British Authorities Express Optimism Over Success of Naval Holiday Proposal

High British Officials Favor American Plan

Hope Naval Experts Will Be Able to Give Effect to Proposal; Opposition to Operating Small Plant

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 (By The Associated Press).—Hope that the British naval experts would be able to see their way clear to give effect to the American plan for a ten-year naval holiday was expressed to-day by high British authorities.

But until these experts have completed the examination of the American proposition and made their report to the British delegates, none of the latter feel that they can express any opinion as to its feasibility. Touching the proposition to maintain a small construction and repair plant, turning out perhaps one warship each year, it was admitted that in the British view there would be no real naval holiday. It is regarded as a technical matter to be considered by the experts, and it will be for them to decide.

The reported intention of the Japanese delegation to ask a higher ratio of naval strength compared with Great Britain and the United States than the 5 per cent fixed in the American plan gives added interest to statistical comparisons of the three countries.

Extent of Coast Line Factor

Extent of coast line in part determines the need of naval forces. The United States has 40,206 nautical miles of coast, as compared with 50,938 for the British Empire and 21,948 for Japan. On the basis of their existing and projected naval fleets, each country would have for each mile of coast line as follows: United States, 50 tons; British Empire, 40 tons, and Japan, 61.

Population might also be considered and the figures are:

United States, 118,832,000, including insular possessions; British Empire, 388,432,000, on the same basis, and Japan, 78,001,000.

The density of the populations of the three is:

United States, 31 persons per square mile; British Empire, 37 persons, and Japan, 299.

The comparison as to national wealth runs:

United States, $350,000,000,000; British Empire, $180,000,000,000, and Japan, $25,000,000,000.

Statistics for Six Powers

To convert some of these figures into a percentage of the average for the six powers, the British Empire, the United States, France, Italy, Japan and China, the following results are obtained:

The American population per square mile is 33 per cent of the average, per capita national wealth 312 per cent, foreign commerce per capita 161 per cent, expenditures on armed forces per capita 106 per cent.

The British Empire shows 42 per cent of the average in population per square mile, per capita national wealth 61 per cent, per capita foreign commerce 76 per cent, per capita expenditures for armed forces 45 per cent.

The Japanese figures against the average of population per square mile are 340 per cent, per capita national wealth 34 per cent, per capita foreign commerce 62 per cent, per capita expenditures on armed forces 98 per cent.

Scrap or Sink Vessels

Naval vessels designated for disarming under a limitation of armament agreement would have to be scrapped or sunk, naval experts declared to-day. No satisfactory method of utilizing naval vessels for any purpose other than that for which they were designed and built has ever been evolved, they said.

Hope of saving the discarded German fleet was voiced in Paris during the peace conference, these officers recalled, only to be thrown out as impractical. The German warships could not be used by other countries effectively on account of design and because of the unusual caliber of ammunition required.

Attempts to remodel the German fleet into merchant and passenger ships also failed, naval constructors said, and similar efforts to-day in connection with ships of the United States Navy were declared to be equally futile.

With the exception of certain light cruisers, which probably will not be scrapped, no naval ships now on the American list could be remodeled satisfactorily, in the opinion of naval officers.

Salvaging Costly Work

Salvaging is possible to a certain extent, it was said, but officers recalled that certain former ships of the navy were still on sale and that purchasers were scarce. An offer for immediate salvaging of the proposed discards is hardly to be hoped for by any commercial concern, officers said, because no existing concern has the facilities and labor to undertake so immense a proposition. In England the best salvage offer received is said to have been a five-year program, permitting the operators to work their men when other work was slack.

In efforts to salvage the old cruiser Tennessee, later the Memphis, wrecked at Santo Domingo a few years ago, a point was reached when, although the salvage amounted to several hundred dollars a day, the operation costs equaled the salvage and the project was abandoned.

British Limit Would Bar Bulk of U. S. Submarines

Vessel of 250 Tons Would Be Putting American Navy Back to the Days of the Grampus

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 (By The Associated Press).—British naval thought in Washington has suggested 250 tons as the limit of size for submarines, it was learned to-day. That would represent a type of craft not now existing in the first line of the American Navy. It would go back to the days of the Grampus, the Pike, the Viper and the Tarantula, now carried on navy lists as the A-3, A-5, B-1 and B-3.

These boats are the oldest in the navy and are included in the second line group more as a type of self-propelling, floating mine for harbor defense. The last two displace 145 tons on the surface and 170 submerged; the next oldest boat, the Narwhal, now the B-1, displaces 288 tons on the surface and 337 submerged.

From that point American second line submersibles run to the M-1, displacing 488 tons on the surface and 676 submerged; while in the first line group of ninety-four boats, the smallest is close to 500 tons on the surface, while the largest run up to nearly 1,000 tons surface. These figures do not include the group of fleet submarines of approximately 2,000 tons.

It is apparent at a glance, officers said, that the United States hardly can accept any such limitation, yet a submersible of the 800-ton type, similar to the ships with which the Germans did most of their work in the war, can cross the ocean and is not within the limitations of operations the British seek to establish.

Sartorial Stars of Conference Are Eclipsed by Head Waiter

Even Immaculate Cutaways and Spats of Diplomatic Secretaries No Longer Impress When Dignified Darkey Totes In Ice Water

From The Tribune's Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16.—The various volunteers who have enlisted in the ranks of journalism for the duration of the conference view with alarm the publication of official communiques. It is one thing to wax enthusiastic, meditative, speculative, analytical or emotional about a session or an interview, or even a printed speech, but the most ingenious writer is forced to strain his imagination to produce the expected copy from an announcement such as the following:

"Washington, Nov. —. For immediate release. The blank committee met to-day at blank o'clock in the Blank Building. There were present Messrs. Blank, Blank, Blank, Blank and Blank. Mr. (or General or Admiral) Blank presided. After considering various important matters the committee adjourned until blank p. m., November blank."

* * *

This system of communiques is almost as informative as was Mr. Balfour's first interview in Washington. Standing in the middle of a circle of reporters in his little apartment in H Street, the British chief delivered a learned and agreeable dissertation on the weather in America in 1917 and in 1921.

Gazing at the yellow carpet or at the ceiling, either rubbing his slender hands together slowly or fingering the lapels of his overlong frock coat, Mr. Balfour remarked on the very strange coincidence that when he first arrived in America four years ago by way of the Canadian border he found the St. Lawrence River frozen over and snow in the upper part of New York State, and this time "it was really quite remarkable—snow was lying on the ground from Canada all the way to Albany"——. Turning to his secretary, he added: "It was Albany, wasn't it, Peterson?" And the secretary cautiously confirmed this important news item. "Yes," Mr. Balfour continued, "snow lying on the ground all the way to Albany. Most remarkable! And today, upon my arrival here, I find it spring."

And, as he was about to proceed with the elaboration of this momentous topic, his secretary warned him that he was overdue at the White House, and Mr. Balfour apologized and hurried away.

* * *

Everything about Mr. Balfour is long. His frock coat hangs down below his knees. His trousers hang down over his heels. His tie is too long, and therefore tucked in under the edges of his collar. His hat is exceptionally tall. Even his speeches seem to stretch out over a great amount of space. But there is something appealing about Mr. Balfour in spite of his elongation. He calls to mind vividly a picture of the early New England schoolmaster, kindly, benevolent, absent minded, apparently insensible to many of the pranks the schoolboys are playing, but none the less able to size them up and make them behave.

* * *

If Mr. Balfour wears his clothes carelessly—his collar is very low and at least four sizes too large—he merely serves to bring into sharper relief the elegance of Baron de Cartier, Belgian Ambassador and head of the Belgian delegation. Immaculately groomed, with the most perfect fitting striped gray and black trousers, a short black morning coat braided like a cutaway, a large flowing four-in-hand, a tall collar with the tips turned out, and a general appearance of sartorial perfection, Baron de Cartier stands first in the race for the Beau Brummell prize. Perhaps the fact that he is the youngest looking of all the delegates adds distinction and gives him a lead which some of the other best dressers among the delegates must envy.

* * *

Even Baron de Cartier, in all his glory, however, is not like the many diplomatic secretaries who served as ushers, messenger boys and waiters at yesterday's meeting and throughout the whole session buzzed around like bees trying to look important, busy and bored all the same time. A diplomatic secretary without his cutaway and spats is like a plucked bird. They were all, therefore, newly pressed and cleaned, and fluttered around immaculately.

* * *

But just as the diplomatic secretaries eclipsed Baron de Cartier, so were they in their turn eclipsed when a large, dignified head waiter, his stomach out, his head well back and his face wearing that expression of inscrutable gravity which only the most experienced butlers assume, entered the arena bearing a large pitcher of ice water on a tray, and set it down on the table of the secretary general, Mr. Garrett. It was just about noon as he came in, dressed in his evening clothes with a white waistcoat, and even though the bilingual Mr. Camerlynck, interpreter of the conference, was orating in French at M. Briand and had the ring all to himself, the head waiter attracted the admiration of nearly every one by the stately manner in which ne made his entrance and exit.

Imperialism Peace Peril, Asserts Hill

(Continued from page one)

what is the international policy of the United States? President Harding has happily defined it as the pursuit of "That finer, nobler thing which no nation can do alone."

My mind keeps dwelling upon these words, because they seem to embody the real sentiment of the American people, as well as the purpose of the American government in calling this conference.

Is that finer, nobler thing the mere saving of expense? We might do that alone by simply abandoning our navy altogether or by reducing it without reference to other nations. Can we believe that the thing we aim to do is finer and nobler because by inviting other nations to do the same we retain some power of self-defense at a lower cost? Certainly this was not what was in the President's mind when he chose these words: "The world," he exclaimed, "demands a sober contemplation of the existing order." Was it not some modification of that existing order that was in his mind? How otherwise could the world be profited by the sober contemplation of "existing order"?

Sober Contemplation Necessary

Having centered upon itself the attention of the civilized world by a superb challenge to mutual sacrifice the conference now closes its door and goes into secret session. The committees will now consider the technical side of the naval question, in order to secure the continuance of the existing distribution of power, and will also examine the questions of the Pacific and the Far East. To these deliberations the public will not be, and for the moment, perhaps, should not be, admitted. Upon the attitude of the powers regarding the "existing order," however, depends all that is really important in the conference, and even the wisdom of the American proposal.

There are perhaps abundant reasons why the President and the Secretary of State should refrain for the moment from a formal expression of American policy regarding the status of the Pacific and Far Eastern questions, but it is timely for the American people to apply their intelligence to them. Exceptionally subject to the recurrence of great emotional waves that sometimes in a short interval of time carry them in opposite directions, and notably discontinuous in their attention to international affairs, the American people, beyond all others, need to follow the President's invitation to the sober contemplation of the existing order.

How necessary this attention is should be realized by the results of inattention when great matters were under consideration at the Paris conference. Then, with startling unanimity, the American people were hypnotized by a mere empty phrase. An imperative and heavily subsidized propaganda was instituted to force the Senate into immediate acceptance of the covenant of the League of Nations as the divinely inspired instrument for the salvation of mankind. It required two years of analysis and discussion before the American people could understand what this commitment would imply. Now it is plain enough that insistence upon a dogma held to be above examination lost to the United States at Paris the leadership of the world. There is at Washington a chance to regain it, and also a chance to lose it permanently, for the real question at issue now is whether the world is to be subject to economic imperialism, with its inevitable brood of conflicts, or governed by an understanding loyally accepted and effectively safeguarded between the great maritime powers, particularly as to the future destiny of the Pacific Ocean.

What is the existing order there?

We have seen the islands taken from Germany quietly divided between two imperial maritime powers, without the slightest deference to the wishes or the interests of the United States. We find those powers in a military alliance in which each binds itself to make war in common wherever its associate is engaged in war. We find one of them, under this protection, claiming a supreme and exclusive economic control over important and vital parts of the Chinese Empire. We learn of the construction of a new naval base at a point imperiled by no conceivable enemy. We are recommended to forego the fortification of any of the islands possessed by the United States on the ocean pathway to the Far East. When we open the map of Asia and regard it as a whole we discover that from Constantinople to Kiao-Chau there is not one nation that is capable of resisting the will of this imperial alliance. Empires have vanished from Europe, but Asia has become the joint possession of the two survivors in the world.

Has America any interest in this? Yesterday we were raising armies to combat imperialism. To-day we are assigning to an imperial alliance, if it is to endure, twice the naval strength which we shall possess, or in any contingency may be allowed to possess. If the existing order is unchanged the United States is renouncing its leadership and putting it into the hands of maritime powers that may at any moment declare a zone blockade on the Pacific Ocean that would shut off our trade with the whole continent of Asia.

If I have cited some agitating facts I have done so in no spirit of antagonism to either of these imperial powers. On the contrary, I recognize fully that the British Empire has accomplished in the world a great work of civilization. I cannot blame Japan for doing what every European nation has done in extending European domain over Asia, or for resisting the further encroachment of that policy by the European powers that menaced her very existence. She was right in resisting Russia and expelling Germany from Shantung, and until her national necessities are recognized and provided for, she has a right to claim, and will claim, that she is justified in following the path of armed penetration.

What the American people should demand is that imperial policy must be changed if the United States is to be counted upon not to oppose it with a different policy. There is no good reason for any military alliance on the borders of the Pacific. Military alliances contemplate war. There is no good reason for contemplating war. We should contemplate peace, and make arrangements for peace. In brief, there should be no political compact regarding the Pacific in which the United States, in consistency with its principles of constitutional democracy, cannot have an equal place; and upon this policy our government should straightway insist.

Such a policy would involve:

1—A pledge to maintain the territorial and administrative entity of China.

2—An abandonment of every form of military alliance in the Far East.

3—A recognition of the open door of trade on equal terms.

4—Respect for the equal sovereignty of all responsible states, with their right to choose and maintain their own form of government.

5—The formation of a permanent council, a virtual projection and continuance of the conference itself, in which every independent state bordering on the Pacific Ocean should have equal representation, and before which any injured nation could freely bring its case for consultation and advice. The safety of each lies in the interest and influence of all.

Dedicated to such policy the reduction of naval armament becomes more than a mere economic expedient. It would afford the basis of security and peace. Without an understanding, it would leave the "existing order" precisely what it is to-day.

The American people were indignant at the betrayal of China at Paris. It will not do to say that China is too weak and too divided to be deserving of consideration. All republics are weak and divided in their beginnings. We were ourselves weak and divided in what our historians have called the "critical period," when all Europe prophesied our downfall. Nothing saved us but our constitution, which placed the rights of man in the foreground and organized a means of defending them by legislative limitations and judicial supervision. These, if applied, can save the weakest democracy, if its neighbors will let it alone. And they will save civilization also, if internationally applied. Deep down under all the rubbish the real issue in this conference and in every other is the supremacy of constitutional democracy on the one hand and the domination of dynastic or economic imperialism on the other.

Hughes's Proposal Technical Alliance, Says the "Temps"

Binding Obligation Among Nations Concerned to Aid Each Other Against Future Attack, Paper Asserts

Special Cable to The Tribune

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PARIS, Nov. 16.—A binding obligation among the nations concerned to aid each other against future attack is seen by the semi-official "Temps" in the Hughes naval limitation proposal, which is analyzed in a long editorial to-night. The plan really amounts to a technical alliance, according to the paper.

"When powers agree among themselves to limit armament," says the paper, "they obligate themselves, if only technically, to succor any state among themselves which faces a danger which her limited armament does not permit her to avoid. There cannot be any agreed limitation to armament unless it hinges on obligations of the parties concerned to help each other."

Although not mentioning Japan, the "Temps" infers that she will be within her rights in calling on both Britain and the United States for aid in the event she is endangered by virtue of the American initiative, which Britain seconded.

"By reason of agreeing to disarm at the insistence of other powers each nation can say to the others, 'Help me to fight the danger which threatens me by reason of the limited power of my armament, which you invited me to be content with,'" the paper says.

The American and British governments are proceeding rather by a concrete solution than abstract doctrines, the editorial finds, and they perhaps do not see just now the usefulness of theoretical conception. "We will not say that the Hughes program is a triumph for England," it says, "because that would suggest that it is a disaster to some other nation."

The editorial points out the absolute difference between the Hughes and Wilson plans; Wilson, with the League of Nations, wanting a world-wide alliance, while the Hughes plan would avoid every alliance and at the same time have actual limitation of armament.

"But," it asks, "is Hughes avoiding alliances? What applies to naval disarmament theoretically applies to land disarmament. But the problem of continental warfare is infinitely more complex, and the result is terrifying consequences in the slightest error of appreciation." This, says the paper, reverts to the binding obligations among nations which collectively agree to limit armament—the obligation to succor in case of need.

Balfour Tossed Briand a Stone, Lauzanne Says

(Continued from page one)

there, how can an agreement be reached?

But there is something more serious. Even if they were both there, and if they signed an agreement, what value would it have? Is the Germany of Wirth a Germany in which one may have confidence? Is the Russia of Lenine an honorable nation on the word of which one may rely? Of course, Germany has on paper an army of only 100,000 men, but how long would it take to transform that army of 100,000 into an army of 1,000,000? Of course, Russia is tired of fighting. So we were told in 1918, when Russia abandoned the cause of the Allies. But, by a curious chance, Russia, who was tired of fighting the Germans in 1918, was not too tired to fight Poland in 1920, and Poland was very nearly overrun.

In any case, no control is needed for the execution of a treaty limiting the naval strength of the three great naval powers, or of any naval power. The control is easy. It is made by the public. One cannot hide a dreadnought, or a cruiser, or even a submarine. They must be built, armed, equipped, navigated. But far more difficult is the control of land armaments because those armaments escape the laws of publicity. Hundreds of cannon may be made in a country without even the people themselves having any knowledge of it. Poisonous gas may be manufactured without any one having heard of it. Machine guns may be hidden by thousands without any one being able to detect them.

Our friend David recently declared in the London House of Commons:

"If Germany arms herself anew we shall know it immediately."

Is that so? What did our friend David know about the armaments of Germany in 1914? What does he know to-day about the number of men that Bolshevist Russia could put in the field? What does he know on his own territory about the machine guns and the rifles at the disposal of the Irish Volunteers? What does any one of us know about the armaments of the people in the Balkans, of the Greeks, of the Kemalists?

Those are only a few among the questions raised by limitation of land armaments. There are many others. If M. Briand has to present them all, the performance will be long at the Memorial Hall. It would be wise to begin earlier. We run the risk otherwise to be there still at tea time.

There is an argument which should really appeal to any American of good sense: "Since you are taking so many precautions when there are only three of you and when no one of you has ever been invaded by one of the others, you can readily see what precautions we are bound to take, we who have been invaded four times in a little more than a century by the same people."

The words of Roosevelt will remain eternally true: "A wise man (or nation) may be caught once. Only fools are caught twice." We have been caught four times. What fools!

We should like if possible not to be caught a fifth time.

U. S. to Make Arms Main Issue, East Secondary, Says Simonds

Hughes Will Not Imperil Program by Double Offensive; Japan Expected to Offer Proposal to Adjust Pacific Problem

By Frank H. Simonds

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16.—Disagreement over the Far Eastern question will not be permitted to distract attention from, or lessen the value of, the demonstration resulting from Mr. Hughes's dramatic naval proposal of last Saturday. This is the key of the situation at the moment when the conference, through committee, takes up Far Eastern problems.

There had been a general expectation that the United States in public session would lay down a program in the Far East as drastic as that in the matter of the limitation of naval armaments. This was based primarily on the knowledge that Mr. Hughes had very strong convictions as to the necessity of profound changes in international dealings with China and particularly with Japanese policy in recent years.

In practice, however, it was impossible for the United States to undertake to present any such program in the Far East and particularly in China, where the United States never has asserted any political, military or exclusive economic claims.

Had Mr. Hughes on Tuesday supplemented his arms utterance by the presentation of a drastic Far Eastern program he would, in fact, have served an ultimatum upon the Japanese. Compromise with that would have been difficult. Not only would this have been the case, but the gain which had been made instantly in the disarmament proposal might have been lost.

It seems perfectly clear now that Mr. Hughes has adopted the military maxim which warns against pursuing two major offensives at the same time. Unquestionably, he is going to seek for as much compromise as is possible, as much adjustment as is possible in the Far East. There are a large number of questions in which agreement is possible; there are a few in which no agreement seems now within the realms of possibility. To insist upon a complete program would still wreck the whole conference. Therefore Washington expects that Mr. Hughes will do the best possible in the Far East, while continuing to consider the disarmament phase as vital.

A forcible reminder of the difficulties in the pathway of such a course was supplied by the Chinese proposal submitted to the Far East Committee of the conference to-day. My Japanese friends describe this as another bombshell. Apparently, but perhaps only apparently, they were taken unawares.

The first response of the Japanese to the Chinese proposal will be an insistence that it may be made specific and definite, since the Japanese allege that it is vague, indefinite and meaningless in its present form. Once the Chinese proposal is reduced to such terms Japan will consider the question as to whether she is to make a counter proposal or not.

The present view of the Japanese is that the United States will not submit a full program in the Far East, but will withhold her hand until the Japanese, Chinese and perhaps British programs are presented, and then endeavor to find a basis of agreement so far as such basis is possible.

China is ably represented here, and China's policy is bound to fight against any final or temporary adjustments in the Far East which are made at the expense of Chinese rights or claims. Beyond all else, China is not ready to make any concession in the matter of Manchuria, and the Far Eastern question centers there.

But in the midst of all the bewildering and conflicting reports of to-night, the fact remains patent that Mr. Hughes has deliberately made this an armament conference. The speech which he delivered on Saturday was prepared two weeks in advance. It was not in any particular communicated to any other nation, and Mr. Hughes himself was under no illusions as to the fact that in disposing of the Far Eastern question in a sentence he had relegated it to a minor part in the conference.

In the nature of things, since for a considerable time now the adjustment of armaments remains a matter for the experts, we are bound to have Far Eastern rumors and gossip dominating all of the conference and of the press reports. But in the face of all these reports, those who are best informed still adhere to the belief that no conflict of interests in the Far East will be permitted to obscure or deflect the main purpose, which is to achieve a measure of naval disarmament, to give the world as a beginning an international amity and confidence, a world conference which, at least within limits, is a complete success and from which the participating nations will emerge, having left behind them much of the distrust and suspicions which they brought to Washington.

Unmistakably what is hoped for now is that Japan herself will voluntarily take the lead in the matter of the Far East and, imitating Mr. Hughes's method of last Saturday, make proposals for regularizing the position of all the great powers with respect to China. Such a proposal, carrying with it certain manifestly necessary concessions on her part, unquestionably would establish a basis for discussion and for conclusions. In reality, the situation to-night seems to be up to Japan. Mr. Hughes will make no demands of Japan. But the initiative on the part of Japan might transform the whole Far Eastern discussion, and such an initiative is expected by a few and hoped for by many.

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No Army Limit Plan Will Be Offered by U. S.

None Expected From Others; Question To Be Referred to Committee When It Is Brought Up by Briand

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 (By The Associated Press).—The United States does not contemplate offering any definite program for limitation of land forces during the conference here, and, so far as the American delegates and their military advisers have been able to ascertain, none of the foreign delegations has prepared proposals for army reduction.

The question of army reductions will be broached in open conference by Premier Briand of France. He has already intimated that France would urge an army for herself sufficient for protection against her neighbors, and the whole question of armies is then expected to be referred to the armament committee of the whole.

The American army already is as small as is consistent with national safety and domestic needs, and Great Britain, it was said, was in a similar position, her army not admitting of any reduction.

Per Capita Military Costs

The most authoritative data thus far available indicate that the per capita military expenditures for purely army purposes of the five countries is as follows:

Continental United States, $3.22; Great Britain (mother country), $12.35; France (excluding dependencies), $22.52; Italy, $6.70, and Japan, $3.38. Including figures for possessions or dependencies of each, the per capita is: United States, $2.89; British Empire, $1.71; France, $10.24; Italy, $6.34, and Japan, $2.42.

Actual expenditures of the five powers on the armies, exclusive of the air service, on a current basis, are approximately as follows: United States, $343,000,000, being the total for the army and fortifications for the fiscal year 1922; British Empire, $755,000,000; France, $933,000,000 including $54,000,000 in addition to the budget for the army of the Levant; Italy, $245,000,000, and Japan $189,000,000, including a special allotment of $50,000,000 for the Siberian expedition.

Pay Scale for Privates

The pay scale for privates a day for men of the lowest grade is as follows for each country: United States, $1; United Kingdom, $0.69; France, $0.05; Italy, $0.04; Japan, $0.06. The ration costs a man a day runs about like this: United States, $0.40; United Kingdom, $0.51; France, $0.33; Italy, $0.69, and Japan, $0.17.

There was much speculation among the conferees whether France would propose or hint at reported desires for definite assurances from America and Great Britain for protection against German aggression, in consideration for an agreement to make radical reduction in the size of the French army. If so, there was high authority for the statement that she would be doomed to disappointment. The American position was said to be against any treaty, compact or agreement, formal or informal, assuring France that America would go to her aid in case of outside aggression.

In this position the American delegates were said to have received assurances of support from Great Britain, and Canada also was said to be ready to adhere to the American view in this regard.

Admiral Bridge Praises Harding Above Bismarck

LONDON, Nov. 17 (Thursday).—Admiral Sir Cyprian A. G. Bridge, noted naval authority, in a letter to "The London Times" proclaims President Harding as one of the great men of modern times, "enormously superior to Bismarck, and superior even to the illustrious Cavour." He declares that the American plan for limiting navies is statesmanlike because it is equitable and practicable, and points out that if it is intended that the American navy shall eventually equal that of Great Britain it is almost a concession, since, had the American 1916 program been maintained "we should either have been surpassed in naval strength or been compelled to expend our latest expensive building program."

Admiral Bridge concludes: "President Harding has done more than any one man to save civilization from destruction by war, or, even if there is no war, from bankruptcy, due to the increasing pecuniary cost of naval forces."

Knickerbocker Show Horses

"I wish we'd been entered. I'd like some of those lovely blue ribbons," said Winnie, the Knickerbocker Horse. "You'd look pretty in them, all right," comforted team mate Ned—"with that lovely gray coat of yours." "You're saying it with flowery language, Ned," chuckled Winnie, "and I'll bet you my next lump of sugar that the Knickerbocker teams entered will win." "Anyway, our Company makes all of our harness, so that's dress-up enough for us," said Ned.

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