

Hughes Propounds Three Points for the Washington Conference

American Policy Will Demand Political Surrender by Japan

Re-establishment of "Open Door," Recognition of Integrity of China and Destruction of Anglo-Japanese Treaty Are Basic Program

By Frank H. Simonds

WASHINGTON, November 5. IN 1918 Mr. Wilson went to Paris armed with his famous fourteen points and determined to make these the basis for the creation of his League of Nations. To-day Mr. Hughes, almost equally the master of American policy, enters a new world conference committed to three instead of fourteen points and resolved to make these the basis for a program of limitation of armament.

The whole Washington conference, at least at the outset, will revolve around Mr. Hughes's three points. They represent the beginning, the middle and the end of American policy. They may be succinctly stated as follows:

To re-establish the doctrine of the open door.

To obtain international recognition of the principle of the integrity of China.

To destroy the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

Since these points are of such vital importance, it is essential to define as well as to cite them. What, then, is the official conception of the meaning of the term "open door"?

To our representatives the "open door" will mean that in China and Siberia every nation shall have the same rights as any other nation; that there shall be no discrimination or favoritism in the matter of concessions, trade and the rights and privileges of different nationals. Our representatives will insist that American economic interests shall not be destroyed as a consequence of the exercise of political control by any other government.

The demand for the international recognition of the principle of the integrity of China is a necessary co-ordinating factor inevitably coupled with the advocacy of the doctrine of the open door.

So far as the integrity of China has been maintained, even nominally, it is a consequence of the course of the United States in the past.

Finally, it is the view of our government and will be the contention of our representatives that the Anglo-Japanese alliance has been the influence which has enabled Japan to threaten the doctrine of the open door and the principle of the integrity of China.

Therefore to eliminate the alliance is an essential step in giving real vitality to the other two points.

Control in the Far East is Real "Yellow Peril"

Every one knows that the ruin of Mr. Wilson was achieved at Paris when he undertook to translate fourteen abstract principles into fourteen concrete realities. What then is the problem of Mr. Hughes? Stripped of all euphemistic phrase, it is stated in the following quotation from one of the closest observers of current Washington sentiments:

"The control in the Far East, which Japan desires, is the real 'yellow peril' if she can control the resources, lines of transportation, furnish the brains for conducting the governments, and finally be in a position to mobilize the man power of China, Manchuria and Siberia, she will not only dominate the Far East, but will be a serious menace to Occidental civilization. It is necessary for our government to take cognizance of this possible domination by Japan and to prevent it. Standing firmly for our policy, the 'open door' and the 'integrity of China,' the United States should be able to rely upon the

support of all other nations and avert a possible world calamity which might follow if these policies should continue to be disregarded."

I venture upon a second quotation from the same source, because nowhere else have I found the official view stated with such clarity and accuracy:

"Then England made an alliance with Japan; an alliance which has hung like the sword of Damocles over the Far East and which has brought about a situation that grows more and more serious when contemplated by the civilized world. Japan has asserted and enforced demands in China which would not have been attempted but for that alliance and the knowledge that she had behind her the greatest naval power in the world. Other nations would not have permitted these encroachments by Japan save for the fact that the alliance with Great Britain made interference impracticable. Under this alliance Japan has gone forward ruthlessly to secure domination over the Far East. She has absorbed Corea, blotting out a nation by conquering and annexing it. She has acquired Shantung and is reaching for more. All because she has the backing or passive acquiescence of Great Britain."

Support of Great Britain Expected by United States

Now, assuming that these statements accurately present the view of the Administration and the conception of Mr. Hughes, what do they mean in fact? Obviously that the United States is undertaking to check Japanese aspiration in the Far East, regarding that aspiration as a direct menace to its material interests and an eventual threat to its safety. To this end the United States has invited the great powers of Europe to conference, and not only does it expect their support, but it expects that one, namely, Great Britain, will retrace certain of its steps.

But there is an obvious necessity to consider the situation as an international situation. Let us assume for a moment that Mr. Hughes, perhaps the greatest advocate of his time in such a case, can present the argument against or, if you please, the indictment of the Japanese purposes and methods with all that supreme skill which marked his prosecution of the insurance corporations half a generation ago. Let us assume that in law and in justice there is no Japanese answer left, what does this mean?

Nothing, unless the United States is prepared to take up arms to enforce the two points which it elects to champion—namely, the open door and the integrity of China. We are undertaking to turn Japan out of China and to compel her to recognize in practice as in principle the integrity of China and of Siberia. She has in practice denied both her whole policy for nearly two decades has been based upon the avoidance of the open or the concealed evasion of these two "points." What if she persists?

Of course, the answer is obvious. All discussion of disarmament becomes futile. It will not be a question of limitation but of expansion of armament for us as for her. That is why the limitation of armament is in reality a minor detail, or rather a remote contingency, and the Far Eastern question is the real problem of the Washington conference, so recognized at

Spokesman for Japan at the Washington Council



BARON SHIDEHARA

Washington, but as yet little appreciated in the nation at large.

At the outset of the conference I would have my readers perceive that the United States is undertaking an aggressive foreign policy. It is undertaking to limit the purposes and policies of a great and proud nation. It is undertaking to forbid China to Japan, so far as Japan has looked upon it as an exclusive field for economic and political exploitation. Mr. Hughes's policy is the assertion of the right to enunciate and maintain a doctrine which is destructive of Japanese policy as it has been applied for more than a decade.


Japan Will Be Told to Get Out of China Politically

To the Japanese we are saying, in effect, bluntly, without equivocation, "Get out of China politically. Get out of Siberia politically. Recall your troops alike from Russian and Chinese soil. Recognize that you have in both territories no other rights than those which belong to all nations. And note that your presence in both countries, your pretensions on the mainland of Asia, constitute not alone a violation of abstract right, but a menace to the United States, so interpreted by it."

Moreover, we are saying to the British in unmistakable terms: "The evil course which Japan has followed in Asia is due in no small measure to the fact that she has been your ally and has exploited that partnership in Asia to her own advantage and to our harm. The price of American friendship is the abrogation of that alliance."

But this, in reality, is still another act of aggression from the Japanese point of view, because the greater the value she attached to the British alliance the deeper must be her resentment when we undertake to compel the abrogation of that alliance. Does one need to recall the results of German efforts to destroy the Anglo-French Entente, as they were disclosed in French reactions to the Kaiser's gestures at Tangier and at Agadir?

Fundamentally, Mr. Hughes's case rests upon the conviction of the imminent justice of the American contention. Japanese efforts to dominate the Far East are not only immoral, they constitute a deliberate invasion of the rights not alone of the Chinese, but of all the countries who would share in the Chinese markets and have a right to share therein. Not only has



PRINCE TOKUGAWA

Prince Tokugawa, President of the Japanese House of Peers, is chief of the Japanese delegation. With him will be associated Admiral Kato, Minister of the Navy, who is the real creator of Japan's naval policy, and Baron Shidehara is Tokio's Ambassador to the United States

body of American citizens as yet conceives to be possible, thinkable. It would be a simple matter for the United States and Japan, sitting together at table, or Japan and the United States sitting at table with the other great powers, to reach an adjustment which would eliminate the danger of war, the immediate danger, anyway, the eventual danger probably, provided the objective of the conference were to avoid war. I assume that it is axiomatic that neither nation desires war. But it is not so simple when one nation sets out to establish principles regarded by the other as inimical, not alone to its interests, but even to its existence.

Three years ago, on the eve of the Paris conference, there were not a few astute observers who perceived that there was a very grave peril incident to the fact that the conference was condemned to pursue two objectives, the making of peace with conquered nations and the creation of a world association to make war impossible for the future. On the horns of this dilemma the conference failed. It made a peace of victory, as it was bound to do, but that peace made, the hope of reconciliation for the future had vanished.

World Asked to Accept U. S. View As Basis of Arms Limitation

Now, at Washington two objectives are again sought. We are not approaching the Far Eastern question with the idea of making the best possible adjustment compatible with the establishment of the principle of the limitation of armaments. On the contrary, we are demanding that our view

of Britain's most noble families, who started his public career as private secretary to the Marquis of Salisbury forty-three years ago, cups his hand as he listens to a speech in the Houses of Parliament, but he still plays a vigorous game of tennis and would certainly qualify well up in the annual senior golf tournament at Apawamis. There could be no finer contrast than that between Lloyd George and Balfour, the former thick-set and powerful, the latter tall and a bit stoop-shouldered, the Premier most careful of dress, the ex-Premier the despair of his valet, who has served him a score of years; the Welshman an ideal of the masses, the Scotsman an ideal companion for the savants of the British Association. Still it is "David" and "Arthur" when they are together.

Balfour has not deserted his old loves—diplomacy, public service, philosophy, theology, chemistry, letters—but he has found a new one—the League of Nations. Some have regarded him as a cynic and the antithesis of an idealist. In the course of my duties in Europe I have met him many times in many places, and nothing could have been finer than his kindness, his frankness and simplicity. Balfour has a real interest and faith in the League of Nations. He is more cautious than his cousin, Lord Robert Cecil, but he shares all his faith in the good which can be accomplished through the league. At seventy-three Balfour goes to America to help in a work which is not unlike that which has occupied so much of his time in Geneva in recent months. Balfour has real affection for America and Americans. He will enjoy his visit as much as will Lloyd George.

The early life of Senator George Foster Pearce, the Minister of Defense, who will represent Australia, closely parallels that of Lloyd George. The Australian delegate is seven years the



ADMIRAL KATO

of the right solution in the Far East shall be accepted as condition antecedent to disarmament. We are asking Japan and the rest of the world to accept our principles, our point, three this time instead of fourteen, as the sole basis of peace and the incidental limitation of armaments.

To my mind the danger is all here, and the danger is very real. A decade ago it was impossible to persuade the mass of British people, or for that matter the majority of the British Cabinet, that Germany meant what she said, that if the British purpose to preserve the status quo in the world were adhered to in the end war would result. To-day it is equally impossible to obtain a hearing for the view that Japan, whatever minor concessions she may be willing to make to avoid a war which she does not seek and, after the German experience must regard with apprehension, will nevertheless choose battle rather than surrender if pressed too far.

Much reliance is placed upon the existence of a Liberal party in Japan and an apparent growing weariness with the chauvinism of the military party. But similar reliance was placed upon a similar element in Germany, which just as certainly existed. The trouble was that in 1914 the men in control of Germany were able to unify all elements by presenting the situation as an attack upon Germany, by picturing the war which was actually made in Germany as in reality a war of defense. And to-day, as every one in the slightest degree familiar with Japan knows, exactly the same propaganda is being carried on in Japan, presenting American policy as an assault upon Japan.

And no one can ever forget that the situation as between Japan and the United States is terribly complicated by the race issue, which inevitably creates a suspicion and a resentment in the breast of every Japanese.

To the public, to the American public, the Washington conference is, as its official title asserts, a conference to discuss the limitation of armament. But to the official world and to the Japanese it is a conference to discuss the limitation of Japanese ambition in the Far East. All limitation of armament is expressly declared to be contingent upon the restriction of Japanese purposes. But the restriction of Japanese purposes may entail war, is

Clash Is Believed Possible Unless Agreement Is Reached

Will Hughes Repeat Blunder of Wilson in Paris? Experts Ask; Principles and Facts Again in Judgment; Peacemaker Sought

sure to entail war if the restriction is pushed beyond a certain limit. This limit, moreover, falls far short of the total vindication of the twin principles of the "open door" and the integrity of China.

The whole art of diplomacy lies in the prevention of a collision. But no collision can be avoided if at the outset either party to a disagreement establishes himself upon an abstract principle. We can do business with Japan on the basis of bargain. We can perhaps prevail upon her to resign all claims upon political influence and economic special privilege within the Great Wall, provided we agree to recognize her special claims in Manchuria and Mongolia—but this is not the "open door" nor is it the integrity of China. And if Mr. Wilson earned enduring condemnation because he sacrificed principle, his principle, in Shantung, can Mr. Harding and Mr. Hughes hope for a more favorable verdict if they sacrifice their principle in Manchuria?

Again, Lloyd George has offered Mr. Harding and Mr. Hughes an easy way to dispose of the Anglo-Japanese alliance by the mere substitution of an Anglo-American-Japanese alliance. But since Mr. Wilson was condemned for his European alliances, can Mr. Harding and Mr. Hughes seek escape through the avenue of an Asiatic alliance? No. Every one knows that no alliance of any sort could earn the endorsement of the United States Senate or of the American people at the present moment.

Facts and Not Principles Will Lead to Agreement

The best informed Washington observer of Far Eastern affairs said to me recently: "The soundest hope for success in the forthcoming conference lies in a tacit avoidance of every question of principle. On questions of principle there can be no hope of agreement, but in the discussion of facts there will be disclosed many details in which accord can be reached easily. For the rest, where there is a disagreement the subjects should be referred to commissions which can sit long and report late. In this way much, enough, can be accomplished."

Yet it is a fact that up to the present moment the emphasis in Washington is being laid on principles, upon points. There is much, very much, which recalls Mr. Wilson and the days which preceded Paris. There is a suggestion that the result of the conference will be predicated upon the strength of the case presented by the United States. Now knowing the way Mr. Hughes has prepared his case, Washington would advise the Japanese to settle rather than to go to trial, if the Supreme Court or any other court were going to hear the matter. Japan would thus escape the humiliation of an adverse verdict already assured. But the Japanese will not present their case to the Supreme Court, nor do they need to accept any form of jurisdiction. They may be persuaded, they cannot be peacefully coerced. But nobody had yet succeeded in persuading the Germans of the moral weakness of their case in 1914, of the legal frailty of their argument. But the whole success of our policy in the Far East depends upon persuading the Japanese of the criminal folly of most of what they have done in the past decade and exhorting from them a firm pledge to go and sin no more.

It depends upon persuading them to accept the principles of the open door and the integrity of China, since we have predicated all our action upon obtaining that conversion. Failing that, limitation of armaments becomes irrelevant and war in the Far East well nigh inevitable. Or it depends upon persuading all the other great powers that they and we have equal interest in establishing these principles, which means alliance first and war later. But this, again, is very far from the limitation of armament.

I presume that 99 per cent of the people of the United States desire to see armaments limited, military and naval expenditure reduced. This is what the Washington conference means to them. But what percentage would be willing to endorse another war to establish the principles of the open door and the integrity of China? Yet just this is the real question before the forthcoming conference, and the limitation of armaments is in the background until it is disposed of.

Japanese Concessions Will Be Rigidly Limited

And there is not one man in ten who knows the Far East who will not concede that any attempt to establish both principles absolutely means war. Men differ as to what Japan will concede of what she has sought, and in part attained, in her war, but all agree that her concessions will in any event be rigidly limited and in no case will amount to fulfilling the three points of Mr. Hughes. Such is the Washington situation at the moment when the conference assembles.

There is another aspect of the situation which must be recognized. The fact that Mr. Hughes has taken a definite position, elected to stand on the three points, which involves a clear and open collision with Japanese policy, means that the control of the Washington conference in the nature of things will tend to pass to other hands. It will inevitably devolve upon some statesman of a third country to seek to avoid a break by finding a basis of compromise between America and Japan.

This would seem to indicate only one thing. Before he has been in Washington a week Lloyd George may dominate the whole situation. No principle troubles him. His objective is adjustment, his purpose and his necessity are to prevent a clash fatal to British as to all other interests. He will have to do again what he and Clemenceau did at Paris—namely, find some viable method of applying the American points.

More and more Washington is coming to believe that the real hope of even a moderately successful outcome of the conference will rest with Lloyd George. Unless he can find a basis of compromise between Mr. Hughes's points and the Japanese performances the Washington conference threatens to be a failure and just as certain a prelude to war as was the Algiers conference half a generation ago.

But this means that the agreement which emerges from the Washington conference will be as essentially a British solution as was that which came forth from the Paris conference, and every one knows the perils which this involves.

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Britain Sends a Family Party

By Arthur S. Draper

LONDON, October 29.

DAVID LLOYD GEORGE will lead a British family party into the Pan-American Building in Washington. In appearance, manners, thought and action no more varied group could have been selected to present British policy at the most momentous international gathering since the Paris Peace Conference. It is a delegation which is well qualified to represent the varied views of the largest empire since the world began. Its members speak the same tongue, but not always the same language. It contains men who, though not born in poverty, have struggled against tremendous odds to reach their present high station. No delegation contains men with greater imagination, greater knowledge of history, greater skill in the arts of diplomacy, greater power in analyzing public opinion and turning that knowledge to their advantage.

Why is the British Prime Minister making the long trip across the Atlantic at a time when his government is beset with domestic problems of the first magnitude? There are two reasons. Mr. Lloyd George regards the Washington conference as of profound importance to the future peace of the world. And, secondly, a visit to the United States strikes his imagination as an adventure second to none of the many he has attempted in the thrilling years of his long political life. The Washington conference was called to study the question of the limitation of armament, emphasis having been placed by President Harding himself on the fact that it was not a disarmament conference because the world was not prepared for that radical step at this stage.

But to the head of the British government the conference offers larger opportunities for great deeds. Limita-

tion of armament is a matter for experts; it is a secondary question. The political field is the one in which he thrives. It may be that he will venture where President Wilson failed, though none will say that the American Executive failed in his efforts to catch the imagination of the European masses. Wilson succeeded and then stayed on to see his power rapidly disappearing. Wilson appealed to all peoples. Lloyd George will be in America but a brief time, and he goes as an ambassador to America rather than to the world at large. It may be a bit distinction, but it is, nevertheless, an important one.

Lloyd George Resembles Roosevelt in Many Ways

Nobody in Washington can teach the "Welsh wizard" any tricks in the game of politics. In many ways he resembles Roosevelt, though the comparison cannot be drawn too closely. Lloyd George's long white hair, his broad shoulders, his winning smile appeal to the eyes of his audience. His homely comparisons, his dramatic though simple gestures, his quick sensing of the spirit of his audience, appeal to their ears and heart. Lloyd George gets to his hearers' hearts if not always to their minds. His bitterest enemies admit his cleverness as an orator. In the whole House of Commons there is no match for the Prime Minister when he is taking part in a debate or answering supplemental questions. At fifty-eight years, with seven abnormally crowded ones just behind him, his mind is marvelously clear, his strength unshaken, his imagination is as strong as ever.

Americans may see a change in the Arthur J. Balfour they knew during the war. He is now seventy-three years old, but if he has grown old in personal appearance he has grown younger mentally. This member of one

junior of the British Premier. In his early days he was regarded as an extreme radical. Starting work as a carpenter and joiner, he became a prominent union organizer and served eventually as the president of the Trade Union Congress. Like Premier Hughes, his early days were filled with work for the laboring class and he arose to power in Australia through energy and ability in furthering the aims of the Labor party. All his life Lloyd George has been a member of the Liberal party, but no labor agitator has advocated more radical measures than the present Premier. Once in power both have become a trifle more conservative, but they have lost none of their appreciation of the feeling of the masses.

Senator Pearce will have no easy task at Washington, because Australia has very definite views regarding the Far Eastern Problem, and those views do not always coincide with those of the British government. Frankly, Australians are worried over the future. An immense area, with a pathetically thin population of whites, Australia is a country which naturally regards the conflict of interests in the Pacific with no small measure of alarm. It can be asserted without fear of contradiction that Senator Pearce will play a large part in the Washington deliberations. His superior, Premier Hughes, could have no stronger understudy than Senator Pearce and no one better qualified to present and fight for Australia's case.

These two representatives appear with Sir Robert Borden and Stinavatra Sastri as members of the British Empire delegation, but any Americans who believe they will speak with the same voice as Lloyd George and Balfour make no allowance for the vastness of the empire and its variety of interests. It is unnecessary to comment here on Sir Robert Borden and the policy of Canada. If English interests were identical with those of Canada Sir Robert's task would be easier and Lloyd George could regard the Washington trip as a fine holiday. They are not. Mr. Sastri, who appears as the Indian delegate, represents

Soft-Collar Diplomacy Appears

Special Correspondence of The Tribune

LONDON, October 29.

SO-CALLED shirt-sleeve diplomacy has been followed by soft-collar diplomacy at 10 Downing Street. "Mickey" Collins is now as great a personality as was Georges Clemenceau a couple of years ago. The Sinn Fein delegations, which now meet around the famous cabinet table in the shadow of the ultra-dignified and conservative Foreign Office of His Majesty's government, is a sign of the times. Some new faces are seen in "The Mirrors of Downing Street."

David Lloyd George has been called a "political opportunist"; he prefers to be known as a real democrat. Consequently no surprise follows the announcement that the British Premier gave a warm handshake to the respectable "Mickey" when they came face to face for the first time under the roof of the historic Downing Street house. "Mickey" was sporting a soft collar and a genial smile, and the Prime Minister was wearing a morning coat, a crop of locks which had not been trimmed since an Inverness barber was imported to the wilds of Gairloch, and an expansive smile.

Even Mr. Lloyd George's political enemies will admit that he is a good sportsman and has a sense of humor. He is not a real democrat. Consequently no surprise follows the announcement that the British Premier gave a warm handshake to the respectable "Mickey" when they came face to face for the first time under the roof of the historic Downing Street house. "Mickey" was sporting a soft collar and a genial smile, and the Prime Minister was wearing a morning coat, a crop of locks which had not been trimmed since an Inverness barber was imported to the wilds of Gairloch, and an expansive smile.

Treasure Hidden Before Christ Hunted in Italy

ROME, Oct. 28.—The townspeople of Bisacque have forsaken their work and usual occupations to seek for a treasure which is supposed to have been hidden outside the town on the ancient Corato Road. No one knows of this hidden treasure until a few days ago, when a certain Signora Giustina Pasculli arrived from Egypt, where she had been living with her father for many years. When he died, a few weeks ago, he handed to his daughter an ancient manuscript sent him by Padre Giuseppe, an Italian monk in America.

On reading this document, after her father's death, Signora Pasculli discovered that it spoke of the hidden treasure near her native town. She immediately returned to Bisacque and, showing the document to the Mayor, asked for permission to excavate.

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