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Democrats Going Back in New Jersey.

So far as there is significance in the result of the city and township elections in New Jersey on Tuesday, it is this: The stupendous plurality of 87,000 for McKINLEY and HOBART was not due to the circumstance that New Jersey Democrats had got through with Democracy.

Nor did it indicate a disposition on the part of New Jersey Democrats who voted for McKINLEY to give up the State to the Republicans for an indefinite period of time. They were disposed with the cowardice of the Tenth Convention, and they were ready to ally themselves with the sound-money Republicans in response to an emergency call from Patriotism. But they did not thereby become Republicans; any more than did the New Jersey Democrats who voted for PALMER.

In the great counties of Essex and Hudson the natural return of the Democrats to their own party on local issues, and in the absence of any immediate call upon their patriotism, is particularly noticeable. Probably even the most sanguine Republican did not expect that in that closely contested State, Republican pluralities of from 50,000 to 100,000 were thereafter to be the regular thing. If any partisan entertained that idea he was foredoomed to indigo disappointment.

These returning Democrats are not going back to the flag of Bryanism, the false standard raised by the ignominious September Convention of last year. They are going back to the platform of the May Convention of the same year, which declared that "the Democracy of the State of New Jersey is in favor of a firm, unvarying maintenance of the present gold standard. We are opposed to the free coinage of silver at any ratio."

And when the honest Democratic flag is raised again, the cowards and time-servers who shrunk away from true Democracy in September will tumble over each other in their haste to get back under it.

The same process, we imagine, is likely to be witnessed in other States also. Observe, if you please, that the Hon. ALLAN McDERMOTT, one of the earliest and angriest protestants against the surrender to Bryanism, is on top again in Hudson county.

The Most Significant Feature of the Cuban War at This Time.

Our Madrid contemporaries have recently printed reports from Havana that the Cuban leaders are "suing for peace," that Gen. GOMEZ has sought to enter into negotiations with Gen. WEYLER for the surrender of the patriot army, and that the revolution will be brought to an end as soon as terms can be arranged with the home Government. It seems that Premier CANOVAS professes belief in these reports; and it is given as a reason for his postponement of the assembly of the Cortes that he desires to announce the pacification of Cuba at the time of their meeting.

It is unaccountable, such an idea can be entertained by CANOVAS or any other man in Spain or elsewhere, when the revolutionists are yet waging war in every province of Cuba, when no word of surrender has ever been heard in the patriot ranks, when all the Cuban leaders refuse to accept any peace other than that of independence, and when the Cuban Government is making unusual efforts to procure fresh supplies of rifles, cannon, powder, and dynamite for the further prosecution of hostilities. The circumstance last mentioned ought to be sufficient to convince Spain that she has received from Havana advices that are false and deceptive. At this time the Cubans are doing their best to procure large supplies of military material; they are trying to get them from this country and other countries; those merrily flying steamers, the Bernudas, the Laurada, and the Three Friends, are not the only ships in their service; they are using all their available tonnage to pay for the supplies and for their transportation. It cannot be supposed that they would do such things were they seeking for peace through surrender to Spain, or if it were not their determination to carry on the war in the third year of its career it on the two previous years. It seems to us that both Spain and the United States may derive information from the circumstance that Cuba was engaged last month, and is engaged this month, in importing arms for war from any country in which they are to be obtained. There can be no peace for Cuba under Spanish rule, or until independence shall be won and freedom established.

We print elsewhere a Washington letter relative to that interesting feature of the case of Cuba which is here noticed, and which may be regarded as the most significant feature of the Cuban war at this time.

The Fur Seals Dispute—A Lesson in Arbitration with Great Britain.

The proposal of President McKINLEY's Administration to provide this year better rules than the ones arranged at Paris for the preservation of the fur seals, is received by the London newspapers with emphatic disapprobation. The Times is "surprised and disappointed" at the reopening of the subject, traces it to "the American Jingoes," and says that to ask for a re-examination of the Paris award sixteen months before the stipulated time "would strike a very serious blow at the principle of arbitration." The Pall Mall Gazette calls it "another lesson on the weakness of arbitration," the St. James's Gazette finds it "a complete demonstration of the hollowness of arbitration," and the Globe, joining the other three newspapers, adds that Lord SALISBURY will undoubtedly refuse to reopen the Behring Sea question before the prescribed date, or before Canada's claims are satisfied.

We commend these English views of the folly of international arbitration to the Senate, which is now considering a treaty of amity and navigation with England. We commend them, also, to those individuals and assemblies that have been denouncing Senators because they have refused to make such a treaty before applying to it the most careful safeguards, lest it should harm the interests of this country. Certainly arbitration is open to the attacks made upon it, as these London newspapers scoff at and reject it, if it alone stands in the way of accomplishing a most urgent international need, like the preservation of the fur seals.

Let us look at the facts. The Paris tribunal laid down a set of rules designed to save these animals from extermination; it left England and the United States to arrange the details, except that these rules must in any case be examined every five years, to see whether they ought to be modified. At the end of the first year it became evident from the operation of the rules that they were wholly inadequate for their purpose. The second year made the menace more acute, and the third showed the increase of ravages in the seal herd by extraordinary facts and figures. Our Government season after season appeals to Great Britain not to wait for the five years to elapse before doing something to preserve the seals from their threatened fate, and in reply is told that, as the St. James's Gazette phrases it, such a request "has inflicted another blow on the believers in arbitration."

Could any answer be better calculated to put us on guard respecting general arbitration with England? The avowed purpose of the Paris rules was to cause a smaller destruction of the seals. To the surprise, we may charitably presume, of the majority of the arbitrators who voted for those rules, they have proved so inadequate as even to be followed by increased destruction. We appeal to England to respect the spirit of the Paris rules, and, by agreement, to change their letter, and are reproached with breach of faith and lectured on the sacredness of arbitration.

It may be said that this is only the common sense of the press and not of the Government of Great Britain. On the contrary, Lord SALISBURY's reply of May 17, 1895, to the appeal of our Government, was that "the arbitrators had fixed five years as the period after which the regulations might be revised. Only one year has elapsed," and "to set aside their authority upon so slight a ground would, in the opinion of her Majesty's Government, be a most serious insult to the authority of arbitral decisions."

Thus it is clear that the London press of this current week merely echoes a Government declaration made year before last. But this is not the only lesson for the Senate and the American people to draw regarding agreements with England. Lord SALISBURY speaks of a fixed period "after which the regulations might be revised." The actual agreement is that the rules "shall be" re-examined every five years, but it does not forbid a voluntary examination and revision earlier "by a common agreement." Article IX. reads as follows:

"The concurrent regulations hereby determined with a view to the protection and preservation of the fur seals shall remain in force until they have been wholly or in part abolished or modified by a common agreement between the United States and Great Britain."

The New Minister to Turkey.

To the excellent diplomatic appointments already recorded, Mr. McKINLEY has added another, equally good, in the man chosen to succeed Mr. TERRELL at Constantinople. TERRELL has had a hard time with some of the missionary brethren, who constitute, with perhaps ten or a dozen exceptions, the entire census of native American citizens now residing in the Ottoman Empire. He has not wholly pleased the missionaries, but he comes home with the knowledge that his life has been lost in Turkey, the best intentioned among them, are entitled to the confidence we would wish to place in their motives toward Greece and Crete.

The evidence multiply that Spain recognizes that there has been a change in the Administration at Washington, and that the authorities now presiding over our affairs there must be reckoned with, and, if possible, conciliated. Despatches received from Havana by Secretary SHERMAN show that Gen. WEYLER has given orders permitting the shipment of 2,500 bales of tobacco hitherto kept in Cuba under his decree of last year. That decree forbade the exportation of leaf tobacco which had at that time been contracted for by American firms. There was no pretence that it was not a violation of existing obligations, and the only ground taken was that military necessities made it advisable to keep the material there for the use of the cigar factories under Spanish protection.

The Tobacco Edict.

Our Government promptly protested, but now, after many months, comes a substantial release of tobacco kept back from several New York firms, while the other cases arising under Weyler's retroactive edict are to be decided at Madrid. It is remarkable how a recognized difference in attitude toward Cuba between the present Administration and its predecessors works in practice. American after American has been released from Spanish dungeons since March 4, with a good prospect that all may soon be gone. WEYLER's edicts are found to be not irrevocable, and perhaps the latest novelty is the welcoming by portions of the Havana press of American intervention in Cuba.

The City Magistrates.

There are now nine City Magistrates for service in the Police Courts of this city: Centre Street, Jefferson Market, Essex Market, Yorkville, Harlem, and Morrisania. Six of them are for actual service, and three are "relay" Judges, so to speak, in case any of these Magistrates cannot be in constant attendance. They have no other duties to perform except to act as Judges in these courts, the Legislature in 1895 having abolished the Court of Special Sessions, in which Police Judges formerly presided, as a separate tribunal, and there being no longer any provisions of law requiring Police Judges or Magistrates to be in readiness to take hall in criminal cases after nightfall at Police Headquarters.

On Tuesday the Legislature adopted, by a vote of 92 to 18, a bill increasing the number of our Police Magistrates from nine to twelve. It provides that after midnight on May 31 there shall be twelve City Magistrates, and that on or before May 15, 1897, the Mayor shall appoint three, whose terms of office shall begin on the first of June and expire on May 1, 1907. The board of City Magistrates is also empowered to appoint an additional Police Clerk. A change is also provided for in the hours for holding courts of the City Magistrates, so that they shall be opened every day at 9 o'clock in the morning and shall not be closed before 4 o'clock in the afternoon, except on Saturday and Sunday and holidays, when morning sessions only shall be necessary. The opening of a new Police Court on West Fifty-fourth street requires an additional Judge, but the public necessity for an increase in the number of City Magistrates by three is not altogether clear. The salary of a magistrate is \$7,000, and the addition of three will be an increase of \$21,000 in expenditure, besides \$2,500 for the additional Police Clerk called for, bringing the total amount up to \$23,500.

One of the arguments used in favor of the abolition of the old Board of Police Judges was that there was no further necessity for the maintenance of fifteen such Judges, the professional reformers contending that ten, or perhaps fewer, "could do the work." When, accordingly, in April, 1895, the Legislature abolished the old Police Court Judges, and established in their places the City Magistrates, it set up the separate tribunal of the Special Sessions Court; and this is how the account of expenses stands as between the two systems, with the number of Magistrates increased to twelve, as provided for in the bill adopted by the Assembly on Tuesday:

Table showing Police Judges and Police Magistrates salaries. Police Judges: Fifteen, at \$8,000 each, \$120,000. Police Magistrates: Twelve, at \$7,000 each, \$84,000. Five Special Sessions Judges, at \$6,000 each, \$30,000. Total: \$234,000.

In other words, it will cost the city \$30,000 more in salary account for Judges under the new system than it did under the old; and instead of saving fewer than fifteen, we shall have saving fewer than fifteen. The increase in the amount of salaries of Judges under the new and reformatory system, the further expenses of the courts will be considerably enlarged. These expenses in the last year of the old system were \$63,000, and those for the Special Sessions Court \$23,000, or a total of \$86,000. Under the present system, the expenses of the Police Courts, exclusive of Judges, as appears from the Comptroller's report, are \$76,700, and for the Special Sessions Court \$25,300. That is, the expenses are: Old system, \$86,000; New system, \$102,000.

If the bill adopted by the Assembly should become law, it would add \$23,500 more, and the cost of the new system as compared with the old would be: Old system, \$200,000; new system, \$274,500.

Their Paramount Question.

The Executive Committee of the National Association of Democratic Clubs has been sitting in Washington, executing an address to the Democratic voters of the country and indulging in other fabrications and confabulations of equally vast moment. Among the committee men in view were the Hon. CHARLES JAMES FAULKNER of West Virginia, whose spirited political vaticinations and statistics fired the Popocratic heart so often last summer and fall; the Hon. BENTON McMILLIN of Tennessee, a member of that Ways and Means Committee which made the first step toward an existing tariff for delinquency; the Hon. G. FRED WILLIAMS, the nervous, young statesman who carried Maine and Vermont with so much fury; the Hon. JOSEPH SIBLEY of Pennsylvania, the plutocrat chief of plutocracy, who knew enough not to be nominated for Vice-President; and not last but as a proxy, Mr. BRYAN, the gifted but retired lecturer. An address which represents the best thought of minds like these ought to make a durable impression upon the Democratic voters and all other voters, especially those who, like the address itself, are best described as scattering. It must be confessed, however, that the members of the Executive Committee seem to be forcing the address season. For some time to come most persons will decline to cherish a frantic interest in what things political are or ought to happen in 1900. The Executive Committee pierces the future with great ease, but more prosaic folk are content to attend to business. Business and the opinions of the present association of so-called Democratic clubs do not agree.

As it is to be expected that the address may be neglected in the press, we here publish, let us say that the addressers are still profoundly convinced that "the paramount question before the people was and is that of the single gold standard against the free and unlimited coinage of silver." It is curious that the addressers take up so much room in bewailing the fact that another protective tariff is in process of construction. The Dingley bill is "this monstrous bill, fit successor to the McKinley bill of abominations," and so on. As several members of the committee voted for the Wilson bill of abominations, this apostrophe spluttering does not add dignity or pathos to the face of their remonstrance. The Government must have money enough to live on. How is it to get it if not mainly by a tariff; and since necessarily, for the next four years, by a protective tariff, what is all this row about?

The less the Popocratic bones have to say about the tariff the better for their credit. In their platform last year they threw away the principle of a tariff for revenue only, and actually proposed that the Wilson tariff should stand until the triumph of the great white dollar. "Until the money question is settled," said the Popocratic platform, "we are opposed to any agitation for further changes in our tariff laws except such as are necessary to meet the deficit caused by the adverse decision of the Supreme Court on the income tax."

If the Popocrats still believe that 16 to 1 is the paramount question, they should cease to lament the iniquities of a Republican protective tariff. They are committed to the support of the Wilson protective tariff; but what are tariffs to them anyway? Are the money changers and the goldbugs dependent upon the tariff for the means of grinding "the toiling masses"?

At a gathering of the rabbinical fraternity of Chicago on the first Sunday of this month, "King Solomon's Flag" was unfurled, amid acclamations and blessings, after dedicatory ceremonies of a Jewish character. We suppose that the flag is a device of the imagination. There is no mention of such a flag in the Bible, and we do not recall any allusion to it in JOSEPHUS. The device is repudiated by that distinguished authority in Jewish antiquities, Rabbi ISAAC M. WISE, who affirms that he never saw or heard of Solomon's flag. "No body," he says, "knew what it was, or what it looked like." As displayed at Chicago, a double triangle of blue, signifying the shield of Israel, was blazoned on a white field, and a dove with outstretched wings was perched on top of the staff. Thus, both war and peace were symbolized in this design. The purpose of the Chicago rabbinate is to make this device the flag of Judaism in the United States.

We may say here that there are Jewish traditions that, when the Hebrews left Egypt, they were marshalled under flags, and the device upon the flag of the tribe of Judah, from which King SOLOMON came, was a lion. There is an allusion to the New Testament to the "lion of the tribe of Judah." It is possible, therefore, that the birds were flying 905 feet above the heads of the people to the day, would be the right device for SOLOMON'S flag.

Wild geese are usually more apting than the stilly birds which flew low in Kansas the other evening that they were knocked down with poles by boys on the house-tops. They would not have met this ignominial fate had they followed the example of their relations who lent themselves to a scientific purpose a few weeks ago. These wild geese were on their way to northern summer resort when they came within the purview of two gentlemen who were busy at the Blue Hill Meteorological Observatory ascertaining the heights of clouds. They turned their headlights on the geese and ascertained that the birds were flying 905 feet above the Neponset River Valley and were bearing the summer resort at the rate of 44.3 miles an hour. It is no discredit to a goose to be a high flyer, and it is a good deal safer.

We have read with interest a pamphlet reporting a prize essay contest in Pittsburgh conducted under the aegis of Trustees of the Carnegie Art and Museum Fund. The judges were Bishop WILSON, Miss E. J. M. WILSON, President of the Pennsylvania College for Women; Mr. GOULD, Comptroller of Pittsburgh; Miss SARAH H. KILKRELL, and Mr. J. H. MACFARLANE, a distinguished lawyer. One hundred and eleven anonymous essays were sent in to compete for six cash prizes, amounting to \$100 in all, offered to the pupils of the Pittsburgh High School and of the High School of the public schools for the best six descriptions of a trip through the Carnegie Museum. These six prizes were duly awarded, but the general excellence of the essays was such that twenty additional prizes of \$5 each were given to twenty competitors in addition to those selected by the judges. The first six essays are published, and very clever they are. The committee also gives a list of some eighty-five names, with the remark: "These contestants were then given honorable mention." This specimen of atrociously bad English is printed along with the remainder of the evidence of the contest, and that because he has not fought the Cuban army in his surling campaign there is no Cuban army to fight. In truth, Weyler has not at any time gone near the camp of Gomez, or the camp of Garcia; he has but skirted along the northern coast of central Cuba in a small steamer, stopping for the purpose of the fortified places occupied by Spanish troops. Knowing the locations of the various bodies of revolutionary Cubans, he has steered clear of all of them, and it is not the purpose of the commanders of these bodies to give the Spaniards the advantage which they would have in a battle upon a field of their own choice; they fight in the open, as they fought her in the two previous years of the war. In obtaining fresh supplies of the munitions of war from time to time, they furnish proof that it is their purpose to keep up the war till Cuba is free. Why should they expend their means for rifles and cannon they have no intention of using?

It is certain that the Cubans would not, at this time, make the most strenuous efforts to produce the weapons of war if they did not entertain the design of using them. Within a month, Gen. GOMEZ will have more arms than he needs for more arms which he has so often made during the past two years. This appeal can have but one meaning, and that is the continuance of the war of the revolution. It looks as if he entertained the purpose of "pushing things" as far as possible during the rainy season, which has almost begun in western Cuba, and will soon be at its height.

The landing of arms for the Cuban service is the revolutionary reply to the oft-repeated Spanish declaration, which is again made at this time, that the rebels are suing for peace, or are anxious of surrendering to Spain, or are ready to entertain propositions for reform. Surely the signs of surrender are not on the Cuban side; surely the Bernudas is not a sign of it, or any of the other arms-bearing ships of the advancing and winning revolution.

The Spaniards seem to think that Gen. Weyler's proposals to a number of safe places in the peninsula are evidence of the confessed weakness and that because he has not fought the Cuban army in his surling campaign there is no Cuban army to fight. In truth, Weyler has not at any time gone near the camp of Gomez, or the camp of Garcia; he has but skirted along the northern coast of central Cuba in a small steamer, stopping for the purpose of the fortified places occupied by Spanish troops. Knowing the locations of the various bodies of revolutionary Cubans, he has steered clear of all of them, and it is not the purpose of the commanders of these bodies to give the Spaniards the advantage which they would have in a battle upon a field of their own choice; they fight in the open, as they fought her in the two previous years of the war. In obtaining fresh supplies of the munitions of war from time to time, they furnish proof that it is their purpose to keep up the war till Cuba is free. Why should they expend their means for rifles and cannon they have no intention of using?

It is certain that all of Gen. Weyler's boasting about the pacification of Cuba under Spanish rule is foolish. It is not less certain that the opinion prevalent in Spain, and promulgated there by the Government for its own ends, that the revolutionists are anxious to negotiate for peace, is equally untrue. Not one of the leaders of the civil or military, has ever uttered a word that hinted of surrender. Every one of them has always stood, and yet stands, faithful to the declaration of independence proclaimed in the spring of 1895.

LAWYER MAY SHED TEARS.

Judge Bates That Weeping Before a Jury is an Admissible Argument.

CINCINNATI, April 14.—The current number of the Southern Reporter contains the decision of Judge Wilkes of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in a case in which among other things it was held that the jury had been unduly influenced by the tears of counsel in argument. The case is as follows: It is next assigned as error that counsel for plaintiff, in his closing argument, in the midst of a very eloquent and impassioned appeal to the sympathy of the jury in favor of the plaintiff, had wept in such a manner as to influence the jury in his favor. The defendant's counsel had urged the jury to find against the plaintiff, and after diligent search had been able to find no other grounds for his verdict. The conduct of counsel in presenting his cases to a jury is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the jury, and the discretion of the trial judge. Perhaps no counsel observe the same rules of propriety and decorum in their addresses wholly in logic—argument without embellishments of any kind. Others use rhetoric, and occupy the time of the jury and unduly excite the sympathy of the jury in favor of the plaintiff. He has wept in such a manner as to influence the jury in his favor. The defendant's counsel had urged the jury to find against the plaintiff, and after diligent search had been able to find no other grounds for his verdict. The conduct of counsel in presenting his cases to a jury is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the jury, and the discretion of the trial judge. Perhaps no counsel observe the same rules of propriety and decorum in their addresses wholly in logic—argument without embellishments of any kind. Others use rhetoric, and occupy the time of the jury and unduly excite the sympathy of the jury in favor of the plaintiff. He has wept in such a manner as to influence the jury in his favor. 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