

The Sun

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As the Century began, about the New York City Hall it was one great blast of life, good nature and cheerfulness. It was an auspicious start. No man there will see the Century's close, but may the United States see it in even greater strength and joyfulness than bless us to-day!

The Past Century

Inasmuch as we stand this morning on the threshold of a new century, it may be well to depart for once from the custom which THE SUN has followed since 1879, and, instead of attempting to forecast the events of the coming twelvemonth, to look back on the political changes of the last hundred years.

Centuries have a philosophical, as well as a chronological, starting point. The eighteenth century, for instance, began in 1688, when WILLIAM the Dutchman landed in England, and thereby acquired the resources needed to limit the agrarianism of France. The nineteenth century dawned in 1789, when the French States General, which had not been convoked since the reign of Louis XIII., assembled at Versailles. To measure the political progress which has been witnessed since the States General were transformed into a National Assembly we should recall the conditions which then obtained in most of the civilized parts of the world. Excepting the new-born American republic, the territory now comprised in the Swiss Confederation and that section of the Netherlands which enjoyed independence under the name of the United Provinces, there did not exist in 1789 upon the earth a polity which fairly could be described as an example of free institutions. Even the three exceptions mentioned were far from being pure democracies. In the United States when the Federal Government created by the Constitution went into operation in 1789, a considerable fraction of the inhabitants were slaves, while, as regards the whites, there were property restrictions of the franchise. In Switzerland, only the forest cantons were truly democratic; Geneva was in the hands of an aristocracy; the affairs of the confederation were mainly controlled by a Bernese oligarchy. In the seven United Provinces the sceptre of political ascendancy had long oscillated between the representatives of the House of Orange and the patrician burghers of Amsterdam. In England only a small section of the population possessed the suffrage, and cherished the delusion that it was self-governing. In 1789 political power was there divided between the sovereign on the one hand, and the noble, or opulent, owners of rotten boroughs on the other, and since 1784 the royal prerogative, personified in WILLIAM PITT, seemed to have acquired pre-eminence.

Nowhere else in the Old World or the New was even the semblance of autonomy conceded to the masses of the people. France was still subservient to the principle formulated by Louis XIV., when he said "The State, 'tis I," and the utmost that could be said for her administrative system was that its absolutism was sometimes tempered by epigrams. The Bourbon monarchs of Spain and Naples knew no Constitutional curb on their caprice, and the small Italian principalities were so many petty despotisms. Central Europe was still haunted by the ghost of the Holy Roman Empire, which, as it has been justly said, had long ceased to be either holy, Roman or Imperial. In the Hapsburg dominions, in Prussia and in the lesser German States there was, as yet, no recognition of popular rights, and even in most Protestant countries religious liberty was trammelled by the maxim that subjects were bound to adopt their ruler's creed. The Government of Russia was an Oriental autocracy checked by assassination. A thin veneer of Western culture had been laboriously spread by the Empress CATHERINE II. over a people which was still essentially barbarian. The farthest lands of southeastern Europe—Bosnia, the Herzegovina, Servia, Wallachia, Moldavia, Bulgaria, Eastern Roumelia, Thessaly and Greece—were still mismanaged by the Ottoman Turk. Egypt was exploited by the Mamelukes, and the rest of North Africa was divided among the so-called Barbary States, some of which paid a nominal allegiance to the Caliph at Constantinople, while all were engaged in piratical raids upon Christian commerce in the Mediterranean. In India, although it had been settled that Englishmen, and not Frenchmen, were to be masters of the vast peninsula, the future Anglo-Indian Empire rested only in the germ, or in the ardent aspirations of a few men like CLIVE and HASTINGS. Most of the rich possessions in the East, which Portugal had once been mistress, had been wrested from her by the Dutch, and the Dutch themselves were decadent. Both China and Japan, which, formerly, had welcomed the Christian missionary and the Christian merchant, were now firmly sealed against the foreigner, nor the Portuguese being permitted to trade at Macao, and the Dutch to retain a trading station at Nagasaki.

If we turn to the New World, we find that Florida, which had been acquired by England in 1763, had been retroceded to Spain, that the whole of the west bank of the Mississippi River and of the immense Louisiana Territory was controlled by the last-named Power in 1789, though it would soon be retroceded to France, and that from the confines of what we now call Oregon to the Straits of Magellan, all the mainland of the New World, with the exception of some insignificant French and Dutch settlements in Guiana, was under the autocratic sway of the Kings of Spain and Portugal.

It is hard, in truth, even for those who possess the historical imagination, to comprehend how hopeless seemed the prospects of those rights of man, proclaimed by some weak English colonies in their declaration of independence, to him who scanned the political horizon in the year 1789, when we see close to the next epoch-making year, 1800, the United States had been

spared the convulsions which had shaken Europe, and by which Spanish America had been rent. In spite of the bitterness engendered by the annihilation of the Federalist at the hands of the Republican-Democratic party, in spite of a threatened war with France and an actual war with England, the republic, definitely founded in 1789, now exhibited amazing proofs of progress and expansion. The population had grown more than trebled in forty years, having increased from less than four millions in 1790 to nearly thirteen millions in 1830. By the purchase of the Louisiana Territory from France, and of Florida from Spain, the area of the national domain had been immensely broadened. Manufactures upon which New England had been driven to concentrate its resources by JEFFERSON'S Embargo, had acquired remarkable development, and a great political party, the National Republicans, soon to be known as Whigs, already stood committed to the principle of protection. Meanwhile, our ocean carrying trade had recovered from the depression which it suffered during the years preceding the War of 1812, and was quickly advancing to rival with England for the profits of sea-borne traffic. At the same time, our agricultural interest was swiftly tending to assume the function of the chief purveyor of Europe. The invention of the cotton gin had imparted an extraordinary stimulus to our cotton industry, and the cultivation of grain for export had begun to acquire huge proportions. The value of steam as a motor, not only for machinery, but also for traction purposes, was recognized, and the adaptation of electricity to commercial uses was close at hand. In 1819 the Atlantic had been crossed by a steamship for the first time; in 1828 the first railroad in the United States was opened for travel; the invention of the telegraph was only five years distant. The moral forces which, ultimately, were to split the Union in twain had already given portentous signs of life. In 1820 the heated debates which resulted in the Missouri Compromise had given clear pronouncements of an irrepressible conflict between the principles of slavery and freedom, and in this very year, 1830, South Carolina was asserting the right of a State to nullify a Federal statute. Through the patriotic and stalwart course pursued by ANDREW JACKSON, however, the evil spirit of Secession was temporarily conjured. For the moment the skies were clear, and the United States looked forward to a long career of peaceful evolution.

In England the lesson administered by her Thirteen American Colonies, almost half a century before, had not, as yet, taught her to concede self-government to the Canadians, nor had it taught her to reform a Parliament which had ceased even to pretend to be a representative body. In her Titanic struggle against the Napoleonic empire tremendous losses had been offset by colossal gains. From that contest she had emerged with a stupendous public debt, with her public credit crippled by the suspension of specie payments and with the relations of capital and labor subjected to a tension from which they were not entirely relieved until after the close of the fourth decade of the present century. On the other hand, she was, as she had never been before 1783, completely paramount upon the ocean, and some twenty years were to elapse before her claim of maritime and naval supremacy was to be seriously challenged. She had kept Gibraltar and secured Malta, and thus, although in 1801 she had just renounced the Ionian Islands, she remained mistress of the midland sea. She had given back Java and other islands in the Far East to the Dutch, but she had retained the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon and the former Dutch possessions on the mainland of southern Asia.

In India the Mogul Lord of Delhi was still permitted to exercise the semblance of suzerain authority, but his mighty vassal, the East India Company, was the actual wielder of power throughout two-thirds of the peninsula. Part of Burmah, however, was still independent, and Lord AMHERST'S embassy to Peking had proved futile. During the fifteen years that followed Waterloo, Great Britain had obtained a new and capacious market for her manufactures by constituting herself protectress of Portugal and Brazil, and by encouraging the Spanish-American colonies in their revolt against their mother country. She had truly, as CATHERINE said, formed the ordinary enemies of the world. Congress by calling a new world into existence to balance the old. During the War of 1812 she had lost a number of frigates in duels between vessels of nearly equal armament; she had seen her flotillas beaten on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain, and she had witnessed the defeat of her Peninsula veterans by JACKSON at New Orleans. On the other hand, she had captured Washington and destroyed its principal public buildings, and, by the Treaty of Ghent, she had escaped explicitly renouncing a single one of the offensive claims on which she had previously insisted. We observe, finally, that at home England hoped that she had healed what had long been an open sore upon her body, politics, by extinguishing the legislative independence of Ireland, and, secondly, by tacitly conceding the emancipation of the Catholics to the agitation headed by O'CONNELL. In a word, she occupied before the world in the year 1830 a position of august elevation and of unparalleled prestige. Moreover, she was on the eve of making drastic changes in the method of electing her House of Commons, changes which in their turn were destined to bear fruit in a multitude of political, economical and social reforms, until they should culminate in a close approach to universal suffrage.

On the Continent of Europe few of the dreams cherished by philanthropists and patriots in the closing years of the last century had been transmuted into permanent realities. Napoleon and the approach of the Russian General DIBLITCH to Constantinople had given Greece her liberty. But where now were the Batavian and the Cyprian and the Parthenon republics? A Prince of the House of Orange reigned in Holland, but the Austrian Netherlands had been joined in a disastrous marriage, the rupture of which was imminent. The House of Savoy had recovered Piedmont; the Hapsburgs ruled in Lombardy and Venetia; the Italian duchies were satellites of Austria; the States of the Church and the reinstated Bourbon sovereignty of Naples relied upon the Vienna Government to protect them from the revolutionary movements which already in 1820 had upheaved the Peninsula. In the hereditary provinces of the Austrian Empire, which lingered scarcely in the consciousness of the world, the copiousness which kept none of the privileges which she had been suffered to enjoy in the days of MARIA THERESA. The King of Prussia was still an autocrat, and in the

rest of the Fatherland the passionate devotion to the cause of nationality and liberty which in 1813 had prompted the uprising of German youth, had, apparently, succumbed to disillusion and to hope deferred. It is true that the specter of the Holy Roman Empire had been exercised by NAPOLEON, but the Confederation, which replaced it, was lax and impotent, and the Frankfurt Diet was merely a puppet in the hands of METTERNICH.

In Spain the attempt of a resuscitated Cortes to regain the ancient liberties of Castile and Aragon had been brought to naught by French invaders willing to execute the mandate of the Verona Congress, and absolutism and bigotry were enthroned once more at Madrid. Poland, almost the whole of which had been given to Russia by the Congress of Vienna, had been motionless for fifteen years, but she was now beginning to stir under her shackles, and the Czar's resources would yet be strained before she would regain at Warsaw. We come to France. After the ending of 1800 she seemed to have lost nearly everything which she had won by an endless outpour of life and wealth in the preceding forty years. The French nation, which, under NAPOLEON, had seen its way extended from the Elbe to the Straits of Messina, and from Dalmatia to Portugal, now found its boundaries curtailed from those of the ancien régime. Its colonial empire, which once vied with England's, had shrunk to the pitiful heritage of Pondicherry in India, a strip of pestiferous marshland in Guiana and a few West Indian islands. Its armies, which had entered every capital of Christian Europe south of the Baltic, had not been able to shield Paris from two occupations by the foreigner. The liberty, equality, fraternity, at which the French Republic had aimed, had become bywords and laughing stocks of the Constitutional monarchs for which, at the outset of the Restoration, France had seemed almost willing to exchange even glory, there remaining hardly a vestige under the last reactionary Ministry of CHARLES X. Yet the year 1830 was to witness an irresistible popular upheaval, which was to replace the Lords anointed by the choice of the people's representatives in the person of a King of the French.

The second of the three epochs, into which the nineteenth century may be divided from a political viewpoint, ended in 1870. During those four decades were wrought changes scarcely less impressive and more durable than those of the Napoleonic period. In the United States were witnessed the annexation of Texas, the war with Mexico and the acquisition of New Mexico and California, the discovery of gold in California, the discovery of the last-named territory, a tremendous inflow of immigrants due to the Irish famine and to the revolutionary troubles in Germany, and the expansion of our mercantile marine to a point at which in the middle of the fifties it seemed destined to displace Great Britain from the sovereignty of the seas. Meanwhile, however, HENRY CLAY'S attempt to avert a rupture of the Union by the conciliatory measures embodied in the Compromise of 1850 had been frustrated by the passage of the Nebraska bill and sectional antipathy had been alarmingly aggravated by the "crime against Kansas" on the one hand, and by JOHN BROWN'S raid into Virginia on the other. When in 1860 the Democracy refused to name STEPHEN A. DOUGLASS the nominee of the whole party for the Presidency, an ABRAHAM LINCOLN, a minority candidate, was elected, it was a minority enough that the dreaded collision between the sections could not be long deferred, and within six months the secession of the Gulf States was followed by the attack upon Fort Sumter, and the Civil War began. During the quadrennial struggle that ensued, European onlookers, not only applauded the dogged persistence and consummate skill of the chief commander on each side, but beheld with awe the seemingly inexhaustible resources of the Northern States, which showed themselves capable of maintaining in the field a larger body of soldiers than the earth had ever seen assembled, if we dismiss as fabulous the tales concerning the forces levied by the Achemenid Kings of Persia. A problem scarcely less urgent and difficult than that which had been solved by war was pressed upon American statesmen by the existence of millions of suddenly emancipated slaves, and, whatever view may be taken of the solution adopted, it cannot be denied that the perplexities and anxieties attending the effort to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution have by no means passed away.

We should here note a fact which differentiates the epoch which closed in 1870 from that which just came to an end; the fact, namely, that, beholding us disband our armies and dismantle our warships, the European peoples recovered from the shiver of apprehension with which they had recognized in 1865 that the United States were temporarily, not only the greatest military, but the greatest naval power upon the globe. It was in the four decades ending in 1870 that England may be said to have touched the acme of her greatness, if we consider her political and economical achievements, not only with an eye to their absolute magnitude, but relatively to those of other Powers. In conjunction with France she had humbled Russia. She had twice chastised the Afghans. In India she had signally extended her possessions toward the northwest, and she had shown herself capable of putting down an appalling mutiny. She had shut off what was left of independent Burmah from the sea. She had engaged in two wars with China, in the first of which she had held Canton to ransom, acquired Hong Kong and compelled the opening of five treaty ports, while in the second, when she had France for an ally, she had entered Peking and exacted large additional concessions. Hardly less noteworthy than the successes of England's foreign and Indian policy was the growth of her new colonial empire in Australasia, which, beginning with a convict settlement at Botany Bay, had developed by 1870 into a group of self-governing Colonies, the growth of which had been hastened by the large profits of the wool industry and by the discovery of gold. In the treatment of Canada there had been a marked and pregnant change during the epoch under review. An insurrection of the French-Canadians had been met by England, at the suggestion of Lord DUMFRIES, not in a vindictive, but in a propagandist spirit, and the rebels, instead of being punished, received larger political privileges than they had previously possessed. The outcome of this far-sighted act had been the evolution of a harmony toward the suzerain State and of a harmony between the French and British inhabitants which culminated in the union of all the British provinces in North Amer-

ica, except Newfoundland, in the Dominion of Canada. At home electoral reform had produced a House of Commons that evoked the popular sentiment that even the Tory party headed by Sir ROBERT PEEL had renounced the principle of Protection and had so modified the Corn laws as to launch the country far upon the pathway to free trade. Thereoforeward for a quarter of a century the progress of British manufactures and of British commerce was astounding, and the politico-economical doctrines of the so-called Manchester School were triumphant, and almost unquestioned. A second Reform bill considerably widened the electorate, and the disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Ireland embodied a well-meant endeavor to conciliate the Irish Catholics, who, it was already evident, however, would be content with nothing short of the repeal of the Act of Union. Meanwhile the foundation of the so-called Free Church in Scotland represented a conscientious and well-organized revolt against the compulsory connection of religion with the State. The epoch with which we are now dealing beheld the awakening of the British public mind to the necessity of sanitary improvements; and the crying need of better facilities for elementary instruction was recognized in 1870 by the Forster Education act.

On the European Continent the second division of the nineteenth century was signalized by the separation of Belgium from Holland, by the rise and fall of the July monarchy in France; by the outbreak of revolution in 1848 from Berlin to Naples and from Paris to Bucharest, and the event of the seventh decade of the nineteenth century was the beginning of the Westernization of Japan. It is satisfactory to recall that it was an American squadron under Commodore PERRY which forced the Shogun, who had long displaced the Mikado as the actual possessor of power, to make a treaty with the United States and to throw open to international trade certain seaports in a country which for upward of two centuries had been sealed against all foreigners except the Dutch. The privilege thus conceded was quickly secured by England, and in due time was shared by other European nations. The contact with Western ideas seemed to electrify the Japanese. They quickly developed marvelous powers of assimilation, and in a period bewilderingly brief they passed through political phases which Europe had not traversed in centuries. The Shogunate, which, under that name or another, had lasted for many hundreds of years, was summarily suppressed; feudalism was abolished; the Mikado emerged from his retirement in Kioto and resumed the personal exercise of his semi-sacred, semi-autocratic functions; nay, before the year 1870 had dawned, he had gone so far as to bestow on his subjects a Constitution which permitted them to take a substantial part in legislation. We shall have presently to glance at the unexampled and far-reaching consequences which were to follow this domestic revolution, and which, within the span of thirty years, were to introduce a new power of the first class among the factors of the Chinese problem.

The three last decades of the century which has just ended had been before the Franco-German War was brought to a close by the peace of Frankfurt, but they beheld no other contest on the Continent of Europe except Russia's nearly successful attempt to capture Constantinople and the subsequent abortive demonstration of the Greeks against the Turks. Of small wars, however, there have been many in other quarters of the globe. Russia has overpowered the Turcomans and completed the absorption of the Khanates of Central Asia, while an Anglo-Indian army, commanded by Lord ROBERTS, reestablished in Afghanistan the influence of the Calcutta Government by placing its candidate, ABDULHAQ, upon the throne of Cabul. Since that event there has been intermittent fighting on the northwest frontier, and that part of Burmah which had retained independence is now incorporated with the Indian Empire. At the beginning of the end, then came his successive checks in statecraft by BISMARCK to retrieve which he suffered himself, against his better judgment, to be driven into the war of 1870, which proved fatal to his dynasty. Like his uncle, he left France smaller in Europe than he had found her and staggering under a load of debt hitherto unparalleled, yet he gave her Cochinchina, and Cambodia, the basis of an empire in Farther India.

Although the revolutionary movements of 1848 seemed to contemporaries abortive, they were to have substantial results within the second section of the nineteenth century. The King of Sardinia, the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria gave Constitutions to their subjects, and, after the battle of Sadowa, their example was followed by the House of Hapsburg itself, as regards both the Kingdom of Hungary and the Gallician provinces. By the close of 1860 the Sardinian States had become the organic law of Sicily and of the greater part of Italy, and, from the hour that France became involved in war with Germany, it was evident that VICTOR EMANUEL would become King of the whole peninsula through the absorption of the States of the Church. The reverses encountered by Russia in the Crimea and the loss of Bessarabia were to some extent counterbalanced by the conquest of Tashkent and Samarkand and the establishment of a protectorate over Bokhara, while in the Far East she secured the province of Manchuria. Her power was weakened by the Taiping rebellion, not only the left bank of the Amur, but also the coast strip between the mouth of that river and the Korean frontier, north of which was presently to rise the naval fortress of Vladivostok. It was not so much, however, by territorial extension as by a majestic act of disinterestedness and philanthropy that Russia was distinguished during the epoch of which we speak. By a stroke of his pen in 1862 the Emperor ALEXANDER II. freed forty million serfs, one-half of whom were attached to the Crown lands, and he further depleted the Imperial revenues in order to compensate private proprietors for the loss of serfs on which they depended. In other words, he recognized that there were equities on both sides, and he deemed it right to bear on his own shoulders the brunt of the sacrifice imposed by an act of unique beneficence. We call it unique, because the sum disbursed by ALEXANDER II. far exceeded the one hundred million dollars appropriated by the British Parliament when it freed the slaves in British colonies, and because, when we undertake the work of emancipation on this side of the Atlantic, we offered no recompense to the slave owners in those border States which had never departed from the Union. It was during this middle epoch of the nineteenth century that the specter of

the Turkish Empire came near passing from the House of OTTOMAN to that of MEHMET ALI. The latter's son, ISMAIL PASHA, one of the ablest Moslem commanders in recent times, had striven loyally to uphold the Sultan's control of the Peloponnese, but, after the destruction of the Janissaries, he became convinced that the time was ripe for a revolution in the Ottoman dominions. At the head of a large and disciplined army, equipped with the best weapons of the Franks, he conquered Syria, defeated the Turks in two great battles and advanced far into Asia Minor. Countenanced as he was by France, he would, undoubtedly, have succeeded in his project but for the interposition of Great Britain and other Christian powers. It is now easy to recognize that the intervention was a mistake. Had the son of MEHMET ALI been enthroned at Constantinople, the whole of the Turkish Empire would have been thrown open to Western influence, and would, probably, have undergone the same regenerative transformation by which Egypt has so greatly benefited. As it was, MEHMET ALI'S descendants, and especially ISMAIL KHEDIVE, builded much better than they knew, for the gigantic debts which they contracted in Western Europe for selfish purposes were to prove instruments of redemption for the long-suffering *fellahs*.

Moreover, it is not to be forgotten that to ISMAIL KHEDIVE is due the first annexation of the Sudan and that, but for his keen appreciation of the value and desirability of the work projected by M. DE LESSERS, it could not have been accomplished. In the Far East, the transference of the seat of the British Government to Hong Kong in the seventh decade of the nineteenth century was the beginning of the Westernization of Japan. It is satisfactory to recall that it was an American squadron under Commodore PERRY which forced the Shogun, who had long displaced the Mikado as the actual possessor of power, to make a treaty with the United States and to throw open to international trade certain seaports in a country which for upward of two centuries had been sealed against all foreigners except the Dutch. The privilege thus conceded was quickly secured by England, and in due time was shared by other European nations. The contact with Western ideas seemed to electrify the Japanese. They quickly developed marvelous powers of assimilation, and in a period bewilderingly brief they passed through political phases which Europe had not traversed in centuries. The Shogunate, which, under that name or another, had lasted for many hundreds of years, was summarily suppressed; feudalism was abolished; the Mikado emerged from his retirement in Kioto and resumed the personal exercise of his semi-sacred, semi-autocratic functions; nay, before the year 1870 had dawned, he had gone so far as to bestow on his subjects a Constitution which permitted them to take a substantial part in legislation. We shall have presently to glance at the unexampled and far-reaching consequences which were to follow this domestic revolution, and which, within the span of thirty years, were to introduce a new power of the first class among the factors of the Chinese problem.

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Although the revolutionary movements of 1848 seemed to contemporaries abortive, they were to have substantial results within the second section of the nineteenth century. The King of Sardinia, the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria gave Constitutions to their subjects, and, after the battle of Sadowa, their example was followed by the House of Hapsburg itself, as regards both the Kingdom of Hungary and the Gallician provinces. By the close of 1860 the Sardinian States had become the organic law of Sicily and of the greater part of Italy, and, from the hour that France became involved in war with Germany, it was evident that VICTOR EMANUEL would become King of the whole peninsula through the absorption of the States of the Church. The reverses encountered by Russia in the Crimea and the loss of Bessarabia were to some extent counterbalanced by the conquest of Tashkent and Samarkand and the establishment of a protectorate over Bokhara, while in the Far East she secured the province of Manchuria. Her power was weakened by the Taiping rebellion, not only the left bank of the Amur, but also the coast strip between the mouth of that river and the Korean frontier, north of which was presently to rise the naval fortress of Vladivostok. It was not so much, however, by territorial extension as by a majestic act of disinterestedness and philanthropy that Russia was distinguished during the epoch of which we speak. By a stroke of his pen in 1862 the Emperor ALEXANDER II. freed forty million serfs, one-half of whom were attached to the Crown lands, and he further depleted the Imperial revenues in order to compensate private proprietors for the loss of serfs on which they depended. In other words, he recognized that there were equities on both sides, and he deemed it right to bear on his own shoulders the brunt of the sacrifice imposed by an act of unique beneficence. We call it unique, because the sum disbursed by ALEXANDER II. far exceeded the one hundred million dollars appropriated by the British Parliament when it freed the slaves in British colonies, and because, when we undertake the work of emancipation on this side of the Atlantic, we offered no recompense to the slave owners in those border States which had never departed from the Union. It was during this middle epoch of the nineteenth century that the specter of

the Turkish Empire came near passing from the House of OTTOMAN to that of MEHMET ALI. The latter's son, ISMAIL PASHA, one of the ablest Moslem commanders in recent times, had striven loyally to uphold the Sultan's control of the Peloponnese, but, after the destruction of the Janissaries, he became convinced that the time was ripe for a revolution in the Ottoman dominions. At the head of a large and disciplined army, equipped with the best weapons of the Franks, he conquered Syria, defeated the Turks in two great battles and advanced far into Asia Minor. Countenanced as he was by France, he would, undoubtedly, have succeeded in his project but for the interposition of Great Britain and other Christian powers. It is now easy to recognize that the intervention was a mistake. Had the son of MEHMET ALI been enthroned at Constantinople, the whole of the Turkish Empire would have been thrown open to Western influence, and would, probably, have undergone the same regenerative transformation by which Egypt has so greatly benefited. As it was, MEHMET ALI'S descendants, and especially ISMAIL KHEDIVE, builded much better than they knew, for the gigantic debts which they contracted in Western Europe for selfish purposes were to prove instruments of redemption for the long-suffering *fellahs*.

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cheaply to tidewater, that it is but a question of a short time when we shall monopolize the markets of the Mediterranean. Under the fostering influence of protection we have been enabled to make wooden goods and silk goods for ourselves in adequate quantities and admirable quality, instead of importing them from foreign countries. The time has gone by when Europeans could ask: Who wears American cloth or dons an American hat? Our boots and shoes are the models of conservatism throughout the world. Our labor-saving machinery is the despair and envy of mankind. Our sewing machines, our reaping machines, our printing presses, our typewriting machines, go to all parts of the globe, where economies of muscle and of time are valued.

It is also during the last three decades that we have beheld the doctrines of the so-called Manchester School discredited as regards the application of capital and the manipulation of labor. For the principle of unlimited individual competition has been substituted, to a large and constantly increasing extent, the idea of concentration. The combinations known as "trusts" have undertaken to minimize the cost and regulate the distribution of commodities. This phenomenon, the most noteworthy in the last third of the century from an economic viewpoint, has, as yet, probably but poorly shadowed the magnitude of its possible proportions. The time may not be distant when not only the iron and steel industry, the coal industry, the mining of the precious metals, the task of railway or steamship conveyance, but even the output of every kind of agriculture, will each be organized and directed by a single colossal corporation.

In England and on the Continent of Europe, while the process of industrial combination has not been carried so far as it has been in the United States, politicians have even there departed widely from the theories of the Manchester economists. The principle of *laissez faire* is obviously repudiated in the Gladstone Land act of 1881 and in the Old Age Pension act for which BISMARCK was responsible. The State Socialism, of which there have been so many examples in Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, Italy and British India, has witnessed the extent of the divergences from the point of view almost universally taken in highly enlightened communities during the fifties and sixties. How much further will the absorption of railways, of telegraphs, of illuminating apparatus and of water-providing agencies be carried by the State? Evidently, we are on the brink of a century radically different, as regards the viewpoint of applied political economy, from that of BENTON and MILL, of RICARDO and McCULLOUGH, of CORDEN and JOHN BRIGHT.

Side by side with the effacement of individual initiative by the consolidation of capital in private business, and of the State's encroachment of a multitude of functions formerly relinquished to private persons, has arisen a cry of the disaffected. In every age there have been, and there may be sure there will be, a party of discontent. The discontent may exhibit the vindictive and reckless temper of Russian nihilism, or the tentative and vagrant proposals of American Populism, or the agrarian bent displayed in Spain, or the relatively moderate spirit evinced by Socialists in Belgium, France and Germany, since they have become sobered by official or legislative responsibilities. No doubt, the growth of Democratic Socialism has been a characteristic, and, to some eyes, a sinister feature of the last three decades of the nineteenth century. In Germany the Socialist vote has increased steadily and rapidly until now it constitutes a large fraction of the electorate, and it has resulted in the return of a corresponding number of members to the Reichstag. In Belgium the Socialists have won, and may win, a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, and now stand forth as the principal opponents of the Ultramontanes. In France the Socialists are so strong in Paris and other large urban centers that they form a considerable faction in the Chamber of Deputies, and have been able to dictate the admission of one of their leaders to the present Ministry. It cannot have failed to be observed, however, that the younger spokesmen of Socialism in Germany and of Collectivism in France are much more cautious, conciliatory and opportunist than were the elder promoters of their cause, who were under no urgent obligation to accommodate theory to practice.

Among other salient and pregnant events marking the last third of the century, which we have mentioned, there have been, and there may be, a party of discontent. The discontent may exhibit the vindictive and reckless temper of Russian nihilism, or the tentative and vagrant proposals of American Populism, or the agrarian bent displayed in Spain, or the relatively moderate spirit evinced by Socialists in Belgium, France and Germany, since they have become sobered by official or legislative responsibilities. No doubt, the growth of Democratic Socialism has been a characteristic, and, to some eyes, a sinister feature of the last three decades of the nineteenth century. In Germany the Socialist vote has increased steadily and rapidly until now it constitutes a large fraction of the electorate, and it has resulted in the return of a corresponding number of members to the Reichstag. In Belgium the Socialists have won, and may win, a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, and now stand forth as the principal opponents of the Ultramontanes. In France the Socialists are so strong in Paris and other large urban centers that they form a considerable faction in the Chamber of Deputies, and have been able to dictate the admission of one of their leaders to the present Ministry. It cannot have failed to be observed, however, that the younger spokesmen of Socialism in Germany and of Collectivism in France are much more cautious, conciliatory and opportunist than were the elder promoters of their cause, who were under no urgent obligation to accommodate theory to practice.

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