from the arena of domestic strife, and one of them is our affection for the United States. We will not have this sacred thing handed about between party and party. We would consider that to be desertion. We have our differences among ourselves. We wish to have no differences with you. We would share with you every thought, every hope, every plan. And in these dark years—darkest before the dawn—your comradeship shone forth in our sky like the morning star.