TO BUILD UP THE NAVY.

A VERY COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF SHIPBUILDING PROPOSED.

It Will Cover Fifteen Years, and Will Give Us Forty-five Battleships, Twenty-three Monitors, Seventy-five Cruisers of All Kinds and 135 Torpedo Boats and Destroyers—Yearly Expense Will Be $40,000,000—States Might Provide Ships, and Would Be Expected to Provide Naval Militia Crews for the Monitors.

The general feeling of the American people can be confidently assumed to be in favor of granting to the navy all that it can consistently ask. There are good reasons for believing this to be the case. For the first time since the War of 1812 the navy has been the predominant factor in our hostile operations: in the war with Mexico and in the Civil War the navy was secondary to the army, and the present is the first occasion which the people have had in which to observe the worth of our naval forces, supplied with an effective fleet, equipped with the best guns and armor, and institute a comparison between its deeds now and in former times. The result has been satisfactory even to those who expected the most. There is not an occasion to be cited where the officers, men, vessels, and guns of our new navy did not do all that could be expected of them whenever opportunity offered.

All those who paid attention to the operations of the navy during the Spanish War, and the shifts to which the Secretary of the Navy was put to find vessels for the work to be done, are fully convinced that we need, not only a much larger fleet than we now possess, but that such navy should be divided into two separate and distinct classes, which we may call, for distinguishing purposes, the offensive and and defensive fleets. The lack of a sufficient number of vessels for harbor defence in the first instance, and the failure to receive what little had been provided, owing to the necessity of using monitors and coast defence vessels on blockading and offensive duty, demonstrated our deficiency in defensive fleets, and the lack of efficient vessels for offensive purposes, even with the assistance of the coast defence fleet, when we could not spare one ship to threaten the ports of our foe across the Atlantic, conclusively show our crying need of more vessels suited to offensive operations. The necessity for a larger navy is not alone the outgrowth of our experience during the late war. Before that time it was generally conceded that we were not yet in such a strategical position as regards number of vessels of the various classes as would justify us in ceasing to add to our fleets. The great American habit of procrastination and failure to be ready till "the day after the fair" has kept us back, but aside from those who seem to be lost to all sense of patriotism in their wild hysterical shrieking about anti-imperialism, the worst procrastinator is now convinced that we must take time by the forelock and, as quickly as possible, get in a position to take care of our coasts, commerce and the additional great interests we have assumed as a result of the war. The lessons of the war, the need of providing suitable protection for our foreign territories, combine to impress seriously upon us not only the wisdom, but the absolute necessity of improving our naval strength in ships, guns, and men as rapidly as possible.

The insufficiency of our present navy being admitted, what do we need to complete our present equipment? Here we find our best experts afraid to face the situation, fearing that the immensity of their demands will appall the people and result in nothing being done. It is of no use to expect anything unless the people fully realize the necessities of the case, and the sooner the situation is fairly faced and provision made for the systematic and regular addition of the vessels needed the better it will be for the navy, the people and the prospects of lasting peace. Just at this time, when the nation is most vividly impressed with the excellencies of what we have and the greatness of our needs, it would seem to be the most opportune time to lay out a comprehensive scheme of naval increase, to be realized as fast as our means will allow.

Before specifying our wants it will be as well to compare our existing fleet with that of the five or six principal nations of Europe and note how we stand in comparison with those of our neighbors with whom we are more or less apt to come in conflict.

VESSELS	Great Britain.	France.	Russia.	United States.	Germany.	Italy.
Battleships, first class	44	18	11	12	6	10
Battleships, second class	21	18	7	1	10	2
Battleships, third class	9	—	5	—	—	2
Coast defence ships	21	19	17	28	19	8
Armored cruisers	16	4	5	7	2	5
Protected cruisers	19	10	4	17	—	—
Cruisers, 2d and 3d class	104	20	16	8	3	14
Gunboats, seagoing	48	88	29	16	17	17
Gunboats, river	56	31	41	—	15	8
Torpedo boat destroyers	96	18	14	16	11	16
Torpedo boats, first class	78	112	85	27	105	110
Torpedo boats, 2d & 3d class	112	138	130	—	8	33
Auxiliary vessels, despatch boats, colliers, &c., are omitted, but their enumeration would show the United States to be still further behind than the above list would indicate. Here we stand fourth in the naval powers by a very small margin, with Germany and Italy running us a very close race, and, with the German programme of increase taken into account as against our own, the knowledge that in three or four years Germany will be ahead of us.						

In enumerating below what is considered our necessities for the protection we require and the proper vessels to be assigned to the defensive and offensive fleets, it should be borne in mind that this is not a scheme for a year or two, but is laid out as a comprehensive plan to take a minimum of fifteen years for its accomplishment, and allowing for the dilatoriness of Congress, a probability that at least twenty years will be required to realize it in full, if at all. It is better to lay out a good and as near as possible perfect system, than a poor one devised for temporary emergencies.

THE DEFENSIVE NAVY.

Defence being more important than offence, and no nation in fact being in a position to take the offensive until its defences are in order for its protection, let us lay out first our scheme of defence.

The United States has an enormous extent of seacoast on both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans to protect. It would seem that the best way to do this will be to divide the various sections into zones, to which arrangement the situation of our principal cities naturally lends itself, and then provide for an outer and inner line of defence and scouts for each zone. The following is suggested as the best disposition of ships and arrangement of zones to meet our requirements:

COAST DEFENCE FLEET.

ATLANTIC COAST.

Zones.	Ports.	Monitors.	Battleships.	Cruisers.	Destroyers.	Torpedo Boats.
1	Eastport	1				2
	Tenacre	1	2	2		2
	Portland	1				2
	Portsmouth	1				2
2	Boston and vicinity	3	4	4	2	4
	Newport	2				2
	Head L. I. Sd.	2				2
	L. I. Sound	2	2		4	4
3	N. Y. Harbor	2	2	4	4	8
	D. L. Cover	4	2			4
	Chesapeake Bay	4	2			4
4	Wilmington	1		3		2
	Port Royal	2	1			2
	Charleston	1				2
5	Savannah	1	2	2		2
	Brunswick	1				2
6	Key West & vic.	2	2	2	2	2
	Tampa					2
7	Pensacola	1	2			2
	Mobile	1				2
	Mouths Mississ.	2			2	2
8	Sabine Pass	1	4	4		2
	Galveston	2				2
		37	24	23	18	60

PACIFIC COAST.

9	San Diego	1	2	1	1	2
10	San Francisco	2	4	3	2	4
11	Puget Sound	2	2	2	2	4
12	Puget Sound	2	2	2	4	4
		9	10	8	8	14
Tot'l Atlantic Coast		37	24	23	18	60
	Pacific "	9	10	8	8	14
	Def'ce fleet	46	34	32	26	74

A study of the provision made for each port and zone will show that the aim has been in all cases to provide a minimum of one monitor and two torpedo boats to each port and if not an ample, at least a fair supply of battleships, cruisers and destroyers to the different zones. The monitors and torpedo boats will act as advance guards to the land defences at each port, for, it is now a well-appreciated fact, that an auxiliary defence at some distance seaward from the land defences is an important and necessary part of the proper protection of a port, to engage, and, if possible, disable the enemy before he has a chance to attack the defences at the port, and later to reinforce the work of land batteries. The torpedo boats can do their special work and get closer to the object to be attacked under the wing of a monitor and stand a better chance of sinking the enemy than if obliged to proceed to the attack alone. To each zone has been allotted one or more battleships, proportionate to the importance of the zone. These vessels are intended to cruise off shore, at or near the middle of the zone to which they may be assigned and, upon being informed by the scout cruisers of the approach of an enemy, to reenforce the station monitors at the point destined for attack. The cruisers designed for scout service should have high speed and large coal capacity so that they can stay at sea for long periods, and, within their respective zones detect the approach of a hostile fleet and then warn, first, the battleships of the zone, secondly, the point threatened. Heavy armor or armament is not needed on these ships, which require rather large steaming radius and great speed than fighting capacity. The uses of the destroyers and torpedo boats need no explanation. The division into zones and allotment of vessels of each class to the different zones, it is believed, will commend itself to the impartial student as being fair to all and affording to each place the importance its position to the country demands. Certainly the principle here laid down must be approved, for no one can gainsay that the destruction of the smallest port we have enumerated in this list would be more expensive than the cost of the entire number of vessels herein provided for; and when that factor receives proper consideration the size of the defence fleet required will not seem so great.

At the present time to meet the demands of such a fleet we have on hand:

Monitors.	Battleships.	Scouting Cruisers.	Torpedo Boats.
29	13	2	35

None of our destroyers is yet in commission and those under construction we have attached to our offensive fleet, where they would seem to be more urgently needed. The battleships take in all under construction at this time; the monitors, the relics of the Civil War, and those now built and contracted for; the scouts are the Minneapolis and Columbia. We have, therefore, still to provide for our defensive fleet the following, viz.:

	Monitors.	Battleships.	Scouting Cruisers.	Destroyers.	Torpedo Boats.
Needed	46	34	32	26	74
On hand	23	13	6	—	35
Required	23	21	26	26	39

The best method of providing for these will be considered in connection with the provision for the requirements of the offensive fleets.

THE OFFENSIVE NAVY.

When we come to consider our requirements for an offensive fleet we find entirely different conditions confronting us. This fleet is to the defensive what the regular army is to the militia. It must be strong in attacking power, able to carry a large supply of coal, stores and provisions, and each squadron must be of sufficient strength to hold its own against any enemy it is likely to encounter. A navy, deficient in vessels, guns, men or material, is worse than no navy at all, as it will be a source of weakness instead of strength when it is most needed. For this reason I have laid down as our actual, necessary requirements for a fairly adequate offensive navy the following:

DIVISIONS.	Sea Going Battleships.	Armored Cruisers.	Protected Cruisers.	Unprotected Cruisers.	Gunboats.	Torpedo Boat Destroyers.
North Atlantic fleet	4	8	8	2	4	12
South Atlantic fleet	2	6	6	2	4	8
European squadron of fleet	2	6	4	2	4	12
Northern Pacific fleet	4	6	6	6	4	10
Southern Pacific fleet	2	4	2	1	4	4
Asiatic fleet	6	10	8	3	10	20
Reserve or dying fleet	4	10	10	—	—	20
	24	50	44	20	26	84

The above list calls for the least number of vessels of each class that the necessities of our position require. It is easy to find where a vessel of one class should be added here, one another there; that protection is not provided for this place or that, nor for convoys; but I think it impossible for the most severe critic to find a spot where one can dispense with a single vessel without actual danger to our interests as they now stand. We have available at present, of the various vessels enumerated above:

Battleships	
Armored cruisers	3
Protected cruisers	15
Unprotected cruisers	15
Gunboats	16
Torpedo boat destroyers	16

It has been stated that the principal qualities needed in our offensive fleet are:

1. Great fighting capacity.
2. Large radius of action.
3. Superiority in fighting quality to enemy.
4. Speed superior to enemies' vessels.
5. Number sufficient to cover and protect our interests.

To achieve this our main reliance must be on our battleships and armored cruisers, with a complement of destroyers. Protected cruisers, second and third class cruisers, and gunboats are needed for convoy, scout and special duty, and for the ordinary work of times of peace, and no navy would be in condition to cope with an enemy without a proper supply of these classes, but the strength of the fleets will lie in the efficiency of the battleships and armored cruisers. The present opinion of naval constructors, and our own experience in the late war, convinces us that battleships should be of 12,500 to 15,000 tons of at least 18 knots speed, of great coal capacity, and furnished with the best armor and guns obtainable. Armored cruisers should be about 12,000 tons, 22 knots speed, large coal capacity, with best gun power and armor that can be with the other requirements. Protected cruisers 8,000 to 9,000 tons, 18 to 20 knots speed, fair gun power, and large coal capacity. Unprotected cruisers 2,000 to 5,000 tons, 18 to 20 knots speed, good coal capacity, and such armament as their size warrants; gunboats, 1,000 tons, 15 knots speed, light draught (not over twelve feet), and best coal capacity and armament possible. Destroyers, 500 to 800 tons, 35 knots speed, good sea boats, and as large a coal capacity as can be managed.

Of the battleships needed we have, strictly speaking, none on hand, and all will have to be built. If some of those now under construction are used for the offensive fleet, their place would have to be supplied in the defensive, so it is the same thing to count them there and as lacking here. The armored cruisers we have are fine vessels of their size, but are not large enough in view of the kind other nations are building. The three ordered at the last session of Congress will be of the right kind, however, to compete with any now built or building for any of the other powers. Our fifteen protected cruisers are good boats and will answer in this class, although smaller in tonnage than we require. Our unprotected cruisers and gunboats are suitable for their classes, and the sixteen destroyers now building are just what we shall want for the offensive fleet in size and speed.

We find then that for both sections of the navy the vessels on hand and needed are as follows, viz.:

	Monitors.	Coast Defence Battleships.	Sea Going Battleships.	Armored Cruisers.	Protected Cruisers.	Scouting Cruisers.	Unprotected Cruisers.	Gunboats.	Torpedo Boat Destroyers.	Torpedo Boats.
Number needed	46	34	24	50	44	32	20	26	110	74
Number on hand	23	13	00	3	15	2	15	16	16	35
No. to be built	23	21	24	48	29	26	10	10	94	39

This makes a total of 191 vessels yet to be built, and 133 destroyers and torpedo boats.

The unthinking will laugh at the idea that the United States can need any such force for the protection of its coasts, foreign dependencies and trade relations with other countries; politicians will stand aghast at the money required to be voted for such a purpose, which they would not mind probably did they not fear it would not be approved by their constituents. Let all the dissidents sit down and think the question over calmly and rationally. Try to pick flaws in the above estimate of our needs and arrange a schedule of our wants to cover your own idea of the needs of the country. Take our extent of coast line, are the requirements of the defensive fleet overestimated? If so, where? Which one of the ports enumerated would you leave without the protection specified or lessen the number of vessels assigned. For most of the ports one monitor and two torpedo boats are provided. Is this too much naval protection to reinforce the land defences and act as a first line of battle to draw out the strength of any attacking force and the torpedo boats serve as the destroying agency of the enemy? The monitor will retire as the foe advances, and become eventually an integral part of the land defences with the advantage that it can be moved from point to point as may be found necessary or advisable. The points where more than one monitor are suggested, as Boston, New York, &c., are such as the most careless observer must see require more protection and of the kind offered by a floating battery. The wide sweep of Massachusetts Bay, the large number of small towns situated upon it, can only receive adequate protection from a force of monitors, and more rather than less should be stationed there. The importance of New York justifies the assignment made there and so with the other places in the list. The problem of proper defence can be met in no other way than by a suitable number of monitors and torpedo boats capable of navigating in all waters and practically indestructible. The defence line of battleships may be omitted by the over bold. Their usefulness and importance must be admitted, nay emphatically asserted, if we are to undertake to guarantee our ports from bombardment; but if we do not undertake to prevent any attack, but aim only to resist one that is made, we can omit most of the battleships provided. So also we can dispense with the scouting cruisers. The omission will be costly in two ways: first, it is likely to result in the serious damage of some of our coast towns, involving a larger expense than would result from the construction of twice the number of defence ships here suggested; second, in the grave loss to the offensive fleet by the withdrawal of its vessels to act as a defence to seaports, for we can feel assured that the same alarmist feeling that depleted our navy during the last war would arise again and political influence would once more compel the Administration to divert the vessels of the navy from their proper and regular duty. In the first case either the loss would fall, unless Congress came to the rescue, upon the city or town suffering the attack, and would be a most unjust division of the punishment resulting from the neglect of the whole country. If, therefore, the line of battleships and scout cruisers is not to be provided, it should be plainly laid down by law that the vessels of the offensive fleet are not to be used for defensive purposes under any consideration during hostilities with another power. While the last scare or fear of a bombardment by the fleet of Spain was silly in the extreme, it is safe to assume that our next war will be with some power far stronger than Spain, one with more ships to spare for attacking our coasts, raising a much greater feeling of alarm and far greater demand for coast protection. The diversion of the offensive fleet cannot be permitted under such circumstances even if it was during the last war, and Congress must look this fact squarely in the face. Of course, the battleships that we have at present, though not specially meant for them selves for scouting duty, will have to serve in the offensive fleet until such time as they can be relegated to their proper duty and place, and the excuse that they are coast line battleships will not serve to take them out of the offensive side of our naval force. They must be used for offensive purposes for some years anyway until we can get a sufficient number of sea-going ships of the first class to do duty on the offensive force and until we can get 10 or 12 first-rates afloat we must pray to be delivered from the danger of war.

In the offensive fleet the most careful scrutiny cannot find a place in which to pare. The North Atlantic fleet will be charged with the duty of sweeping the Atlantic and protecting our commerce there and our West Indian possessions and Cuba. In the charge will be the great ocean highways from Europe to our shores and the protection of Porto Rico and Cuba as well as the Gulf of Mexico. Its strength as laid down will not be sufficient for its needs against the French or Russian fleets, or even the German, as the case may be, and it would be found necessary to reinforce it from the European and reserve fleets in such a case. The South Atlantic fleet will have charge of our interests on the east coast of South America and the west coast of Africa, and the extent of territory it will have to cover could not be properly done in war time by twice the number of vessels. The European fleet would be the invading or aggressive one, and for special operations it would have to draw from the others instead of giving them aid. The Asiatic fleet would need a large reinforcement, would not be equal to an attack against the land defences of any Continental nation. As a nucleus, however, it could be used to make limits, keep a force of vessels of other nations at home to protect their interests against a meddlesome course on the high seas. The Northern Pacific fleet will have the care of our western coast, Alaska and Hawaii. It would have about as much work in proportion to its size as the North Atlantic fleet, and work fully as important. The Southern Pacific fleet would have commerce and interests in those seas to protect and might also be charged with the care of Samoa. The Asiatic fleet will have the greatest task of all. It is therefore, made the strongest numerically and in fighting capacity. Westward the course of empire has taken its way until it has gone so far that it seems to be about to recommence at the far East the conquest of the world. China, the prize of all nations, teeming with a vast population, defended by all arts of war, and offering the richest goals, is surrounded by a list of no'ves waiting to tear a strip of territory from its worm-out grasp. Japan is raising herself to a high place in the councils of the world, and we have assumed responsibilities in the Philippines that may involve us on the Asiatic coast. With all these interests to protect and our new possession of Guam, the size of this fleet should be increased largely. It is useless to expect this however for many, many years, and the Dewey of this day will be obliged to sink if he supposes the deeds of the hero of to-day by reason of his still more inadequate allotment of vessels to compete with the superior forces of our foes.

The vessels assigned to the reserve fleet are few, and liable to be needed twice over in case of an equal hostile force.

It must be borne in mind that the programme here outlined covers a period of some years. There should be no two opinions as to what we most need. Emphatically our greatest lack is in battleships and armored cruisers; the comparison of our stock of these classes with that possessed by other nations shows this without possibility of argument; and when we note the rate at which the other great powers are adding to their stock of these vessels we must conclude that we want them at once.

If we undertake the construction of a certain number of vessels of each class every year, laying down a definite programme to be followed without diminution each year, and if we include in this programme three battleships and three armored cruisers at the same time and provision made for gradually acquiring the vessels needed for that purpose. Nearing twenty-three monitors and twenty-one battleships we should order one of each class every year until the number is complete. As it is almost never likely that our coast marine will receive accessions of a class of vessels suitable for scouting cruisers, we may defer any provision for them. In destroyers and torpedo boats we are lamentably weak, and while the necessity or usefulness of these boats is not cause of doubt, the possibility of doubt we should supply ourselves with a reasonable number to use as a protection against those of other nations. We should build ten destroyers per year for the next five years and five per annum after that time and we should have twenty-five annum until we get the number needed. Passed on these lines the construction programme would be about as follows, viz.:

FOR FIRST FIVE YEARS, EACH YEAR.

3 seagoing battleships at $3,500,000 each	$10,500,000
1 coast defence battleship	3,000,000
1 monitor	1,500,000
3 armored cruisers at $4,000,000 each	12,000,000
1 protected cruiser	2,100,000
1 unprotected cruiser	1,000,000
1 gunboat	250,000
10 destroyers at $300,000 each	3,000,000
5 torpedo boats at $150,000 each	750,000
Per year for five years	$34,100,000

Armor and armament would be additional and make the total appropriation required in the neighborhood of $50,000,000 each year.

SIXTH, SEVENTH AND EIGHTH YEARS.

Same as above, less 5 destroyers each year	$32,600,000	27,800,000

NINTH AND TENTH YEARS.

2 coast defence battleships	$3,000,000	$6,000,000
2 monitors	1,500,000	3,000,000
3 armored cruisers	4,000,000	12,000,000
1 protected cruiser		600,000
1 cruiser		2,000,000
1 gunboat		250,000
5 destroyers	300,000	1,500,000
Per year for 2 years	$26,700,000	50,900,000

ELEVENTH, TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH YEARS.

2 coast defence battleships	$3,000,000	$6,000,000
2 monitors	1,500,000	3,000,000
3 pro. cruisers	2,100,000	6,300,000
3 ar. cruisers	4,000,000	12,000,000
5 destroyers	300,000	1,500,000
Per year for 3 years	$26,700,000	80,100,000

FOURTEENTH YEAR.

1 coast defence battleship	$3,000,000	$3,000,000
2 monitors	1,500,000	3,000,000
3 ar. cruisers	4,000,000	12,000,000
2 pro. cruisers	2,100,000	4,200,000
1 scout cruiser		2,000,000
5 destroyers	300,000	1,500,000
		25,700,000

FIFTEENTH YEAR.

2 coast defence battleships	$3,000,000	$6,000,000
3 monitors	1,500,000	4,500,000
2 pro. cruisers	2,100,000	4,200,000
3 armo. cruisers	4,000,000	12,000,000
		26,700,000
Total expenditures in 15 years		$451,700,000
Add 35 for armor and armament, say		148,300,000
Total		$600,000,000

An average of $40,000,000 per year for the next fifteen years for the increase of the navy.

This programme leaves at the end of fifteen years three armored cruisers and nine protected cruisers to be built, all of which can be laid down in one year without exceeding the annual sum allowed for each year by more than $5,000,000, or the whole can be divided into two years and one or two other vessels built each year.

The average of forty millions per annum for fifteen years is certainly a good round sum, yet, compared with the amounts European nations are spending on the increase of their naval establishments, it is not a large amount. Some are spending as high as fifty to sixty millions per year and it is an open question whether our expenditures on the scale here indicated are sufficient to place us in as good a relative position as that we now occupy. With that, however, we need not concern ourselves: the large expense here suggested are all we can afford and will be sufficient to put us in a good position, to say the least. With the amounts required from time to time for repairs and renewals and for incidentals as yard and docks, we shall be spending a very large sum on the navy.

Ways and means for this increase are now to be considered. The work here outlined is certainly for the good of the whole country and especially for the advantage of posterity. It would seem that such an important work as is here being considered is one where a great part of the cost could fairly be saddled upon those who will receive the greater part of the benefit. Especially as we are still engaged in paying pensions to those who defended the country during the Civil War does it seem fair that the whole of the first five years' expenses should be provided for by an issue of bond for the sum needed each year on account of "increase of the Navy." After five years it is altogether possible that a very large part of the present pension list will drop off rapidly, and by that time is part, possibly half, of the yearly expenditure could be paid from the yearly revenues without unduly taxing the people.

There is one other way in which the necessary increase can be in part provided without any tax on the general Government. If each one of the States and Territories would undertake to furnish at least one battleship, armored cruiser, or monitor, according to population and means, we should acquire our navy at a much earlier date, with less friction from economists, lawmakers, and add largely to the popular interest in the navy as a patriotic branch of our national life. Under such a plan New York and Pennsylvania could give two battleships, or one battleship and one armored cruiser, or two armored cruisers; other States, in proportion to their population and wealth, contributing one battleship or armored cruiser or a smaller vessel. Rhode Island could manage a protected cruiser at least, and no State but what can do as much as that, even if it has to issue short term bonds in payment of the cost. The plan is patriotic, feasible and a time saver. It would tend to stimulate the liberality and patriotism of the interior States, and, if properly presented by Congress to the States, could hardly fail to secure prompt and hearty response.

To provide a suitable number of officers and men will not be hard. An increase in the number of cadets at the Naval Academy will supply the officers, and the popularization of the navy by having each State provide a vessel, would tend to furnish a good number of seamen from its interior. In time of peace 5,000 to 20,000 men would be the max mum number needed, as the majority of the vessels of the offensive fleet would be laid up in ordinary, with care-taking crews only, and all of the vessels of the defensive fleet either in ordinary or in charge of the naval militia of the various States. It could be made a sine qua non, before a monitor was provided for any port, that such place should provide a sufficient number of officers and sailors to take charge of it or them, as the case might be. The navy yard would be able to provide a crew for one monitor, and the State in which a port or ports were situated could no doubt furnish enough naval militia to man the defence fleet allotted to that section. All vessels being sheathed and coppered, they would need no fresh water station in which to lay up, and frequent dockings would not be necessary, while the fleet of destroyers and torpedo boats can be hauled out of water and kept under cover as the various navy yards, save as required to be used in practicing for the needs best work to young officers. The increase in the navy will be gradually needed and no large number will be required in one year. The Personnel act will provide a good number of officers for commands; rank and additions can be made as needed. We require one thing, however, we are not likely to get, and that is a supply of high ranking officers—Admirals and Vice-Admirals. We should have at least one Admiral and three Vice-Admirals, with a sufficient number of Rear Admirals to fill the important sea and shore commands. The Admiral should be the technical Commander-in-Chief of the Navy on duty at the Department as the official adviser of the Secretary, and two of the Vice-Admirals should be on duty at sea, one on the Atlantic and the other on the Pacific, ever an officer of his grade should be found most needed from time to time. The necessity for this lies in the fact that other nations have their important fleets on foreign stations under the command of a Vice-Admiral, and we should be in a position to demand their flags and commanders all the courtesy and consideration afforded to any nation, and at the same time have an officer of as high a rank as any he is likely to meet with on the station so that his rights, personal and official, may have as much weight as those of others. It is really more necessary that we should do this than that we should have Ambassadors instead of Ministers, for our naval commanders are generally in a position where they are forced to deal with men who are invested with the influence of cities and without the assistance of diplomats or regular diplomatic proceedings. The expense is a mere trifle, and the exalted rank is worthy the magnificent officers we have, soldiers and sailors, trusted with the command of our floating fortresses.

The increase of the navy demands provision for its care and repair. We are now about as ill equipped with yards and docks as possible, and the docks lately ordered are not, in some instances, of a permanent order. For durability we need stone dry docks and plenty of them. Each navy yard should have at least one large enough to take in the largest class of ships and two others capable of taking each two of the smaller vessels, so that five ships might be docked at one time. The cost for maintenance of a properly constructed dry dock is practically nothing and its need is great in time of war. Proper defences have to be provided for our foreign naval stations as we all as those at home and a suitable force provided for the protection of them. The Marine Corps is the proper body to be charged with this duty and it should receive such additions to its rank and file as will enable a sufficient number to be detached at the various stations for proper care and protection.

The habitual procrastinator argues that we have plenty of time in which to get ready for our next war. The over-confident citizen who thinks we can whip any nation under the sun does not see the necessity for prompt action, but surrender to the desires of either class is like to leave us in a serious position at any moment. It is true that we awakened the envy and admiration of the world by the conduct of our navy during the war with Spain. Other nations, however, feel confident that they could give a better account of themselves than did the Spaniards, and this is no doubt true. The feeling of respect we created will not stave off hostilities and the present conduct of certain foreign nations indicates that ere long they or we must do some giving in. As we feel that we have excellent grounds of offence against some and as the differences are sure to be over trade questions, where neither power will care to give in without a trial of strength, the danger of collision is great. Our motto should be "Ready, aye Ready" for whatever enterprise may come to us in the future, and the people should see to it that the politicians provide the sums needed to place the navy in a state of preparedness to take advantage of any exigencies that may arise.

A. M. BAILEY.

DESIRABILITY OF TRUTH TELLING.

Jones's Run on Unwelcome Visitors Failed to Secure Results Hoped For.

"I am going to stick to the truth hereafter," said Jones, as he bit savagely at the end of his cigar. "The other day while I was at home my wife chanced to look out of a window, and I heard her give a gasp as she did so. I looked up from my paper and my wife gave me a look of horror.

"'Here comes that second cousin of yours, his wife, three children, two dogs and something in a cage,' she cried, tragically. 'What has ever possessed them to leave the country and inflict themselves upon us? There is no telling when they will go away, and I simply cannot take the time to entertain them!'

"'Here,' said I, seized with a bright idea, 'tip over a few chairs, move the furniture about a bit and tell them that we are cleaning house. They will not expect us to receive them with the house torn up.'

"We had barely time to overturn a few things when the cabalcade bore down upon us.

"'Hullo!' roared my second cousin, as he seized my hand and nearly broke all the bones in it, 'thought we would come down and pay you a visit!'

"'Glad to see you,' I said with all the grace that I could muster. 'I am awfully sorry that you should find us in the midst of house cleaning.'

"'Right in our line!' roared my second cousin again. 'Take hold, Mandy, and we'll show them how we clean house in the country!' Gosh, it was lucky that we came just as we did.'

"In spite of my protests and my wife's tears, they caught up our furniture and carried it into the street, where it was immediately surrounded by an excited crowd of street urchins who were under the impression that the house was afire and who swarmed into the house to aid in the good work. Our expensive rugs were taken out and beaten with a broom handle until they were nearly in rags, while our finely waxed floors that were the pride of my wife's heart were so marred from heavy boot heels as to be ruined. The whole house from cellar to garret was overturned, scrubbed, washed and sandpapered. It was too much for me; so after trying in vain to stop the general wreck I fled to my club, leaving my wife in the last stages of hysterics.

"Now that they have things all slicked up, to use their expression, they say they are ready to pay us a nice long visit. As I remarked in the first place, I am going to stick to the truth hereafter."

Too Many Marriages Says Bishop Spalding.

From the Chicago Tribune.

BLOOMINGTON, Ill., Nov. 1.—The Conference of Charities and Corrections, which opens its fourth annual meeting to-day, considered the preventive forces of education and trade unionism in charity. The Right Rev. J. L. Spalding, Bishop of Peoria, told the delegates at the evening session that one-half the marriages which take place should be prevented as causes of pauperism, vice and crime.

"If it were possible," said Bishop Spalding, "though, I do not see how it ever can be, it would be right it would be a duty, to prevent half the marriages that take place. People enter into these relations in the same spirit that they would purchase a horse, a house, or a suit of clothes. They have no regard for the sacredness of the relations upon which they enter. Education cannot be a preventive of the necessity for charity, a preventative of pauperism and crime, unless it be an education of love. It must be a vital power with him who teaches. In such a way the home is the best school. But where the one who marries is a sot, a criminal, the home gives no education. Where the shadow of divorce hangs over a home, or separation has already taken place in one, the children of that family are ready to pass on as wanderers to the detriment of society. Our American home depends upon the vigor with which we fight divorce. We talk of qualifications and franchise and of demanding that a man prove his worth to cast the ballot. We say nothing to the end that a man should show his qualifications for marriage."

One of Love's Confidences.

From the Chicago Tribune.

(Slipping the ring on her finger)—"Let's keep this secret a little while, darling. Don't say anything about it."

(In a whisper)—"I won't, love—till I find out whether the stone is genuine or not."

Unnecessary Caution.

From Harper's Bazar.

Physician (giving advice)—Lastly, McGorry, don't go to sleep on an empty stomach.

McGorry (who is ailing)—No danger av thot, dochthor; I always slape on me back.

THE NERVOUS MAN'S STORY

A LIFE'S ROMANCE WOUND ABOUT THREE COCKTAILS.

Dreams of a Golden Future Shattered by the Palm of Miss Ham of Chicago—And Ignorance of Botany—Unexpected Discovery by the Bartender at the Conclusion

His hand shook so violently that a third of his cocktail was spilled before he could get the glass to his lips. The bartender remarked:

"Better slow down a bit, old chap. You are a going it too strong. You'll have pink monkeys and blue snakes if you keep on. Then will come a padded cell and all your old friends a sending you white grapes and jelly. I'm no reformer but I've seen too many young fellows going it like you not to put my oar in when it can be done in time."

"You have made a mistake in my case, Mr. Bartender, but I appreciate your motives," said the shaky man. "I am by no means alcoholic though one might easily draw that conclusion from the way in which I take my cocktail. That shakiness is constitutional, not acquired I assure you."

"You don't say?" said the bartender, throwing the ice out of the shaker. "I kinder thought you ought to get on the water cart. Tough, aint it, to have the shakes and not to have had the drinks that caused them?"

"It not only makes my infirmity liable to misconstruction but it has proved an obstacle to my success in other ways. My acute nervousness and my lack of botanical knowledge prevented my marriage to the wealthy Miss Ham, of Chicago, two months ago. It's a sad tale and I wonder that it hasn't been published in the newspapers. The best stories don't get into print, do they?" And the nervous man thoughtfully turned his cocktail glass upside down and studied its pattern.

"Have the next one on the house. What'll it be? Same?"

"Just a little bit dryer than the previous one, thank you. The sugar is bad for the stomach."

"Who did you say that Miss Ham was?" said the bartender, as he made the long handle of the spoon revolve between his thumb and his first finger.

"One of the wealthiest girls of Chicago," said the nervous man.

"A good looker?"

"Um—m, no, but lots of money. We were sympathetic, very. Her father fitted up a house for her in New York as a studio and she spent her winters here with an aunt as chaperone. I met her at an Uncut Leaves sociable."

"That's a new one on me," said the bar tender, pushing the cocktail to the front of the bar.

"Purely literary," said the nervous man. "Authors who don't publish, and that sort of thing. Where did I come in? Well, I qualified on the strength of having lived a summer in Rochelle Park and attended the lecture course. Miss Ham and I were very sympathetic. I had talent and she had money. I made sure of the latter, and then it seemed evident that we were intended for each other. With money, which would mean leisure, I might have accomplished something in literature."

"Is that a good thing to do?" asked the bartender, just to show himself interested.

The nervous man looked peevish, and then, as he drank his cocktail, he continued: "Miss Ham and I sat together at the Uncut Leaves Sociable, and she was good enough to ask me to call. I did call four days later. What I saw in her studio convinced me that she was my affinity. Rich hangings, potted palms and fine pictures contributed an air of luxury not easily equaled. I could hear the silk lining of her dress rustle in the hall above as she came down to see me.

"'You probably think that I am crude because I come from Chicago,' said she.

"'You are different from Chicago girls,' said I.

"A warm flush of pride redeemed her rather plain features.

"'The study of art and nature have made me what I am,' said she modestly. 'I am merely a student and not an originator. Chicago is so garish and artificial. I can't bear artificial things. They annoy me. I dearly love nature in all her forms.'

"She swept across the studio floor and tenderly poured a glass of ice water on a palm which stood beside a Louis something or another sofa. It was one of those palms with leaves that shoot out like blades of grass.

"'I love palms,' she said. 'I enjoy seeing them grow.'

"That ended my first love Miss Ham, but I made many others. I felt that she ought to be mine. She liked me, and I knew that if I only asked her in the proper way she would be mine.

"'Neck and neck on the home stretch, eh?' said the bartender sympathetically.

"'Thank you,' said the nervous man absentmindedly, pushing his cocktail glass over for a another drink. 'Two months ago,' he continued, 'I went to Miss Ham's studio to cast myself at her feet and to paint, metaphorically, a glorious future for us together. Oh, I was in her answer I felt more nervous than usual. It was a crisis in my life. Behind me were long years of poverty and disappointed struggle. Before