SOME NEW BOOKS.

Modern Europe.

We are indebted to Prof. Charles H. Andrews for a new and successful attempt to trace *The Historical Development of Modern Europe*, from the Congress of Vienna to the present time (Putnam). The large octavo volume, comprising upwards of six pages, begins with a concise appreciation of the characteristics of the old regime, to which is added an outline of the French Revolution and of the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte. The narrative extends from 1815 to 1897. The book, which is printed entirely from other works, is based on a careful study of the methods of various authorities, and the story of Europe. The one hundred years is not chronologically, but grouping from country to country, and then from country to international affairs, is adopted as an aid to continuity and unity of action. The author has kept the history of all the European States of a important level. This method, which has been followed to secure a good perspective, has the disadvantage of leaving a confusing picture in the reader's mind. Therefore the chapters on separate governments and authorities, such as the Papacy, the Prussian military system, the Revolution in France, the Italy, Bismarck, and the Liberal movement in Europe, are valuable whole, separate and, though, a little time before forming a clear idea of the whole, which is followed in a chapter on the Revolution, and concluding with a summary and conclusion. There are lacunæ in the book, which require a good deal of explanation. The reader's purpose is to keep in view the development of thought and movement of European life as a whole, for study such movement, to have made for progress rather than to describe events where in detail, or to be expected all things with historical accuracy. For this reason but little space is given to the administration and laws of the Napoleonic dynasty, and only a chapter is allotted to the growth of political experience and education in Prussia. So, too, the revolutions that have taken place in France and Belgium are reviewed chiefly on their diplomatic side, and but little is said about incidentally about the internal affairs of Spain. Portugal, Switzerland and Sweden, those countries having taken but little part in effecting the great changes in political thought and organization that have marked the last sixty years. We should note also that but little attention is paid to military campaigns, not because Prof. Andrews objects to "drum-and-trumpet" history, but because he believes that the details of battles and the movements of troops pertain, except in their political consequences, to the science of military strategy and tactics. Moreover, except in a few important instances, our author has avoided all comments of a biographical nature, on the ground that a statesman's character can be best understood by his work. In general it may be said that he refrains from the utterance of personal judgments on the ground that these reflecting merely the sentiments of the writer, and based too often on present day standards, seem out of accord with the spirit of modern historical presentation. We observe, finally, that all footnotes and bibliographical references have been omitted, although a list of the works consulted will be found in one of the prefaces.

I.

In his introduction the author recognizes that what the French Revolution overthrew was not mediævalism, but the system which had been established for it in the middle of the seventeenth century. The Treaty of Westphalia, which closed the Thirty Years War, gave legal sanction to the system which it was the part of the French Revolution to demolish. Mediævalism had presupposed universality in Church and State. The system definitely organized in 1648 was based on a different fundamental idea, to wit, the supremacy of the State, an idea that dominated public law during the last half of the seventeenth and most of the eighteenth century. The embodiment of the State, however, was not the nation, it was the prince, he was the product of Roman, feudal and Christian forces and was looked upon as autocrat, suzerain and chosen of God. Prof. Andrews shows how to this conception the tendencies of fourteen centuries had contributed the Roman law and institutions, the feudal law and customs and the Christian doctrine regarding the divinity of kings had cooperated to advance the interests of the prince rather than those of the people, and to promote not the liberty of man, but the authority of the State. At this epoch (1648-1789) the State, in a word, was confounded with the person of the sovereign, and the authority of the State was impersonated in the prince. He gathered into his own hands all kinds of power, made alliances and accepted treaties, was chief of armies and arbiter in peace and war, fixed the taxes, regulated imposts and extended or curtailed expenses, had the right of confiscation and escheat, and owned unoccupied lands; created the nobility, made the laws, dispensed justice and stood forth as sovereign head in religious matters; he was in fine the master of his people, their guardian, judge, legislator and pontiff. Such were Louis XIV., Frederic II. of Prussia and Joseph II. of Austria. Under such circumstances no other human authority was acknowledged. Legislative bodies as such did not exist, for assemblies of notables, estates or peoples were but councils of State committees for consultation, not for action. God alone was the judge of the actions of princes, and to Him alone were princes responsible.

Elsewhere in his introduction Prof. Andrews points out that the causes for the general decay visible in the eighteenth century were everywhere the same, although the form of government differed among the States of the continental system from the despotism established in Spain, Prussia and the States of the Hapsburgs to the pseudo-republicanism exemplified in Switzerland, Holland and Poland. An unequal distribution of wealth, excessive expenditures in court life, the erection of magnificent buildings and the maintenance of extravagant mistresses and court favorites, armaments costly and continuously increasing in volume, and the heavy demands of war, these were the burdens that weighed upon the States of continental Europe. The Governments were in debt, and, worried by an ever-recurring deficit, were forced to borrow at ruinous rates and to draw on their revenue for many years ahead to pay the interest. In these respects the smaller States were more exhausted than the larger, because, while their resources were inferior and less certain, they were equally prodigal. The nobility and the church freed themselves from financial obligations to the State on the score of privilege; the bourgeoisie, hampered by annoying guild and trade restrictions, paid to the State more than their share; the peasantry, crushed by a double burden, made payment, not only to the Government, but also to the feudal seigneurs, who, though they no longer fulfilled their part of the feudal contract by giving their dependants protection, yet retained their feudal rights, and held the peasantry in subjection. Touching the point last named, Prof. Andrews is careful to correct a misconception still widely current by noting that in France the burdens incumbent on the peasantry were least onerous and least vexatious, though here, as in Denmark, the nobility, partly non-resident, left the control of their estates to intendants and agents. Serfage had been reestablished in Russia and Prussia in the sixteenth century. In Poland it was still harshly maintained; in Germany it was rigorously enforced; in some parts of Italy, indeed, in Hungary and sections of the composite Prussian monarchy, the rulers endeavored to restrain the oppressive nobility; on the other hand, in most of the minor States of the Holy Roman empire, the treatment of the peasantry was atrocious, they being regarded as little better than slaves.

There is no greater mistake than to attribute the suppression of serfdom to the French Revolution. There is no trace of the error in this volume, our author is at pains to prove that the desire for social reform was not confined to France, it existed in other countries of Europe, where it was brought about, not by the influence of French ideas, but by conditions antedating the French Revolution, analogous though they might be to those which the French Revolution effected. Natural law founded on reason and drawn from the Christian religion put the principles of the Roman law after the manner of Justinian, authority rested gradually upon popular consent, and political liberty followed in fact. The religion of humanity, the feeling that all should labor for the good of the human race, began to find expression throughout Europe. Kings and reformers assigned as common, though for different reasons, primacy in the interest of their sovereignty, with the period and classes concerned, the abolition of mediævalism, perhaps the French States-General, but in Europe as in Russia, serfdom had in other countries ceased to recognize the importance of a better word, not political reform, abolitions was encouraged, schools were opened, industries were multiplied, and in Sweden and Russia religious toleration began to be tolerated. Serfage tended to disappear. It was modified in Poland under Ferdinand II., in Bohemia, Moravia, Galicia and Hungary under Joseph II., and almost, nothing in England. Was contrasted before, it was abolished in Baden in 1783 and in Denmark in 1788. Elsewhere the rigors were diminished, and the probability of the peasant was made more endurable. The penal laws were amended, torture was either done away with or reduced in severity, and reforms of the civil law were begun, this author lays stress upon the fact that the reforms initiated by Joseph II., the brother of Marie Antoinette, though undertaken with an unfortunate disregard of tradition and national prejudice, were more drastic in their nature than those proposed in the Constituent Assembly of the French Revolution itself. Thus throughout Europe, toward the end of the eighteenth century, the ground was prepared for a social and civil reformation, which was to be carried out by the State, and for the State, but in no way was to limit the State. Reforms were undertaken in the interest of power, enlightened despotism was willing to sanction religious toleration and civil liberty, but there was no thought of a reorganization of the State itself in the interest of popular sovereignty or of political liberty.

II.

Such a reorganization, however, was inevitable. The State in minimizing or extinguishing the influence of the traditional assemblies, in promoting social and civil reforms, in destroying feudalism and in overthrowing the power of the church, had stirred the passions of the people, rousing hopes rather than satisfying desires. These very reforms made by the State had led the people to believe that the old World needed rejuvenating altogether, had created discontent at a time when the instability of the social order gave promise of success to popular movements and had familiarized the people with the idea of change. There was unrest in Prussia and there was discontent with the reigning dynasty in Sweden, the Belgians were in armed resistance to the House of Austria, revolution broke out in Bohemia, Hungary and Galicia, there was civil war in Holland, where the patriot party tried to regain the national privileges withheld by a despotic stadtholder, while in Geneva a municipal revolt that had been stimulated by the writings of Rousseau foreshadowed, in its hatred of classes and in the cosmopolitan character of the principles that actuated it, the greater revolution to come. In a word, the State system, that in its pursuit of absolute power had ruined the institutions of the past, was already in its turn threatened with ruin when the sudden outbreak in France transformed a progressive revolution into a cataclysm which overwhelmed in a marvellously brief space of time the whole European order. Beginning as a purely national movement, the French Revolution soon took the form of a vast international convulsion, and scattering its ideas throughout Europe by means of military proselytism, drew down upon itself the wrath of European governments. By its proclaimed principles it seemed to threaten the very foundations of European monarchy. Its doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, propounded as an evident and universal truth, and its appeal to all nations to revolt and free themselves, were so foreign to the principles embodied in the old regime that they were interpreted as a menace to all established governments to which revolution, considered as an overturning of society, was unknown and incomprehensible.

Those who get their notions of the French Revolution from Dickens's "Tale of Two Cities," or even from Carlyle, imagine that the Revolution broke out in France because the misery was there more intolerable, because the feudal practices were there more iniquitous than elsewhere, and because the government was there less intelligent and more despotic. Such persons may do well to note what our author says upon the point on Page 9: "The movement began in those parts of France where the old institutions were already disappearing, where the agriculturist, already ceasing to be a serf and becoming a proprietor, was the more alive to the burdens he bore, and resented more deeply the imposition of a few lingering feudal dues. The feudal obligations became more hateful as the condition of the peasantry improved, the yoke seemed less easy to bear as it became less weighty. As prosperity increased, the people of France sought to escape from the restrictions of feudalism and mercantilism imposed upon them; they felt the demands of a progressive civilization, and revolted against a system that, on the eve of the nineteenth century, retained the narrow and burdensome conditions of three centuries before. France was a country where ideas of reform had been most widely spread, where intelligence was most highly esteemed, and where education, even among the peasantry, was well advanced; where was greater homogeneity of national feeling, where government was more centralized, the nobility less important politically, and the power of the King more absolute than was the case elsewhere. The fact that France was a nation free from disintegrating forces, either political or racial, gave to her popular movement a strength that was wanting in similar uprisings in other European States, and she acted before the other States because she had already solved the problem of national unity and national independence."

Although, nominally, the narrative here set forth begins in 1815, the author, of course, cannot avoid an attempt to define the significance of the part played by Napoleon. Prof. Andrews's view of the influence exercised upon France by the Emperor is summed up in the first two paragraphs of the fourth chapter. He begins by noting that France, more than any other European country, had been altered by the events of the period extending from 1789 to 1814. There had the old State been entirely destroyed and the old society shattered, there the forces set loose by the Revolution, checked although they had been by Napoleon's absolutism, were still active, resolute and persistent. In the year 1814 France was at bottom a State inclined toward democracy. Its feelings, thoughts, customs and forms of expression savored little of the narrowness and inequality of the eighteenth century. The Revolution had done its work thoroughly in France, and although its principles had as yet found no adequate expression in government, yet the seed had been well sown, and the French people at large were under the spell of a new and liberal influence.

To this end Napoleon himself had in no small part contributed. Although his government had been the opposite of democratic, although it had violated every principle of the Revolution, although it had throttled the press, stifled all independence in commerce and trade, allowed corporations to exist only on the fulfillment of onerous conditions, subordinated every office to itself and enhanced that the end of administration, of religion and of the court, should be the term therefore of Napoleon and the State. Although it had done all those things, nevertheless, it had also strengthened the cause of the Revolution, the work of the Revolution. It had raised to high positions men of the burgher and peasant classes; it had made it easier than ever before for men of talent without regard to birth, wealth or belief to become eminent in the State and in the army; it had relieved trade of the old guild restrictions and had strengthened the earlier municipal policy that was hampering free competition; it had freed the peasant from the impediments and dues of the manor; before it had broken up the great estates and, although it is not probable that the amount of actual property thus had therein been increased, yet the enjoyment of property of a moderate size had indubitably been thereby made easier. Lastly, in the Code Napoleon it had erected a body of laws that was intelligible to workers of inherited talent in the development of a democratic rather than an aristocratic community.

The author's clear reference to the Battle of Waterloo will be generally accepted as sensible. Neither England nor Prussia, for instance, can claim to herself the credit of the victory of Waterloo. Wellington could not have won without Blücher, nor could Blücher have won without Wellington. The battle is famous, not because it was a defeat for Napoleon for eventual failure in his part was inevitable, but because it was a defeat, it was sudden and overwhelming. Napoleon had come in contact with only one of a series of might, unique drawn in all, after about France, under the leadership of men who had learned the importance of united action. Europe was determined on the overthrow of the man who had once more threatened its peace, and neither armistice nor compromise was possible. The reappearance of Napoleon, in no way altered the course of events, except as it bound the allies more closely together, dispelled the diplomatic lethargy at Vienna and subjected France to a heavier punishment. The question of the future of Europe and the destiny of Napoleon was settled not at Waterloo, but at Leipzig, and the more famous battle only made impossible the continuation of his personal supremacy over France. After the flight from the field of battle only one course lay open to the defeated Emperor, and that was to abdicate absolutely.

It is well known that the War of the Hundred Days cost France dear in territory and money, as well as in prestige. By the first Treaty of Paris, which had been ratified April 30, 1814, France had not only recovered the greater part of her colonies, but, by being suffered to retain Avignon, the county of Venaissin, the county of Montbeliard and all the districts formerly belonging to Germany that had been annexed to France before Jan. 1, 1792, she gained much more in the way of a frontier than had been offered to Napoleon at Chatillon. By the second Treaty of Paris, on the other hand, the fortresses of Philippeville, Marienburg, Saarlouis, Saarbruck, Landau and the territory of French Savoy were to be surrendered, and France was left very much as she had been in 1790, in some directions, indeed, her territory was reduced to an extent less than she had possessed a century before. By far the heaviest burdens now imposed upon her, however, were the war indemnity of 700,000,000 francs, to be paid in five years without interest, and the requirement to furnish 50,000,000 francs per annum for the equipment, clothing and incidental expenses of the allied troops, which, to the number of 150,000 men, were to occupy the soil of France for a period not to exceed five years. It was this second Treaty of Paris which Bismarck had in mind when he framed the provisions of the even more exacting Treaty of Frankfort in 1871.

III.

The Czar Nicholas I. is reported to have once asked an ambassador at St. Petersburg, "Why am I like John Sobieski?" and answered his own question by saying, "Because we were both fools enough to save Vienna." The truth is that Russia was bound by a formal agreement to assist Austria in putting down a rebellion, if called upon. This fact, which is often overlooked, is brought out by Prof. Andrews in that part of his book which deals with the arrangements made at Vienna and elsewhere for the maintenance of public order and with the principles laid down by the Holy Alliance, so called because the Czar Alexander I., while under the influence of Baroness de Krüdener, drew up an exposition of his religious enthusiasm applied to politics and presented it to Austria and Prussia, which adopted it. The same document was eventually signed in turn by every European power except England, Turkey and the Pope. It was of no political consequence, except as it gave a certain amount of moral strength to the union of the powers already established for the preservation of peace.

A definite agreement of much more importance was made at Paris, Nov. 20, 1815, when the four chief Powers, Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia, undertook to give to the principles laid down at Vienna the application most suitable to a time of peace, and covenanted to renew their meetings after fixed intervals. After 1815 the first opportunity that arose for the testing of the new system and of Metternich's ability to control the decisions of the allied Powers occurred in 1818, when a congress was called to determine whether the French territory should be evacuated two years before the date named in the second Treaty of Paris. Not only was the evacuation decided upon but the union of the great Powers was completed by the invitation extended to France, and accepted by her, to take part in their deliberations, present and future. By a declaration put forth on Nov. 15 of the year last named, the five Powers announced their object to be "the maintenance of peace and the guarantee of all transactions hitherto established." This implied an agreement to interpose for the defence of monarchical privileges against popular encroachments. Canning at the time regarded this declaration as a menace to liberty, and his fears were realized in the acts of the congresses of Troppau and Laibach, which assembled in 1820 and 1821, to suppress the popular risings in Naples, Piedmont and Spain. In the circular issued from Troppau the three Powers, Austria, Russia and Prussia, asserted the right to take common measures of safety against States in which the government had been overthrown by rebellion. Putting the principle into immediate practice, the congress authorized Metternich to send 80,000 men into the Neapolitan kingdom. This interposition in Naples prepared the way for intervention in Spain, where a military revolution had broken out in 1820 against the restored Ferdinand VII., who, five years before, had overthrown the constitution, and had since been conducting himself in a brutally arbitrary manner. A congress, held at Verona, sanctioned the restoration of Ferdinand VII. by the French, but England not only declined to approve of the act, but gave a certain amount of encouragement to the rebellion of the Spanish colonies in America, or, as Canning put it, called a new world into existence to balance the old. It seems a mistake to say, as our author does on page 125, that the principle of interfering in the internal affairs of States was applied for the last time at Verona. Evidently what he means is that the principle was not again enforced by a syndicate of Powers. He would not, of course, deny that the doctrine of intervention was afterwards upheld, or carried out by individual state. It is certain, however, that the principle of primacy of Troppau and Verona was repudiated at the Treaty of London, signed on July 15, 1840, by Great Britain, France and Prussia, a treaty which recognized the independence of Greece, so far, at least, as the Congresses of Europe, to which Belgium was indebted for her independence, had not.

Although, as we have seen, the performance of Europe in this case was not exactly in accordance with the principles of the Holy Alliance, it continued to be maintained by the three eastern Powers for twenty years longer. In 1848 after the revolutions in France, Belgium, Italy and Poland, and after the abortive conspiracy of Frankfort, the three Powers, Russia, Austria and Prussia, met at Olmütz and Warschau and renewed their fidelity to the principles of Troppau and Laibach. A treaty was drawn up on Oct. 15 of the year in question, which declared that the courts of Austria, Prussia and Russia recognized the right of every independent sovereign to summon every other independent sovereign to assist him in putting down revolution. No opportunity of carrying out this agreement on a large scale was afforded, and the revolution of 1848 and the quelling of Hungary. In 1853, however, Austria, not satisfied to stand by under the Czar's protection, sent Count Grassalko, and the protectorate would have gone further had the not been deterred by the attitude of France and England. A year later, in consequence of the continued agitation in Poland, and the use made of the independent city of Cracow as a refuge for revolutionists, the three eastern Powers determined to occupy the city, and Austria was commissioned to reduce it to order. Subsequently the city and environs with the consent of Russia and Prussia were annexed to Austria. Finally, when in 1856 the Hungarians attempted to win independence from Austria, that Power applied to Russia for aid in pursuance of the agreement signed at Munchengratz. With this request Russia complied, and the overthrow of Hungary at the hands of Paskievitch is described by Prof. Andrews as the last attempt to apply the doctrine of intervention in the interest of absolutism. Should we not refer to the same principle, however, the restoration of the Pope in Rome by France and the restoration by Austria of the reactionary governments in Southern and Central Italy which had been overthrown in 1848.

IV.

Prof. Andrews is not one of those who regard the revolution of 1848 as a complete miscarriage. Considered as an expression of popular feeling, it had been, he thinks, too widespread and too definite for its meaning to be misunderstood by the upholders of the old régime. Even though many of the reforms of the previous decade were done away with and absolutist princes were restored to their thrones, yet the Europe of 1850 was in many respects far in advance of the Europe of twenty years before. A sentiment of sympathy for the popular cause and of willingness to recognize popular claims had become more prevalent. Public opinion now condemned the tyrannous policy of repression, and resented the employment of military force as an insult to the civilization of Europe. The struggles for unity in Italy and Germany and for constitutional independence in Hungary were historical facts that could not be overlooked, the work of Mazzini, Manin and d'Azeglio were to make possible Cavour's success, the work of the German National Assembly was to make possible Bismarck's achievements, and that of the Hungarian Diet the task performed by Deak. Nor had even the immediate advantages been unimportant; not a few governments had been permanently liberalized. Many of the constitutions which had been conceded during the revolutionary outbreak were retained, and the people were admitted to a not inconsiderable part in the management of affairs; the importance of the classes engaged in trade and commerce had been vastly augmented. In a word, the revolution of 1848, though not resulting in a great overturning of society, as that of 1789 had resulted, was, nevertheless, supplemental to the earlier movement, in that it made impossible a long retention by governments in Central Europe of the doctrines and methods of the old régime which the greater revolution had overthrown in France nearly sixty years before.

How came the second French Republic to be so short-lived, and how are we to explain the success of the coup d'état of Dec. 2, 1851? The author's answer to this question will be found on page 40 of his second volume: We should have mentioned that two volumes are here presented within a single cover. The causes for the overthrow of the second republic are attributed quite as much to the circumstances of its origin and the character of its organization as to the acts of Louis Napoleon and his associates. Organized by a few, it was immediately placed at the mercy of the nation by the proclamation of universal suffrage. In the first exercise of its new right the nation practically repudiated the republic by giving to an Assembly, the majority in which were Monarchists, the task of drafting a republican constitution, an act which, as might have been foreseen, endangered the very existence of free institutions by involving them in parliamentary anarchy. Thereupon the people of France, wearying of parliamentary disorder, fell under the spell of a pretender bearing the name of Napoleon, and accepted, either with content or with resignation, his usurpation of power. Louis Napoleon, making the most of the opportunities that the republican government offered, accomplished the coup d'état and made himself Emperor. Prof. Andrews himself does not deny that this act was a crime, nay, a great political crime, but at the same time he reminds us that it was a crime in which the French nation concurred. A vast majority of the voters made itself *particeps criminis*, made itself an accessory after the fact. The ignorant peasantry, receiving for the first time the voting privilege, showed that it cared less for liberty than for an increase of its wealth and its profits; the intelligent classes, who alone appreciated political freedom, having come to look on parliamentary government as productive of quarrels and prejudicial to prosperity, supported whatever would rid France of anarchy. From 1848 to 1852 the French people as a whole rather countenanced than hindered the designs of the man who was to deprive it of the institutions it had inherited from the great revolution.

In the final analysis of causes our author holds that the reaction of 1852 was but the logical consequent of the revolution of 1848, that the excesses of the one made possible the excesses of the other; the errors of the one made inevitable the errors of the other. He considers Louis Napoleon no more guilty of a crime than were the revolutionists who had overturned the government of Louis Philippe, and proclaimed instead a system and a franchise which France did not want, to which she never gave her consent. "Louis Napoleon, a man of conviction, though of mediocre ability, was as sincere as were the Republicans of 1848; they had their theory of government, he had his; if his methods were to be deprecated, so were theirs; if he was despotic, they were revolutionary. As in Central Europe the victory of the Radicals had made possible the reaction of 1849, and the final success of a counter-revolution, so in France the Republicans and Socialists of 1848, who had decreed the Republic, and established universal suffrage, had themselves, and themselves alone, to thank for the erection of the Second Empire." This is a very different view of the coup d'état of 1851 from that taken by Victor Hugo, yet it is one which the majority of recent historians seem inclined to share.

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the establishment of a entirely popular government.

It is in the final outcome of the same tendency that the author sees the political importance of Germany in 1897. [illegible]

[illegible]

V.

[illegible] Europe [illegible] the principles of the French Revolution were forced to give way to the principles of the old regime. [illegible] the upholders of the old regime were compelled to acknowledge themselves [illegible] who were putting into [illegible] the lightest methods of government, or administration that characterized the middle of the century. It is one of the merits of this book that it recognizes this important difference in character and result of the struggle in Italy from that in Germany, that established the independence of Italy and Belgium. The Italian war was a war for a foreign power against a foreign power, [illegible] the Austrian [illegible] and the Italian [illegible] Austria was [illegible] to every means in her power to [illegible] Italy, [illegible] the Roman Catholics [illegible] the temporal power of the Pope were [illegible] the cause thus laid at least [illegible] the revolutionary leaders, who [illegible] would gladly have [illegible] the success from those whom [illegible] had called the moderates and have fought an successful defeat for an idea and [illegible] over Napoleon himself, who thought he had aided the Italian cause, had no intention, as is evident from his brochure "Napoleon III. et l'Italie," and from the terms of the Treaty of Zurich, of allowing Italy to become anything but [illegible] federation. But the victory was [illegible] the King, who had conquered himself [illegible] tradition and his prejudices, and had [illegible] his daughter and his birthland for Italy, and of Cavour, who by the sheer force of his genius had compelled Europe to recognize a new international principle based on the affinities of peoples, and had inaugurated not only a new Æsina for Italy, but also a new public law for Europe.

How has Italy used her independence? This, also, is a question to which we expect a response in a work portraying the history of Europe in the nineteenth century. A chapter is allotted to the reply, the purport of which, however, is condensed in a couple of paragraphs on pages 404-5. It is admitted that, at the close of 1897, the year with which the period covered by this narrative ends, Italy was immersed in difficulties, and many of the obstacles to her progress seemed almost insuperable. She was burdened with a heavy debt, which, notwithstanding the fact that taxation was excessive, tended to increase rather than diminish. Moreover, the people, agricultural rather than industrial, frugal but not thrifty, patient but not persistent, and taxed out of all proportion to the productive capacity of the country they inhabited, were fast becoming Republicans and Socialists, less from conviction than from discontent and despair. "The heavy expenditure which was the cause of the evil had been due not to the ordinary cost of administration, but to the subsidizing of railway systems, extravagance in the civil service, more or less dishonesty in the awarding of contracts and in greatest part to the enormous armaments and expensive colonial expeditions which the Italian Government had felt bound to support. Both the Government and the people had seen the wisdom of abandoning an aggressive colonial programme, but the nation, proud of its past, and unwilling to renounce its ambition to figure as a great Power and enter upon a period of recuperation which was the only means whereby an economical and financial equilibrium could be obtained, upheld its Ministers in their policy of supporting an expensive army and navy, in spite of the fact that the country, poorly supplied by nature with the sources of wealth, could ill afford the expense of maintaining a prominent international position, and that the attempt to do so was leading to emigration on one side and to well-organized socialistic insurrection on the other."

At the same time, Prof. Andrews does by no means regard Italy's situation as hopeless or discouraging. "Italy had been called upon in the short space of a generation to do what other States had taken centuries to complete, and it is scarcely surprising that in all respects she had not succeeded. To have gained territorial, administrative and legal unity, to have built railway lines and telegraphs, to have raised the standard of education, improved the sanitary condition of the cities, and brought peace and protection to her people, such a result was encouraging for the present and promising for the future. Should she be able to find a modus vivendi with Europe that would admit of a reduction of armaments and the lightening of the weight of taxation, and to arrive at some understanding with the Church that would bring the clergy and the loyal Catholics to her support and prevent them from allying themselves with her enemies, the Socialists and Republicans, she certainly would have no difficulty, as past events had shown, in maintaining her position as a strong and independent constitutional monarchy."

VI.

An account of the process by which the unity of Germany was to a large extent attained will be found in the fifth and sixth chapters of the second part of the book before us. In the tenth chapter is outlined the subsequent course of events in the new empire. Here due stress is laid upon the fact that the Federal State created in 1871 bore indelible marks of the conditions from which it had sprung and the circumstances that had attended its establishment. The system of universal military service and the achievement of unity by force of arms naturally gave to the new empire a military character, and increased its interest in military affairs. Again, the supremacy of Prussia, both politically and territorially, and the fact that her armies had led the way to victory, that her King had been invested with the imperial office and that her representatives formed a majority in the Reichstag, or Federal House of Representatives, made it inevitable that she should force her methods upon the other constituent States, and that Bismarck, who had controlled her destinies since 1862, and become both President of the Prussian Ministry and Chancellor of the Empire, should be the device and enforcer of the new policy. The history of the twenty-seven years following 1870 was to be characterized, first, by the personal supremacy of Bismarck, and then (after 1890), by that of the Emperor William II.; the form of Government, though constitutional, and in the main liberal, was not to be parliamentary, for the people, though sharing in the Government, were to have but an indirect and negative influence on its policy; political tendencies were to be, on the whole, in the direction of monarchical and paternal government liberally conducted, and away from the line of development marked out by the national movement of 1848 and the national association of 1859. As far as political events were to show, there was to be but little progress in Germany toward the attainment of the political ideals of the French Revolution; the forces of conservatism and reaction were too great, the spirit and opinions of the people of the Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western sections were too diverse, the class divisions were too deep-seated and the victory of Prussia was too complete to make possible

James Martineau.

SHORT NOTICE.

The book entitled James Martineau, by J. W. Jackson. Little, Brown & Co., is not merely a biography, it is also an exposition of the subject's religious and philosophic teaching. It presents, moreover, an independent discussion of the themes selected for treatment, the biographer, although a disciple, not always accepting his master's conclusions. We shall here confine ourselves to that part of the work which deals with Dr. Martineau's life and character, yet we would note one interesting fact brought out in the introductory chapter. It seems that, on the Messianic question, the biographer was, for a time, inclined to dissent from his master's views. Dr. Martineau's contention that Jesus did not claim to be the Messiah seemed to Mr. Jackson for a while incredible. He tells us, however, that, collating the synoptic texts which bear upon the problem, he soon found that his own affirmative position was not devoid of difficulties, and at length, meditating the declaration made at Cæsarea Philippi, the general truthfulness of Dr. Martineau's theory was irresistibly borne in upon him. We add that the biographer concurs in Dr. Martineau's opinion that the same person could not have written the Fourth Gospel and the Apocalypse, and, moreover, that neither the Apostle John, nor, indeed, any Jew was the author of the Fourth Gospel. Dr. Martineau believed that, by the latter work, we are transported into the age of Marcion and the anti-Jewish Gnostics, whose Christianity was not a development, but a defiance of the Israelite religion.

The great Unitarian theologian and philosopher was the descendant of a victim of the Edict of Nantes, a certain Gaston Martineau, who, after his arrival in England married Marie Pierre, also a refugee. They settled in Norwich, where their descendants, for some generations remained. Their third son, David, adopted the medical profession. The son of the last named, who bore the same name, also became a surgeon. So did the second David's eldest son, Philip Meadows Martineau. Of the latter's seven children the youngest, Thomas, became the father of the subject of this biography. Thomas Martineau, after marrying Elizabeth Rankin of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, settled in his ancestral Norwich and engaged in the manufacture of bombazine. Of his eight children, the sixth was Harriet, born in 1802, and the seventh was James, born April 21, 1805. James was not only the most distinguished of the family, but for many years he was the sole survivor. His death, indeed, did not occur until Jan. 11, 1900, when he was but a little less than 95 years old.

Of James Martineau's early home life we have but scanty details. The religious discipline of the family was probably graver than is now to be enforced in Nonconformist households nowadays. The traditions of Puritan ancestry had not then had time to relax their hold; they enjoined compulsory Bible readings and severely decorous Sabbaths. It is certain, however, that in the bias of religious opinion the family had departed widely from the Calvinistic standard of its Huguenot ancestors, indeed, it represented the liberalism of the day. The church to which it adhered stood for English Presbyterianism, the root whence English Unitarianism sprang. A cardinal principle of the English Presbyterians was the requirement of no creed; on the contrary, they adopted for their rule the maxim of Chillingworth: "To the Bible, and the Bible only, the Christian shall subscribe." Outside of his home young Martineau's surroundings were by no means unfavorable. Norwich was, of course, no Athens, yet in the early part of the nineteenth century it had considerable intellectual life. Indeed, the Norwich of that day might have filled an alcove of a public library with the works of its native or adopted authors. Lord Houghton said of Norwich not many years ago: "I know of no provincial city adorned with so many illustrious names in literature, the professions and public life." Among the useful institutions of the city is a grammar school founded in the fourteenth century.

To this school James Martineau was sent from his ninth to his fifteenth year as a day scholar. Here he made rapid progress in classical studies, and also learned the French language. From the Norwich Grammar School young Martineau proceeded to a boarding school at Bristol, kept by Dr. Lant Carpenter, who was a scholar of distinction in his day. Here he remained but two years, for his father had decided that he was to be an engineer, and accordingly he was sent to Derby to learn his profession. A twelve-month later, however, James announced his desire to become a minister, and his father, though disappointed, offered to bear the expense of the needful education. It is well known that at the time when young Martineau determined to enter upon the training preparatory to the ministry the great historic universities of England were closed to such as would not sign the Thirty-nine Articles. The college chosen was the Manchester College, then located at York, subsequently moved back to Manchester, and ultimately established at Oxford. The course was five years, the first three of which were devoted to studies of a general character, the last two to theology. Hebrew was taken throughout the course. At the end of five years James Martineau stepped forth into life with thoroughly disciplined faculties, together with a store of mathematical and physical science, of classical languages and literatures, of history, logic, philosophy and theology, that gave him ample equipment for his chosen career.

In 1827 James Martineau, then 22, was settled to preach, but did not at once entered upon the ministry. For a year he was tutor in the Manchester College, then transferred to Dublin, where he preached for the Presbyterians. Then he was ordained, but only worked for a little while among the Presbyterians, Unitarians and Episcopalians. Finally he became a Unitarian minister, and was settled over the Paradise Street Chapel in Liverpool. His salary there was scarcely equal to his needs, and he not only took pupils to eke out a scanty living, but began to exercise his hand as a literary. In those days he was a follower of James Mill and Bentham, and accordingly, championed the doctrines of necessity and utility, which he was later to repudiate. Mr. Grundy dying in 1835, Mr. Martineau became sole pastor. In the following year appeared his first original book, The Rationale of Religious Inquiry, a thin volume, little larger than Emerson's "Nature," and, like that, a revelation of original power. The book won immediate recognition, and in sixteen years reached a fourth edition. It was characterized by great polemical dexterity, but also by a fearless and invincible candor. It contained the following noble testimonial to the Roman Catholic Church, at whose dogma of infallibility he was to deal a trenchant blow: "It deserves to be placed side by side with the well-known words of Macaulay on the same subject: "Long and far was the church the sole vehicle of Christianity, that bare it on over the storms of ages, and sheltered it amid the clash of nations. It evangelized the philosophy of the East, and gave some sobriety to its wild and voluptuous dreams. It received into its bosom the savage conquerors of the North, and nursed them successively out of utter barbarism. It stood by the desert fountain, from which all modern history flows, and dropped into it the sweetening branch of Christian truth and peace. It presided at the birth of art, and liberally gave its traditions into the young hands of Color and Design. Traces of its labors, and of its versatile power over the human mind, are scattered throughout the globe. It has consecrated the memory of the lost cities of Africa, and given to Carthage a Christian, as well as a classic, renown. If in Italy and Spain it has dictated the decrees of tyranny, the mountains of Switzerland have heard its vespers mingling with the cry of liberty, and its requiem sung over patriot graves. The convulsions of Asiatic history have failed to overthrow it on the heights of Lebanon, on the plains of Armenia, in the provinces of China, either in the seclusion of the convent, or the stir of population, the names of Jesus and of Mary still ascend. It is not difficult to understand the enthusiasm which this ancient and picturesque religion kindles in its disciples. To the poor peasant who knows no other dignity it must be a proud thing to feel himself a member of a vast community, that spreads from Andes to the Indus; that has bid defiance to the vicissitudes of fifteen centuries and adorned itself with the genius and virtues of them all; that beheld the transition from ancient to modern civilization, and itself forms the connecting link between the Old World in Europe and the new; the missionary of the nations, the associate of history, the patron of art, the vanquisher of the sword."

In 1839 an event took place which brought Mr. Martineau into a good deal of prominence. This was the so-called Liverpool Controversy. In January of the year named there appeared in print an invitation "to all who call themselves Unitarians in the town and neighborhood of Liverpool," to attend a course of lectures in which the errors of Unitarianism were to be exposed. It was signed by a Mr. Ould, an Anglican clergyman, and at the same time there was published a syllabus of a course of lectures, thirteen in number, to be given by thirteen clergymen of the Church of England. The subjects were to traverse the entire line of difference between Unitarian and orthodox faith. Not long afterward there appeared an invitation "to the Trinitarians of this town and neighborhood who may feel interested in the approaching Unitarian controversy." Ultimately the lectures on both sides were published, thirteen against thirteen. Of the lectures on the Unitarian side Mr. Martineau wrote five, John Hamilton Thom and Henry Giles four each. Three of Martineau's lectures were reprinted in America, his biographer suggests that of the many who have read and admired them, probably not one has suspected that they came out of the hottest of controversies. With slight touches those lectures might do service as Unitarian tracts even now.

In 1831, while in Dublin, Mr. Martineau had compiled a small collection of "Hymns for Christian Worship." In 1840 he brought out a second and much larger hymn book, entitled "Hymns for the Christian Church and Home." This hymn book was in general use among the Unitarian churches in England until the compiler himself superseded it with another collection. In the same year he was appointed professor of mental and moral philosophy and political economy in Manchester New College, given to that institution, from which he had graduated, after its removal to Manchester. With the college he was to be associated for forty-two years. Now doubly occupied as minister and professor, it is not surprising that during the next five years he did little outside of literary labor. In 1845, however, he contributed to the *Prospective Review* discussions of "Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold," "Church and State," and "Whewell's "Morality." In the following year he sent to the same magazine papers on Whewell's "System of Morality" and Theodore Parker's "Discourses on Matters Pertaining to Religion." In 1851 appeared a second series of "Endeavors After the Christian Life," a selection from his pulpit discourses, a first series had been printed in 1842. About the same time he sent to the *Westminster Review* a paper on "Strauss and Theodore Parker." In the following year readers of the *Prospective Review* met with articles from his pen on "William E. Channing" and "Philosophic Christianity in France." In the same year, memorable for the building of a new chapel for his Liverpool congregation, he enjoyed a period of rest and study in Germany. At Berlin he attended the lectures of Trendelenburg in logic and the history of philosophy. Trendelenburg was an expounder of the Stagirite, and this circumstance brought Mr. Martineau to Greek philosophic studies, the effect of which he describes as a new intellectual birth. He also bestowed a good deal of attention upon German philosophy, and his friend, R. H. Hutton, tells how, in the depths of German winter, they two toiled in a frolic chase after Hegel's "P