

# The Four Great Treaties Since the Thirty Years' War

## Agreement Entered Into at Riga Between the Poles and Russians Among Most Important

By Frank H. Simonds

IN SEVERAL recent articles I have discussed the armistice of Riga, that is, the preliminary peace settlement between the Russians and the Poles—as is affected of the latter country and as the rise of Poland was destined to influence the future relations of European states. But the settlement at Riga has a far wider significance. We are, in fact, in the presence of one more, the fourth in order, of those great settlements of European territories since the close of the Thirty Years' War, which generally is accepted as marking the beginning of modern history.

Taken together, the treaties signed at Paris and the Riga document, to which must be added a number of subordinate agreements like those between the Baltic states and Russia, constitute a settlement wholly comparable in magnitude and importance to those of Westphalia, Utrecht and Vienna. The liquidation of the German War, like the liquidation of the wars of the Reformation, of Louis XIV, of the French Revolution and of Napoleon, must open a new page in world history.

It is interesting and not without value for the future, then, to examine this latest European settlement, having regard to its relation to the last. For from the fall of Napoleon in 1815 to August, 1914—that is, from the Battle of Waterloo to the invasion of Belgium by the

## Auction Bridge

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IN LEADING against no-trumpers, neither the leader nor his partner having made a bid of any kind, it is usual to modify the opening from high-card combinations which were given in the last article for two reasons.

In the first place, there is no danger of the high cards being trumped unless they are led out at the first opportunity, which is always the risk when playing against trump contracts. In the second place, it is highly important, when playing against no-trumpers, to make the small cards of your long suits, which is almost an impossibility against a trump call.

To accomplish this it is essential, wherever possible, to leave each partner with one or more of the suit, so that no matter which gets into the lead the suit may be continued. If the leader, who is long in the suit, starts out with his high cards, even if he wins the first two rounds, he may exhaust his partner's power to return the suit later and everything will then depend on his getting in himself.

We therefore get the general rule that high cards are not led against no-trumpers when there are only two touching honors at the head of the suit, unless there are seven or more cards in it. Against a trump we make our high cards for fear of losing the first trick to a small card and then getting our high ones trumped.

With three honors at the top of the suit a high card is the correct lead against a no-trumper; but with only two such cards, even if they are ace and king, the rule is to begin with a small card, either the fourth best or the smallest of the suit.

The difference this distinction may make in the result is often very marked, and untaught players who lead the same way against trumps or no trumps frequently lose tricks by it, although they may be unconscious of the cause, or even of the loss. The opening often has the further defect of misleading a good partner and weakening his confidence. Here is an example, showing how a different opening made a marked difference in the score. It was played in a duplicate game:

♥ A Q 9 8 2	♥ K J 10 8 3
♦ 10 7 4	♦ 8 2
♣ 15 4	♣ 10 9
♠ 7 2	♠ K 10 9

  

♥ A	♥ 8 2
♦ A 8 6 2	♦ 10 9
♣ 4	♣ K 10 9
♠ A 9 6	♠ 7 2
♠ 7 2	♠ A Q J 5 3

  

♥ A 4	♥ 10 6
♣ K 6	♣ 10
♠ 6	♠ 8
♠ 7 2	♠ K

Z dealt and bid a spade, which A passed. Being very weak in spades Y called two hearts, which B passed, and Z went two no-trumps.

At one table A, who was not familiar with the distinction between leading against trumps and no trumps, started with the king and ace of diamonds, upon which dummy played two small cards, the dummy's partner leading the queen on the

several races to which the contemporary map of Europe bears testimony are almost insignificant. To begin with, so far as Great Britain, Spain, Switzerland and Portugal are concerned there has been no change whatever.

### Changes Resulting From War

Actually more than a century of crowded history in western Europe has resulted in but three changes of any extent, one of which is purely provisional. The Treaty of Versailles, while in the main accepting the line of 1815 between the Belgian people, then Dutch subjects and now independent, and the German, has assigned to the former rather less than four hundred square miles of territory east of Liège, constituting the districts of Malmédy and Eupon, with the one and a half square miles of Moresnet, overlooked a century ago. This change, moreover, does no more than rectify a mistake of the earlier treaty, since the majority of the 75,000 people dwelling in this region are not only Walloon but have recently signified their satisfaction with the transfer to Belgian rule.

In the second place, while accepting the frontier drawn between France and Germany—that is, between the French monarchy and the Prussian and Bavarian kingdoms of 1815—the Treaty of Versailles has reopened a dispute which filled the records of the negotiations of a century ago, by creating the Sarre district and bestowing upon the inhabitants the right, fifteen years hence, to vote for French, German or independent status. More than half of this Sarre basin was French before the revolution, half of it was assigned to France following the first abdication of Napoleon, and this half was not actually taken from France until after Waterloo.

As between the German people and their western neighbors, then, the recent settlement accepts the settlement of a century ago, except as to 1,000 square miles and approximately three-quarters of a million of people. As to these, it leaves the decision with the people themselves, and the districts adjoining the Belgian frontier have already accepted the Belgian nationality, while those adjoining the French have still to vote four years hence.

By analyzing the changes of a century we shall see that they correspond to certain very clear historical circumstances. We have first to consider the Italian phase. The Congress of Vienna denied to Italy any shadow of unity, even that illusory fraction residing in Napoleon's kingdom of Italy. But the wars of the nineteenth century gave Italy Venetia and Lombardy at the same moment that the leadership of the House of Savoy supplied a center for Italian patriotism and led the way to internal consolidation. The conference of 1919 extended the process by giving to the Italian nation the boundaries of antiquity, the Alps from Switzerland to the Quarnero, while it hesitated to resolve the dispute between the southern Slavs and the Italians as to the islands and a portion of the mainland on the eastern side of the Adriatic.

As to Poland, the Paris Conference, after long debate and much bitterness, resolved to restore substantially those frontiers which were overturned when Frederick the Great undertook his infamous partitions. Posen, West Prussia, in larger part, and a fragment of East Prussia were restored to Polish sovereignty. Danzig was created an amorphous political molecule, depending upon the League of Nations, but in some vague measure reproducing an ancient status. In doing this the Paris

Conference went back not to 1815, but to 1772, and in three districts, where just decision seemed difficult, resort was had to the compromise of a plebiscite. Two of the regions already have voted for Germany; a third, Upper Silesia, has still to decide, but if it chooses German allegiance we shall have restored on the eastern marches of Prussia substantially the frontiers of 1772.

As to Austrian Poland the Paris Conference found little difficulty in arriving at a decision, because the whole of western Galicia spontaneously turned to Warsaw. As to eastern Galicia there was more controversy, but in the end the result was the same. Thus, at Paris, Poland received the territories stolen by the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs in the eighteenth century. As to the Russian share in the spoils of partition, however, Paris found itself unable to reach a decision, and the actual settlement has been by the sword and is set forth in the terms of Riga, which give to Poland not the frontiers of 1772, as in the west, but those of 1793—that is, of the second partition.

As to the Russian territory, aside from Poland, Paris was equally unable to make a division, and after war the separate Baltic races have arrived at a settlement with the Russians which undoes the work of Peter the Great and his successors so far as the Baltic shore is concerned. Finland emerges free; Estonia, Livland and Lithuania have been similarly successful in escaping Russian control, although between Lithuania and Poland there survives a quarrel which may have grave consequences in the future.

In sum, however, Russia retires behind frontiers which recall those of the seventeenth century, so far as the Baltic foreshore is concerned, and in the case of Poland and Finland the conditions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. On the whole thousand miles of boundary extending from the Gulf of Finland to the Black Sea only the stretch of the Dniester remains unfixed by agreement, and here the Rumanians have made good the frontiers of Turkey in 1812 by annexing Bessarabia, which passed to Russia in 1812 and was definitively recognized to be Russian at Vienna three years later.

In the case of Russia, as of Germany, however, while there has been a collapse, there was not actual disintegration. The collapse of Germany had permitted the escape of the Poles. The fall of Russia had not merely enabled the Russian Poles and the Baltic tribes to escape, but also had enabled the Rumanians of the Dniester to turn to their brethren across the Pruth; but so far as Turkey and Austria were concerned the events of the World War amounted to an integral destruction.

Thus on the territory which was Austro-Hungarian we see arising a number of new states: a mutilated Austria, containing the German fraction; Czecho-Slovakia, holding the Czechs, Slovaks, and a fraction of the Ruthenian people; Jugo-Slavia, gathering in not alone all the Southern Slavs, of the Hapsburgs, but also the Serbs of Serbia and Montenegro, who were until recently in large numbers under Turkish rule. Like the Austrian Poles, the Austrian and Hungarian Rumanians escape to the sovereignty of their own nationality across the Carpathians.

Grecks May Rule Constantinople

Finally, so far as Turkey in Europe is concerned, Greece completes the absorption of all the Thracian districts and approaches the walls of Constantinople at the Chatalia lines; in a word, arrives within sight of that Byzantine capital from which she was evicted some five centuries ago. Moreover, in all that has happened in recent months, there is the frank hint that, with British approval, Greece will presently enter Constantinople, now occupied by Allied troops and dominated by Allied warships, and thus restore conditions existing nearly half a thousand years ago in southeastern Europe.

Looking back to the settlement of the Congress of Vienna for a moment, we perceive that out of it grew certain distinct conflicts which make up the history of the nineteenth century. The age long rivalry between the Latin and the German on the Rhine survived to make the war of 1870 and to contribute to the making of that of 1914. France had created in Germany and Italy a longing for national solidarity by her effort to conquer and dominate. As a consequence the German and the Italian peoples struggled upward to race and national solidarity in the wars of the middle of the last century. By refusing to undo the wrong done to the Poles by Frederick the Great the Congress of Vienna preserved a wound in the east of Europe which did not heal and could not be cured.

But the main outcome of the settlement of Vienna was the inevitable creation of the eastern question. The great Russian Empire emerging from the Napoleonic struggle almost as potent as the United States at the close of the World War, resumed its glacier-like march toward the open waters beyond the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. To meet this thrust, first Britain and France, then Britain and Austria, finally Germany and Austria, united. War after war marked the progress of the struggle, the race between the German and the Slav, as it finally developed, for the road to the Near East, and the bridge to Asia Minor, which is the peninsula of Constantinople.

Ground of Next War

It was this rivalry, this race, which really precipitated the World War, although it was complicated by Anglo-German and Franco-German circumstances. And looking forward to the future, on the basis of the new adjustments it must be perceived that there is every chance that in the next hundred years the effort of Russia to regain her position on the Baltic and to achieve her conquest of Constantinople, to gain the prize which was in her hands by Anglo-French consent during the World

War, will be renewed. Thus we may have at one time a new eastern question and a new Baltic question.

In the nineteenth century, first Prussia and then the German Empire and Russia were long friends and even allies. The separation between the two, due to the German support of Austrian pretensions in the Near East, was fatal to both dynasties and to both empires. Today nothing seems at once more momentous and more probable than a new association of the German and the Slav, which will inevitably challenge almost ever detail in the settlement of 1919-'20, certainly every circumstance save in the west.

## The Congress of Vienna Controlled Europe for the Century Prior to 1914

Russian may not again strike hands and seek to extinguish Polish liberation by dividing Polish lands.

### Disputes Over Small States

As between the new states, erected as a result of recent treaties, many disputes of a dangerous character have come with the liberation of the smaller nationalities from the overshadowing menace of great and tyrannizing powers. Thus the Poles and the Lithuanians are at daggers drawn, over Vilna; bitterness still survives between Czechs and Poles over Teschen, recently divided between the two, both of whom claimed the whole district. Between the Rumanians and the Serbs there endures the acute and very dangerous dispute over the Banat. Between the German-Austrian fragment, now erected into a separate republic, and the Jugo-Slavs there is the issue raised by the plebiscite of Klagenfurt, recently decided in favor of the Austrians. Between the Hungarians and all their neighbors there exist disputes having their origin in the determination of the Magyars to regain all of their ancient lands, despite the fact that all of these lands are inhabited by people who prefer other rule to a return to Hungarian supremacy.

### Continental Policy

The World War reestablished the fact, proved so completely in the wars of Louis XIV, that Great Britain will never consent, save after complete defeat, to the establishment of a strong military power in the new countries, in Belgium, in Poland. German failure to realize this fact led to the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. A new German effort to disturb the frontiers drawn in the war would almost inevitably involve the British again. Therefore, so far as the Alsace-Lorraine question itself is concerned, the settlement of Versailles might seem destined to secure.

### Settlement of Vienna

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### Rise of New Issues

Moreover, in the north there has arisen a new problem, or rather a question which filled the history of Europe for many centuries with the threats and realities of war, namely, the Baltic question, has been revived. Russia has retired from the Baltic, save about the head of the Gulf of Finland, but who can believe that the great Slav state of the future will permanently consent to be separated from the sea by a thin facade of helpless states, such as Estonia, Livland and Lithuania, even if all three should seek strength in unity? Yet it will be the policy of all the states interested in the Baltic, of Sweden, Germany and Great Britain, to preserve the independence of these states and thus prevent Russian control of the Baltic.

To the Baltic question there is added the Polish, also of very great antiquity. Poland has escaped from the Russian, German and Austrian grip, but if the disappearance of the Austrian makes Polish escape on this side permanent, if the frontiers of Poland have accepted with respect to the Russian leave open the way for an ultimate restoration of friendship between both branches of the Slav family, between the German and the Poles, the frontiers laid down at Versailles represent only an incitation to war. Nor can Poland ever be quite sure that the German and the

representation under the supervision of Irish returning officers, the assembly to be empowered to frame a regular Irish constitution, provide for the protection of minorities and determine the external relations of Ireland. It is expected that Sinn Féin would agree to this procedure, as it is admitted that the Dail is not fully representative for such purposes. It is extremely questionable, however, whether the British government would accept the authority of such an assembly.

### Viscount Grey's Plan

Two other schemes have been put forward recently for an Irish settlement. The first, proposed by Viscount Grey of Fallodon, met with instant approval from a large body of English, as well as Irish, opinion. The main points in Lord Grey's suggestion were:

Ireland to have the same freedom as the other dominions to settle her own government. But—

One foreign policy, one army and navy for Great Britain and Ireland.

Britain to withdraw after two years and leave Irishmen to govern themselves.

Close on the heels of this generous suggestion, came another even more generous from the Liberal leader,

## Is an Irish Settlement Possible?

(Continued from page one)

and gives Unionist Ulster a mandate over Ireland without responsibility.

British Opposition

Only a small section of the British press, and that under direct influence of the government, supports the Home Rule bill. Until Lloyd George made his speech at Carnarvon on October 9 it was generally believed that the intention could not possibly be to continue with a measure so obviously unpopular.

Five Via Media

Between what may be regarded as the two extremes of Irish settlement, a republic and the present government's bill, are five via media, the result of serious moderate opinion's consideration of the Irish problem.

Three lesser suggestions, which have not been so thoroughly aired and discussed as some others, are the following:

(1) A proposed means of settlement by way of secret negotiation between the government and Sinn Féin. Overtures have been made from time to time in this direction; one has recently been attempted by Lord Middleton, leader of a group of southern Unionists which has held aloof from the Dublin peace confer-

ence. This latest overture, made through a prominent Catholic bishop, failed, like all its predecessors, because preliminary conditions of negotiation which it refuses to concede are demanded of Sinn Féin. In any case Sinn Féin is opposed to secret negotiation; conversation with its leaders shows them convinced they have a good case before the world and consider public opinion their ally.

(2) The Dublin peace conference put forward a means of settlement. Its proposal was that the British government should declare Ireland entitled to full, national self-government within the empire, with complete legislative, administrative and fiscal independence, and should summon an elected Irish constituent assembly, in which representatives of Ulster should have the status of free contracting parties, to draft an Irish constitution for automatic ratification by the British Parliament. The objection offered by England to this proposal is that in an open election 90 per cent of those elected would be Sinn Féiners!

(3) A movement is on foot to approach Sinn Féin with the suggestion that, failing action by the government, Dail Eireann itself should summon an Irish constituent assembly, to be elected by proportional

ex-Premier Henry Asquith, who proposed for Ireland:

Status of autonomous dominion to the fullest and widest sense.

Equal terms with the dominions with regard to external relations and making and revising treaties.

Separate army and navy.

Fiscal independence.

Somehow within these limitations essential settlement of the Irish problem must lie. If England and Ireland cannot soon get together and frame a peaceful solution, Britain must continue to rule Ireland with an iron hand. There are at present close to 100,000 soldiers and policemen engaged in keeping order in Ireland, and there is no order.

As long as the present condition of affairs exists murders of policemen and soldiers will continue. It has been shown that these murders are leading to counter murders. The vicious circle from which, so far as can be foreseen, there is no breaking away, save in the direction of sheer anarchy and annihilation, is continued. The country tends more and more toward republicanism. It is agreed that, at the present time, it is more in Britain's interest to be generous toward Ireland than in the interest of those whose one aim is the Irish republic.

## School for Card Players

Question—Dealer bids no-trump, and fourth hand asks for a heart lead after two passes. Dealer and second hand pass, and third hand bids himself with king-jack small in hearts, six clubs to queen-jack, and the ten, nine of diamonds and spades. Should he bid two no-trumps or pass?—A. H. S.

Answer—If fourth hand is a sound bidder, he offers to save the game against no-trumps, if he can get a heart lead, and third hand cannot stop the suit, if it is led through twice by getting the player on his right in again. The better bid seems to be three clubs. If the no-trumper is fairly strong it must be in clubs, diamonds and spades, and game in clubs is not improbable, with the advantage of having the hearts led up to, instead of through.

Question—Z has bid no-trump, fourth hand two clubs dealer, Z going back to no-trumps, all passing. The leader holds four clubs to the king, the ace, king small in spades, and three rags in each of the other suits. We have a bet as to which club he should lead, top or bottom?—C. T. M.

Answer—The proper opening is the king of spades. This shows the ace and gets a look at dummy. For the second lead, most players prefer the small club, because, unless the declarer has the suit stopped with the ace, his queen may be caught.

Question—The contract is five clubs doubled. The declarer makes only three odd, but detects one adversary in a revoke. She scores five-odd and game by taking two tricks. Her partner insists that three-odd doubled was enough, and

that the 100 points penalty was worth more than the two tricks, the adversaries having lost their right to any penalty for the unfulfilled contract through the revoke.—M. E. P.

Answer—No matter what errors the adversaries commit, the declarer must fulfill her contract to get live-odd. If these cannot be got in plus, they must be made up by the revoke penalty, or the declarer cannot score below the line.

### POKER

Question—In a jackpot all but two players are driven out after the draw. When A calls B, and B shows three deuces, A says they are good, and throws up his hand. When another player starts to pick up A's hand to look at it, A snatches it and says that if any one wants to see it he must pay as much as B did. Is this correct, and if so, why should A get the chips?—C. McJ.

### CRIBbage

Question—The crib shows three sixes and a trey, with a trey turned. Please count this hand for us.—L. M. G.

Answer—Lay the three sixes in a triangle, each side a pair, 6 holes. A trey with each pair makes a fifteen, 6 more. The other trey the same, 6 more, and a pair of treys 2 more, a twenty hand.