

# Kato, "Simple Sailor," Tames the Militarists of Japan

## Premier Backed by the Greatest Power in the Land When Fighting War Lords

### Japanese Views of Kato and His Cabinet

## Reduction of Army Is Among the Chief Goals Set by the Nippon Statesman

By Adachi Kinnosuke  
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**ADMIRAL BARON TOMOSABURO KATO**, Japan's new Premier, has been hailed as the "peace Premier." His appointment was acclaimed as a distinct victory of the peace party over the war lords of the empire. And yet, Admiral Kato is one of the master minds among the naval lords of Nippon; he is an eminent militarist.

Why then does the appointment of one of the ablest militarists of the country to the premiership spell the utter defeat of militarist dominance over the destiny of Japan? But it is only an apparent paradox. No one, no power but a great militarist can effectively smash a militarist caste in Japan or anywhere else. Tokugawa Iyeyasu, founder of the 250-year peace of the Tokugawa Shogunate, was a military genius; it was no gentle devotee of peace who put Napoleon on St. Helena. And at the present time, there is no able hand than that of Admiral Kato to deal effectively with the armed masters of Japan of to-day.

Admiral Kato was a leading Japanese delegate at the Washington conference. He is committed to carry out the treaties, resolutions and declarations which came out of the Washington conference, in letter and in spirit. And as the world knows, one and all, they deal knock-out blows at militarist dominance of the foreign policies of Japan. This is the reason given by the foreign correspondents stationed at Tokio for hailing the Cabinet of Admiral Kato as the pledge of future peace in the Pacific and the defeat of the militarist party in Japan. This is all right as far as it goes. But the trouble is that it does not go far enough.

For what does it profit the peace of the Pacific if the Japanese navy were tailored according to the letter and spirit of the Washington conference and the army of Japan (not exactly the shyest violet in the field of Mars) were left in all its pomp and power?

The real all-important meaning of the coming of the Kato Cabinet seems to have escaped the foreign observers entirely. It is this: Admiral Kato has made up his mind to cut down the army of Japan. And he has the power, the backing, the means to persuade the war lords of Japan of the unwisdom of minding the suggestions of Admiral Kato and his Cabinet on this all-vital point.

Admiral Kato is one of the few men in power to-day in Tokio who both desire and can clip the eagle wings of the military dictators of the foreign policy

of the Japanese empire. And for the following reasons:

In 1868 the Tokugawa Shogunate fell and the Emperor was restored to actual power. Satsuma and Choshu were the two mighty clans which brought this about. In the course of time the Japanese army was held in the hands of the Choshu men, headed by the famous Elder Statesman, the late Prince Yamagata; the navy was in the hands of the men of the Satsuma clan largely. Outsiders have crept into both branches of service, but they who joined the navy joined the Satsuma forces and they who entered the army gave their support to the Choshu camp.

As Nippon waxed in strength and stature, the rival camps became more and more jealous of each other in their struggle for supremacy—not only military but also political. The singular institution of the Elder Statesman in Japan helped a good deal in the growth of the influence of military and naval men in the politics of the country. It came to pass at one time that actually the Chinese and Siberian policies of the Empire were often blue penciled by the fighting men of the empire. It was widely rumored and gossiped at the time that Marquis Okuma and his Foreign Minister, Viscount Kato, knew nothing of Part V of the so-called Twenty-one Demands presented to China until after the Peking correspondent of The Associated Press had wired it all over the world. And the rumor had all the earmarks of truth to those who knew to what an appalling extent the war lords of Japan, drunk with the mad dream of power, carried their folly.

Throughout those mad glory days of militant Japan the army and navy kept pace in growth. The one rarely permitted the other to get anything substantial (usually in the shape of appropriations) without getting an equal advantage in kind.


Now, Admiral Kato is not a Satsuma man, as is his chief at the Battle of the Sea of Japan, Admiral Togo; but all his interests, his heart, his associations are with the Satsuma camp.

When the world tide of public opinion forced upon the representatives of the powers at the Washington conference a drastic reduction of the naval programs of each of the five great sea powers of earth Japan, like the rest of them, saw the wisdom of submitting to the heroic reduction program of the American Secretary of State. The Japanese delegation—Admiral Kato no less than the rest—saw something more than a mere burial of the expansionist aspirations of Japanese militarists. They saw in the fruits of the Washington conference the only way out of economic and financial ruin for Japan. The Washington conference stopped with the curtailment of the



naval expenditures of the powers. Admiral Kato and his friends of the Satsuma clique did not stop there; they had not the slightest idea of stopping with the reduction of the navy. And no one saw and realized this aspect of things more keenly, easily and quickly than the army chieftains of Japan—the gentlemen of the Choshu clique. Knowing these things fall well, are the war lords of the army going to fight about it? Have they made preparations to do so? Are they making them now? They are not. For the simple and all-sufficient reason that it is useless. The newspapers of Tokio are telling everybody in no modest headlines that there is an understanding between the new Premier and his Minister of War, General Yamanaishi, a stellar member of the mailed-fist oligarchy, over this question of the reduction of the land forces of Japan.

Where does the power of Kato come from—the power which tames even the insolent and arrogant lions of the army? Admiral Kato did not jump at the Premiership when Marquis Matsukata, about the only survivor of the famous group of elder statesmen, offered it to him in the name of his master the Emperor. He declined it—at least once, they say. When pressed from every side to reconsider he took a long, long time to ponder over it. The ground on which he declined the honor—the one thing which made him hesitate under all sorts of pressure—was this: "I'm nothing but a simple sailor," was the way he put it. "I know little of the intricate art and business of a statesman." He made it plain that he is entirely void of political ambitions;



Above (left)—A cartoonist's conception of the premier; (center)—Kato on his way to report his appointment to his imperial ancestors; (right)—Uchida, Foreign Minister. The cartoon below shows the new Premier being wheeled by the ex-Premier Takahashi, with Kenkyukai, the predominant party in the House of Peers, waiting alongside.

all he wished was to round out his life of service to the state as a navy man. After he made up his mind to accept the portfolio his first step was to marry himself to the mightiest political

power in the land. He did not go to a political party; he went to the House of Peers of the Imperial Diet. A glance at the list of his Cabinet members suffices to show how thick is the tie between him and the upper house. His Home Minister, Dr. Rentaro Mizuno, is from the House of Peers; so is Kentaro Arai, Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, and Viscount Toshiada Maeda, Minister of Communications. Both the Education Minister, Dr. Eikichi Kamada, and the Minister of Justice, Dr. Keijiro Okano, are weighty pillars of the upper house.

Count Yenkiehi Oki, through whom the late Hara and Takahashi cabinets kept up their friendly communications with the House of Peers, remains in the Kato regime as the Minister of Railways. The Minister of Finance, Otohiko Ichiki, is a crown member of the House of Peers and a Satsuma man to boot, and, besides, he is a member of the majority party in the upper house, called Kenkyukai. The president of the Census Board, Count Chokan Ogasawara, is also a member of the upper house.

This is the "Cabinet of Peers" if ever there was one.

There is the point at which practically all the press attacks of the country are centered: "Since it is the Cabinet of Peers, it can hardly be expected to meet the needs of the people," as the Tokio "Jiji" has it. There, too, lies the chief strength of the new Cabinet. The political power of the House of Peers of the Japanese Diet has not been advertised in foreign countries. American readers know practically nothing about it. Nevertheless it is tremendous. It has been a notorious wreck of many a strong Cabinet in Japan. The late Prince Ito formed his fourth Cabinet in the fall of 1900. He was in the heyday of his political power; he had just succeeded in forming his party, the Seiyukai. He dared to appoint to the position of the Minister of Communications Toru Hoshi, the astute and notorious politician who was known as the "Tammany boss of Japan." Hoshi

at the time was the Seiyukai whip. That outraged the gentlemen of the House of Peers. The upper house fought the measures of the Ito Cabinet at every turn. This war ended in the downfall of the Ito Cabinet in May, 1901. The peers wrecked the Yamamoto Cabinet in 1914 because his naval policy did not suit them; they wrecked the Okuma Cabinet in 1916 over a comparatively minor matter of sinking fund.

Every politician, including Admiral Kato, knows all this, and evidently the Admiral acted according to the lights. It has its dark side, this wedding of the Kato Cabinet with the House of Peers. It is not popular with the press; it is sailing in the teeth of the ever growing power of public opinion in Japan.

Practically every newspaper in the country is criticizing the Kato Cabinet as a step back—a big step backward in the journey of constitutional government in Japan. From the party government of Hara it has gone back into the moldy shade of reactionary, bureaucratic regime—that is the burden of the charge. That is what Kato and everybody else expected the newspapers would say; there is nothing striking or new in all this attack. Whatever he might have done in the selection of his Cabinet members, the newspapers would have attacked him. That also is a matter of common knowledge. It is quite a fad nowadays for the Japanese newspapers to be "agin the administration" in every thing. Premier Obtains Aid of the Dominant Party. After wedding himself solidly with the House of Peers the Admiral Premier did not neglect the House of Representatives. He made sure of the support of the Seiyu party, the dominant party in the lower house with an overwhelming majority. And he had no trouble in doing so. In the first place the Admiral in continuing the policy of the Seiyukai Cabinet of Mr. Hara and of Takahashi in many directions, notably in its foreign policy and in bringing the fruits of the Washington conference to a happy consummation. The Seiyukai men themselves take this view. At one time there was talk of Mr. Tokonami, former Home Minister and a leader of the Seiyukai, remaining with the Kato regime. The leaders of the Seiyukai have declared publicly and more than once that they are ready and willing to give hearty support to the Kato Cabinet and continue most friendly relations with it. The Seiyukai is likely to do this. To antagonize the Kato regime means to lose the support of dominant elements in the House of Peers. For, as has been already made clear, not only the Kenkyukai, the majority party in the House of Peers, but also an-

other organization in the upper house, called the Koyu Club, is liberally represented in the Kato Cabinet. The loss of the friendly support of the upper house spells the political suicide of the Seiyukai. And the Seiyukai men cannot bear any such nightmare, even for a fleeting second. More than that, the Seiyukai men are looking to the Kato Cabinet to hand the government back to them in course of time—in no far distant future. The Seiyukai sees itself not only as the father of the Kato Cabinet but also as its legitimate heir. In the circumstances the Seiyukai men cannot find any political nourishment in the thought of picking a serious quarrel with the new Cabinet of Admiral Kato. The Seiyukai is going to be good to the new Cabinet. Therefore the Kato Cabinet had a sort of friendly strangle hold on the majority party in the lower house, as it has a wedding ring around the fingers of the dominant parties in the House of Peers.

"The cabinet of peers," "government by bureaucrats," etc., are not exactly elfin music in the ears of our American friends, but there is no question that Admiral Kato devoted no little thought in choosing the dumping instead of the flower. But a short year ago—that is, before the Washington conference—a reactionary regime coming to power at Tokio would have spelt a pretty black tale in the international relations of Japan. It would have told a distinctly threatening story for the peace of the Pacific basin. All is different to-day. The expansionist in the foreign policies of Japan is in the museum with the skeletons of the mammoths. The result of the Washington conference is not the only thing which brought this about. In Japan, in the realm of practical politics, there are many factors which compel the gentlest possible attitude on the part of Japanese diplomacy. Her financial and economic conditions, for example, Japan has not recovered from the prolonged period of business depression which followed the war; no cheering signs are visible on her stormy financial and commercial horizon as yet. The nation is literally crying for the adjustment of prices of basic commodities. The answer is yet to come. The country is afire with labor agitation and the uprising of tenant farmers against the landlords. Nobody would pay the slightest attention to the vapourings of militarists who preach a foreign war as a cure-all for domestic ills. That sort of thing might have been all very well in the days of the Great Louis, but between the days of the French monarch and the present a few centuries have come and gone, and the world moved a bit. There are not many men in the whole of Japan more fitted than Kato to look after the future peace of the Pacific basin.

# Russia's Far Eastern Fisheries Become a Critical Problem

By Leo Pasvolksy  
WASHINGTON, July 22.

WHEN Admiral Kato, as the new Prime Minister of Japan, announced recently the decision of his government to undertake immediately the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Siberia, he was, no doubt, influenced in making this action so soon after his assumption of that high post by his experience here as the head of the Japanese delegation to the Washington conference. During his stay here, the new Prime Minister indicated on a number of occasions that he was generally in favor of such a policy on the part of his government. He had ample opportunity, besides, to observe what the general attitude in the United States is toward the whole question of the Japanese military operations in the Russian Far East. And since it is fair to assume that the Admiral, as one of the principal signatories to the treaties worked out by the Washington conference, expects to make a close rapprochement with the United States one of the bases of his foreign policy, there seems no doubt that so early an action in the Siberian matter has been in deference to the American feeling on the question.

The cable dispatches from Tokio indicate that the Kato Ministry is not prepared, however, to go beyond the position stated in the declaration read into the records of the Washington conference by Baron Shidehara in the name of the Kato delegation. In this declaration the Japanese government undertook, at the earliest opportunity, to withdraw its troops from the City of Vladivostok and from other portions of the Primorsk, or maritime province of Siberia, only. It is these troops that Premier Kato now promises to withdraw. Yet the really important phase of the situation lies in the Japanese occupation of the island of Sakhalin and of the mouth of the Amur River. The Japanese position in Washington and, apparently, Premier Kato's position to-day is that these portions of Siberia the Japanese are not prepared to evacuate at the present time.

The conferences disposed of that portion of its agenda which referred to Siberia by merely reading "into its record two statements on the question. The first was an official declaration on the part of Japan, in which a solemn promise was made to evacuate eventually the Russian terri-

tory still occupied by Japanese troops, as well as to respect certain principles of Russian sovereignty and of international equality of economic opportunity on the territory of Siberia. The second statement was a declaration of the position held by the government of the United States on the subject of the Japanese occupation of portions of Siberia. There was nothing more specific or definite.

It was quite natural, therefore, that those who expected from the conference some sort of action on the Siberian question were sorely disappointed. It was no less natural, too, that the handling of this question in Washington came in at the time of the conference, and still comes in at the present time, for an abundant share of adverse criticism. In fact, it has assumed, in the general opinion of those interested in Far Eastern affairs, the aspect of the greatest failure of the Washington conference.

And yet it is scarcely fair to lay too much blame upon the statesmen who sat around the conference table in Washington—except, perhaps, for promising, in the agenda, as full a discussion of the Siberian question as of the Chinese. Such a promise was, quite obviously, unfulfillable. The Siberian question, as well as the Chinese, rests primarily not upon an enunciation of principles of international action, but upon the actual application of these principles. And such an application is of necessity a matter for adjustment between the two countries concerned—in this case between Japan and Russia. Since Russia was not, and could not be, represented in Washington, such an adjustment was impossible. It must remain impossible until there is a recognized government in Russia, authoritatively competent to deal with the situation.

The one thing which the Washington conference did accomplish with regard to the Russian Far Eastern situation was to put Japan on record as to her intentions, and in this way to provide a basis upon which restored Russia—if she should be disposed to utilize it—may find it easier to conduct her eventual negotiations with Japan for the adjustment of the problems involved. This adjustment will be most difficult at best. And possibly the most striking illustration of the difficulties which loom up in the future, as well as of those which confronted the Washington conference, in this regard, may be found in the problem which is concerned with the question

of Japan's relations to the Russian Far Eastern fisheries. Center of Stage Held by Japanese Military

It is rather unfortunate that the center of the stage in the consideration of Far Eastern problems, so far as it concerns Russia, is still held by the fact of Japan's military occupation of portions of two Russian provinces on the Pacific Coast. To be sure, this fact is important enough, but the really significant element in the situation is that of Japan's economic penetration into Siberia, and none of the aspects of this element is more serious than that of the fisheries. This is especially so since Japan has taken important new steps since the conference with regard to her relations toward the Russian Far Eastern fisheries, and even more so because this particular question really involves a test of her intentions and promises as enunciated at the Washington conference.

It will remain for a future Russo-Japanese parley or, possibly, another international conference, to decide whether or not Japan has really been guilty of utilizing the fact of her superior strength and Russia's temporary weakness in order to take an unfair advantage of the situation thus created. She is accused to-day in many quarters of doing precisely this. It seems a fairer thing to do, however, to leave conclusions to such future as can pass judgment upon them and act on the basis of this judgment. What one can do at the present time is to set down the story of the actual events and the salient features of the authoritative presentations of the case by both sides, as found in the official documents which happen to be available. That, in itself, seems eminently worthwhile.

Japan as a nation depends for her vital sustenance upon a fish-rich diet, in counter-distinction to a meat-grain diet, which constitutes the basis of the food supplies of Western nations. Fish, therefore, is an article of vital national necessity to Japan. And though, as an essentially maritime nation, Japan has at her disposal important and extensive fisheries in her own territorial waters, these fishing areas prove to be insufficient for her needs. The growth of her population and the gradual depletion of her own fisheries because of incautious exploitation have been largely responsible for this state of affairs and have made it imperative for Japan to seek new sources of fish and to turn to the

Russian fishing areas, which are tremendous in extent and in abundance. Nippon Gained Important Rights in Fishing Line

Prior to the Russo-Japanese war of 1903-04 the Russian Far Eastern fisheries were generally closed to foreign exploitation. But one of the concessions obtained by Japan as a result of the Treaty of Portsmouth, which terminated the war, was the acquisition of a series of important and far-reaching advantages and privileges in the Russian fishing waters. In 1907 a special fisheries convention was signed between Russia and Japan which was to regulate the participation of Japan in the exploitation of the Russian fisheries.

In accordance with this convention the Japanese were placed generally on an equal footing with the Russians so far as the commercial exploitation of the fisheries was concerned. The only exception was that the Japanese were forbidden to engage in fishing in the mouths of rivers and in a specified list of bays and inlets. Outside of that, however, all the fishing areas placed under exploitation by the Russian government were open on a basis of equality to both the Russian and the Japanese fishermen through a system of bids, held annually.

The fisheries convention was originally signed for twelve years and, consequently, expired in 1919. By that time Russia had already gone through several stages of her revolution, and the group which actually controlled the territory comprising the fisheries was the Kolchak government, at Omsk. With this government the Japanese opened negotiations concerning the status of the fishing industry in the Russian waters after the expiration of the convention. It was finally agreed between the Japanese government and Kolchak's Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the convention of 1907 would remain indefinitely prolonged, pending the establishment in Russia of a fully recognized government, which would then take up with Japan the question of the original convention.

For several years prior to the expiration of the fisheries convention Japan had been pressing upon the Russian government a number of important modifications in the operations of the Far Eastern fisheries. The most important of these modifications urged by Japan was the removal of the restriction of fishing areas as far as the Japanese are concerned, which consisted in their being prohibited from fish-

ing in the mouths of rivers, in bays and certain inlets. The Kolchak government fell at the beginning of 1920, and on February 24, 1920, the Japanese Consul General at Vladivostok, in a note addressed to the Primorsk Zemstvo administration, which was then in control of affairs at Vladivostok, announced that the Japanese government decided to take the matter of safeguarding the interests of its subjects engaged in fishing in the Russian waters directly into its own hands. In accordance with this decision, he demanded from the Vladivostok authorities that Japanese fishermen be left in undisturbed possession of 189 fishing areas which they held under long-term leases, and also of 118 areas the leases to which expired in 1920. The payments for the leases were to remain identical with those which obtained during the preceding year, and the sums thus collected would be placed in the hands of the association of Japanese fishermen in Russian waters, which would place them on deposit in a proper institution subject to the order of the existing authorities.

The note ended with the following significant statement: "Thus, the above-mentioned decision of the Japanese government does not signify any intention on its part to acquire new rights or interests and does not permit the Japanese to engage in fishing in such areas as have not until now been under exploitation. Moreover, it respects fully the rights of Russians holding fishing areas for exploitation. This was the situation in 1920. A year later, however, at the beginning of 1921, the Japanese government decided on a different policy. On January 17, 1921, the Japanese Consul General at Vladivostok presented to the existing Russian authorities there a note which defined, in five demands, the policy which the Japanese government decided thenceforth to pursue with regard to the Russian fisheries, and this policy, even on the face of it, was a very drastic one. Drastic Policy Adopted To Fit Needs of Nation

The reason assigned by the Japanese government for the drastic character of the policy upon which it had determined was that the Japanese fishing interests had suffered grave injuries during the preceding years because of the disorganized state of affairs existing in the Russian Far East. In view of this, "the Japanese government, expecting no improvement in the situation in the near future," proposed the following measures: 1—All payments for leases, whether from Japanese or Russian lessees, must be deposited in banks chosen for that purpose by agreement between the Japanese government and the existing Russian authorities. The Russian authorities can divert only one-third of the total deposits to their own uses. The other two-thirds must remain untouched until the end of the annual season, when a special agreement must be made between the Japanese government and the Russian authorities as to the disposition of the sums thus accumulated. The purpose of this provision is to make it possible for the Japanese government to make adequate compensation to such of the Japanese fishermen as would find their property destroyed or injured during the season by partisan bands, etc. The amount thus involved during the season of 1921 was estimated at 1,200,000 yen, or about \$600,000, of which \$400,000 would thus be tied up, subject to a disposition authorized by the Japanese government. The Japanese Consul General at Vladivostok would be empowered to make a periodic examination of the accounts concerned with these sums. 2—The Russian authorities must indicate the valuation of the various fishing areas offered at the bids, and the papers required by Article XI of the fisheries convention, normally issued by the various Russian consulates in Japan, can now also be issued by Japanese authorities. 3—The Japanese lessees acquire the right to engage boats for the service of a group of areas issued by them, either in their own name or together with Russian lessees; to transfer their equipment from one lease area to another at the expiration of the lease and to leave their own guards for the winter to guard their shore property. To the first two of these rights the Kolchak government consented in the course of negotiations with the Japanese in 1919. The Japanese note states that it merely reiterates the position thus reached. With regard to the third, according to the note, the Kolchak government refused categorically to grant its consent on the ground that the exercise of that right on the part of the Japanese would be tantamount to Japanese colonization. The Japanese note insists on the exercise of the above right. 4—The Japanese acquire the right of engaging in fishing in rivers, bays, and inlets restricted by the convention of 1907, except such localities as are restricted anyway for strategic or breeding purposes.

Threat of War Linked in Mikado's Demands. After enumerating these demands the Japanese Consul General informed the Russian authorities that the Japanese government was determined to put them into operation, stating that, in the case of refusal on the part of the Russians to accept the demands, "the Japanese government would be compelled to take such measures as it would consider necessary for the de-

ference of the interests of its subjects," though "taking of such measures would be undesirable so far as it was concerned in view of the fact that friendly relations exist between Japan and Russia."

This note aroused violent opposition on the part of all Russian groups. The Primorsk Chamber of Commerce filed a comprehensive protest, stating that the throwing open of the river and inlet fishing areas to the Japanese would merely tend to put Russian fishing interests out of business; that the taking over by the Japanese of the coastwise shipping of fishing equipment would really put the Japanese in full control of all of the Russian coastwise trade in the territory; that the establishment of a system of a published evaluation of leases would put the Russians at a great disadvantage as compared with the Japanese; and finally that the whole position taken by the Japanese government is utterly incompatible with either Russia's national honor or with the vital economic interests of the Russian Far East, since the Japanese would be permitted to have a control over the disposition of the sums paid in for the leases, which constitute Russian property.

However, no official reply to the Japanese note was given until March 14, when the government of the Far Eastern Republic proposed that all the questions involved should be taken up by a special conference of representatives of Japan, the Far Eastern Republic and Soviet Russia. In the meantime the Japanese agreed to a postponement of the annual bids, which were to take place at the end of March, and finally agreed to permit their subjects to take part in the bids, leaving the question of a Russian acceptance of her demands open for the time being.

The Japanese note of January 17, 1921, referred to the fisheries generally. But the Japanese were already in actual control of two of the most important fishing regions, viz., those of Sakhalin and Kamchatka.

Far Eastern Situation A Mass of Complications. Finally, in April, 1922, when the time came for holding annual fisheries bids in Vladivostok, the Japanese government carried out the threat contained in the note of January 17, 1921, and announced that it would thenceforth refuse to recognize any Russian jurisdiction over the fisheries whose administration is concentrated at Vladivostok; by permitting its nationals to hold fishing permits directly from the Japanese authorities without the in-

strumentality of the bids system as carried out by the existing Russian authorities. The Vladivostok government, as well as various public organizations, have again protested against this, considering this action a direct violation of the existing convention.

All this creates an extremely complicated situation as far as Japan's relation to the Russian Far Eastern fisheries is concerned. It is very significant that in the note of January 17, the Japanese government justified its five demands on the ground that it considers their acceptance by the existing Russian authorities as the only method whereby "Japan's rights under the fisheries convention can be safeguarded in the present situation." And then, just before uttering the threat which we quoted above, the note contained the following, even more significant statement:

It is self-understood that as soon as there exists in Russia a legal government which would safeguard the interests of the Japanese fishermen, the whole fishing industry will be placed again on its former basis. This statement constitutes a definite and important promise on the part of Japan. The eventual fulfillment of this promise is inextricably bound up with the whole sum total of her present activities in the Russian Far East. As we have already seen in the vitally important question of the fisheries, the fact of the Japanese military occupation of the island of Sakhalin and which occupation she has no intention to end under her present policy—gives into her hands tremendously valuable privileges which she does not enjoy under her treaty arrangements with Russia. She promises to give up these special privileges and advantages, as well as others which she at present possesses by virtue of her presence in Siberia as direct accompaniments of the military occupation.

The real test of Japan's promises will come when she will be called upon to do this, for that alone will prove her sincerity in asserting that she is not actuated by a desire to take an unfair advantage of Russia's temporary plight. There is scarcely another "hang-over" from the discussions which came within the purview of the Washington conference that is more fraught with possibilities of future complications than the one concerned with Japan's relation to the Russian Far East. But there are not likely to be any complications if Japan proves equal to this difficult, but really determining test.