

Secretary Hughes Paves the Way for International Amity

Directness of Tactics Opens Road to Peace

Strategy in Offering Naval Plan First Prepares the Powers to Meet Other Issues With Friendly View

By Frank H. Simonds
Opening days of the Conference on Limitation of Armaments two facts emerge, two facts which are unmistakable. Already we have had a period of deflation and of precision. Deflation which reduces to comprehensible and possible dimensions the program of the conference, precision which gives boundaries to the discussion on the question of naval limitation.

To Mr. Hughes more than to any one else is due the fact that despite the excessive demands of the days preceding the opening of the conference, demands voiced most feverishly and even hysterically by some of the foreign correspondents, the atmosphere of Washington in the first days has been sharply contrasting with that of Paris. There is something in the very dry, unemotional, prosaic but none the less impressive manner in which the Secretary of State makes public utterance which almost without being appreciated by his audiences has given the dominant tone to the conference itself.

Remembering Paris and all that the whole world suffered as a consequence of the boundless expansion of expectation, one must feel that Mr. Hughes has already performed a very great service in bringing the discussion from the clouds to the pavement in the opening hours. In the days which have been marked by the beginning of the conference I have encountered Mr. Hughes several times; the last occasion was a few hours after he had delivered his address at the first session. On each of these occasions he has emphatically asserted that the conference was to have facts, to deal with facts and the decisions to be reached would be based upon facts.

Now, when one considers how little reference there has been to facts in much of the discussion which has preceded the conference; when one realizes that the country has been deluged by impossible forecasts of what was to be done, the service of the Secretary of State is hardly to be exaggerated, the service of deflation. It is easy to understand why Europeans, and particularly Europeans who have come here still under the shadow of conditions in their own countries, should expect and hope to see the agenda of the Washington conference extended beyond the narrow limits of questions which, after all, must seem to them parochial, but it is not less clear, as Paris proved, that in this direction lies ruin.

Statesmen Warn Arms Limitation Only Possible

In addition to deflation, there was precision. For many weeks, with increasing intensity, the debate has raged over the relative importance of Far Eastern and disarmament issues. The people of the United States have seen the conference as one for disarmament, despite the "warnings" of their statesmen that disarmament was impossible and only a measure of limitation possible. The Administration has held to the view that before disarmament or limitation must come the solution of the Pacific problems. The result has been the stimulation of pessimism and the increase in the danger of an American-Japanese conflict.

But at the opening session of the conference Mr. Hughes deliberately elected to make the question of naval armament the chief business of the gathering. By his own words he assigned the Far Eastern issues to a relatively subordinate place, and as a consequence the success or failure of the conference itself will be measured henceforth by the achievement in the field of armament limitation, which in practice means in the department of naval armament.


This decision was a fitting answer to a Japanese maneuver which just preceded the first session. By this maneuver Admiral Kato had at one time disclosed a Japanese purpose to go far beyond general expectation in the field of naval reduction and also the evident Japanese wish to make the question of arms, and not of Asia, the main business of the conference. Mr. Hughes' opening program of reductions was a startling answer to Kato which, while permitting the Japanese representative to hope for success in the direction of Asia, pinned him down at once in the matter of naval holidays.

Arms and not Asia, then, will be the conspicuous problem of the conference, and in that direction, it seems to me, lies the best promise of peace. Looking at the conditions and circumstances of the conference as they unfolded themselves in the first days of the gathering, what then are the reasonable expectations for results that the world may hold?

Substantial Naval Reductions Reasonably May Be Expected

First of all, a very substantial reduction in the size of the world's navies, even if there be modifications of Mr. Hughes' initial proposal. Doubtless in due time Japan will press for concessions on our part, which will envisage dismantling existing fortifications and refraining from further fortifying in the Pacific, that is on the western side. We may expect many technical counter-propositions, but these will be only technical.

In the same way we may correctly infer, I think, that the broad general lines of Mr. Hughes' proposal were



Hughes Balfour Briand Tokuyama Schanzer

"The Big 5" of The Washington Conference

already foreseen by the British; it may even turn out that a British declaration in the matter of the Philippines will supplement their previous announcement of a purpose to establish a naval base at Singapore. This declaration would, in all probability, take the form of a proclamation of a British Far Eastern policy which would commit British sea power to the maintenance of the status quo in the South Pacific, not as a detail in an Anglo-American partnership but as a circumstance in British policy.

For obvious reasons Australia and New Zealand would view with unceasing apprehension any Japanese advance southward, such as the seizure of the Philippines would involve. For the British government to declare that the maintenance of the Philippines under their present sovereignty would be a portion of British Far Eastern policy would not only have a profound effect upon Japanese plans, but would go far to meet the apprehensions of our naval authorities. Reduction of American sea strength while the defense of the indefensible Philippines is one of the duties of our navy must arouse much professional opposition.

Looking at the disarmament question from the broader aspect once more, it is plain why there is the soundest of reasons for giving it the first place. And this reason is found in the fact that the statesmen of the world will in this field have only to preach to the converted. The domestic situation, social as well as financial, of the three great powers really concerned—namely, Britain, Japan and the United States—is such that popular

opinion not only favors but demands that relief from taxation which can only be found in armament holidays.

Question of Far East Is Not Clear to British and U. S. Public

Now it is not equally true that in the United States and in Britain the public grasps the meaning and the dangers of the Far Eastern question. For the principles of the "open door" and the "integrity of China" there is, as I have pointed out frequently, no such popular understanding as there is for the policy of the limitation of armaments. The very principles are difficult of translation, hard to make clear to masses of people, and having at bottom some of the same inherent weakness as marked the Fourteen Points at Paris.

And the aftermath of the Paris conference proved that there was little profit in legislation which sought revolutions and transformations, for which the public of the various nations were not in the least prepared. Disarmament or limitation of armaments is a fact which the world public has grasped—a fact, in Mr. Hughes' sense. The Far Eastern question is a problem—grave, certain to have serious consideration—but as yet a problem for which no acceptable solution exists in the minds of the people of Japan or the United States. Therefore, Mr. Hughes begins with naval armaments. And this beginning insures agreement on the first matter in hand, which will certainly permit the discussion of other questions in a better spirit.

Accepting, then, as almost inevitable now, in view of what has already hap-

pened, that the Washington conference will make progress, great and almost undreamed-of progress in the direction of the limitation of naval armaments, what then is the second promise?

Obviously we must deal with the Far Eastern question. Limitation of armaments will reduce taxation, improve local and domestic conditions; it will tend to prevent unrest at home, but it will not and can not prevent war. Yet it is well to perceive at once that a question so complicated and involved as the Far Eastern cannot be solved at a single world conference. We are not going to solve the problem and we shall probably settle only a few of its many dangerous interrogations. Perhaps the greatest gain that might be made here would be the creation of that kind of spirit which would aid mightily in solutions in the future and at other conferences, for there must be other conferences, perhaps one at Tokio to continue what was begun in Washington.

Much Depends Upon Manner Far East Case Is Presented

Now, in the Far Eastern discussion which must come all will depend upon which manner in which the American case is presented and the degree to which we are disclosed as seeking adjustment, not striving to impose abstract principles. And my judgment is that the first real step will be the fixation on the map of that unit which will henceforth be called China for the purposes of international agreement. This China will, I believe, include the eighteen provinces, but recognize paramount economic and perhaps political privileges to Japan in Manchuria.

As to the eighteen provinces, with the possibility of some exception in the matter of Shantung, I believe we shall see the United States, Britain and Japan, which are most concerned, able to reach an agreement which will include the reaffirmation of the principles of the integrity of China and the open door. Shantung will raise difficult and precipitate debates. It may be that Japan will be able to maintain there claim to special privileges so far as the railway is concerned.

At all events, aside from the problems presented by the Shantung Railroad and certain mines, it seems to me not only entirely possible, but quite likely, that the United States, Great Britain and Japan may be able to find some practicable formula which will contain a mutual recognition of equal rights of all concerned.

Against that, it seems to me, Japan may expect to receive from the United States and Great Britain definite recognition of special interests in the Manchurian area which will constitute economic control and in practice lead to political supremacy.

Since the problem of Siberia is one over which there is an unmistakable division of opinion in Japan itself, there is no prospect that Japan will show herself insistent upon special privileges. I am impressed by the fact that on the military side Japanese soldiers hesitate to commit their country to a policy which would invite inevitable conflict with a resuscitated Russia, while the whole Japanese commercial world perceives that the so-called Pacific penetration of eastern Siberia has been accompanied by a de-

crease in Japanese trade and a costly expansion in anti-Japanese feeling.

Translation of Vague Terms Would Remove Suspicion

Now, beyond these rather meager specific details there is inevitably one major gain which of itself would give enduring value to the work of the Washington conference. We are dealing with dynamite. No one can mistake that. In the Far East a collision between the United States and Japan has seemed not only possible but, at least to the European observers, increasingly probable. Japan has viewed the course of the present Administration in calling the Washington conference with suspicion, apprehension and a good deal of more or less restrained hostility. To the Japanese mind the United States seems to be undertaking a policy designed to restrict the Japanese future, and this has been the more true because the United States policy has been disguised by such vague terms as "The Open Door" and "The Integrity of China." A translation rather than a definition of these terms, together with a recognition on the part of the United States of Japanese freedom of action in those areas which I have specified, it seems to me, would do much to remove this suspicion and apprehension.

In the last analysis, it is not the limitation of armaments—it is the removal of mutual suspicion—which will contribute to make peace. And if the United States and Japan can adjust or reconcile their views in the Pacific the greatest present peril to world peace will be eliminated.

There remains still another question, yet another problem still more complex. I find that almost without exception my English friends who have come here to the conference hope to see some kind of Anglo-American association in the Pacific, and more exactly some kind of Anglo-American-Japanese partnership looking toward the rehabilitation of Chinese finances. Needless to say, political action would almost inevitably follow such combination. In the British mind this supplies an easy and perhaps the best avenue of escape from the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which has become the target of American criticism.

It is easier to believe that the Washington conference will find a practicable plan for naval disarmaments and a satisfactory means for removing Japanese-American friction and distrust than it is to believe that any kind of international association in China can be agreed upon.

British Cling to Desire For League Substitute

This brings one to consideration of the question of an association of nations in a far larger sense. No one can have read the articles of H. C. Wells and other English writers without feeling that they all believe that the Washington conference has as its primary duty not the consideration of questions like those of naval armaments or of Pacific rivalries, but those larger problems involved in some larger reorganization of international relations. Our English friends still cling if not to the specific fact of the

Poincare Says France, Unassisted, Must Make Germany Pay

From a Special Correspondent

PARIS, November 1.
FRANCE must depend on herself and herself alone to force payment by Germany of the tremendous sum she owes France. So says Raymond Poincaré, Senator and former President, in a printed attack on the policy of the Briand government, which he declares is in effect depending upon everything but force—the only way—and is generally too easy on Germany.

Poincaré contends that Germany is pulling the wool over the eyes of the nation which came out of the war victorious. Vigorously opposing the recent rapprochement policy of the Briand government, he advocates a system based on acts rather than kind words. He considers the committee on guarantees and the reparations commission, which are supposed to see, that Germany makes her payments, futile and absolutely incapable of any results so long as they have their hands tied behind their backs and have not the power to go to Berlin and dictate terms, taxes and conditions with a strong army behind them at their back and call.

Germany is rich and prosperous, says the Senator, who believes that if the case is properly handled the mark will go up and France will be repaid. This question of exchange must be regulated before all others, he declares, or Germany will keep printing marks wholesale in order to buy gold, and in the end, as the mark keeps going down, France will have difficulty collecting. No matter what taxes Germany places on the country, these will never bring anything but worthless paper marks into the government treasury.

Poincaré attacks the present administration strongly because it raised the economic sanctions from the Rhine frontier before an agreement had been reached on the operation of the regulation forbidding Germany to make commercial discriminations against the Allies. At this very time, he adds, General Nollet, in charge of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control in Berlin, said that Germany had not disarmed, and "The London Times" announced that Germany still had 800,000 fully equipped soldiers on foot.

Versailles Treaty Leaves France "Glorious and Ruined"

Poincaré brands the Versailles Treaty as a Pyrrhic victory for France, which left her both "glorious and ruined," and while Germany is perfectly willing for France to keep the "ruin" she is doing her best to dispute the "glory," which is the small compensation France has gained for her great sacrifices. When the Supreme Council sent its

ultimatum threatening to occupy the Ruhr, the Allies showed such determination that to save Germany from being invaded Wirth induced a feeble majority to support him. He received 220 votes against 172, while the Reichstag has 469 members. Poincaré thinks that is a proof that Germany will do everything in her power to avoid meeting her obligations, that she will profit and has profited by all the concessions she made to her, but she has and will persistently refuse to submit to any of the conditions imposed.

France has made too many concessions to Germany already, insists the former President, but Berlin harps in a loud tone that if concessions are not made Wirth will fall, dragging the Republic with him. The Allies are dancing to this tune in order to avoid imperialism or Bolshevism in Germany, he says, and sarcastically adds: "If there is any danger to the Republic of the Reich then by all means France should immediately bow humbly to Germany's wishes."

Poincaré writes in the Paris "Matin": "Poor Germany! She has just obtained the lifting of the economic sanctions for the end of this month and the opening of the Reichstag. It is another gracious act on the part of the Allies due to the cleverness of the Reich. When we have made a hundred of these concessions we will make a heavy cross of them to carry on our backs.

"But didn't Mr. Wirth declare that each time we refused to satisfy his wishes he was exposed to the attacks of his adversaries and his governmental authority was menaced? And isn't it necessary that we be conciliatory and even generous to save Mr. Wirth and with him the German Republic, the supreme hope of universal peace? The economic sanctions are, therefore, suppressed even before time was taken to come to an agreement with the Reich on the functioning of the surveillance committee, which is to prevent discriminations contrary to the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty and prejudicial to the interests of France.

"We will soon know how republican Germany, which resembles imperial Germany like a twin, will recompense us for this new politeness. In the mean time we have only to open our eyes to see where she is trying to lead us. With the pretext to better a defective treaty the Allies have not ceased to make it worse. After a whole series of more and more mediocre transactions, at the beginning of May the Supreme Council drew up an ultimatum and a method of payments, which should, they told us, be the very limit of the concessions.

everything was ready for the occupation of the Ruhr, and the spirit of wisdom had immediately descended upon Germany. On April 28, Mr. Stresemann (German Minister, who has since been put out of the government) made most amiable speeches about us. He said he was in accordance with the majority of the People's party (Volkspartei) for a policy of rapprochement with France and to insist that Germany make the necessary sacrifices to properly execute the provisions of the treaty. The peasants would have to accept mortgages on their lands; the laborers would have to give more of their time; capital would give up a portion of its profits. Mr. Stresemann, who as the head of many corporations, is well informed of their customary maneuvers, indignantly denounced the egoism and ill-will of the important industries, of the fortune of Hugo Stinnes and of the profits of the Badische Anilin. The ultimatum was sent on May 5. What have we achieved by it so far?

Germany Has Formidable Army Equipped and Ready
"First of all, at the very moment the economic sanctions were suppressed, the International Commission of Control, headed by General Nollet, stated solemnly that Germany had not disarmed, and 'The London Times' gave a cry of alarm certifying that Germany had managed to preserve an army of not less than 800,000 men on foot.

"By Article III of Paragraph C of the ultimatum Germany had been ordered to execute, without reservations or delay, the measures concerning military, naval and aerial disarmament. About which the 'Berliner Tageblatt,' in a semi-official paragraph, says: 'By right, the demands of the Entente are not justified, in fact, they are inexecutable. It has cost us a thousand efforts to establish our police. It is the backbone of the German republic. Without it, the republic would fall.' It is always, you see, the same story; and since we must save the republic, how could we not consent to save its backbone?

Work Against Reparations Is No Less Dangerous
"For the reparations, the work which is being carried on against the ultimatum is neither less subtle nor less dangerous than for the disarmament. Concerning another Versailles treaty, that of 1783, Michelet said: 'France kept the glory and the ruin.' This judgment was perhaps not very equitable, for the treaty of September 3, 1783, had not only given us glory; it had effaced the memories of the Seven Years' War, gave back several colonies to France, revived our pres-

ence in Europe and forced England to recognize the independence of the United States. But for all that we have gained, the peace of to-day would define too truly the words of Michelet. Furthermore, Germany, while willing to leave us ruin, is already trying to dispute the glory we have gained.

"In the note, which I mentioned higher up, the German government agreed to fulfill, without reservations or conditions, her obligations, such as they were established by the reparations commission, and to establish all the measures of guarantees prescribed. After having fixed the German debt at a figure very inferior to the damages (at 132 billions) the reparations commission has again attenuated the consequences of its decision by a state of payments which would have the effect of substituting bonds for payments in money and a nominal capital for a real capital. But, after saving the Ruhr by a pretty bow to the Allies, Germany has begun, against the ultimatum which she had provisionally accepted, a systematic campaign, which was at first timid and then became very bold. It is not only papers like the 'Taegliche Rundschau,' which repeat daily, 'We must not execute the ultimatum, not only because the execution is quite impossible, but because it presupposes guilt on the part of Germany, and she is not guilty.' It is Mr. Stresemann who, forgetting his speech of April 28, reproaches Mr. Rathenau for having made a flagrant political and economic misrepresentation when he affirmed that the conditions of the ultimatum could be realized; and Mr. Stresemann adds: 'We must get rid of the ultimatum and, above all, shut up the people who claim that it is possible to execute it!'

"The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Simons, declared at Essen: 'The payments demanded by the Allies cannot be made; and, in all events, Germany will not participate in the reparations if they do not leave her the left arm of her economic body, Upper Silesia. The entire Upper Silesia should belong to Germany.'

"And finally Mr. Rathenau himself says at Munich: 'The integral execution of the ultimatum would hurt the whole world more than it would us.'

But no matter what taxes she may impose in the future, it will never bring her anything but paper marks. We cannot accept paper marks. Germany makes as many as she wants, and she would have a nice time debasing them in printing as many as we would ask her for. As long as the mark doesn't go back to par, we are forced to demand gold or foreign specie. The result is that it is necessary for the German government to have enough paper marks on hand to buy sufficient gold to pay us the annuities which she owes after deducting the value of the supplies she furnishes for reconstruction. But the more paper she puts out the more the mark will go down and the balance of the German budget will be upset between the provisions they make for receipts and for expenses. This will necessitate a new issue, which will bring about another lowering of its value, and so it will continue.

"And, however, the real wealth of Germany is immense, and it is growing every day, and the signs are increasing of a growing prosperity. The Reich therefore soon will be solvent, the mark will go up, exportation will increase, gold will come back into the country, and we will finally be paid, if we want it, with obstinacy and with method.

"The difficulties they put up are only temporary. Germany is making fun of us when she says they are permanent. The London Conference created, to go with the Reparations Commission, a Committee of Guarantees to see that Germany makes the proper payments. But if Germany is not disarmed, the committee is completely useless. It even has its arms cut off. It has the theoretic right to verify, the German resources, the amount of her exports, the fiscal and customs receipts. But the committee is forbidden to intervene in the administration of the Reich; it has no means of enforcing its wishes, and if Germany persists in depreciating the mark, in sparing her citizens from heavy taxes, and in duping her debtors, the committee has not the power to interfere with this comedy.

it; but no matter what taxes she may impose in the future, it will never bring her anything but paper marks. We cannot accept paper marks. Germany makes as many as she wants, and she would have a nice time debasing them in printing as many as we would ask her for. As long as the mark doesn't go back to par, we are forced to demand gold or foreign specie. The result is that it is necessary for the German government to have enough paper marks on hand to buy sufficient gold to pay us the annuities which she owes after deducting the value of the supplies she furnishes for reconstruction. But the more paper she puts out the more the mark will go down and the balance of the German budget will be upset between the provisions they make for receipts and for expenses. This will necessitate a new issue, which will bring about another lowering of its value, and so it will continue.

"The difficulties they put up are only temporary. Germany is making fun of us when she says they are permanent. The London Conference created, to go with the Reparations Commission, a Committee of Guarantees to see that Germany makes the proper payments. But if Germany is not disarmed, the committee is completely useless. It even has its arms cut off. It has the theoretic right to verify, the German resources, the amount of her exports, the fiscal and customs receipts. But the committee is forbidden to intervene in the administration of the Reich; it has no means of enforcing its wishes, and if Germany persists in depreciating the mark, in sparing her citizens from heavy taxes, and in duping her debtors, the committee has not the power to interfere with this comedy.

"The first precaution to take, if we do not want our debtor to enrich herself at our expense, is to give such powers to the Committee of Guarantees as are necessary, or backing the Reparations Commission with force so that it can exercise on all the wealth and resources of Germany the privilege that Article 248 of the treaty established as a guaranty. A right destitute of sanctions is but an imperceptible shadow. It is up to us to see that we are paid, as it is up to us to force Germany to disarm."

"Well, if the statesmen and the diplomats and the legislators of this world, instead of following their present course, would go out in the country, lie under the trees, watch the leaves fall and the clouds go sailing by the laws of supply and demand would probably do the rest."

Pitfalls That Menaced Paris Parley Avoided

Simonds Says Results of Far Eastern Discussions, Depend Upon Manner in Which Case Is Presented

League of Nations, at least to some more or less definite substitute for it which would have the same general character.

Now, I do not believe as a result of what has happened in the opening days that anything of the sort is likely to happen. Washington shows no inclination at the present time to undertake responsibilities on the Hoang-ho which the United States rejected on the Rhine. Specific commitments in China would in the last analysis involve the necessity of sending soldiers to the Far East and becoming, in a sense, the guarantor of the frontiers of China.

Nothing that has happened suggests that Mr. Hughes has any intention of reviving, so far as this country is concerned, the project of the League of Nations or of undertaking so far as the Pacific is concerned to create some new association resembling even remotely that which has its headquarters at Geneva. Much less evidence has been disclosed of any inclination on his part at any stage of this conference to propose American adhesion to the Geneva body. The danger of any such experiment on the side of domestic politics is too patent to be mistaken.

To sum up, in the opening days it seems to me that Mr. Hughes, with the sanction and the support of the President, has undertaken to put the disarmament circumstance to the fore because it is one on which agreement is not only possible but extremely likely, and in the second place he contemplates discussions over the Pacific which will in the main consist of an exploration of the regions in which agreement can be found and a measurably generous recognition of Japanese claims in regions which will be in dispute.

How to deal with China? How to remove the Anglo-Japanese Alliance without consenting to become a partner in a larger association which imposes foreign commitments? These are questions which remain to be answered and for which no present answer is discoverable.

Hughes Reverses Order of the Paris Conference

A real harm is done to the cause of peace, it seems to me, by the constant emphasis which is laid upon precisely those definite objectives the pursuit of which brought the Paris conference down in ruin so far as its American phase was concerned. We are not going to inaugurate a new machinery to make world peace in the Washington conference. We are not going to promulgate some new and complete system of international relations. All this was tried in Paris and ended in one of the most dismal disappointments the world has ever known. In Paris we worked from the general to the particular. In Washington it is unmistakably Mr. Hughes' purpose to work from the particular a little in the direction of the general.

To put the thing quite simply: Mr. Hughes seems resolved to do two or three things, one or two of which at least are comparatively simple and the doing of which will contribute to the general restoration of international amity. I was in Paris in the opening days of the last conference, and I have lived in Washington all through the first days of the present session. At Paris one felt as if one were traveling in the clouds. In Washington there is at least a reassuring reminder of the pavement under foot. All things considered, it would be difficult to imagine a more propitious opening than the Washington conference has had.

I am aware of the fact that such a forecast of the probable achievement of the world conference will seem meager to those who hope that there will be some startling and far-reaching success. Yet, I repeat, a conference which was marked by much mutual goodwill and by little actual legislation might in the end prove far more profitable than the Paris conference, which was marked by excessive industry in the manufacture of documents. The comment of Baron Shibusawa to my friend Louis Seibold while the latter was in Tokio recently seems to me worthy of careful consideration. Seibold had discussed most of the major questions of interest at the moment and at the close of his interview he asked this question:

"What would your excellency regard as the chief trouble with the world today?"
"Back quick as a flash came this answer: 'Too many events.'
"I understand in general the meaning of this," responded Seibold, "but perhaps your excellency would elaborate."
"Well, if the statesmen and the diplomats and the legislators of this world, instead of following their present course, would go out in the country, lie under the trees, watch the leaves fall and the clouds go sailing by the laws of supply and demand would probably do the rest."
Perhaps the worst thing at Paris was the multiplicity of "events," and a part, at least, of success in Washington will flow from an application of the philosophy of Baron Shibusawa. (Copyright, 1921, by the McClure Newspaper Syndicate.)